Royals Report Card 2011: Part Eight.

Alright, we’re into the lightning round. Let’s do this fast.

Louis Coleman: B+

The Royals drafted Coleman in the fifth round of the 2009 draft, and he was seen as a signability pick – he was a college senior, so he had less leverage to sign. But he was an excellent college pitcher, the ace of the LSU staff and the guy who recorded the final out of the College World Series that year.

Because he didn’t throw that hard and threw from a three-quarters delivery, teams didn’t see him ever succeeding as a starting pitcher in the pros. But the Royals quite sensibly thought that he had the ability to be a situational right-handed reliever at the very least, and when it’s the fifth round, it makes perfect sense to draft a guy who may have a limited ceiling but also is a safe bet to have a major-league role in some capacity.

And that’s exactly what the Royals got. He made it to the majors in less than two seasons, after a minor league career that included a 2.16 ERA in 121 innings, just 76 hits and 31 walks*, and 141 strikeouts.

*: From now on, just assume that “walks” means “unintentional walks” in my writing. I’m tired of writing out the qualifier, but I think it’s silly to lump the two together.

Coleman was the first callup of last season, after he had whiffed 16 of the 30 batters he faced in Triple-A, and had a very good year: 2.87 ERA in 60 innings, 44 hits, 20 walks, 64 Ks. His fastball is a little straight, leading to nine home runs, and he not surprisingly had a big platoon split: right-handed hitters hit .180/.260/.360, while LHB hit .257/.371/.432. (Although that OBP against LHP is larded with six intentional walks in just 74 at-bats.) But let’s be honest: he would have been the best pitcher in the Royals bullpen in most years between 1996 and 2006.

And now, he’s back in Omaha, because the Royals felt he wasn’t one of their four best right-handed relievers. You could quibble with the decision to keep Everett Teaford ahead of him, but the Royals do need at least one reliever who can go 2 or 3 innings at a time, and Coleman isn’t that guy. This is a deep bullpen.

The gambit to take Coleman in the middle rounds of the draft worked so well that the following year, the Royals did the same thing, using their fourth round pick on a senior college left-hander out of Florida. Kevin Chapman may well turn out to be an even more useful bullpen piece than Coleman, but he’ll be doing so in Houston.

Tim Collins: C

The biggest compliment I can give Collins is that while he started last season as a bit of a freak show – hey, everyone, come see the “5-foot-7” pitcher! He looks like the batboy! – by the end of the year, what I was hearing about Collins were complaints from fans that he walked too many guys, and even some doubts about whether he was all that he was hyped to be. In other words, he was being treated like every other pitcher, height be damned. That’s a victory in itself.

No question, Collins’ control needs refinement. He walked 46 batters in 67 innings, or 6.2 per 9 innings. The only pitcher in the majors last year (min: 50 IP) with a higher walk rate was Aroldis Chapman.

But when I watched Collins pitch last year, I didn’t get the vibe that he couldn’t throw strikes, the way Mitch Williams, to name another 21-year-old left-handed rookie who walked a ton of batters, did. I got the vibe that Collins simply chose to work the edges of the strike zone, and was willing to walk a batter rather than give him something good to hit. It seemed to me like he wasn’t walking a lot of guys on four or five pitches, but that he was getting to 3-and-2 on everyone, and then daring them to take a pitch.

Of course, perception doesn’t always fit reality. But the data is suggestive.

While Collins had the second-highest rate of walks per nine innings, he had the tenth-lowest percentage of pitches that were strikes, at 59%. Kyle Drabek, at 55%, was the wildest pitcher in the majors by this metric, but other guys who threw fewer strikes than Collins included Francisco Liriano and Trevor Cahill.

Of the 295 batters Collins faced, 60 of them – over 20% - reached a full count. Of those 60 batters, nine struck out – but 26 walked, more than half the walks Collins surrendered.

I don’t have the data mining skills to know how those numbers compared to a typical pitcher. But I can compare him to Chapman, who faced 207 batters, and only 33 reached a full count. (17 walked, 8 struck out.) I looked at two other wild hurlers, Henry Rodriguez and Carlos Marmol. Rodriguez reached a full count on 60 of 295 batters; Marmol did so on 58 of 327 batters.

Not counting intentional walks, Chapman walked a batter on four pitches 9 times. Marmol did as well. Rodriguez did so 12 times. Collins only did so 7 times.

The sample size is small, and the differences may well be meaningless. But I’m glad to see that the data is at least suggestive that my theory makes sense. If Collins’ high walk rate was partly a matter of choice, it would seem to be an easier problem to fix than if it was a matter of him simply not being able to find the plate.

Mind you, there are other, more fundamental reasons to think his walk rate will improve this year. He was just 21 last year, and a rookie, and young pitchers tend to improve their command more than any other skill as they reach their mid-20s. While he was wild in the minors, it wasn’t nearly to this degree – he walked 94 batters in 223 innings, or 3.79 per nine.

It’s possible Collins takes the Mitch Williams path and never learns to harness his command. But I’m optimistic he goes more the Scott Radinsky route. Radinsky was a 22-year-old left-handed fireballer who walked 35 batters in 52 innings as a rookie. The following year he walked just 21 batters in 71 innings, and was one of the best left-handed relievers in the majors. Despite a shoulder injury that cost him the 1994 season, Radinsky still had an ERA under 3 five times in an eight-year span before his career petered out.

Aaron Crow: B+

I mean, sure, Crow was coming off a season in which he managed a 5.73 ERA in 163 innings split between A-ball and Double-A, so yeah, I’d have to say he exceeded expectations. He made the All-Star Team as a rookie; when he was selected he had a 1.36 ERA in 40 innings, having allowed just 26 hits and 15 walks with 39 strikeouts.

In his very next outing, he allowed 3 runs in 1.2 innings and blew a 4-2 lead in the eighth inning on July 4th. From that point until the end of the season, Crow threw just 22 innings, allowed 29 hits and 14 walks, with a 5.24 ERA. He missed several weeks with a sore shoulder.

Still, it was a successful year overall, and if the goal was to give Crow a year to acclimate himself to the majors by pitching in the bullpen, allowing him to gain confidence in getting hitters out by airing out his fastball and concentrating solely on his fastball and slider, with the intention to then move him to the rotation – you know, the way teams used to break in promising young arms – it would have been a great stepping-stone year.

But that’s not how it works anymore, unfortunately. Teams have placed such an emphasis on their bullpen – even as we know that it’s much easier to find quality relievers than quality starters – that they’re afraid to mess with success. They can’t risk losing 70 good innings, even if it might one day lead to getting 200 good innings. The Royals officially moved Crow back into the pen after Joakim Soria’s injury, but the odds were always slim that he was going to be in the rotation this year. And the Royals have already made noises about how Crow, having thrown only 62 innings last year, would have to be gently moved back to a starting role by stretching out his arm.

I’ve tried to be polite about this in the past, but it hasn’t worked, so pardon me for being more explicit: THE VERDUCCI EFFECT IS BULLSHIT. There is NO NO NO evidence that a pitcher who exceeds his previous year’s innings total by 30, or 40, or even 200, is more likely to get hurt than a pitcher who doesn’t. Yes, if you take a list of young pitchers who exceeded their innings total, some of them will get hurt the following year, and some will see their performance erode. But young pitchers get hurt. And young pitchers who exceeded their innings total probably did so because they were pitching better than they have before. When those pitchers decline the following year, that’s not the Verducci Effect: that’s regression to the mean. Every serious statistical study that has looked at this concept has come to the same conclusion: there is no magic threshold of innings increase that a young pitcher should not cross.

Aaron Crow threw 163 innings in 2010. That’s actually an incredibly high total for a minor-league pitcher in today’s era. I don’t have the time to check, but I’d wager that’s the most innings thrown by a Royals’ farmhand in the last five years. But you’re trying to tell me that because he threw only 62 innings last year, now Crow is suddenly incapable of throwing more than 100 or 130 innings this year? Please.

The injury concern I have with young pitchers is more general: they shouldn’t throw too many pitches in any given start. Thankfully, the baseball industry has completely overhauled their approach to pitch counts in the last 20 years, to the point where that hardly is a concern at all.

The evidence that we do have, dating back to Craig Wright’s book The Diamond Appraised, is that the concern with pitchers is primarily before the age of 25. You can’t find a 20-year-old pitcher who threw 250 innings in the live-ball era that didn’t live to regret it. You’ll only find a few 22-year-old pitchers who did the same. But once a pitcher turns 25, you can ramp up the pitches and the innings a little.

Aaron Crow turned 25 this winter. I think he can handle the workload. When Nolan Ryan turned 25 years old, he threw 284 innings, and he did just fine, in large part because he threw relatively few innings before he turned 25. The year before, he threw just 152 innings. That’s a 132-inning bump in one year. Verducci Effect, my ass.

Sorry, Tom. You’re a great writer. But you’re not an analyst, and you really need to stop promoting this debunked concept.

Anyway, the sad thing about the Royals and Crow is that they’re hardly out of step with the industry on this one. Look at how the Yankees screwed up Joba Chamberlain, or how the Reds are doing their best to screw up Aroldis Chapman. Or look at the Astros, who have taken Brett Myers – who has averaged 220 innings with an above-average ERA the last two years! – and made him their closer. That’s right, because there’s nothing the worst team in baseball needs more than a closer.

At least the Rangers, after using Neftali Feliz as their closer for the past two years, are finally willing to gamble that he can render more value throwing 180-200 innings than throwing 60-70. The Rangers, of course, take their cues from Nolan Ryan.

I have no idea if Crow can succeed as a starter; some scouts whose opinions I respect very much don’t think he can. But don’t you have to find out? Especially when you already have a phenomenally deep bullpen, and a rotation that most consider among the worst in baseball? Maybe the Royals are taking the Feliz route with Crow, and have every intention of moving him back to the rotation soon. But if the Royals aren’t willing to do so now, you have to wonder if they ever will.

Kelvin Herrera: A

A year ago, Herrera was full of promise, and completely devoid of health. He was talented enough that he reached a full-season minor league at the age of 18, making three appearances for the Burlington Bees in 2008 (and pitching well.) He then pitched in a total of nine games in 2009 and 2010 combined. He slipped onto the back end of Baseball America’s Prospect Handbook, ranking 30th in the Royals’ system this time last year.

An oft-injured starting pitcher can make for an often-healthy reliever, and that’s what we saw from Herrera last year. He jumped three levels in one season, from high-A to Double-A to Triple-A to the majors. In 68 minor league innings, he allowed 42 hits, walked 13, and struck out 70. Those of you who saw him pitch on TV a couple of days ago saw why – in addition to throwing a high-90s fastball, Herrera throws a changeup that’s almost unfair.

A lot of prospect experts – I’m thinking of Kevin Goldstein here, although it holds true for almost all of them – hate using comps for prospects. Every player is unique, and comparing a prospect to a major-leaguer is inaccurate and usually overly optimistic. I get their concerns, but personally, I love comps, because it makes my life easier. It’s hard to keep track of literally thousands of different ballplayers from the majors down to rookie ball. Maybe it’s not entirely accurate to say that Eric Hosmer resembles Will Clark – but it’s accurate enough, and it conveys a skill set much more succinctly than to say “Hosmer is a left-handed hitting, slick-fielding first baseman with the ability to challenge for a batting title, hit 30+ home runs, and even steal a few bases.”

Anyway, for the past six months or so I’ve been using one particular comp for Herrera: Rafael (not Yuniesky) Betancourt.

They’re obviously not identical – Betancourt actually started his career as a middle infielder, didn’t convert to pitching until he was 22, blew out his arm and missed most of three seasons, and didn’t reach the majors until he was 28. But the similarities are real:

- Both throw upper-90s heat

- Both throw excellent changeups

- Both have outstanding control

- Neither throws a good breaking ball

Betancourt’s control is beyond outstanding, actually. In 560 career innings, he has 99 walks (unintentional, again). When Herrera hit the very first batter he faced in the major leagues, he equaled Betancourt’s career total – Betancourt has hit one batter in his nine-year career. From 2005 to 2009, he threw two wild pitches – total.

Betancourt has never been entrusted to be a closer – at least until this year, when the Rockies finally acknowledged the fine work he’s done over the last decade. (He throws so many strikes that he’s susceptible to the homer, having allowed 59 in 560 innings, which might have held him back.) But he has a 3.18 career ERA, including a 3.00 ERA since joining the Rockies in 2009. With the exception of one awful season (2008), he’s alternated between being good and being very good from year to year. I argued at the time that his 2007 season was the best season by a middle reliever ever.

The arc of Betancourt’s career, as a pitcher who hasn’t quite been good enough to be an elite closer, but certainly good enough to be an elite set-up man, seems like a reasonable expectation for Herrera. That will play.

Greg Holland: A+

The best grade for 2011 goes to the guy who didn’t even make the Royals’ Top 30 Prospects list, a guy I ranked behind Blake Wood before the season began, a guy who started the year in Triple-A, then came up in mid-May and had, inning for inning, one of the most dominant relief seasons in the franchise’s history. His 11.10 Ks per 9 innings ranked second in team history (min: 50 IP), behind Soria’s 2009. His 5.55 hits per 9 innings ranked third, behind Soria’s 2008 and Robinson Tejeda’s 2009. (I love how two different Soria seasons rank ahead of him.) Holland’s WHIP of 0.933 ranks fourth, behind Soria’s 2008, Roger Nelson’s 1972, and Dan Quisenberry’s 1983.

Not only did Holland have a 1.80 ERA, he allowed only 2 of 33 inherited baserunners to score, which lowered his teammates’ ERA by a considerable amount. While acknowledging that relievers are fickle and he could turn into a pumpkin as quickly as he busted out of one, he’s pretty clearly the best reliever on the roster at this moment.

Which is why I’m pleased that Ned Yost just announced Jonathan Broxton will be the closer.

While the closer is an important role, so is the role of the guy who comes in with the game tied, or who comes in with men on base and the game on the line. If Holland had been named the closer, he wouldn’t have seen 33 inherited runners – he might not have seen five all year. Let Broxton take the glory role, particularly since he’ll be a free agent at year’s end. If Holland were named the closer, all those saves would just increase his salary come arbitration time in two years. Furthermore, if Soria does come back, it will make for a lot less drama if the guy who kept his closer’s spot warm was on his way out the door anyway.

Jeremy Jeffress: D

The stuff is still there. Jeffress still throws 100, and his curveball still buckles hitters’ knees and flutters scouts’ hearts. Pitching in the Arizona Fall League All-Star Game, Jeffress came in and struck out the side – including two players named Bryce Harper and Derek Norris.

He was only pitching in the AFL because he couldn’t throw enough strikes to stay in the majors after breaking with the team on Opening Day. After walking 11 in 15 innings, he went to the minors and walked 40 more in 56 innings, with just 44 strikeouts – necessitating a demotion all the way to Double-A. (He also got arrested – though the charges were later dropped – on a domestic assault charge this winter. Idiot.)

The stuff is still there, and I certainly wouldn’t dismiss the chance that the light bulb goes on at some point and he becomes an elite reliever overnight. But for now, I’d treat Jeffress as a lottery ticket. Maybe you cash in at some point, but for now you just stuff him in your wallet and check back later.

Joakim Soria: D+

I’ve already said everything I need to say about Soria. If he never throws another pitch for the Royals, I’d still put him in the team’s Hall of Fame whenever he becomes eligible. By bWAR, Soria’s first four seasons were all better than Holland’s 2011, and all rank among the 15 best relief seasons in team history.

Robinson Tejeda: F

Listed more as a cautionary tale than anything else. Tejeda was claimed off of waivers from the Rangers in 2008, and for the next two-and-a-half seasons was a very valuable reliever – valuable enough to start seven times, and do well in that role. In 174 innings, he allowed just 120 hits. He walked 92, but struck out 184, and allowed only 12 home runs and a 3.47 ERA. He was great.

In 2011, he started the season with no velocity on his fastball, was disabled after 7.1 ineffective innings, and when his velocity didn’t come all the way back, he was placed on waivers. No team was willing to pick up his modest $1.55 million salary, so he toiled the rest of the year in Omaha, finished with a 3.80 ERA and decent peripherals there, and signed a minor-league deal with the Indians this winter.

With relievers, it’s easy come, easy go. The Royals may have a great bullpen today, but it could fall apart in a hurry. And with as many arms as they have, they’d be fools not to trade one or more of them while their stock is still high.

Blake Wood: B

He wasn’t exactly good last season, but Wood was certainly adequate, and that was more than I expected from him. He was drafted as a starter in the third round in 2006, the transitional draft when Dayton Moore had been hired when no one was in control, the draft that gave us Luke Hochevar as a #1 pick and the execrable Jason Taylor in the second round. Wood looked like a blown pick himself, as a starter who simply didn’t have the command to get guys out. But he started 2010 in the bullpen, his velocity ticked up, and he showed at least a glimmer of hope.

Then last season, in 70 innings, he allowed 66 hits, walked 25, and struck out 62, with a 3.75 ERA. If that’s your eighth-inning guy, you have problems. But at this point, even if he were healthy he would be the last guy in the Royals’ bullpen at best. I don’t think he’s got more upside than what he showed last year – his fastball is too straight to fool batters more often than he did. And I don’t see where he fits on this team even after his elbow heals up.

But he’s 26 years old, he’s not arbitration-eligible until next year, and he’s five years from free agency. There are probably a few teams out there that would be happy to have a guy like Wood on their roster. Holding on to him is kind of pointless, and I’d be happy to see him traded away for some magic beans that may or may not sprout in a few years. If not Wood, then someone.

The Royals have a wealth of relief talent, but it’s not going to do you any good in Triple-A, and it’s likely to evaporate soon enough, so best to extract as much value out of it now as possible. Moore has shown an admirable ability to build bullpens on the cheap in Kansas City – his one big failure was the year he actually decided to throw money at the problem. If you’ve got that ability, you ought to be aggressive in cashing those guys in at their peak, knowing you have the resources to replace them soon enough.

Dominated.

(The Royals open their season in less than 72 hours, and I’ve got contracts to review, spring training decisions to cover, last year’s report card to finish, and who knows what else. I’ll do my best to get through them all, but I may not be as thorough as usual. Which is probably a good thing.)

Lee Judge, who when he isn’t making fun of sabermetrics actually does a good job of covering the Royals from an inside perspective, had a story about Alex Gordon last week. Gordon had taken a bite of a cupcake.

This was apparently big news within the Royals’ clubhouse. Gordon does not eat cupcakes. He does not eat pizza. He presumably does not eat anything that might be construed as the slightest bit unhealthy.

It’s a silly anecdote, a throw-away one-liner about what happens inside the clubhouse. But when I read that anecdote, the first thing that crossed my mind was, “Damn, the Royals have to get him signed.”

They did. And suddenly, this doesn’t look like the spring training from hell anymore.

Dayton Moore can keep screwing up the little things as long as he keeps getting the big things right. Yes, I’m annoyed that Johnny Giavotella is in Omaha while Chris Getz and Yuniesky Betancourt platoon at second base. But if, two weeks ago, you had told me that Giavotella would get optioned, but that Gordon would sign a long-term deal before Opening Day, I would have taken that deal in a heartbeat.

Baseball fans outside of Kansas City may not appreciate just how fantastic Gordon was in 2011. He was, in many ways, the quintessential five-tool player, finally showing off the breadth of talents that were on full display in Wichita in 2006. He hit for average (.303) and hit for power (72 extra-base hits, 23 homers) and stole bases (17 for 25) and played defense (a Gold Glove in left field, although Brett Gardner would have been a much better selection) and showed off a cannon arm (a major-league leading, and Royals franchise record, 20 baserunner kills.)

He did important things that don’t fall under the rubric of the Five Tools. He showed patience at the plate, leading the team with 67 walks. He grounded into only 9 double plays all year. According to Baseball-Reference.com, he was worth 5.9 Wins Above Replacement last year. While Gordon got a couple of MVP votes – he finished 21st overall on the ballot – he was actually one of the ten best players in the American League last year.

He probably won’t be that good again this year, and may not be that good again in any year. He doesn’t have to be. Even a regressed Alex Gordon is an above-average left fielder, and even if he regresses Gordon will likely be worth the money he’ll earn.

While I was hoping that the Royals would have been able to get a club option in the deal – or at least avoid a player option – I also expected the dollars to be more. Gordon’s contract replaces his $4.775 million deal for 2012 with a $6 million salary, then $9 million next year, $10 million in 2014, and $12.5 million in 2015. Gordon holds a player option for 2016 at $12.5 million.

(It’s worth noting that a team’s ability to get club options in a long-term deal is directly correlated with how far the player is from free agency. Salvador Perez, six years away from free agency, gave the Royals three option years. Alcides Escobar, four years away, gave them two option years. Last year, Billy Butler (three years away) gave them one option year. Neither Gordon nor Zack Greinke (two years away) gave them any.)

The player option is all downside; if Gordon is as good as we think he is, it won’t be exercised, but if last year proves to be a massive fluke, then the Royals will be saddled with a $12.5 million commitment. But look at it this way: while Gordon got an out clause for the final year, he also signed a 5-year, $50 million contract. For the same number of years, that’s less money than the Royals signed Gil Meche or Mike Sweeney for.

Of course, since Gordon was already signed for 2012, essentially this comes down to a $45.225 million guarantee for the next four years, with an out clause. That makes the deal look a little better for Gordon. But it’s still a good deal for the Royals even if Gordon falls back to earth a little. If he doesn’t, it’s a great one.

The only thing about Gordon’s 2011 that looks a little fishy is his batting average; it’s difficult to hit .300 and strike out 139 times without massive power. Gordon’s batting average on balls in play was .358. While hitters have a lot more control over that stat than pitchers, .358 is on the edge of sustainability. It’s more likely that he was a little lucky last season, and even with his new swing he’s more of a .330 BABIP guy. That would drop his batting average to around .280 or so.

If Gordon hits .280, but with the same amount of power, plate discipline, speed and defense he showed last year, he’s a hell of a player. He’s 28 years old now; he’ll be 32 the year of his player option. Contrary to popular perception, he is not entering his prime – most players peak at age 27, and we likely just saw Gordon’s peak season, when he was 27. But I think it’s likely he’ll perform at a level close to his peak for at least the next 3-4 years.

Gordon fits the profile of a player who is likely to age gracefully almost to a tee. He is a tremendous athlete, and he has both power and speed – players with both skills age better than both plodding sluggers and punch-and-judy speedsters. He takes such phenomenal care of himself that it’s a minor story when he takes a bit from a cupcake.

The one thing in Gordon’s profile that works against him staying productive into his mid-30s is his injury history. But he’s more durable than you’d think from looking at his stat line – he played 18 games in the minors in 2009 and 75 games in 2010. Counting his minor league time, his games played the last five years goes 151, 134, 67, 149, 151. He’s only been on the DL three times in his career, and two of those were fairly minor: a quad strain in 2008 cost him three weeks, and a fractured thumb from an awkward slide into second base in spring training in 2010 cost him the first two weeks of the season.

The only serious injury Gordon has suffered was the torn labrum in his hip he suffered early in 2009, which cost him three months. He recovered from surgery on schedule, and has had no sequelae since. He’s not Cal Ripken, but he’s not exactly Chris Snelling.

I could see Alex Gordon resembling another ex-Royal, in the sense of never having a season quite like last year’s, but still having a long and productive career into his mid-to-late 30s. In 2000, his last season with the Royals, Johnny Damon hit .327/.382/.495, led the league with 46 bases, and was worth 6.6 bWAR. (He was worth 20 runs with his legs alone – at the plate, Gordon had the better season.)

He would never again have a season that good again. But over the next 11 years, Damon was worth an average of 3.2 bWAR a year, and was worth 2.8 bWAR as recently as last year, when he was 37. Damon is amazingly durable – he’s one of the few players in history to have played in 140+ games 16 years in a row. But the two players have similar profiles in terms of how likely they are to age gracefully. Damon’s game was more speed and batting average based, which if anything made him more prone to ups and downs offensively. When Damon hit .327 he was a stud; when he hit .256 the following year in Oakland, he was a cipher with the bat. If Gordon hits .245, in today’s depressed offensive environment, he should still hit with enough power to provide some value.

Whether Gordon is still a valuable player when he’s 36 is sort of irrelevant, because the Royals are only on the hook through his age-32 season. Compare Gordon to Joey Votto and it becomes even more clear how good this deal is. Both players are 28 years old (Votto is five months older than Gordon.) Both signed contracts two years away from free agency. Yet Gordon will make almost exactly half annually what Votto makes with his new deal, and the Royals are committed to Gordon for five years, compared to TWELVE years for Votto. The Royals are out from Gordon’s contract after his age-32 season; the Reds are on the hook for Votto until after his 40th birthday.

Sure, Votto is a better player than Gordon, but THAT much better? Gordon was worth 5.9 bWAR last year; Votto was worth 6.5 bWAR, but in the National League. Of course he has the vastly better track record, and he’s the safer bet going forward, etc, etc. But the Reds made a financial commitment to Votto that is FIVE TIMES what the Royals made to Gordon.

Six weeks ago, there was only one skill we could state, with a fair degree of certainty, that Dayton Moore’s front office possessed: they knew how to identify and develop talent. But with three players signed during spring training to contracts that buy out two years of free agency – I still have to get around to discussing Escobar’s deal – I think we can add a second skill to Moore’s ledger: he has the ability to get those players to commit to the organization long-term.

Yes, there are plenty of things Moore does which drive me nuts, and I’m sure he will continue to drive me nuts at times in the future. But really, if you’re the General Manager for a small-market team, and you could only do two things really well, aren’t these exactly the two things you’d ask for? Acquire amateur talent – when it’s still in your price range – and then sign that talent to contracts which make them fit into your payroll for as long as possible?

It might seem like a no-brainer for the Royals to offer these long-term deals. It might even seem like a no-brainer for Salvador Perez and Escobar and Gordon to sign those deals. But getting a player to commit to your organization isn’t simply a matter of dollars. It’s a matter of building a culture in the clubhouse that makes those players want to stick around. It’s a matter of developing a level of trust with your players, that they trust your ability to build a winning team around them, and that they trust your integrity enough to accept security in exchange for the chance to make more money elsewhere.

In the case of Perez and Escobar, you could argue that with free agency being so far away, and with neither player having earned enough money to be secure on their own, that they would have signed those deals no matter who their GM was. But Gordon was two years away from free agency, and counting the money he was due to earn this year, had earned about $12 million since he was drafted. If he didn’t trust Dayton Moore, he wouldn’t have signed. That he did sign says a lot about how the players feel about their front office.

Unlike the other team at the Truman Sports Complex, the Royals have kept virtually every player they’ve wanted to keep since Moore was hired. The one exception to that would be Zack Greinke, who nonetheless signed the same kind of deal Gordon did – a four-year contract when he was two years away from free agency. (The terms were virtually identical – Greinke got $38 million for four years, Gordon gets $37.5 million plus his option. Greinke’s deal was slightly more back-loaded, earning him $13.5 million each of the last two years.)

Greinke ultimately demanded an out, because he lost the trust in Moore’s ability to build a contender in Kansas City by the time his contract is up. But I don’t sense that Greinke lost trust in Moore as a person, and if he makes it to free agency next winter, I honestly think he would consider returning to Kansas City if the offer was there. Besides, the Royals got a good return in the trade. Greinke’s departure from the Royals would have occurred after the 2010 season even if he hadn’t signed a long-term deal, but instead of getting two draft picks as compensation, they got their starting shortstop (who himself is now signed through 2017), their starting centerfielder, a lottery ticket reliever, and one of their best pitching prospects.

Aside from Greinke, the Royals have kept everyone they’ve wanted to. You could argue that they shouldn’t have kept the players they wanted to keep (e.g. Bruce Chen), but it’s an impressive trait, given the Royals’ limited financial resources, that they’ve managed to convince every key player they’ve had in the last five years (Gordon, Butler, Soria, Greinke) to commit to the team past the point of free agency.

Signing Gordon has a few other benefits. First, it keeps the lineup from becoming precariously right-handed over the next few years. With Gordon, Eric Hosmer, and Mike Moustakas, barring injury the Royals can depend on having at least three left-handed hitters in their lineup most nights. (They may have five in the lineup on Opening Day, with Chris Getz and Brayan Pena, but Perez will be back soon enough, and if Getz doesn’t lose his job to Giavotella, he’ll lose it to Christian Colon, both of whom bat right-handed.)

As I’ve pointed out before, the Royals’ top hitting prospects almost exclusively bat right-handed. There are 15 hitters in Baseball America’s list of the Royals’ Top 30 Prospects, and twelve of them are right-handed. Clint Robinson (#21) and David Lough (#30) are left-handed, and Daniel Mateo (#28) is a switch-hitter. It’s hard to envision any prospect currently in the system who doesn’t bat right-handed becoming an everyday player for the Royals.

You can survive with three left-handed bats in your lineup. Losing Gordon and replacing him with a right-handed hitter would have crossed the tipping point, I think, where every team brings in their version of Louis Coleman in the late innings to rip through four or five right-handed bats in a row. Now, the Royals don’t have to worry about that possibility for the next four years, by which time they’ll hopefully have scrounged up a left-handed bat or two.

The other benefit to signing Gordon is that he was really the only key player on the roster who was eligible for free agency between now and the end of the 2014 season. Now, the Royals are well-positioned to lose a minimal amount of talent to free agency over the next five years, which means their window to contend should be over multiple seasons. These are the only players on the 40-man roster that have the right to leave as free agents at the end of each season:

2012: Yuniesky Betancourt, Jonathan Broxton, Humberto Quintero, Jonathan Sanchez

2013: Bruce Chen, Jeff Francoeur, Brayan Pena

2014: Chris Getz, Luke Hochevar, Mitch Maier, Jose Mijares, Felipe Paulino, Joakim Soria

In 2014, the only players currently on the roster that might have left would be a pair of backup catchers, a utility infielder, two starting pitchers of questionable worth, and an everyday right fielder – the one position where the Royals have an elite prospect likely to be ready in the next two years.

Before the 2015 season, the Royals might lose Hochevar and Paulino, but 1) they might not be worth keeping at that point anyway, and 2) if they are worth keeping, the Royals have three years to work out an extension.

After the 2015 season, both Gordon and Butler may be free agents, which would hurt. But that’s four years away. The Royals have four full years to build on their current roster before they lose a single one of their core players.

And finally, having signed Perez, Escobar, and Gordon in quick succession, the Royals have now increased the odds that they might get a long-term deal done with Hosmer. Now, “increased” is a relative term. I think the odds are still very slim – but six weeks ago I would have said they were non-existent.

Votto’s contract signals the new world we’re living in, where TV contracts are going through the roof and there’s more money for everyone – but where there’s potentially an even bigger financial gap between the haves and the have-nots. In such a world, if the Royals want to get a deal done with Hosmer, they need to do it now. Not next year: now.

If Hosmer is going to sign a deal, it’s going to be a straight contract, no option years – Scott Boras doesn’t operate like that. Does 8 years, $80 million sound reasonable? Hosmer’s going to make about $1 million over the next two years combined, so that’s basically a 6-year, $79 million deal once Hosmer reaches arbitration. That might sound ridiculous, but if Hosmer is as good as everyone thinks he is, he’ll challenge for $10 million his first year of arbitration, and could easily be at $15 million by 2016. If Hosmer goes year-to-year, he could easily make $50-60 million in his four arbitration years, and then another $50-60 million in his first two free agent years alone.

But $80 million guaranteed today might appeal to him more than the non-guaranteed opportunity to make $100-120 million over the same time frame. At the same time, 8 years/$80 million ought to fit – it’s a tight squeeze, but it will fit – into the Royals’ payroll structure.

Getting Gordon signed, on top of the contracts to Perez and Escobar, was a coup for Dayton Moore. But if those contracts lead to the biggest, boldest signing of them all, well, that would be a true revolution.

Out With The New, In With The Old.

(At 2:07 this morning, my wife gave birth to our fourth daughter, who decided to enter the world two weeks early. Both mother and daughter are doing well, and her three big sisters are handling the commotion as well as can be expected. I will likely be missing from this site for the next few days, but this blog post was almost complete before I was rudely interrupted, so I’ve gone ahead and finished it. I hope you’ll understand if it’s even more rambling, incoherent, and error-riddled than usual.)

Well, this spring training just keeps getting better and better.

And by “better and better”, I mean “worse and worse”.

The Royals came into the spring with, essentially, only three roster decisions. Five of the seven bullpen spots were almost assured: Soria, Broxton, Holland, Coleman, and Mijares. A sixth spot was likely going to the loser of the Luis Mendoza/Felipe Paulino rotation battle. That left one open spot and a half-dozen candidates.

Three of the five rotation spots were guaranteed to Luke Hochevar, Bruce Chen, and Jonathan Sanchez. That left Danny Duffy, Felipe Paulino, and Luis Mendoza fighting for the last two spots.

Eight of the nine lineup slots were set: Salvador Perez (C), Eric Hosmer (1B), Alcides Escobar (SS), Mike Moustakas (3B), Alex Gordon (LF), Lorenzo Cain (CF), Jeff Francoeur (RF), and Billy Butler (DH). Brayan Pena was the backup catcher. Yuniesky Betancourt was the utility infielder. Mitch Maier was the fourth outfielder. Jarrod Dyson was the pinch-runner. The only open roster spot was that of the starting second baseman, a battle between Johnny Giavotella and Chris Getz.

Even when guys started getting hurt, there was clarity in who their replacements would be. Soria’s injury just convinced the Royals to leave Aaron Crow in the bullpen. Perez’s bum knee forced the Royals to make a trade, with Humberto Quintero taking his spot for now, and Jason Bourgeois bumping Dyson off the roster. But 22 of the 25 roster spots were spoken for. It’s a credit to the Royals that they have enough talent that they don’t have a lot of decisions to make on who to keep. The lack of open spots also limits the opportunities the Royals have to screw up those decisions.

But man, they’re trying.

Sunday morning, I saw that the Royals’ lineup that day had Yuniesky Betancourt starting at second base, and I tweeted out, “At this point I’d be stunned if Giavotella makes the Opening Day roster.” Not 15 minutes later, the Royals made it official, optioning Giavotella to Omaha.

And I admit: I lost it a little. Those of you who follow me on Twitter were entertained by the live streaming of a man blowing off some steam, and ripping the Royals for holding back their youth movement on the basis of a tiny and irrelevant spring training sample. And just when I was about done, a follower tried to play the “the professionals know more than you” card, and pretty soon I was recapping every brain-dead Royals decision of the last quarter-century. I mean, seriously, if you want to argue that the people who get paid to run a team know more than a well-educated fan, you’re better off picking just about any other franchise in American sports.

Oh, and in the middle of all that, Felipe Paulino took the mound with a rotation spot on the line and flat-out soiled himself. This did not improve my mood.

Anyway, I’ve finally had a chance to breathe, and reflect, and analyze. And I’m feeling a little better.

But just a little.

The Royals are sending mixed messages as to why, after Chris Getz failed to slug even .290 for the second straight season last year, and after he lost his job to Johnny Giavotella in August, and after Giavotella showed more pop in two months than Getz showed in two years, and after Giavotella came into spring training as the favorite for the starting job, they reversed course this spring.

Is it because of defense? “(Giavotella) needs to continue to focus on his defense,” manager Ned Yost said. “Johnny is a much better defender today than he was at this time last year, but we had two better defensive options in Betancourt and Getz.”

Let’s ignore the fact that Ned used the words “better defensive options” and “Betancourt” in the same sentence. I can almost buy this argument. The knock on Giavotella has always been that he is a below-average defender at second base. Getz isn’t as good as the Royals think he is, but he’s probably average, maybe even slightly above, at second base.

And I’ll grant the Royals this: on days when Getz is at second base, and Quintero is behind the plate, this might be the best defensive squad the Royals have thrown out there in a long, long time. Ignoring the pitcher, the worst defensive player in the Royals’ lineup is probably Moustakas, and he’s only a little below average. Assuming Eric Hosmer’s poor defensive numbers can be corrected with positioning, Moustakas would be the only below-average defender on the field.

In particular, having Quintero (and Perez when he returns) behind the plate, Escobar and Getz at the keystone, and Cain in centerfield makes for very good defense up the middle. Gordon and Francoeur only have average range, but their arms are both significant weapons in the field.

If you believe the numbers that evaluate Asdrubal Cabrera to be a below-average shortstop, instead of the highlight reels that argue the opposite, then as they’re constituted now, the Royals might have the best defense in the AL Central. That is worth something. (Although with the Indians going with Jack Hannahan at third base over Lonnie Chisenhall, that claim is now debatable.)

So okay, Giavotella is going back to Omaha purely to work on his defense, and the Royals will platoon Betancourt and Getz until they’re satisfied with his glove. This is a message they’re sending to Johnny, not an indication they’re satisfied with Getz.

“Like I told Johnny, it wasn’t anything that he did,” Yost said. “It was just that Getz came into camp a totally different player, one that I didn’t expect to see and, quite frankly, I thought Yuni would be serviceable at second base, but I didn’t think he’d be nearly as good at second base as he’s been. So we had to players that showed up that were better options defensively for us.”

Oh, God.

Let’s ignore the fact that Ned used the words “good” and “second base” and “Yuni” in the same sentence. Getz came into camp a totally different player? The Royals have remarked since camp opened that Getz has a new swing, one that allows him to drive the ball for more power. Kevin Seitzer is the Bat Whisperer, so maybe it’s true. Let’s see what Getz has done in Arizona with his new-found swing:

He’s 8-for-31 with seven singles and a double. His slash line is .258/.314/.290.

Mercy me. Someone get to reinforcing the outfield walls pronto.

In the warm, thin air of Arizona, where the ball travels so well that Alcides Escobar hit five homers and slugged .636 last spring, Getz’s retooled swing has his slugging average all the way up to… .290.

“I told Getzy this morning,” Yost said, “that when he showed up to camp, I saw no way for him to make our club. But he came as a totally different offensive player – to his credit.”

PLEASE STOP TALKING.

If I’m parsing these quotes accurately, Getz had no chance to make the club at the beginning of spring training, but thanks to a re-tooled swing that has helped Getz slug .300 – well, not .300, but close! – he’s convinced the Royals to change their minds.

The first rule of Spring Training is not Don’t Talk About Spring Training, but it’s close: Don’t Talk About Spring Training Stats. What happens in Arizona and Florida in March, on rocky fields against wildly varied competition, against pitchers who are working on their own weaknesses instead of trying to exploit yours, is worse than meaningless – it’s downright deceptive.

Do you remember who led the majors in homers last spring training? Jake Fox. He made the Orioles’ roster based on his performance – then hit .188/.250/.396 in 52 plate appearances before he was optioned back to Triple-A on June 1st.

But I guess the Royals are ahead of the game here, because they didn’t give Getz the second base job based on his spring training stats. How could they – his stats suck! They gave him the job based on a new swing that hasn’t even shown results in spring training. Now no one can claim that they were deceived by his spring training performance. Savvy!

Sure, I might be overreacting. This could certainly work out. Maybe the talk about Getz’s new swing is just a smokescreen to cover the fact that this is really all about Giavotella’s defense. Maybe Johnny will be back as soon as May if he shows legitimate improvement with the glove, or if Getz is still slugging in the .200s by then. Maybe the long-term impact of this move is minimal, and I’m getting worked up over nothing.

But that’s a lot of maybe’s, and a lot of if’s. All I know with certainty is that the Royals are convinced that, in the here and now, Chris Getz is a better option at second base than Johnny Giavotella. I think that’s troubling.

It would be one thing if Giavotella were one of the scrapheap leftovers from the previous administration. Then it would be understandable (though still not excusable) that they’d rather go with the Proven Veteran, the way they decided they’d rather trade a reliever for an expensive Mike Jacobs then give Kila Ka’aihue the chance to prove whether they were wrong about him. But Giavotella is a Dayton Moore guy through and through. The Royals used an early second-round pick on him in 2008, even though he was seen by most teams as a third-round talent. He was drafted as an offensive-minded second baseman with a questionable glove, but someone who would be a pest at the plate, hit for a good average, find a way to get on base, and hit a bunch of doubles.

And here’s the thing: Giavotella is exactly the guy the Royals thought they were getting. That’s a tribute to their scouting acumen – they pegged him perfectly. He has turned into exactly the sort of player they hoped he would be.

And, having done so, he’s out of a job. Because of Chris Getz.

So what bothers me here more than the implications on the field is the thought process behind it.  I don’t think they’ll bury Giavotella. I think they legitimately do like him, and want him to be the starting second baseman at some point this year. But the Royals’ lack of faith in their own Process is disturbing. Giavotella has his flaws. But if you don’t think he’s a better second baseman than Chris Getz, either you’re making a mistake now, or you made a mistake when you drafted him.

And then there’s Felipe Paulino, who like Giavotella entered camp as the incumbent, and also entered camp with considerable reason to think that he would be better in 2012 than he was in 2011. In Gio’s case, it’s because of his age and the fact that his hip is now healthy; in Paulino’s case, it’s because of his stuff and the fact that his BABIP is historically high.

Like Giavotella, he hasn’t done anything to warrant losing his job, not because he’s played well in spring training, but because it’s very hard to do ANYTHING in spring training that should cost you your job.

But with Luis Mendoza pitching brilliantly all month long, and after Danny Duffy flashed the best stuff of anyone in his first outing, Paulino’s job was at least in mild jeopardy. After throwing two shutout innings in his first “official” spring training performance, he lost the strike zone in his second outing, allowing four runs in his first inning of work before pitching two more scoreless innings. On March 20th he went four solid innings, allowing one run, striking out four and walking no one.

And then on Sunday, against a Brewers’ lineup that had maybe two players who will start the season in the majors, he was completely awful. He couldn’t get out of the third inning, and allowed six hits, three walks, and five runs in 2.2 innings.

The next day, Mendoza started against the Giants and threw five shutout innings. That lowered his spring ERA to 0.54; in 16.2 innings he has allowed 11 hits, walked three batters, and struck out 16.

I’ll also point out that he leads the Royals with four wins this month, which is of course completely and utterly meaningless, but then so is pretty much ever other stat from spring training. That’s why they call it spring training and not “spring performing” or “spring for-realsies”.

If spring training stats mattered, the Royals would be worried about Bruce Chen’s numbers, which – even after allowing three runs in six innings today – are far worse than Paulino’s: 34 hits and 24 runs allowed in 18 innings. Instead, Ned Yost announced today that Chen will be the Opening Day starter. Which is fine. I would have gone with Hochevar myself, but aside from the fact that the order hardly matters, Chen’s performance in spring training shouldn’t be held against him.

But I am deeply worried that Paulino’s performance will. There is just something about Paulino which rubs his teams the wrong way. The Astros gave him up for Clint Barmes, the Rockies gave him up for nothing. Maybe they just couldn’t see past his BABIP luck, but maybe there’s something else – something that we can’t see from our perch as an educated outsider – that makes Paulino add up to less than the sum of his parts. I don’t know, and I’ll confess that there may be factors in play here that I don’t and can’t understand.

In the abstract, giving up on Paulino ought to hurt the Royals far more than sending Giavotella back to Omaha. But if Paulino gets the shaft in the rotation battle, I’ll probably take it a little better. Partly that’s because, with Paulino out of options, if he isn’t in the rotation he’ll be the long man out of the bullpen.

And partly, it’s because I’ll confess to becoming increasingly curious as to just what the hell Luis Mendoza can do. I’ve already broken down his performance last season here, and my conclusion was that while I would be fine with him in a long relief role this season, that his inability to miss bats, even when he led the PCL in ERA last season, meant that it was very unlikely his success there would translate to being even an average starting pitcher in the majors.

Well, in addition to being the best starting pitcher in camp, Mendoza has also shown the ability to miss bats, having struck out 16 batters in 16.2 innings. Again, it’s spring training, so it’s probably meaningless. However, reader Ed Muller pointed out that Mendoza’s strikeout rate last year, while poor overall (5.1 Ks per 9 innings), improved significantly as last season went on – through June, he had a strikeout rate of 4.11 per nine innings, but from July 1st onwards, he struck out 6.51 per nine.

The basic difference is that, while I don’t think Mendoza has figured things out, there’s at least a chance, as opposed to the odds that Chris Getz has finally discovered the Fountain of Extra-Base Hits. Both players are 28 years old, but Mendoza’s a pitcher, and pitchers don’t follow the aging curve nearly as smoothly as hitters. It’s very rare for a hitter to suddenly figure things out in their late 20s. It happens – hello, Jose Bautista – but it’s rare enough that you have to approach any such claims with skepticism.

But pitchers break out in their late 20s all the time, usually due to a substantial change in their approach, like learning a new pitch. Mike Scott learned a splitter* in 1985, when he was 30; prior to that he was terrible, with a 29-44 career record and a 4.45 ERA in his 20s. (A 4.45 ERA in the early 1980s, pitching in Shea Stadium and in the Astrodome, would be like a 5.45 ERA today.) Then in 1985, he went 18-8 with a 3.29 ERA in 222 innings. In 1986, he led the NL with a 2.22 ERA, struck out 306 batters in 275 innings, had a WHIP of 0.923, won the Cy Young Award, and single-handedly scared the bejeezus out of the 108-win New York Mets in the NLCS.

*: Many people, most prominent among them Orel Hershiser, swear that Scott’s “splitter” was really a “scuffer”. I report, you decide.

Esteban Loaiza was a 31-year-old journeyman going into the 2003 season, with a 69-73 record and a 4.88 ERA (95 ERA+). He then signed with the White Sox, Don Cooper taught him his famed cut fastball, and for one glorious season, Loaiza was one of the game’s best pitchers – 21-9, 2.90 ERA, league-leading 207 Ks in 226 innings, and he finished 2nd in the AL Cy Young Vote.

Ken Hill was only 24 when his transformation occurred, but it was equally dramatic. After a rookie season in 1989 when he led the NL in losses (15) and walks (99), he started the 1990 season with a 5.49 ERA in 79 innings and was optioned to Triple-A. He then learned the split-fingered fastball, and was insanely dominant for Louisville – 85 innings, 47 hits, 27 walks, 104 Ks. He returned to the majors in 1991, with a 3.57 ERA in 181 innings, and was an above-average pitcher for the next six years.

And, of course, just last year Philip Humber learned Cooper’s cutter, and went from Quadruple-A pitcher to one of the White Sox’ best starters. So it’s certainly possible for Mendoza to take a great step forward this year; while he hasn’t learned a new pitch, he completely overhauled his delivery last year, and now throws almost directly overhand, giving his pitches more sink.

I still don’t think it’s likely, because in all those cases above, the improvement went hand-in-hand with a new-found ability to miss bats. Mendoza’s ERA title for Omaha last year was not accompanied by a raft of whiffs. If the uptick in Mendoza’s strikeout rate late last year and this spring is meaningful, the Royals may have something on their hands here. I’m skeptical, but I wouldn’t rule it out completely.

And as I finish writing this, it turns out that most everything I’ve just written is a moot point – the Royals have announced that Paulino will start the year on the DL with a sore elbow, giving Duffy and Mendoza the final two spots in the rotation. Obviously, an injury is concerning, but assuming this isn’t season-threatening, this might even be a good thing in the long term. (It’s being reported as a minor forearm flexor strain, that ought to keep him out for no more than a few weeks.) For one thing, it might explain Paulino’s disappointing performance this spring. It also allows the Royals to give Mendoza a legitimate audition in the majors to put the proof in the pudding.

If Mendoza flames out, then the Royals will have seen what they needed to see, and they can move on from Mendoza without needlessly stunting a more talented pitcher’s career. If he turns out to be for real, well, there are worse things than having six qualified starting pitchers. Particularly since, as we’re seeing with Paulino, the odds that all six are all healthy at the same time is slim. (This, of course, is the reason the Royals’ argument that they didn’t need Edwin Jackson because they already had enough starters was so silly. But that ship has sailed.)

And yes, the timing and nature of Paulino's injury seems a little...convenient. But given his erratic performance this spring, Occam's Razor leads me to give the Royals the benefit of the doubt here.

This has been an awful spring, with more injuries in one month than the Royals had all of last year, and at least one questionable roster decision. Certainly, the shine has been taken off my optimism/blind hope/delusion that the Royals could contend in 2012. I don’t want to minimize the short-term hit the Royals have taken. But in the long-term, the impact of everything that’s happened this month should be contained. For 2013 and beyond, my optimism is unshaken.

You may not want to trust my judgment, though. As a new father, everything looks even rosier than usual.

Joakim Soria, Past & (Maybe) Future.

The elbow injury to Joakim Soria is terribly unfortunate, and possibly career-ending, at least with respect to his career as a member of the Kansas City Royals.

What the injury wasn’t was particularly surprising.

There’s not a ton of analysis to do on Soria’s injury. He blew out his elbow and required Tommy John surgery in 2003, when he was a 19-year-old in the Dodgers organization. The injury caused him to miss all of 2003, and he didn’t pitch in 2004 either, although he was probably in extended spring training much of that time. The Dodgers released him after the season, and he went back to pitching in Mexico in 2005, where he caught the eye of the Padres, he joined their system in 2006 while continuing to pitch in Mexico…and the Royals plucked him in the Rule 5 draft that winter, whereupon Soria, whose stateside experience had peaked with 12 innings in the Midwest League the year before, instantly became one of the best relievers in the American League.

(Quick aside, when I was down in Surprise last month, I was introduced to a group of Royals scouts before a scrimmage. “Rany, have you met Louie Medina?” I was so excited I didn’t even say hi, I just blurted out, “You’re the guy who’s responsible for Joakim Soria!” “Partly,” he responded modestly. “Soria is the guy most responsible for Joakim Soria.”)

While Tommy John surgery has revolutionized the game by allowing pitchers to recover from a major injury at 100%, one of its side benefits is that by giving pitchers a brand-new ligament in their elbow, there’s typically a “honeymoon” period, whereby the new ligament is almost guaranteed to hold up for five years after the surgery. It’s very, very rare for a pitcher to fully recover from Tommy John surgery, only to tear the new ligament within five years.

And right on schedule, Soria’s elbow didn’t give him any problems through 2008…but in 2009, his arm started barking a little, causing him to miss a few weeks an dlimited him to just 47 appearances. (I’m honestly not sure if it was his shoulder, his elbow, or both. The Royals initially denied that he had any injury at all, remember.)

Soria was back in peak Mexicutioner form in 2010, but in 2011, something was wrong from the beginning. By the end of May he had a 6.55 ERA and five blown saves, which was already a career high. Everyone panicked, myself included. It wasn’t simply that Soria was pitching poorly, it was that he wasn’t pitching like himself. His once-unhittable curveball had simply disappeared. He was throwing this weird cutter that he didn’t need and that didn’t work.

The Royals were convinced that there was nothing structurally wrong with Soria, and to their credit, he pitched like vintage Soria from June 1st onward: in 38 innings, he had a 2.58 ERA, struck out 41 batters and walked only seven. On paper, it looked like he was back.

On the mound, it wasn’t as clear. He still rarely threw his curveball – according to Pitch f/x data, here is the frequency with which Soria threw the Guillotine:

2007: 14.1%

2008: 14.2%

2009: 13.0%

2010: 6.8%

2011: 7.1%

It’s a testament to Soria’s command and his fearlessness on the mound that, despite missing his best off-speed pitch, and despite a fastball that averaged only 91, he was still an elite reliever in the second half. But the question as to what happened to Soria’s feel for his curveball remained. So did the question as to whether he could ever get back to his pre-2011 form.

Those questions only intensified when Soria started getting lit up from his first outing in spring training. During that same Royals’ scrimmage, Soria gave up three runs to his teammates – every other Royals pitcher on both teams gave up two runs combined. In three official spring training outings, he gave up 10 hits and 7 runs in 3.1 innings. In a “B” game against a bunch of Rangers minor leaguers, he got torched.

And then his elbow went pop. After seeing three different physicians, Soria finally accepted the inevitable and will undergo Tommy John surgery with Dr. Lewis Yocum on April 3rd. In a perverse way, the fact that Soria needs this surgery might be the best thing possible for his long-term career. Even when he was pitching well in the second half of last season, the magic was gone. The way he was pitching early in spring training had me terrified that he was going to reprise last season again, and that he’d cost the Royals three or four wins early in the season before they tried to adjust.

Instead, we now have good reason to think that Soria’s struggles last year were health-related after all. And there’s good reason to think that with a healthy elbow, he can return to being the Soria of old. My friend Will Carroll assures me that a second TJ surgery, while rare, has the same success rate as the first one. Soria’s previous ligament lasted him eight seasons; there’s no reason to think his next one won’t last just as long.

I can’t fault the Royals or their training staff here – at least not since 2009, when their mishandling of his symptoms was just a small part of the injury cluster that caused me to blow my stack. Whether it’s his relatively slight build, his mechanics, or the strain that his curveball put on his elbow, Soria may simply be prone to this kind of injury. It was probably inevitable that this day would come.

Which, of course, makes the Royals’ repeated refusal to even consider trade offers for him so damning.

I don’t feel like re-hashing the did-the-Yankees-offer-Jesus-Montero-or-not discussion. Clearly they were very interested in Soria, not only because Soria was one of the best closers in baseball, but because Soria was pretty clearly the most Riveraesque closer in baseball. His repertoire was different – there’s only one pitcher in baseball who can throw that cutter – but Soria’s demeanor and unflappability on the mound would have particularly appealed to the Yankees, who saw him as someone who could survive the fishbowl of New York, and be perfectly positioned to succeed Rivera whenever the Greatest Closer of All Time decided to abdicate his throne.

Was Montero formally offered? I have no idea. Was Montero discussed? From media reports, up to and including Jayson Stark’s most recent appearance with Soren Petro, almost certainly. Were the Yankees willing to offer a substantial amount of talent for Soria, Montero or not? Without a doubt. Were other teams interested in Soria? Of course.

Did the Royals screw up by not selling high on Soria? Do I really have to answer that question?

Jesus Montero wouldn’t fit the Royals’ roster at all, but then you see what Montero finally brought back – Michael Pineda – and you try to envision what the Royals’ rotation would like with him at the front of it…

I don’t want to come down too harshly on the Royals. Frankly, while I felt that the Royals should have traded him, I wasn’t nearly as forceful on the issue as I should have been. The reason I didn’t lay the hammer down is the same reason the Royals didn’t trade him: we loved Soria too damn much.

From 1998 to 2006 the Royals had the worst bullpen over a nine-year stretch in major league history. Dayton Moore was hired in 2006, when the Royals’ closer was Ambiorix Burgos, who 1) had a 5.52 ERA, 2) blew a franchise-record 12 saves in 30 opportunities, and 3) was one of the most malignant people ever to wear a Royals’ uniform – in a just world he’d probably be locked up for the rest of his life.

The other relievers in the pen were lefties Jimmy Gobble (5.14 ERA) and Andy Sisco (7.10 ERA), and right-handers Joel Peralta (4.40 ERA) and Elmer Dessens (4.50 ERA). Jeremy Affeldt (5.91 ERA) and Mike Wood (5.71 ERA) made cameos. Todd Wellemeyer, with a 3.63 ERA – despite having as many walks (37) as strikeouts (37) – was the best reliever on the team.

Joakim Soria was taken in the Rule 5 draft after the season, and this obscure kid from Mexico who no one had seen before was dropped into the nuclear wasteland of a bullpen the following April, put on a HAZMAT suit, and started kicking ass and taking names. After recording two outs in a 7-1 game in his major-league debut, Soria was brought in to protect a 3-1 lead in the eighth inning his next time out – he had graduated to being the team’s set-up man after one appearance. He threw a scoreless inning. In his third outing, he got four outs to protect a 2-0 lead in the seventh and eighth, only David Riske gave up three runs in the ninth to lose the game.

In his fourth major-league appearance, Soria was the Royals’ closer. It was six up, six down, three by strikeout. He would give up the closer’s role temporarily when Octavio Dotel came off the DL, but it was returned to him when Dotel was traded in July, and he’s held it ever since.

Soria was the vanguard of a revamped bullpen which included Riske (2.45 ERA) and Zack Greinke (3.54 ERA before returning to the rotation). Even Gobble had a 3.02 ERA. In 2006, the ERA of the Royals’ bullpen was 5.41. In 2007, it was 3.89. Dayton Moore had accomplished a miracle, but even he knew that it was Soria who wielded the staff.

That doesn’t excuse Moore’s decision to hold on to Soria at all costs, but it does explain it. Of all the mistakes a sports organization can make, excessive loyalty to its own players is the most understandable from a human standpoint. Bill Belichick is perhaps the most unsentimental executive in sports; he’s always willing to trade his players at the peak of their ability, if he senses an arbitrage that will make his team better. It’s a philosophy that has carried him to five Super Bowls and three championships.

If the debacle with Soria has any silver lining, it’s that it might teach Moore that a touch of Belichickian unsentimentality is a necessary ingredient to a winning franchise. But just a touch. For all his success, Belichick comes off as a bit of a dick. And personally, I’d rather that the guy running the Royals not be a dick. (That’s what we have the Chiefs for.)

And even Belichick is probably going to stick with Tom Brady when the Golden Boy is 47 years old and can’t throw a spiral more than ten yards.

That’s all spilled milk under the bridge now. (I’ll take “mixed metaphors for $400”, Alex.) The question is what do the Royals do going forward, because the sad reality is that while Tommy John surgery might be the best thing for Soria, it might be the worst thing for the Royals. Soria is already making $6 million this year, and he has an $8 million option for 2013 and an $8.75 million for 2014. Those options are worthless at this point; no one’s going to pay him $8 million in his first year off surgery, when he might miss the first month of the season before he’s ready to pitch.

That means that, for all intents and purposes, Soria is a free agent. But it also means the Royals have the opportunity to re-sign Soria and save money in the process. Both sides have shown loyalty to each other – Soria by signing a team-friendly contract early in his career, the Royals by repeatedly refusing to trade him. There should be a strong relationship here, one that the Royals should make use of by offering Soria a new contract for 2013 right now.

Let’s say the Royals tear up his options for 2013, but sign Soria to a guaranteed contract for, I dunno, between 3 and 4 million for next year. (He’s going to earn $750,000 anyway when the Royals decline the option.) This gives Soria the peace of mind that he’s got a guaranteed contract for next year, and it gives the Royals incentive to fully invest in his recovery from surgery.

Pitchers are generally on the mound 11-12 months after Tommy John surgery, so there’s no reason why Soria can’t be pitching for the Royals on Opening Day or close to it. Stephen Strasburg had surgery on September 3rd, 2010, and returned to the Nationals’ rotation (after three minor-league rehab starts) on September 6th, 2011. Adam Wainwright had surgery on February 28th of last year, and is ready to break camp with the Cardinals this spring. An April 3rd surgery date should put Soria on track to be activated sometime in mid-to-late April next season. Yes, there are risks involved, but about 90% of pitchers return from surgery with undiminished stuff. I think it’s worth the Royals offering him half his salary for the 90% chance that Soria pitches at 90% of his pre-injury talent level for 90% of the season.

(This also would require the Royals to adopt the standard rehab regimen for Soria, as opposed to the incredibly conservative timetable that they have John Lamb on. Lamb hurt his elbow last May, had TJ surgery on June 3rd, but the Royals have said they don’t expect him on a mound until July, that he will make “six to eight legit starts” this year, and that “he may make it as high as High-A this year.” I understand not wanting to push your young starter, but I don’t understand essentially giving up an entire year of development when the industry standard would have him on a mound a month earlier and you might get a half-season’s worth of starts out of him, putting him on course to start in Triple-A next season and be in Kansas City by mid-season.)

Even better for the Royals would be to sign Soria to a one-year deal with an option for a second season – I’m thinking a vesting option with a really low threshold, like 25 appearances or something. Essentially it would be a two-year deal, but it would give the Royals an out in the event his rehab goes really poorly. Just pulling numbers out of the air here, but a $3.5 million contract for 2013, with a $5.5 million vesting option for 2014, might work for both sides. Soria is likely to be better in his second year after surgery than his first, and it would be nice for the Royals to swing a deal that keeps him in a Royals uniform for the next two years, saves the franchise some money, and still pays Soria close to market value for a pitcher returning from a season lost to surgery. (If Soria heads out onto the market, he won't even be the only closer returning from Tommy John surgery - it was announced today that Ryan Madson will be going under the knife and is out for the year as well.)

The best recent comp for Soria would be Joe Nathan, who along with Jonathan Papelbon was Soria’s main competition for the title of “Best Non-Mariano Closer In Baseball”. Nathan had Tommy John surgery on March 25th of 2010. He was back on the Twins’ roster on Opening Day of last year, but it was pretty clear he wasn’t completely ready – on May 24th he went back on the DL with forearm inflammation, having allowed 15 runs in 15.1 innings. He missed a month, but after returning on June 25th he was pretty much the Nathan of old – while he had a 3.38 ERA after returning, in 29 innings he allowed 21 hits, walked 5, and struck out 28. After the season the Rangers were convinced enough that they signed him to a two-year, $14.75 million deal.

So there’s your template – Soria may only be about half as valuable in 2013 as he was at his peak, but he ought to be close to 100% by 2014. Reworking his contract to give him $9 million over the next two years seems a fair deal for both sides. Just today, Soria made it clear he’d like to stay with the Royals, while acknowledging that he won’t be getting $8 million next season to do so:

“I’d like to have the opportunity,” he said, “to sign back here after I become a free agent – if they don’t take the option, which is obvious they won’t take it.

“I just want to get ready as soon as possible to have the chance to pitch on the major-league level again either with this team or another one. I would like to stay here.”

If the Royals are savvy, they’ll take the “after I become a free agent” scenario out of the equation, and get a deal done with Soria a lot sooner than that. The Royals guaranteed Salvador Perez five years and Alcides Escobar four years because they felt that those contracts might save the team money in the long term. The same wisdom applies here.

As to how this affects the bullpen...it is one of the biggest arguments in favor of Dayton Moore as a GM that even with Soria out all year, and even with Blake Wood out for at least the season’s first month, the Royals still have more quality relievers than they have roster spots to accommodate them. The only substantial impact the injury has is that it guarantees Aaron Crow will open the year in the bullpen, but that was likely going to happen either way. Jonathan Broxton, Greg Holland, and Crow are locks, and Jose Mijares seems to have the LOOGY job locked down. Louis Coleman is the ROOGY (Right-handed One Out GuY), the guy who can be used to terrorize a string of right-handed hitters – they hit .180/.250/.360 against him last season – but has the stuff to hang in against lefties as well.

Barring a surprise demotion of Danny Duffy to Omaha, either Luis Mendoza or Felipe Paulino will be the long man, as they’re both out of options. (You know where I stand on that battle. You also know that the Royals are almost guaranteed to make the wrong decision.) That leaves one open spot, for the following candidates, in decreasing order of likelihood:

Tim Collins

Everett Teaford

Kelvin Herrera

Tommy Hottovy

Jeremy Jeffress

That’s quite an extraordinary accomplishment, that even without Soria and Wood, the Royals have no less than 11 pitchers who are worthy of a major-league bullpen spot. (Well, 10 – I’m not sold on Hottovy yet, but his new sidearm motion makes him a potential left-handed specialist if he finds success in Triple-A.) The Royals have seven or eight pitchers who would have been one of their two best relievers in 2006, or 2004, or 2002, or 2000, or 1998.

Emotionally, the loss of Soria hurts. Practically, it may barely be felt at all.

That’s particularly the case of Broxton is back to full health. He has pitched well in limited spring training innings, and he’s running his fastball up into the mid-90s. It seemed a curious decision for the Royals to sign him at the time; they were spending $4 million for a toy they didn’t need, given the strength of the bullpen. It looks like a stroke of genius now, which has led more than one Royals fan to wonder if the team already knew they would be without Soria’s services this season. Given the way Soria finished last year, I doubt that’s the case.

I think this was just another example of Moore being unable to resist a young veteran talent available on the cheap. I can’t say I blame him: Broxton is 27, the same age Jeff Francoeur was when the Royals signed him, and just a year older than Melky Cabrera was. Like Francoeur and Cabrera, Broxton is coming off a couple of poor seasons, but with reason to think he may improve – in Broxton’s case, it’s because the downturn in his performance can be traced to a 48-pitch outing in July of 2010, and that persisted until he was shut down last year to have bone spurs removed from his elbow. Broxton was a good bounce-back candidate regardless; with Soria out, his value to the Royals intensifies.

I’ve been asked by Royals fans – and by more than a few fantasy baseball players – who I think will replace Soria in the closer’s role. While Greg Holland is clearly the team’s best reliever based on performances last year, I would actually give Broxton the first crack at the job myself, and I think the Royals will decide the same thing in the next week or so.

For one thing, given the straitjacket that is put on closers in today’s game, it’s not entirely clear that you want your best reliever to close anyway. You don’t want a Burgos or a Ricky Bottalico in that role, but if you have two relievers, one of whom is capable of a 2.00 ERA and the other is capable of a 3.00 ERA, I’d probably prefer the latter in the closer’s role. That role involves an awful lot of two-run and three-run leads, and almost always requires no more than three outs of work. Let Broxton take the glory role, and let Holland do the heavy lifting, coming into tie games and coming in with men on base and staying in to pitch multiple innings.

Last season, Holland made 46 appearances with the Royals, and in 21 of them he was brought in with men on base. In 20 of them, he recorded four outs or more. Nine times he pitched at least two full innings. You won’t see that kind of usage if he’s in the closer’s role, which would be a shame.

There are ancillary benefits to making Broxton the closer. Broxton’s a free agent at year’s end, but Holland is under club control for five years, and will be arbitration-eligible in 2014. Adding saves to his resume will increase his future salary without increasing his future worth. Letting Broxton close also makes for much less drama if and when Soria returns next season; his interim replacement will have signed somewhere else, so Soria won’t be taking the glamour job away from one of his teammates.

The bottom line is that this injury is not nearly as painful on the field as it is in our hearts. Losing a half-season of Salvador Perez is probably worth two wins in the standings, but an entire lost year of Soria, based on what we saw from him last year, is likely worth only a single win. There’s still a chance for a happy ending to this, if Soria re-signs and re-discovers the magic from the first four years of his career. The thought that Soria has thrown his last pitch for the Royals is a difficult one to stomach. But I’m optimistic that we won’t have to digest that thought just yet.

Absence.

Joakim Soria may have thrown his last pitch in a Royals uniform.

That was not the worst injury news the Royals received last week.

Oh, and they also made a silly trade, giving up legitimate prospects at least in part to acquire a player who creates a roster crunch without being notably better than what the Royals already have on hand.

Other than that, it’s been a fantastic week.

Let’s start at the beginning, when Salvador Perez reached for a Jonathan Sanchez pitch during warm-ups, caught his spike in the ground awkwardly, and limped off the field. The roller-coaster of emotions began – maybe it’s nothing, oh my God maybe he tore his ACL (out for the year!), oh the MRI shows it’s just a torn meniscus (4-6 weeks!), oh he’s come out of surgery and they’re saying…12-14 weeks?!

I don’t know about you, but I enjoyed the previous drama surrounding Salvador Perez a lot more.

While it was a meniscal tear, my understanding is that the tear was on the lateral (outside) part of his knee, and that the tear went all the way through the meniscus, both things which lengthen the recovery time. I’m also under the impression that 12-14 weeks is a conservative recovery time; I’m hopeful that with the training staff the Royals have in place these days, that Perez will be back towards the lower end of that estimate. (Speaking of which, Perez’s injury will be the first major test case for the quality of Nick Kenney, Kyle Turner, et al. Last year they did such a fantastic job of keeping guys healthy that we didn’t get a chance to see how effective they could be at nursing a player back to health.)

Still, given the timeframe here, it’s unlikely Perez will be on the field again for the Royals until mid-June. Furthermore, the Royals have already made it clear that even upon his return, he’s likely to catch no more than 3-4 times a week the rest of the season. Do the math, and the over/under on the number of games Perez plays this season is 65, maybe 70 tops.

By comparison, Perez started 39 games for the Royals last year. On the list of reasons why the Royals could be substantially improved from last year, “a full season of Salvador Perez” was near the top. That won’t be happening now.

While this sucks for 2012, my understanding is that if rehabbed appropriately, this injury should have a minimal impact on Perez’s career going forward. The key is “if rehabbed appropriately”, which is why, as painful as it is in the short term, limiting him to 65-70 starts is absolutely worth it if allows him to return to full-time duty in 2013. Perez is the first Royal in a quarter-century to be under club-control for eight seasons; if ever there was a player where long-term health takes precedence over short-term performance, it’s him.

The injury is unfortunate, and it only reinforces why a player like Perez might sign a long-term deal that could cost him millions of dollars over going year to year. But it’s still a great deal for the Royals, and if they had the option to re-consider the deal, they would (and should) still do it. Dayton Moore made a reasonable point after the injury, stating that because Perez had the security of a long-term deal, he would be less inclined to try to rush back onto the field before he was ready. Many a player has jeopardized his long-term future by downplaying or flat-out lying about his pain symptoms. There’s no guarantee Perez won’t still do that, but you have to hope that the security of a long-term deal, as well as the responsibility of a long-term deal, will keep him from doing that.

The Sandy Alomar comparisons have followed Perez around for at least the past year. We can only hope that the comparisons don’t extend to his fragility – after playing 132 games as a rookie in 1990, Alomar wouldn’t play in even 90 games again until 1996.

Perez, unfortunately, was perhaps the single player the Royals could least afford to lose to injury. I mean, even an injury to Eric Hosmer – perish the thought – would only open up an opportunity for Clint Robinson to play, and maybe even establish some trade value in the process. The dropoff from, say, Alex Gordon to Mitch Maier or Jarrod Dyson would be substantial, but at least the Royals have someone available to replace him.

In the case of Perez, it’s not just that the difference between him and Brayan Pena is significant – it’s that you have to carry two catchers, and it just so happens that the Royals’ third catcher, Manuel Pina, suffered the exact same injury a few weeks before Perez. The next two guys on the depth chart, Max Ramirez and Cody Clark, are not guys you want to go to war with on Opening Day.

So the Royals went shopping for short-term options, even kicking the tires on Ivan Rodriguez, a reasonable short-term option given that Pudge can still throw with the best of them (he nailed 13 of 25 runners last year). But from the beginning, the Royals appeared to be focusing on Humberto Quintero, who has been with the Astros for seven years and has worked his way up to playing about half the time.

I like Quintero, and thought he was a good guy to be focusing on – particularly since he looked like he was out of a job in Houston. Jason Castro, the Astros’ first-round pick in 2008, missed all of last season with a torn ACL but is back this year; between him and backup Chris Snyder, who was signed as a free agent this winter, there wasn’t a place for Quintero.

I like Quintero because, sort of like Brayan Pena, he’s not quite starter material but a step up from your typical backup catcher. In Pena’s case, his bat is a notch better than most backups; in Quintero’s case, he hits like a backup catcher but his defensive skills are near-elite. He’s thrown out 28% of attempted base-stealers in his career, which is about average, but as Jeff Sullivan summarizes here, the numbers suggest he is terrific at both framing and blocking pitches. The numbers agree with the scouts, who have long been high on his defense.

Quintero almost replaces Perez with the glove, which is a good thing, because his offensive skills are almost comical. He’s a career .234/.268/.321 hitter. (As Craig Brown points out, only one player this century – the immortal Jeff Mathis – has a lower OBP than Quintero in 1000 plate appearances or more.)

In 1075 at-bats, he’s walked 37 times. It’s actually worse than that, because eight of those 37 walks were intentional. And it’s actually worse than that, because about 80% of his career plate appearances have come in the #8 hole, in front of the pitcher, so no doubt many of his unintentional walks were not completely unintentional. (In 194 plate appearances outside the #8 spot in the lineup, Quintero has walked six times.) Quintero figures to be one of the least patient hitters in the recent history of the Royals, and that’s saying something.

Oh, and his power, modest as it is, is mostly a creation of Minute Maid Park. Ten of his 15 career homers were hit at home; his career slugging average on the road is .299.

Still, Quintero fills an obvious need, he’s only getting paid $1 million this year, and he seems to be a real impact-maker on defense. The Rays – who kinda know what they’re doing – signed Jose Molina to a $1.5 million contract this winter because of his defensive skills, even though his career line is .241/.286/.344 and he’s 37 years old. Given the Royals’ predicament, Quintero isn’t a bad acquisition. I expect him and Pena to share the job about 50-50 until Perez comes back, and at that point, well, Pena better hope he justifies my belief in his bat, or Quintero won’t be the one looking for gainful employment elsewhere.

It’s the second player in the trade that makes no sense. The Royals also acquired 30-year-old outfielder Jason Bourgeois, who hit .294/.323/.357 for the Astros last year, and also stole 31 bases in 37 attempts, despite playing in just 93 games.

I don’t get it.

Bourgeois had nice numbers for a fourth outfielder last season, but his performance was out of character for him. In 2010, he hit .220/.294/.268 in 123 at-bats. That was his rookie season, when he was 28 years old. That alone should tell you something.

Bourgeois’ career line in the majors is .262/.307/.324. His career line in Triple-A is .296/.348/.405.

By comparison, Mitch Maier’s career line in the majors is .253/.332/.346. His Triple-A line is .295/.342/.447.

Maier is also five months younger than Bourgeois. He also bats left-handed. Consider the makeup of the Royals’ bench. Yuniesky Betancourt bats right-handed. Quintero bats right-handed; when he starts, Brayan Pena is a switch-hitter. If Bourgeois takes Maier’s place on the roster, then the Royals essentially have no pinch-hitting options for Alcides Escobar against right-handed relievers in the late innings. The lineup already tilts to the right side – the only left-handers in the lineup are Hosmer, Gordon, and Moustakas. The first two aren’t being pinch-hit for in any circumstances; if the Royals want to sit Moose in a tight spot, that’s what they got Yuni for.

So the Royals have to have a legitimate left-handed hitting option on the bench. It’s hard to see how Bourgeois could take Maier’s spot.

That leaves the final bench spot, tentatively being given to Jarrod Dyson. In some respects, Bourgeois is a hybrid between Maier and Dyson; he doesn’t hit as well as Maier or run as well as Dyson, but he does a little of both. But it seems to me that you’d rather have a player with Dyson’s skill set on the bench, because Dyson is the rare player with speed that can truly be game-changing, as we saw last year. He’s also an elite defender, something Bourgeois – despite some pretty fielding numbers from one of the defensive metrics last year – isn’t.

Bourgeois did start a game at second base for the Astros last year (his only start at second base in the majors) and it was his primary position in the minors – up until 2007 or so, when he became a full-time outfielder. It’s nice to have a guy with some experience at the position in a pinch, but you don’t design your roster around what might happen in the 17th inning of a game. Or at least you shouldn’t.

So I don’t get what Bourgeois does. He does have an option, so maybe he just goes to Omaha and is injury insurance – but then why bother to acquire him in the first place? You already have David Lough for that anyway. Or maybe the Royals truly think that Dyson still has the ability to be an everyday outfielder, and want him playing every day in Omaha. That’s about the only explanation I can come up with for why they wanted Bourgeois in the deal. (For what it’s worth, Bob Dutton is suggesting that this is the likely outcome – Dyson returns to Omaha to make way for Bourgeois.)

In exchange, the Royals gave up left-handed reliever Kevin Chapman, who Baseball America ranked as the 18th-best prospect in the system. Chapman was drafted in the fourth round in 2010 as a college product who ought to move through the system quickly, and while there have been some bumps along the way, he’s done mostly that. Lefties who throw 94 don’t grow on trees; even though his command is iffy and his slider is only average, he could be a seventh-inning guy in the majors.

Ignore his 4.94 ERA last year; in 62 innings, he struck out 90 batters – nearly one-third of those he faced – which is an impressive ratio. He finished his first full season in the minors in Double-A. He’s sort of the left-handed version of Louis Coleman, who was drafted in the fifth round the year before. While I don’t think he’ll be as good as Coleman was last year, I do think he could be a part of a major-league bullpen for several years. In the Astros’ system, he might be a Top-10 prospect.

Having said that, Chapman alone is not a terrible price to pay. The Royals have Tim Collins and Everett Teaford, and they signed Jose Mijares cheap, and Tommy Hottovy is trying to remake himself as a sidearm specialist, and they still have Blaine Hardy, and they picked up Ryan Verdugo and Antonio Cruz in trades…they have options. Unless Chapman develops into a true impact reliever, they won’t miss him.

It's a shame they have to give up a guy like Chapman, because while he might not have earned a spot with the Royals, and while he wasn't going to bring back big talent in a trade on his own, he's the perfect third or fourth guy to throw in a trade when the Royals are ready to cash in their prospects for an elite player, and they need one more guy to get the deal done. Think Jeremy Jeffress in the Zack Greinke trade, or Brad Boxberger from the Reds in the Mat Latos deal. A strong-armed reliever isn't worth much on his own, but he makes for a nice clincher. Chapman won't serve that role for the Royals going forward, which is a shame. But you have to give something to get something, and Chapman was something.

The problem is that Chapman’s not all they gave up. There’s also a Player To Be Named Later, and in a deal like this, that PTBNL could be anything from a courtesy throw-in to a legitimate prospect. Astros GM Jeff Luhnow was quoted after the deal as saying that the PTBNL was a “key component” of the trade.

I have no idea what that means. He’s obviously not going to say that the player is a nobody. On the other hand, there’s no incentive for him to pump up the player if it’s some kid in Idaho Falls that no one’s heard of. And then there’s the question of why the player’s a PTBNL in the first place.

My guess - perhaps I should say hope - is that it might be a player who is out of options, but the Royals want to see how their roster shakes out first. Would Sean O’Sullivan or Vinny Mazzaro qualify as a “key component” of the trade? They might, simply in the sense that they’d go right to the Astros’ major league roster and maybe even into their rotation. (It’s the Astros, people. Look at their team. No, really: go look at it. It’s like looking into a Royals time capsule from 2005.)

If it’s someone along those lines, someone the Royals probably would have lost on waivers in the first place, I can live with the trade. If it’s an actual prospect, then you have to ask why the Royals would give up so much talent for a backup catcher who was going to struggle to make his team’s roster, and a 30-year-old fourth outfielder who doesn’t bring any skills that the Royals’ two backup outfielders don’t already have.

Ten days ago, the Royals were rolling, Danny Duffy was dealing, and some of us (okay, me) were thinking ambitious thoughts. One injury later, the Royals have lost probably two wins in 2012, there’s at least a small chance that their prized young catcher may be injury-prone going forward, and they’ve given up at least one and maybe two fine prospects for a catcher they need for only half a season and an outfielder they didn’t need at all. Suddenly, that Grantland article I wanted to write about how the Royals could be this year's miracle team doesn't seem like such a smart idea.

And that was just one injury. I’ll talk about the other injury next time.