The Final Homestand.

When the Royals came to the ballpark on the morning of September 18th, 1995, to begin a 11-game homestand, here were the wild card standings in the American League:

TEAM          W   L    GB

SEATTLE      69  63   ---

KANSAS CITY  67  63   1.0

TEXAS        68  64   1.0

NEW YORK     68  64   1.0

The 1995 Cleveland Indians, one of the greatest teams of my lifetime, were 91-41 on their way to finishing 100-44. They were so good that they suppressed the rest of the league – aside from the Indians and Red Sox, no team in the league had won even 55% of its games. So the Royals, despite having a worse record than they do today, were absolutely in the wild card race.

Moreover, they had an excellent opportunity to gain ground, as they were starting a five-game series with the Minnesota Twins, the worst team in the league, who had a 48-81 record at the time. The Royals won the first game of a doubleheader that Monday.

These being the Royals, they then lost the next four games to the Twins. The Indians came to town and won the first two games of that series; by Sunday, September 24th, the Royals were 69-69 and 4.5 games behind the Yankees for the wild card spot with six games to go. It was over. (The Mariners had already climbed ahead of the free-falling Angels, and wound up winning the AL West in a tiebreaker game.)

The Royals begin their most important homestand in 18 years tonight, and really, they have no business still being in the race at all. The Royals weren’t able to sweep Cleveland last week, and the Indians took full advantage of their schedule by sweeing four games against the White Sox over the weekend. After this series with the Royals, the Indians feast on nothing but Astros, White Sox, and Twins the rest of the season.

But the Rays are 7-14 since August 25th, and the Rangers have suddenly lost six in a row and 11 of 13. Even though the Indians are a half-game back of both teams, ESPN gives them a better shot at the playoffs (68%) than Texas (59%) and Tampa Bay (53%). The Royals are at 7.6%. Here are your standings:

TEAM          W   L    GB

TEXAS        81  67   ---

TAMPA BAY    81  67   ---

CLEVELAND    81  68   0.5

BALTIMORE    79  70   2.5

NEW YORK     79  71   3.0

KANSAS CITY  78  71   3.5

The Royals are still in ninth place in the AL, they’re 3.5 games back with 13 to play…but they still control their own destiny, because on this homestand they play the Indians and the Rangers.

Even better, while the Royals open a three-game series against Cleveland tonight, the Rangers and Rays are playing…each other. Meanwhile, the Orioles travel to Boston for a three-game series, while the Yankees head to Toronto.

So even though the Royals need to vault four teams and make up 3.5 games to get into the playoffs not only is it feasible in the next 13 days, they could easily do the bulk of the hard work by Friday.

Consider this: if the Royals sweep the Indians, these would be standings on Friday morning in a worst-case scenario:

TEAM          W   L    GB

TEXAS        83  69   ---

TAMPA BAY    83  69   ---

BALTIMORE    82  70   1.0

CLEVELAND    82  71   1.5

NEW YORK     82  71   1.5

KANSAS CITY  81  71   2.0

This assumes that 1) the Rangers and Rays split, and 2) that the Orioles and Yankees both sweep their series; 3) the Indians win their Thursday night game against the Astros.

The Rangers then come to town over the weekend, and while Cleveland starts feeding on the bottom-dwellers of the AL, and the Yankees host the Giants, Tampa Bay hosts the Orioles for four games.

Let’s assume that the Royals take 2 of 3 against the Rangers. Once again, here are the standings next Monday morning in a worst-case scenario:

TEAM          W   L    GB

CLEVELAND    85  71   ---

NEW YORK     85  71   ---

TEXAS        84  71   0.5

TAMPA BAY    84  71   0.5

BALTIMORE    84  71   0.5

KANSAS CITY  83  72   1.5

This assumes that the Yankees and Indians sweep, and that the Orioles take two of the first three games against the Rays.

If the Royals sweep the Indians and take 2 of 3 against Texas, they can not be more than 1.5 games back with seven games to play, and while those seven games are all road games, three are in Seattle and four are against the White Sox.

Let’s flip the scenario and assume the Royals win 2 of 3 against Cleveland but sweep the Rangers. Here’s your absolute worst-case scenario:

TEAM          W   L    GB

TAMPA BAY    86  69   ---

CLEVELAND    86  70   ---

NEW YORK     85  71   1.0

BALTIMORE    84  71   1.5

KANSAS CITY  83  72   2.5

TEXAS        81  74   4.5

In this scenario, all other teams would win out against non-contenders, and the Rays would sweep the Rangers but lose 2 of 3 to the Orioles. This is more problematic, in that the Royals would need to make up 2.5 games in seven days on Cleveland. While the Royals play in Seattle and Chicago, the Indians would host the White Sox on Tuesday and Wednesday, and then finish the year with four games in Minnesota.

But that’s not impossible. The Royals would be only two back in the loss column, meaning they could close the gap to two games by winning next Monday while the Indians are idle. Also, while they’re three back of Tampa Bay and half a game back of the Yankees, the two teams play each other for three games.

And again: this is a worst-case scenario. Not only does it require the Indians and Yankees to sweep the Astros, Giants, and Blue Jays – it requires the Rays to win a precise number of games against the Rangers and Orioles.

So here’s what you need to take home: the Royals need to go 5-1 on this homestand. That’s pretty much non-negotiable; 4-2 will put them in roughly the same position they are now, where they need a lot of things to break just right for them in the final week, only they won’t have the advantage of a lot of contenders playing each other.

But if they go 5-1, they’re guaranteed to be in good position with a week to go. It will help if the Rangers/Rays series doesn’t end up in a sweep for either team. It obviously helps if some of the spoilers can spoil a game or two.

But mostly, the Royals just need to win. They need to treat every game like a playoff game. They need Ned Yost to limit his decisions to just “bad” instead of “egregious and indefensible”. They need their best players to play like stars, and they need their role players to step up and be a hero at an unexpected time.

They still control their own destiny. But if they don’t care of business this week, they won’t control much of anything a week from now. No more excuses, no more mistakes. Just win.

And if 40,000 of you are on hand this week to gently encourage them to do so, so much the better.

#YOSTED #AGAIN

I’ve really had my fill of writing about Ned Yost’s tactical decision-making this month. Honest. I have.

But I’ve also really had my fill of watching him make decisions that cost the Royals ballgames and are threatening to bring an end to the most exciting month of Royals baseball in a decade or two.

Let’s set the stage again.

Max Scherzer was dealing for Detroit this afternoon. Maybe he deserves the AL Cy Young Award, maybe he doesn’t, but let’s not let the argument over whether his win-loss record means anything (it doesn’t) obscure the fact that he’s been a phenomenal pitcher all season. In seven innings he struck out 12 Royals, the most strikeouts by any pitcher against the Royals this season, and allowed only a run on a solo homer to Alex Gordon.

Meanwhile, Jeremy Guthrie was…not Max Scherzer. He gave up a pair of two-out singles in the first; in the second, he allowed a leadoff single and then a home run to Alex Avila, followed by two more singles before he retired the final two batters of the inning.

He began the third inning by allowing back-to-back singles to Prince Fielder and Victor Martinez. At this point, the Tigers were 8-for-14. But he retired Andy Dirks, Omar Infante, and Avila in order to get out of the inning.

In the fourth, Ramon Santiago led off with a bunt single, but Guthrie got Austin Jackson to ground into a double play, and Torii Hunter’s bunt attempt failed.

In the fifth, Miguel Cabrera led off with a single, and Fielder doubled to put men on second and third with none out. At this point, the Tigers were 11-for-22 in the game. But Guthrie worked his way out of another jam, getting Martinez and Dirks to ground out to Eric Hosmer with the runners holding, and then Infante to ground out to Escobar.

Through five innings, the Tigers were 11-for-16 with a home run and a double with the bases empty or a runner on first base only – but they were 0-for-9 with runners in scoring position.

This has been the key to Guthrie’s success all season – he has worked out of jams all year long by pitching much better with runners in scoring position. His BABIP, coming into today’s game, was .299 – actually higher than his career mark of .281. But look at these splits – before today’s game:

Bases empty: .273/.333/.454

Man on first base only: .302/.343/.431

Runners in scoring position: .244/.290/.359

What Guthrie has done this year is awesome, and it’s helped to post a 4.08 ERA and win 14 games despite pitching on the edge all year. It’s also completely out of line with what Guthrie has done in his career. For his career, Guthrie actually has a higher OPS with runners in scoring position (765) than with the bases empty (760). Those splits are unsustainable. That doesn’t negate the value of what he’s done this year; it does mean that you can’t just assume that Guthrie has some magical ability to pitch with men in scoring position.

Given the way he was pitching, you could make a strong case that he should have been pulled after five innings, if not sooner. Again: it’s September, you’re in a pennant race, AND YOU HAVE ONE OF THE BEST BULLPENS EVER ASSEMBLED at your disposal. Oh, and because it’s September, YOU HAVE ELEVEN RELIEVERS to choose from.

Guthrie took the mound for the sixth, which I found curious, but I suppose defensible. Avila struck out; Santiago grounded out, and after Jackson walked, Hunter popped out.

The Royals were unable to take advantage of a second-and-third, one-out situation in the top of the seventh, and the score remained 2-1. Guthrie came back out to the mound to face Miguel Cabrera, Prince Fielder, and Victor Martinez. I would argue that this was a mistake, and I still think it’s a mistake even after Cabrera and Fielder grounded out, and after Martinez lined a single to left, Dirks struck out.

The Royals needed a run and they only had six outs left, but they also got Scherzer out of the game after 116 pitches, exposing the Tigers’ biggest weakness: their bullpen. Drew Smyly has been the Tigers’ best reliever this season, but Alcides Escobar led off the eighth with a double. After Gordon failed to advance him by popping out, Escobar stole third base while Bonifacio struck out – Escobar is now 19-for-19 on steal attempts this year. Hosmer grounded out, but not before Escobar raced home when Smyly buried a pitch that Avila could not keep from bouncing away from him. On a gift run from the Tigers, the Royals had tied the game.

A day after the Royals turned a remarkable defensive play that kept them from potentially losing a game they had no business losing, they had a chance to win a game they had no business winning. Even though the Tigers were the home team, my first thought after the Royals tied the game was that this was now a battle between their bullpen and ours, and I liked our chances.

At no point did I think there was ANY chance that Guthrie would take the mound again. Not after 7 innings. Not after 102 pitches. Not with a collection of bullpen arms that is the envy of baseball lurking behind an outfield fence.

Jeremy Guthrie took the mound. He struck out Omar Infante looking on five pitches. Alex Avila batted. On a 1-1 pitch, Guthrie hung a slider right over the middle of the plate, and Avila did what you’re supposed to do when a tiring starter who was skating on thin ice all game long parks a pitch in your happy zone.

That was the game. Five more batters would come to the plate, two for the Tigers and three for the Royals, and all would make out. Jeremy Guthrie got his complete game. He also took the loss.

Let’s back up here. Guthrie started the 8th inning despite having thrown 102 pitches. Back on May 6th, Ned Yost got second-guessed by half of Kansas City because he pulled James Shields in a 1-0 game after eight innings. That day, Shields had thrown…102 pitches.

And here’s the thing: I never joined the second-guessing, because pulling Shields was the right move. It was the right move EVEN THOUGH Shields had allowed just two hits and two walks in eight innings, and had struck out nine. It was the right move because a fresh Greg Holland was likely to be more effective than Shields facing batters for the fourth time. People got upset because Holland gave up the tying run – but it was the last run Holland would give up until June 16th, and the last lead he would blow until September 5th. (People also got upset in hindsight because it turned out to be the first game in a 4-19 stretch that will probably keep the Royals out of the playoffs.)

But again: pulling Shields was the right move. So how on Earth can Yost pull Shields after 102 dominant pitches in early May, but leave an inferior pitcher having a vastly inferior game on the mound in a September pennant race with three extra relievers at his disposal?

Do you know how many times Yost has let his starting pitcher go back out to start an inning, having already thrown at least 7 innings and at least 102 pitches? Twice, and it was Shields both times. On April 13th, Shields pitched the ninth against the Blue Jays losing 3-1, having thrown 103 pitches. He worked around a one-out walk to throw a scoreless inning.

The other time was on May 17th in Oakland. Shields had thrown 102 pitches, and had allowed the game-tying home run in the 7th inning, when he took the mound to start the 8th. The first batter he faced, Adam Rosales, hit a home run. The Royals lost, 2-1.

So in September, in a pennant race, with ELEVEN relievers on hand, in a tie game, in the 8th inning, with his #4 starter (at best) having thrown 102 pitches, and having allowed 12 hits already, Yost sent him back to the mound. Even though he had only asked his starting pitcher to work that hard twice all season, and one of those two decisions proved disastrous.

It’s true, Greg Holland (1.33 ERA) pitched yesterday, although that was his first game since Wednesday. And Luke Hochevar (1.67 ERA) also pitched yesterday, although that was his first game since Tuesday. But here are the other options that Yost could have turned to:

There was Wade Davis (no runs in four relief innings), who hasn’t pitched since Monday, and has pitched four innings all month.

There was Kelvin Herrera (3.70 ERA), who hasn’t pitched since Tuesday.

There was Aaron Crow (3.55 ERA), who hasn’t pitched since a week ago Friday, and just twice all month.

There was Tim Collins (3.60 ERA), who hasn’t pitched since a week ago Thursday – ten days ago.

There was Louis Coleman (0.35 ERA – one run in 26 innings), who pitched an inning on Friday, and before that hadn’t pitched in a week.

There was Will Smith (1.75 ERA as a reliever), who faced one batter yesterday, but before that hadn’t pitched in a week.

There was Francisley Bueno (no runs in six innings), who threw 19 pitches on Friday, and before that hadn’t pitched in eight days.

There was Donnie Joseph (no runs in six innings), who threw 11 pitches on Friday, and before that hadn’t pitched in eight days.

The Royals have eleven relievers on the roster. Every one of them was available to pitch. Nine of the eleven hadn’t pitched the day before. Thanks to the off-day on Thursday, not one of the Royals 11 relievers had appeared in more than one game in the last three days. They were all available.

AND IT’S THE ONE OF THE BEST BULLPENS EVER ASSEMBLED. Ten of the 11 relievers have a better ERA than Guthrie. (The exception is Luis Mendoza, who’s appeared in one game in the last three weeks.) Seven of the 11 have ERAs under 2.00 in relief. The bullpen ERA for the team as a whole is 2.55, which remains the lowest by an AL team since 1990.

Yost chose to stick with Guthrie. He stuck with Guthrie even though the Tigers were batting 12-for-32 (.375) in the game. He stuck with Guthrie even though, for his career, batters were hitting .305/.387/.426 when they were facing Guthrie for the fourth time in a game.

After Infante struck out, Yost stuck with Guthrie against Alex Avila, even though Avila’s left-handed, and while right-handed hitters were batting .221/.278/.337 against Guthrie this year, left-handed hitters were batting .332/.381/.522.

Yost stuck with Guthrie against Avila even though Avila had already homered against him earlier in the game. (You think single-season platoon splits and pitcher vs. hitter matchups don’t matter much? I agree with you! But those are the stats Yost believes in, and even those stats told him to get Guthrie the hell out of the game.)

With two weeks to go in the season, with the Royals with genuine playoff aspirations on September 15th for the first time in the memories of many of you reading this, in a tie game in the bottom of the eighth inning, with a phenomenal and rested bullpen at his disposal, Ned Yost chose to stick with a league-average starting pitcher who didn’t have his best stuff and who was laboring his fourth time through the lineup.

And the Royals lost the game. Guthrie did get his complete game, even though he allowed 13 hits. It was just the fifth 13-hit complete game of the decade. The last time a pitcher threw a complete game while allowing more than 13 hits? Tim Wakefield, in 1996. There's a good reason for that: pitchers aren't allowed to throw a complete game when they don't have good stuff.

Unlike Monday’s debacle, afterwards even Yost sensed he might have made a boo-boo. “I thought he could get us through the bottom of the order, but I pushed him too far…Hindsight is 20-20, and there will be a lot of that. I just thought (Guthrie) had enough to get us to the ninth.”

Hindsight is 20-20, but sometimes foresight is too. If you’re reading this, you probably had 20-20 vision into the future from the moment Guthrie walked out to the mound in the eighth.

“The way he had pitched,” Yost said, “I just felt real strongly that he could get us to the ninth, turn it over to the pen in a tie game and give him a chance to win the game.”

Give HIM a chance to win the game. Not the Royals. Jeremy Guthrie. Because pitcher wins – which are nothing more than an accounting trick – matter more than team wins. 

Reading that quote, I suddenly feel like Brian Kenny isn’t being forceful enough in his crusade to #KillTheWin. Kill the win? Ned Yost risked losing a game in order to give his starting pitcher a chance to get the “win” on his ledger instead of another pitcher on his own team. Waterboard the win. Napalm the win. Nuke the win.

I wish we could buy Yost some glasses, but I don’t know how you can just wave away what’s happened this week. It’s not just that Yost made tactical blunders that may have cost the Royals two games – it’s that he made radically different errors in each game. On Monday, he pushed too many buttons (pinch-hit for Cain, then bunted with the pinch-hitter, then pinch-hit for Dyson with Pena) in a panicked attempt to do something to score the tying and winning runs. Today, he stood pat and stuck with his starting pitcher when he literally had 10 better options in the bullpen waiting for a phone call.

If Yost kept making the same mistake over and over again, maybe you could drill him to stop making that mistake. But when he overmanages one night and undermanages the next, what do you do?

I don’t know what the Royals will do. But I’ll tell you what the Brewers did in a September pennant race, five years ago today: they fired Ned Yost.

The Brewers made the playoffs. The Royals probably won’t. Unfortunately, they probably won’t whether or not they retain Yost’s services for the rest of this season.

I just hope that they remember today’s game, and Monday’s game, when they decide whether to retain his services for next season.

The Score Board: 9/14/13.

No promises, but as long as the Royals keep winning and keep staying in the playoff chase, I’ll try to keep writing a column every day or two. Let’s jump in.

For the third consecutive series against an AL Central rival, the Royals began with a loss. While Friday night’s loss wasn’t as emphatic and disheartening as the previous Friday, and wasn’t as crushing and preventable as Monday night’s, it was just as damaging to their playoff hopes. They really need to win every series at this point.

If I’m going to rip Ned Yost for his tactical catastrophe on Monday – and...let’s see...I did rip him – then I have to give him credit for fostering an atmosphere in the clubhouse where the Royals keep coming back from tough losses like nothing happened. Friday night seems like a pretty clear loss on paper, but between the outs on the bases and the defensive plays that were almost made, the outcome could have been very different.

Tonight, in the most important game the Royals have played in many years, Ervin Santana was once again everything the Royals could have expected and more. He threw 6.2 scoreless innings on just 83 pitches, walking just one and striking out five. Santana’s command has been an underrated part of his improvement this season; he’s walked four batters in a start just once all year.

The Royals got a run in the first, and then did everything in their power to not score another. After Eric Hosmer’s RBI triple, he was thrown out at the plate on Billy Butler’s grounder. In the third, Emilio Bonifacio walked with two out, then was picked off first base, then was thrown out of the game for protesting the call (which was probably missed). This brought Chris Getz into the game, and naturally in his first plate appearance, he batted with two outs and the bases loaded, and flied out.

Santana nursed a 1-0 lead into the bottom of the seventh, but with one out gave up singles to Victor Martinez and Andy Dirks. At this point I openly wondered on Twitter about whether Yost should pull Santana. On the one hand, he had only thrown 83 pitches. On the other, you have the best bullpen in recent AL history, you have seven outs to go, and you have to win this game. You have to win every game from here on out, or at least every winnable one.

There’s a lot of evidence that a pitcher’s effectiveness doesn’t simply decline with rising pitch totals, but with how many times he has worked through the order – hitters are significantly more effective the third time they’ve seen a pitcher in a game than their second. This was Santana's third time through.

This wasn’t a slam-dunk call, because a right-handed hitter (Omar Infante) was at the plate, and Santana’s slider-heavy repertoire has always made him much tougher on right-handers than left-handers. The decision was in that gray area where you could make enough of an argument either way that it wouldn't be fair to nail Yost to the wall for either decision. Yost left him in the game and Infante hit a slow ground ball that Alcides Escobar made an excellent play on, but both runners moved up.

Alex Avila was due up, a left-handed hitter, in a situation where a single would score the tying and winning runs. At this point in the season, you simply have to make a change there – and Yost, to his credit, did exactly that. Will Smith came in and faced pinch-hitter Nick Castellanos. Castellanos got a moral victory by putting the ball in play – but Smith got the only victory that counts when the ball settled in Jarrod Dyson’s glove.

Getz led off the top of the eighth with a walk, and Hosmer followed with a gorgeous bunt to the left of the mound that Miguel Cabrera had to just put in his pocket. When your #3 hitter can also bunt for a hit when the defense goes to sleep, it just makes him that much more difficult to defend – witness Robinson Cano making the Red Sox pay for their shift with a bunt double yesterday.

With two on and no one out, Butler hit a medium-depth flyball to right field. Getz tagged, Torii Hunter made a perfect throw to third base, and Getz was out. Salvador Perez walked, but Mike Moustakas flied out to end the inning – a flyball that would have brought home a run had Getz not tried to take the extra base.

In the moment, I didn’t mind Getz’s decision too much. The cardinal rule is to never make the first or last out at third base, but this would have been the second out, i.e. with one out, there is a real advantage in advancing from second to third base. If Getz is safe 75% of the time in that situation, it’s worth going. Hunter made a fantastic throw, and you could argue that Getz just got unlucky.

When I mentioned this on Twitter, I quickly got shot down. Hunter was positioned to catch the ball with his momentum bringing him towards the plate, and has a very strong arm – Getz had to know a good throw would nail him. These are valid points. I still think that Getz is probably safe more often than not in that same situation, but it probably wasn’t a 75% chance. Also, Chris Getz has earned our skepticism any time he makes any baserunning decision. Also a valid point.

The Royals had eight hits and four walks, but just one run, and if they wound up losing this game it would have been one of the most painful losses of the season. All they needed to do to prevent that was to get two more scoreless innings from their bullpen, and specifically from their two best relievers, Luke Hochevar and Greg Holland. Consider this: coming into today, Holland’s strikeout-to-hit ratio of 2.58 is the highest single-season ratio in Royals history for anyone with 30+ innings. Hochevar’s ratio of 2.06 is second-best. Granted that we are living in the most strikeout-friendly era baseball has ever seen, these are arguably the two most dominant relief seasons in Royals history.

Hochevar did his part, getting Don Kelly to ground out and striking out Austin Jackson. After he gave up a double to Hunter, Hochevar got Miguel Cabrera to ground out to second base on his first pitch. (For those who disagree with my suggestion that the Royals trade Holland this winter, because Hochevar hasn't proven he can handle the ninth inning - tonight's inning was more pressure-filled than most save situations, and he did just fine.) After the Royals went quietly in the ninth, setting up the most important half-inning in the recent history of the franchise, they called upon Holland, having the most dominant season inning-for-inning in the entire history of the franchise.

Holland proceeded to walk Prince Fielder on five pitches.

At this point, Tigers manager Jim Leyland does what he usually does when his slow, fat, slow first baseman/DH reaches base in the ninth inning, and what Ned Yost NEVER does when his slow, fat, slow first baseman/DH reaches base in the ninth inning: Leyland left Fielder in the game. I tweeted at the time that Yost would have pinch-run for Fielder 100% of the time in that situation. (Actually, I tweeted that he would have “pinch-hit” for Fielder, because it was stressful and my fingers weren’t working properly and paosdkf;lawehads.)

I didn’t comment on the wisdom of Leyland's decision one way or the other. While I think Yost pinch-runs for Butler more than he should – particularly since he rarely pinch-runs for Salvador Perez, who’s only marginally faster – I think in this situation pinch-running made some sense. Pinch-running for the tying run is more important than pinch-running for the winning run, because the downside of pinch-running is that you lose the bat if the game goes extra innings. If Fielder represents the tying run, he’s not going to bat again unless he crosses the plate – and if he crosses the plate, then by definition he will have to score on some sort of ball in play. (A home run would end the game.) If Fielder's running speed does not come into play the rest of the inning, than the Tigers aren't scoring, and Fielder ain't batting again.

Throw in the fact that the Tigers are the home team, and that playing for the tie at home is a useful piece of conventional wisdom, and I think you can argue that the downside of losing Fielder’s bat in the 11th inning is superseded by the importance of getting him home in the 9th. Leyland chose not to. This would prove decisive.

Holland fell behind Victor Martinez 1-0 before coaxing a pop fly to right field that Getz and Lorenzo Cain almost miscommunicated on. He then struck out Andy Dirks on his filthy splider, or whatever that pitch is called. One strike away from victory, though, Holland let Infante pull a ball into the left-field corner for a double.

And so began one of the most spectacular plays in recent Royals history, and one of the greatest exhibits of team defense in a season marked, more than anything, by great team defense.

Even with Fielder running from first base, it was going to be tough to keep him from scoring. There were two outs, so Fielder was running on contact, and Infante hit a lazy, looping line drive that bounced twice before hitting the left-field wall. But Gordon bare-handed it, hit Escobar in short left field, and Escobar threw a one-hopper that Salvador Perez snared, then tagged Fielder just before Fielder touched home plate.

That’s the Cliff’s Notes version. This was a phenomenal defensive play from start to finish, that turned a tie game with the winning run on second base into a win, in a pennant race. And if any one of the three fielders involved in the play doesn’t do a perfect job, it doesn’t happen.

Bill James once wrote – I think it was about the 1986 California Angels – that the teams that run this kind of play, where an outfielder hits a cutoff man who throws to the plate, the best are veteran teams, teams where the players have been playing together for years and know exactly how to operate it. None of these three guys have turned 29 yet, and only one of them was on the roster three years ago – but they ran this play like they had rehearsed it together in a dozen spring trainings.

Gordon will probably win his third Gold Glove in a row this winter, and will probably deserve it. This was his 15th assist of the season, to go with 17 last year and 20 the year before that. That is extraordinary, for a left fielder to nail 15 baserunners in three consecutive seasons. Baseball-reference unfortunately does not allow me to search this data, but Sean Lahman’s baseball database splits outfielders by their respective positions going back to 1954. And since 1954, Alex Gordon is the first left fielder ever to nail 15 baserunners in three consecutive seasons. Only three left fielders have had 15 assists in any three seasons – Bernard Gilkey and Bobby Higginson did it three times each, while Carl Yastrzemski did it six times.

You can see why on this play. Not only does Gordon have the arm and quick release of a former third baseman, and not only does he shave a crucial split second by bare-handing the ball, he puts this ball right where Escobar wants it. Whitey Herzog wrote in his memoir that Casey Stengel used to teach outfielders to aim for the cutoff man’s glove side, so that his momentum will allow him to turn his body to make the second throw. If the cutoff man has to backhand the ball, even just slightly, he has to waste valuable time turning his body back in a position to throw to the plate. Gordon’s throw sailed to Escobar’s left, towards the foul line, allowing Escobar to drift ever so slightly towards the line and then continue his motion by pirouetting towards the plate.

Perez’s play was fantastic as well, reaching glove side to snare Escobar’s throw on a short hop and then come back with his glove arm to tag Fielder. Let’s put it this way: Brayan Pena – who was on deck to pinch-hit for the Tigers – probably doesn’t put the tag down in time.

But the play that might get the least attention – but was the most important – was the glue that connected Gordon’s throw and Perez’s tag. Escobar caught Gordon’s throw just inside the left field foul line. He has to get that ball to his catcher, and he has to do it while somehow not hitting Prince Fielder, who is running in almost exactly a straight line between him and Perez.

There was only one place for him to put that ball – he had to throw it outside the foul line, so that it wouldn’t bounce off Fielder’s ample back or broad shoulders, but close enough to the line that Perez could field it and still tag Fielder. There was a window maybe three feet wide that Escobar had to hit – and he did so perfectly.

(Addendum: as Bob Dutton wrote in his game recap, Perez's catch-and-tag was made more difficult by the fact that he couldn't see Escobar's throw. This makes sense - again, a 300-pound man was running almost directly between him and Escobar. Perez saw enough of the throw to anticipate where it was headed, and put his glove in the perfect position to snare it on a short hop.)

All season long, the Royals have been playing defense at a level I’ve never seen them approach before and that no other AL team can touch. Tonight, three of their defenders – all three of whom deserve at least consideration for the Gold Glove – combined on a play of artistic beauty and immense implications.

And they won, 1-0, for the fourth time this season, their most 1-0 victories in a season since 1986. The Royals have won as many 1-0 games this year as they did from 1991 through 2002 combined. One more 1-0 victory would tie the franchise record set in 1972, when pitchers still batted and the league ERA was 3.06.

Even with Tampa Bay and Cleveland winning, their playoff odds ticked up to 11.0%, because the Orioles and Yankees both lost, and the Rangers dropped their fifth in a row, putting them in a tie with Tampa Bay. With three home games against Texas next weekend, the Royals suddenly have two potential avenues to squeeze into the playoffs. Tonight was the most important game the Royals have played in many years. But it's less important than tomorrow's game.

The fun is still probably ending soon. But I’ve been saying that for a while now, and the fun hasn’t ended yet. On the contrary, it feels like it’s just beginning.

Chaos.

Here are the American League standings on the morning of August 25th, after the Royals had lost seven games in a row, including five games at home against the White Sox and Marlins:

TEAM          W   L    GB

DETROIT      76  53   ---

TAMPA BAY    74  53   ---

TEXAS        75  54   ---

BOSTON       76  55   ---

OAKLAND      72  56   ---

CLEVELAND    70  59   2.5

BALTIMORE    69  59   3.0

NEW YORK     68  61   4.5

KANSAS CITY  64  64   8.0

The Royals had the ninth-best record out of 15 AL teams. They were as close (eight games) to the 13th-place Toronto Blue Jays as they were to a playoff spot, as represented by the A’s, who at the time held onto the second wild card.

I don’t have the ability to search ESPN’s playoff odds day-by-day, but Baseball Prospectus’ playoff odds are now available at MLB.com, and you can see how each team’s odds have gone up or down all season. On the morning of August 25th, the Royals’ playoff odds dropped to 0%. I assume they’re just rounding down, which means their actual odds were less than 0.5%.

Here are the standings right now:

TEAM          W   L    GB

BOSTON       89  59   ---

OAKLAND      85  61   ---

DETROIT      84  62   ---

TEXAS        81  64   ---

TAMPA BAY    79  66   ---

NEW YORK     79  68   1.0

CLEVELAND    78  68   1.5

BALTIMORE    77  69   2.5

KANSAS CITY  77  69   2.5

Baseball Prospectus’ odds for the Royals are now at 4.2% – and they were at 5.6% before the Rays – thanks for nothing, Wil Myers – won last night.

ESPN has the Royals’ odds at 12.8% (now down to 11.8% after the Indians took advantage of their schedule with another win against the White Sox this afternoon). If memory serves, those odds were around 3% when the Royals bottomed out three weeks ago.

So while the precise probability that the Royals are playoff-bound may differ between different models, they all agree that their odds have soared – somewhere between four-fold and ten-fold – in three weeks. They’ve roughly tripled just in the last week, since James Shields became the first starter in recorded history to give up 14 hits and not get out of the fourth inning.

This sudden wave of playoff excitement has come on awfully fast, is what I’m saying. And as much credit as the Royals rightfully deserve for it, at least as much credit has to go to Tampa Bay, without whose collapse none of this is possible.

Prior to the Rays’ win yesterday, the Royals had made up 8.5 games on the Rays in 18 days. That is an extraordinary pace. Consider that two years ago, when the Rays were themselves the beneficiary of a historic collapse by the Red Sox in September, they made up 8 games in 21 days to tie the standings. Meanwhile, the Cardinals made up 8.5 games in 22 days to do the same on Atlanta. (Of course, both Tampa Bay and St. Louis tacked on another game in another day, when both teams won game 162 while the Sox and Braves lost.)

The problem, of course, was that the Royals were 10.5 games behind Tampa Bay when this comeback started. The other problem was that there were no less than six teams between the Royals and Rays at the time – and while the Rays have dropped behind Texas, Boston, and Oakland, that still leaves three teams between the Royals and Rays. The Royals finally caught the Orioles yesterday, which means that they’ve gone from the ninth-best record in the league to…tied for eighth.

The Royals have closed what was a dispiriting gap between them and the other contenders. But all they’ve done, to this point, is put themselves in the mix of a wild five-teams-for-one-spot finish.

It’s actually somewhat more exciting than that, because the Rangers’ recent swoon puts them 4.5 games ahead of the Royals, and unlike the Rays, Texas still has games against the Royals – three in Kansas City next weekend. Sweep those games and the Royals would be 1.5 games behind the Rangers. So it’s basically six teams for two spots.

At this point, the greatest obstacle for the Royals isn’t the distance, it’s the traffic. (Apologies to whoever I stole that line from.) Two-and-a-half games to make up is doable if you’re only chasing one team, because you have two paths to victory – play really well, or play just okay while they play terribly. In 2011, the Rays were 17-10 in September, and just 6-4 in their last 10 games. The Cardinals were a little better at 18-8 and 7-3, but they went just 4-3 in the season’s final week. But each team was only chasing one team, and when that team collapsed they were in.

The Rays may continue to play terribly, but if they do, they very quickly won’t be the team the Royals are chasing. SOME team, whether it’s the Indians, the Rays, or the Yankees, will play well over the last 16 games of the season – and the Royals need to be at least one game better than the best of them just to force a tie. Realistically, the Royals need to go at least 12-4 if they’re going to play any more games after September 30th.

But I think a lot of fans would have taken that scenario at the start of the year – that a 12-4 finishing kick would lead to extra baseball, even if it just meant a wild card game or even a tiebreaker game just to get into the wild card game. Hell, I probably would have taken that.

I didn’t think the Royals would be in this position with 16 games left, and it’s fair to ask myself if I missed something in my analysis. But here’s the thing – the Royals are exactly where I expected them to be. They’re doing it differently than I thought – less offense and more run prevention – but before the season I made the formal prediction that they’d win 86 games, and right now they’re on pace to win 85.4 games.

So I don’t think I’ve misjudged the Royals. I might have misjudged the wild card race, though. My assumption was that, based on the quality of the other teams in the AL, that it would take at least 90 wins to make the playoffs – and that was before you account for the fact that the Astros changed leagues. Adding the Astros ought to make the playoff standards even higher, for two reasons:

1) When you add more teams but keep the number of playoff spots the same, the standards to be a playoff team go up, in the same way that it’s a lot harder to finish in the top 10 of your graduating high school class when there are 306 kids in your class instead of 17.

2) The Astros are such a bad team that they single-handedly improve the winning percentage of the other 14 teams in the league. The Astros are on pace to finish 55-107; accounting for the 18 intraleague games, that means that the average AL team would pick up 1.62 additional wins from playing the Astros. (Obviously the exact number depends on how many times you played them – AL West teams would pick up more wins, AL Central and East teams less.)

So I figured it would take 92 wins to make the playoffs. If that’s the case, the Royals would need to go 15-1 to get there. I remember Rocktober 2007 well enough to say that’s not impossible, but it’s not something worth believing in either.

And here’s the thing: three weeks ago, it looked like it would take 92 wins. The last playoff spot at the time was held by the A’s, who were on pace for 91.1 wins. Factor in the chance that someone could have caught the A’s from behind, and 92 wins seemed like a fair bet.

Except now, the Rays are clinging to that final wild card spot, and they’re on pace for 88.3 wins. Given the sheer number of teams right behind them, chances are someone will get a little hot down the stretch – but there just aren’t enough games left for that number to go up much higher.

My former colleague Clay Davenport, who was there when we founded Baseball Prospectus back in 1996, and was (I believe) the first person to ever use Monte Carlo simulations to project postseason odds, continues to do so at his own website. Clay adds an interesting wrinkle, which is that he also posts the average number of wins by whatever team wins each division as well as both wild card spots. This gives you an idea of what number to shoot for.

According to Clay, whatever team wins the second AL wild card averages around 88.9 wins. The first AL wild card averages 90.8 wins. Round those up to 89 and 91. 12-4 gets the Royals to 89 wins. That’s a difficult road, but it’s not impassable, or impossible. Hell, 14-2 might get the Royals to host the wild card game.

Three wins doesn’t sound like much, but this time of year, it’s the difference between difficult and impossible. The Royals have caught a break in that the standards to make the playoffs in the AL have suddenly lowered. They’re going to need a few more breaks to take advantage of the first one. This journey is still probably coming to an end sooner rather than later. But let’s enjoy every moment of it as long as we can.

#YOSTED

“If the Royals ever get into a playoff race with Ned Yost as their manager, he’s going to cost them games in September with his tactical decisions.” – Joe Sheehan, to me, many, many times over the past few years.

So let’s set the stage, if you don’t mind.

The Royals recovered from the worst loss of the season Friday night to take the last two games against Detroit. As valuable as these wins were, the fact that they came against the first-place team in the division was of no extra benefit. Barring a miracle, the Royals aren’t catching the Tigers. They’re going after the wild card.

Tonight, though, the Royals opened a three-game series in Cleveland, a series which does have an added importance. The Indians are one of four teams the Royals have to overcome in the next three weeks, ranging from 1 to 3.5 games ahead of them in the standings. The Indians have, by far, the easiest schedule of the five: aside from six games against the Royals, they play six against the White Sox, four against the Astros, and four against the Twins. All 14 of their non-Royal games come against the three worst teams in the league.

But: they play the Royals six times. Of the remaining games on their schedule, the games against Cleveland are clearly the most important, and they would be even if the Royals still had games against the Yankees or Orioles or Rays, which they don’t. The Royals have to win five of these six games, or even sweep them. Even going 4-2 would just pull the Royals even in the loss column, and while the Indians have 14 cupcake games, six of the Royals’ other 13 games come against Detroit and Texas.

This series is huge. Tonight’s game was huge.

It didn’t start well at all. Asdrubal Cabrera homered in the second inning; in the third, Jose Ramirez singled for his first major league hit, then scored from first base on Drew Stubbs’ groundout after Eric Hosmer threw wildly trying to nail him at third base. Meanwhile, Jarrod Dyson was thrown out at the plate trying to score from third on Alex Gordon’s grounder to first base.

Yan Gomes homered in the fifth to give Cleveland a 3-0 lead, and after Hosmer singled in a run in the sixth, Carlos Santana led off the bottom of the seventh with a drive that nicked the very edge of the fair pole in right field – it was originally called a foul ball, but reversed on video replay.

But down 4-1 with six outs to go, the Royals fought back. Alcides Escobar doubled to lead off the eighth, and Gordon homered to bring the Royals within a run. Wade Davis gave up an infield single to Ramirez in the bottom of the inning – but then picked him off and finished the inning without further incident.

Down a run to start the ninth inning against the team they absolutely have to beat, against the closer (Chris Perez) everyone loves to hate, on the 9th of September, the Royals got to work. Salvador Perez singled. Mike Moustakas walked. The Royals had men on first-and-second and no one out.

“Is this the most tension you’ve ever felt as a Royals fan? This moment?” – Joe Sheehan, in a text to me, at this moment.

I’m too young to remember anything before 1982, and I was living overseas in 1984 and 1985, so with a nod to 1989, it’s basically between 2003 and this year. Everyone forgets that the Royals were tied for first place on the morning of August 30th in 2003, and just a game out on September 4th, but on September 9th that year they were, as they were today, 3.5 games out. While they would stay exactly 3.5 games out every day from September 11th to September 17th, they never did get any closer than that.

And that entire time, they never played the two teams they would ultimately finish behind, the White Sox and Twins. By the time they played the Sox, on September 19th, both teams were all but finished: the Royals were 4.5 games back, the White Sox 3.5 games back, with 10 games left.

Tonight’s game was against a direct contender with time still on the clock, a game the Royals didn’t play at all that September. The most tension I probably felt that season came in August; the Royals entered their final series in Minnesota on August 22nd a half-game behind the Twins, and one-game behind the Sox. They won the first two games of that series, 3-2 and 4-3, before getting blown out in the finale.

But in both of those wins, the Royals had the lead after five innings and held on to win. In the first game, the Twins didn’t threaten in the ninth until they reached base on a strikeout/wild pitch with two outs, followed by another strikeout to end it. In the second game, Mike Ryan led off the bottom of the ninth with a walk against Mike MacDougal, who struck out Shannon Stewart and then got Luis Rivas to hit into a game-ending double play.

I guess that moment could have qualified as the most stressful moment of the last 28 years. There were still 34 games left in the season after that game. There are 18 games left after tonight. Even acknowledging the steeper odds the Royals face this year compared to in 2003, September is the month for drama, not August.

So to answer Joe’s question: yes. Tonight, after Salvador Perez and Mike Moustakas reached base to put the tying and winning runs on base in the ninth inning against a team the Royals absolutely have to beat in order to make the playoffs, was probably the tensest moment of my entire life as a Royals fan.

(I’m 38 years old, by the way. I have lived and died with this team on a day-by-day basis for at least 24 years. And tonight was…yeah. I know.)

Okay, so now that the stage is set, let’s look at what happened.

Ned Yost, recognizing the stakes, decided to use every weapon at his disposal in the ninth inning. Chris Getz ran for Perez even before Moustakas walked; when Moustakas walked, he was pulled for Pedro Ciriaco.

I had no problem with this; if anything, in the moment it reminded me a little of the most famous ninth inning in Royals history, when Dick Howser used FOUR pinch-hitters and TWO pinch-runners, and one of those pinch-hitters drove in one of those pinch-runners to tie the game ahead of Jim Sundberg’s winning run. (See, kids, there was a time when baseball teams chose not to carry eight relievers, and instead had something they called a “bench”, where you could actually keep position players that could enter a game and provide value with their bat, their glove, or their legs.)

Ned Yost still wants his eight relievers, but fortunately it’s September, which means you can carry a bunch of extra players - I believe the Royals have 34 on their active roster right now. I’ve got no problem with Getz and Ciriaco pinch-running.

And then Yost calls on David Lough to pinch-hit for Lorenzo Cain.

Okay, an interesting decision, but it’s defensible, I suppose. Lough gives you the platoon advantage against Perez, and you still have several other bats to pinch-hit for Escobar with, and…wait, what? He pinch-hits for Cain with Lough, and then orders Lough to bunt?

Honestly, I don’t have a huge issue with bunting in the abstract in this situation. Giving up an out to move a runner from first to second is almost always a bad move (unless it’s the pitcher batting) – but giving up an out to move a runner from to second and a runner from second to third is, in the right circumstances, break even or even better. Prior to the bunt, with men on first and second and none out in the ninth, down a run, the Royals’ chances of winning the game were around 43%. A successful bunt that moved the runners to second and third with one out would actually increase the Royals’ chances of winning the game to about 44%. (Here’s a game from earlier this year against the Mets where the Royals bunted in the exact same situation – you can see their win probabilities listed in the play-by-play section.)

Basically, the bunt in that situation is a break-even play, depending on who’s at the plate, the pitcher, etc. I would argue that facing a less-than-elite closer in Perez, with a batter that has the platoon advantage and is tough to double-up (Lough has only grounded into three double plays all year), with good speed on the bases, that you’re probably better off swinging away in that situation. And I certainly don’t think it’s worth wasting one of your better pinch-hitters just to order him to put a bunt down.

But okay, it’s not the worst managerial decision I’ve ever seen. No, that came next.

So with one out and the tying run 90 feet away, the winning run 180 feet away, Jarrod Dyson was due to bat. Dyson’s not the first guy I’d want up in that situation, but he’s far from the last. He’s a lifetime .267/.334/.370 hitter against right-handed pitchers. He’s not a great contact hitter, but he’s not a swing-and-miss guy either – in 647 career plate appearances, essentially one full season of play, he’s struck out 123 times. And obviously, his speed can create all kinds of problems on any ball hit on the ground.

Only Dyson doesn’t come to the plate. In his stead, Yost sends up…Carlos Pena.

Now, there are probably situations in which I’d rather have Pena at the plate than Dyson. Two outs, tying run’s at the plate, you need a homer to tie…yeah, I could see the case for Pena in that situation.

This was not that situation.

The Royals had just bunted – they had just given up an out – in order to put two runners in scoring position. You know what “scoring position” means, right? It means IN POSITION TO SCORE ON A SINGLE. We don’t say a runner on first base is in scoring position, even though he could score on a double, and obviously the batter is in scoring position if he hits a home run. The point of moving runners into scoring position is so that THEY CAN SCORE ON A SINGLE.

Jarrod Dyson hits singles. Lots of them, actually. He’s a career .252 hitter, and 74% of his hits are singles. He has singled in 17% of his career plate appearances.

Carlos Pena does not hit a lot of singles. Walks and homers, yes. Singles, no. As Matthew Pouliot pointed out in his takedown of Ned Yost this evening, Pena hits singles in 10.3% of his career plate appearances – fewer than every other active player with 1000 plate appearances other than Adam Dunn. (And by the way, it’s not a good sign when a national baseball writer writes a column within minutes of the final out to point out what a terrible manager you are.)

Pena has had a long and occasionally brilliant career despite not hitting singles, because he hits home runs (27 or more six times) and draws walks (87 or more six times). But here’s the things – when you hit a home run or you draw a walk, IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCES WHETHER THE RUNNERS ARE ON FIRST AND SECOND, OR SECOND AND THIRD. A homer drives them all in; a walk loads the bases either way.

If Yost was planning to pinch-hit for Dyson with Pena, HE SHOULD NEVER HAVE BUNTED THE RUNNERS OVER. And if he wanted to bunt the runners over, HE SHOULD NEVER HAVE PINCH-HIT WITH CARLOS PENA. These two individual decisions, questionable but not catastrophic on their own, are like nitro and glycerin put together.

Yost gave up an out to give his team a chance to take the lead with a single – and then sent a batter to the plate with an unusual, nearly historic, inability to hit singles.

The other advantage of the bunt was that it moved the tying run to third base, allowing you to potentially tie the game without the benefit of a base hit. You’re not supposed to play for the tie on the road, but with the Royals’ bullpen, what the hell.

In which case, the last thing you want is a strikeout. Dyson has struck out in 19% of his career plate appearances. Pena has struck out in 27% of his career plate appearances.

So to reiterate: with the tying run on third base (don’t strike out!), and the go-ahead run on second base (hit a single!), Yost swapped out his scheduled hitter for a pinch-hitter who 1) strikes out 40% more often and 2) hits singles 40% less often.

AND THAT’S NOT THE WORST PART. No, the worst part is that CARLOS PENA IS DONE. He’s finished. He can’t hit anymore. For God’s sake, he was released BY THE HOUSTON ASTROS on July 31st, once they realized that no team was willing to trade for him. At the time he was released, he was hitting .209/.324/.350. Last year, playing every day for the Rays, he hit .197/.330/.354 in a feverish attempt to prove that occasionally the Rays don’t know what they’re doing. He did hit .225/.357/.462 for the Cubs in 2011, but hit .196/.325/.407 the year before that.

Since the start of the 2010 season, Pena is hitting .207/.335/.398. Since the start of the 2012 season, he is hitting .201/.327/.352. I’m not saying his secondary skills don’t give him a tiny bit of value. But I am saying that as terrible a choice as he would be to bat in this situation if he were at his peak, he’s an even more terrible choice today. For God’s sake, Pena hasn’t hit .230 in a season since 2008.

The Royals had plenty of better options than Pena in the franchise’s most leveraged plate appearance in 28 years. They could have let Dyson bat. They could have had Getz running on contact, making it more likely he’d score on a ground ball. That risked getting Getz thrown out at the plate – like Dyson had been earlier – but that would have put men on first-and-third, and with Dyson on first, they could have stolen second base, knowing there’s a good chance that the Indians wouldn’t have thrown through (even though Dyson had been thrown out trying to steal earlier) because it would have given Ciriaco a chance to steal home with two outs.

They could have put on a safety squeeze play, knowing again that the worst-case scenario was that they could have stolen second base with Dyson and have men on second-and-third again.

Or, if Yost really didn’t trust Dyson in that situation, he could have used a different hitter. Like, I don’t know, DAVID LOUGH. Lough has a higher career batting average than Dyson – admittedly a small sample size – and also has a lower strikeout rate. Lough’s big weakness is that he doesn’t walk, but again, with men on second and third walks don’t matter. Power doesn’t matter. Singles matter, and Lough hits singles on 18.7% of his career plate appearances.

Instead, Yost used Lough to put a bunt down because he didn’t trust Cain in that situation, or anyone else on the bench, including Johnny Giavotella or Jamey Carroll. If you don’t trust Jamey Carroll to put a bunt down, just cut him already. Or perhaps Ciriaco could put down a bunt, in which case you pinch-run for Moustakas with Carroll or Giavotella or Justin Maxwell instead.

This would require Ned Yost to think more than one move ahead, though.

Anyway, this is the Royals, where no bad deed goes unpunished. Pena saw six pitches and didn’t swing at any of them, including a 3-2 slider that sent him back to the dugout along with the Royals’ postseason hopes, more or less.

The Royals still had one out left, and Yost sent George Kottaras to the plate to bat for Escobar. If those are my two choices, against a right-handed pitcher, I of course want Kottaras at the plate – but again, in this specific situation (second and third, two out), Kottaras’ skill set is utterly misapplied. The Greek-Canadian God Of Walks has singled in 9.2% of his career plate appearances – an even lower rate than Pena’s. He’s hit eight singles all season long. He takes, and he rakes.

He took ball four this time, after fouling off four two-strike pitches, a magnificent at-bat that, because of the way he was used, didn’t do a whole lot to increase the Royals’ chances of winning the game. Because what it did do – load the bases – could have been accomplished WITHOUT BUNTING. If Yost had pinch-hit for Cain with Kottaras, a walk there would have loaded the bases with none out. If the bases were loaded with none out, Lough could have pinch-hit and driven in two with a single, or hell, Pena could have pinch-hit and had a chance to drive in the tying run with a walk.

Instead, with two runners on base and no one out, in the biggest inning his franchise had played in a generation, Yost seemed to go out of his way to put his players in a position to fail. He used the most players least suited for the situation that he deliberately gave up an out to create. With all that, the Royals still had Alex Gordon at the plate with the bases loaded and two outs. Gordon flied out. If there was only one out, the runner probably scores from third. And who knows, there might have been only one out if Yost hadn't given one away for no purpose. But he did.

There’s no way to sugarcoat this: Ned Yost made the most consequentially bad managerial decision I have ever seen from a Royals manager. Maybe the stakes weren’t quite as high, but this was Lin Elliott-caliber choking. This was Grady Little-caliber managerial malfeasance.

And I have to think the Royals’ front office understands this. As much as I rag on them, I have no doubt that they are very bright guys who understand baseball very well – and they must understand that Ned Yost just cost their team a ballgame in a pennant race with tactical decisions that can not possibly be defended. And they must understand that there is a small but real chance - I would say around 2% - that the outcome of this game will decide the outcome of the wild card race, with the Indians winning the wild card and the Royals finishing one or two games behind them.

Hell, I think Ned Yost himself understands he screwed up, although he may never admit it, much as Grady Little still refuses to acknowledge that maybe he should have pulled Pedro Martinez after seven innings. Like an NFL coach screwing up the clock management in a two-minute drill, in the heat of the moment, without enough time to coolly think through the implications of all his decisions, Yost made a decision that he can’t justify in the morning. (Fortunately, the Chiefs’ don’t have a coach who would ever screw up the clock.)

A few columns ago I wrote that Ned Yost’s influence on the decision to fire Kevin Seitzer was itself a fireable offense. I tried to sugarcoat that a little just yesterday, writing that as long as the two could co-exist, I’d be willing to accept Yost’s continued employment as manager.

Well, I can’t anymore. I think Ned Yost has done a decent job of what he was hired to do: develop these young players, get them acclimated to the major leagues, nurture them through the inevitable bumps along the way. It hasn’t always been pretty; Escobar looks like Angel Berroa Jr. at the plate, and the jury is still out on whether Mike Moustakas will ever reach his potential. But then Salvador Perez was never supposed to be this good.

If this is Yost’s final season as the Royals manager, I will remember him more fondly than most of his predecessors. Trey Hillman was overmatched. Buddy Bell was luckless and hapless. Tony Pena abandoned his team in the middle of the night. Tony Muser just wasn’t very good. Bob Boone wasn’t very good even though he apparently invented the game of baseball. Yost will have accomplished something during his time as the Royals’ manager, something I’m not sure I can say about any other manager since Hal McRae.

But at this point, his continued employment is a detriment to the organization. Tonight, with his team in a pennant race, in the most crucial inning his franchise has played since the year Back to the Future was released, Ned Yost cost his team the game with his indefensible decisions. It wasn’t the first time. And I fear it won’t be the last.