Around The World In Eighty Pitches.

With Luke Hochevar set to take the mound tonight, it’s a good time to ask, just how significant was his performance last Friday?

It was significant, obviously, in the sense that it was the best start of his career by far – his first complete game, and his game score of 79 was 12 points higher than his previous career high (last July 11^th against Seattle.) This was the Hochevar in the catalog – not an overpowering strikeout guy, but a pitcher who throws strikes, gets groundballs, and gets quick outs.

Only Hochevar wasn’t getting quick outs – he was getting QUICK outs. Four-pitch innings in the first and ninth bookended the 72 pitches he need to get through the seven innings in the middle. Checking the box score on my iPhone that evening, I remarked to my wife (who was holding on to every word, believe me), “I think the Royals set a record tonight.” And to the best of our knowledge, they did. We only have pitch count data back to 1988, when a fledgling STATS Inc. decided to start tracking pitches – so it’s quite possible that Larry Gura or Paul Splittorff twirled a 79-pitch gem at some point. But at least in the last 22 seasons, no Royal had ever thrown a complete game in 80 pitches. No one had come particularly close. Here’s a list of the fewest pitches thrown in a nine-inning performance by a Royal:

Pitches Date Pitcher

80 6/12/09 Luke Hochevar

88 8/19/97 Ricky Bones

89 8/6/95 Mark Gubicza

90 9/2/96 Tim Belcher

91 8/12/90 Tom Gordon

Ricky Bones actually went into the ninth inning having thrown just 75 pitches, one fewer than Hochevar, but struggled in his final inning, facing six batters (but throwing just 13 more pitches.)

Honorable mention goes to Kevin Appier, who on July 23^rd, 1992, threw 92 pitches – in ten innings. Appier was notorious for racking up high pitch counts, but on this day he threw just 80 pitches in the first nine innings, then 12 more in the tenth. I remember watching this game on TV, and while I was surprised to see Appier come back out for the tenth inning, there was a perception that he hadn’t been worked all that hard. I say “perception” because pitch counts simply were not available at the time – I had no way of knowing whether Appier had thrown 92 or 192 pitches, and I’m not sure the Royals did either. If they had known that he was still under 100 pitches, I wonder if they would have let him pitch the 11^th inning as well. (Which would have been awfully cool; no pitcher has gone more than 10 innings since Dave Stewart threw an 11-inning shutout on August 1^st, 1990.)

By any measure, Hochevar’s performance was historic. The question I have is whether it’s meaningful, by which I mean, is his performance a strong indicator that Hochevar is a quality major league pitcher.

Those of you who, like me, were weaned on the Bill James Historical Abstracts may remember a column James wrote in the 1985 edition. The column discussed what James called “signature significance”, which is a performance so dominant and rare that, even though it occurs in a small sample size, it presages a degree of quality in that player. It is the “signature” of a great player, and only a great player, to have such a performance.

If it’s Game 7 of the World Series and you have the choice of throwing a shutout or striking out 15 batters, you would of course take the shutout – while 15 strikeouts is not typically associated with bad performances, you’d want to take the sure thing. But if the question is whether, knowing nothing else about a pitcher except his performance in one game, you’d rather have the guy who threw shutout or the guy who struck out 15 batters – you’d take the guy with 15 Ks every time.

Shutouts have inherent value, but they do not have any particular predictive value. Bad pitchers can throw shutouts. (And, against the Royals, they usually do.) Good pitchers certainly throw more of them – but the fact that a pitcher throws a shutout is not singular evidence that he is a good pitcher.

On the other hand…there have been 27 occasions this century in which a pitcher struck out 15 or more batters in one game. Here’s a list of those pitchers:

Randy Johnson (9 times)

Pedro Martinez (4 times)

Mike Mussina (2 times)

Jake Peavy (2 times)

Mark Prior (2 times)

Erik Bedard

Cole Hamels

Johan Santana

Curt Schilling

Jason Schmidt

Ben Sheets

John Smoltz

Ron Villone

There are 11 outstanding pitchers on that list – and, yes, Ron Villone, who struck out 16 batters on the final Friday of the 2000 season against a Cardinals team that had already clinched a playoff spot. Late September performances always come with a discount.

The point is, if you told me that a young, previously unheralded pitcher is going to strike out 15 batters tonight, I’ll tell you without even knowing his identity that he’s going to be a star. There’s always a possibility things go wrong – he hurts his arm or develops Steve Blass Disease or whatnot – but the odds are exceedingly high that he’s going to become a star. Shutouts can be a fluke; 15-strikeout performances almost never are. A 15-strikeout performance has signature significance.

So getting back to Hochevar, the question I have is this: does an 80-pitch complete game constitute signature significance? Is this one start evidence, all by itself, that Hochevar is going to become a star?

Going back to the list above, given that Ricky Bones once threw an 88-pitch complete game, I’m going to say that an 88-pitch complete game does not have signature significance. But there’s a big difference between 88 pitches and 80. If we extended our study of strikeout pitchers to include pitchers with 14 strikeouts, we’d find guys like John Maine and Wade Miller, good pitchers having the games of their lives rather than great pitchers. It’s possible that 88 pitches is at the inner edge of what an extreme finesse pitcher, even a marginal one like Bones, can do when everything is working – but that 80 pitches is beyond that range.

So what I’ve done is come up with a list of every pitcher since 1993 who has thrown 85 or fewer pitches in a game. But a word of caution: pitch count data is notoriously unreliable, as many times different sources will differ on their pitch counts by two or three pitches. Just by way of example, that Appier game above, Baseball Reference lists his pitch count at 92 – but in the same file, if you count up the pitches to each batter individually, you end up with 95! I think the problem is that in the bottom of the second, Mark Whiten was caught stealing on a 1-2 pitch to Glenallen Hill – and since Hill started over to lead off the third, the three pitches he saw in the second inning were not counted. This sort of stuff happens all the time – some sources don’t count the pitches thrown in intentional walks, for instance – so this data can’t be considered completely reliable. But we’ll do our best.

Since 1993, a pitcher has thrown 85 pitches or less in a complete game 25 times. (I’m defining “complete game” as “9 or more innings”, to eliminate complete games of the 8-innings-in-a-loss variety.) Here’s a list of those 25 in chronological order. An asterisk denotes a start of 80 pitches or less.

1993 – 1998

Jim Abbott

John Smiley

Tom Glavine*

Orel Hershiser

Darryl Kile

Billy Swift

Bobby Munoz*

Greg Maddux

Chad Ogea

Bob Wolcott*

Jim Bullinger

Greg Maddux

Greg Maddux*

Joey Hamilton

Mike Grace

Andy Ashby*

2001

Jon Lieber*

Steve Sparks

Roy Halladay

2005 – 2009

Carlos Silva*

Rich Harden

Carlos Silva

Aaron Cook*

Aaron Cook*

Luke Hochevar*

An interesting mélange of talents here, to say the least. These pitchers share certain general characteristics. They’re not power pitchers, which makes sense, since strikeouts take a lot of pitches. Also, they’re almost all groundball pitchers. This also makes a ton of sense when you think about it. Aside from hits, there are two major impediments to a low pitch count: balls, and foul balls. And while I’ve never seen a study that’s looked at this issue, I’m willing to bet that groundballs are much less likely to go foul than flyballs – and therefore groundball pitchers give up fewer foul balls than flyball pitchers. It’s easier to keep your pitch counts low when the batter isn’t fouling off pitches right and left.

In terms of quality, though, there is no firm consensus. There are 21 different pitchers on this list. Thirteen of them have made at least 180 starts in their careers, and three more – Carlos Silva (159), Aaron Cook (153), and Rich Harden (110) – are likely to get there as well (although the clock is ticking on Silva). Making 180 starts is the equivalent of being a full-time starter for six seasons – that seems to be a pretty good indication of quality. Not a star, maybe, but a valuable starting pitcher.

But then you have the other five guys, who are in italics above – Bob Wolcott, Bobby Munoz, Mike Grace, Jim Bullinger, and Chad Ogea – none of whom reached 100 career starts. And as you can see, even if we tighten the requirements to exclude the guys who threw 85 or 84 pitches, that doesn’t help Hochevar – both Wolcott and Munoz threw 80 pitches on the dot. So based on the percentages, that means that Hochevar has about a 76% chance (16 of 21) to develop into a quality starter.

If you want to spin the numbers a little, you can point out that all five non-quality starters pitched between 1994 and 1997, and the feat has become more rare since. (There were 16 low-pitch starts made between 1993 and 1998, but just nine in the decade since.) It’s possible that the feat has become rarer because it’s become harder – teams have wizened up to the importance of plate discipline over the last ten years. If that’s true, than Hochevar’s performance is more impressive – every other pitcher who has done so in the last decade has been a quality starter.

But for now, I would argue that a single 80-pitch complete game, as impressive as it was, does not constitute signature significance that Hochevar is going to have a long and successful career. It is certainly suggestive, but not an ironclad guarantee.

Keep in mind, only three pitchers have done this twice – Silva, Cook, and (3 times) Greg Maddux. So if Hochevar does this again – then we have a winner.

Are The Royals In The Wrong League?

If you haven’t listened to this week’s show, please do so. Will Leitch stayed out of the range of bicycles only long enough to join us for 20 minutes, but we covered more material than you’d expect to hear in an hour-long show. Leitch is, apparently, one of the few men in American who talks faster than I do.

We also had our first disgruntled caller of the year, as a Cincinnati Reds fan took exception to the manner in which Jason Anderson and I discounted the Royals’ performance over the weekend by pointing out that it came against the inferior competition of the National League. I completely empathize with someone who wants to stand up for his hometown team, but anyone who wants to argue that the Reds are a better team than the Royals just because they have a better win-loss record is going to have to find a way to deal with those pesky facts.

The fact is that with tonight’s convincing win against the Diamondbacks, the Royals are now 47-32 against NL teams since the start of the 2005 season, a .595 winning percentage, while playing just 244-388 (.386) against AL teams in that span. The odds that a team with a “true” winning percentage of .386 would actually win 47 out of 79 games is .00014, or about one in seven thousand. And while the Royals are probably the most dramatic example of AL teams beating up on NL competition, they are far from the only ones.

This of course gets back to the Royals’ decision, over a decade ago, to stay in the American League when they had the opportunity to jump ship. Despite the obvious difference between the leagues today, I think it’s far from clear that the Royals made a mistake in choosing to stay.

For one thing, the AL didn’t emerge with a clear superiority until about 2005. Interleague play began in 1997, and the NL won the season series four times in the first eight seasons. But in 2005 the AL went 136-116, then 154-98 (!) the following year, then 137-115, and 149-103 last season.

Most estimates about the degree of difference between the leagues come in between eight and ten wins, so let’s split the difference and say it’s nine – an AL team moving to the NL would win roughly ten more games against intraleague competition, but they’d lose about one game in interleague play because they would now be playing the AL in those affairs.

So give the Royals a bump of nine wins each year starting in 2005, and put them in the NL Central instead of the Milwaukee Brewers, and you have…a team that still doesn’t so much as sniff a postseason berth. Last year the Royals would have gone 84-78 instead of 75-87…which would have left them in fourth place in the division, 13 games behind the Cubs and five games out of a wild-card spot. The Royals would still have finished under .500 from 2005 to 2007; the only saving grace is that they might have avoided any 100-loss seasons in that span.

Looking to the future, while it’s possible and maybe even likely that the AL will maintain its dominance, from the Royals’ standpoint the question of which league is superior is a lesser concern than which division is superior. While a wild-card entry to the postseason is certainly nice – and a more likely outcome in the Yankee and Red Sox-free National League – the Royals’ best hope for a playoff spot is to win their division. Aside from the fact that the NL Central is the only division in baseball with six teams, there’s an even more compelling reason to think that going forward, the Royals will be better off staying in the AL Central.

There are 11 teams in the two Central divisions, and those 11 teams represent some of the smallest markets in baseball, from Kansas City to Milwaukee to Pittsburgh to Cincinnati to Minneapolis-St. Paul. The favorable geography that lumps most of the small-market teams in the same division, raising the odds that one of them will make the playoffs, is an underrated contributor to increasing parity in baseball.

Of those 11 teams, only one can boast of a combination of market size, economic strength, and fan passion strong enough to upset the balance in the division. The teams listed in the last paragraph don’t have the market size; neither do the Cardinals, despite a passionate fan base. The Tigers and Indians play in the heart of the Rust Belt. The Astros have a large population to draw on, but play in a state where the #1 sport is football and the #2 sport is spring football. The White Sox play second fiddle in their own city.

The one team that has the market muscle to simply blow the other teams in their division out of the water is the Chicago Cubs. The fact that the Cubs have not taken advantage of their, well, advantages to this point is much to their discredit – but those who think that the Cubs will continue to underplay their hand do so at their own peril. The Cubs’ biggest handicap to success for the last few decades has been their ownership. We have decades of evidence that strongly suggests that corporations and baseball teams are a bad mix, dating to the days when CBS owned the New York Yankees, and the experience of the Tribune Corporation with the Cubs is no different. The bottom line is that corporations tend to place profits over winning – in fact, they have a fiduciary responsibility to do so. It’s no surprise that the Cubs, despite immense financial resources, have never leveraged those resources into building a juggernaut.

That may change, and soon, because the Tribune Corporation is about to hand off the Cubs to a new owner – the Ricketts family. It’s possible the deal may fall through, but realistically the Cubs will be under new – and probably private – ownership soon. You only need to look at the Boston Red Sox to see what can happen when a rudderless organization that has squandered natural resources for ages is purchased by a small entity of savvy owners looking to win.

So going forward, if you were to ask me which division I want the Royals to be in, the simple answer would be, “whichever division the Cubs are not in.” The AL may be the superior league. But I’d rather go up against a division full of above-average teams than try to wrest the division away from one single dominant franchise.

The Five Stages of Being a Royals Fan, Using Only Blog Quotes.

Stage 1: Denial

“Let’s take a deep breath, everyone. Good teams lose six games in a row. The difference is they also win six games in a row.”

“So don’t panic. This is the AL Central, where the Royals can lose six games in a row in mid-May and still hold on to a share of first place.”

Stage 2: Anger

“I realize that pride goeth before a fall, but this is ridiculous.”

“Momentum means NOTHING.”

Stage 3: Bargaining

“So if the Royals get a favorable outcome today, they would need only a three-game sweep of the Tigers at home – with Meche, Greinke, and Davies starting – to be back atop the division by Wednesday night. That’s not likely, mind you. But the mere fact that it’s possible is testament to how silly it is to be giving up on the season already.”

“Yes, the Royals have the same record after 43 games that they had last year. But to argue that this means they’ve made no progress is as silly as arguing that they’re going win more than 102 games because – as Martin Manley points out – they have a better record after 43 games than the 1977 Royals did.”

Stage 4: Depression

“I have no idea if the Royals are going to turn things around, whether they’ll get back to .500 this year, whether they’ll contend again in 2009. On paper, there’s no obvious reason why the Royals can’t reverse course. But I know that the Royals aren’t going to win a damn thing so long as they’ve got a GM who isn’t willing to cut losses on a contract that was a mistake the moment it was signed, and a manager who doesn’t understand that just because you have a pitcher on your roster doesn’t mean you have to use him in tight situations.”

Stage 5: Acceptance

“I think the Royals should trade for Jeff Francoeur.”

This Crow Doesn't Taste So Bad.

As those of you who follow me on Twitter (@jazayerli) know, my initial reaction to the Aaron Crow was, shall we say, less than enthusiastic. This wasn’t a reflection on Crow so much as it was a reflection on Grant Green, who thanks to the Pirates’ late decision to go cheap yet again and select Boston College catcher Tony Sanchez – probably the 20^th-best player in the draft – at #4, the tumblers fell into place for Green to be available at #12.

The Royals selected Crow instead, and as MLB Network cut to commercial they gave us a look-in at the A’s war room, and it seemed like every person in that room had a big sh*t-eating grin on his face. Knowing exactly why those jerks looked so smug – and sure enough, the A’s took Green with the #13 pick – only made me more upset.

But then I started getting feedback from people in the industry who know a lot more about this stuff than I do, and started to warm up to the pick. Keith Law, ESPN’s draft guru, wrote me, “I don’t see how you can complain about that one!” Law uses exclamation points even more rarely than he praises the Royals, so that was something. Law had Crow as the 5^th-best player in the draft, and Green at just #13. Law isn’t afraid to voice scouting opinions that differ from the consensus – last year, he was maybe the only prospect maven in the world who thought that Pedro Alvarez was overrated, and that sentiment looks pretty smart at the moment. But Law isn’t the only draft expert who ranked Crow more highly than Green; Baseball America’s last draft ranking had Crow 7^th and Green 13^th. And While Kevin Goldstein had Green ranked higher, it was hardly a slam-dunk - #5 vs. #7.

Green’s strengths are obvious: he’s a polished college hitter who will be in the majors soon, and he gives you a good bat at a premium defensive position – a position the Royals have a particularly strong need to fill. But he’s not perfect. He hit just four home runs this season, and nine last year – while he hit for power in the wood-bat Cape Cod League, it’s not clear how much power he’ll have in the majors. A guy who hits .280 with 20 homers is a star at shortstop; a guy who hits .280 with 12 homers is just a good player.

Secondly, and maybe more importantly, there is a legitimate difference of opinions from scouts on how well he can play shortstop. Some feel he’ll be an average defensive player with no issues; some think he’ll be below average but playable; some think he’ll have to move off the position entirely. This is not a trivial concern for the Royals. If Green can handle shortstop, he fills a huge need. If he can’t, then he’s a third baseman or a second baseman, two positions where the Royals already have more than enough options as it is. If the Royals fall into the camp of people who think that he can’t play shortstop, then it would be hard for them to justify taking Green.

Still, I think that all things equal, the Royals should take the player at a position of need. But clearly the Royals did not feel that all things were equal between Green and Crow, and took the pitcher even though they had bigger needs elsewhere.

I can respect that. It’s easier to respect that decision when you consider that aside from Green, Crow was the best player on the board when the Royals picked. Looking at the three draft lists (BA, Law, Goldstein), the only players ranked higher than Crow who were still available were Tanner Scheppers (on two lists), Alex White (on one), and Kyle Gibson (on one). Gibson’s stress fracture manifested itself after he showed up 4^th on BA’s list, and Scheppers is coming off a shoulder injury and Will Carroll is scared to death of him. BA had White 6^th and Crow 7^th, but Goldstein had White 14^th and Law had him 10^th. If you were to put together a Wisdom of Crowds-style draft list, then Crow was absolutely the right pick.

Beyond the pure talent considerations, there’s a lot to like with this pick. Crow has been off the radar this year because, having failed to sign with the Nationals last year as the #9 pick, he didn’t pitch for anyone this year until starting his season with the Fort Worth Cats a month ago. A year ago, he was the best right-handed pitcher in college, with a 43-inning scoreless streak for Mizzou (yes, yes, not Missou, I get it, thanks everyone.) He didn’t sign with the Nationals, but this is one of those rare cases where you can blame the team as much as the player – the final negotiations had Crow wanting $4 million, the Nationals offering $3.5 million, but the lack of dialogue between the two sides until the last moment sank the negotiations. Aaron Crow has maintained the Hendricks brothers as his adviser. The Nationals, you might have noticed, have declined to maintain the services of Jim Bowden. I wouldn’t hold Crow’s decision to sit out a year against him that much. (Maybe he was worried that Bowden was going to skim some of his bonus.)

The comparisons between Crow and Luke Hochevar are too easy to make; both pitchers didn’t sign as college juniors, went the indy ball route and signed with Fort Worth, and then got drafted by the Royals. That comparison seems to bother some people, but frankly, I don’t see what the problem is. The disappointment with Hochevar doesn’t stem from his performance, but from the fact that he was the #1 overall pick. If the Royals had drafted Hochevar 12^th, no one would be complaining about his career path to this point. The Royals just had the misfortune of drafting #1 overall in a year when there was no clear #1 overall pick. The year before, they would have taken Justin Upton; the year after, they would have taken David Price. Instead, they had to pick from the best of many options, and given the turmoil in the front office at the time – Dayton Moore had just been hired but could not give his input in the draft – it’s not surprising that they chose a compromise pick in Hochevar.

The thing is, on pure stuff Crow might actually have a slight edge on Hochevar. Hochevar had better sink on his pitches, but Crow’s velocity is a tick better. Both rely on sliders as out pitches; it will be interesting to see whether the Royals force Crow to emphasize his curveball during his development as they did with Cool Hand.

Also, the fact that Crow went to college in Missouri and high school in Kansas gets back to the idea of knowing your backyard better than anyone else. Presumably the Royals have a better feel for Crow - his family, his work ethic, his health record - than most teams do. If they don't, they're doing something wrong.

Also keep in mind that if you’re still a believer in Project 2010 – and given the way the Royals are playing, I wouldn’t blame you if you weren’t – then Crow has the ability to be ready for a rotation spot as soon as this time next year. He’ll be the best pitching prospect in the organization the minute he signs. He’s not young – he’ll be 23 in the fall, which makes him older than, say, Dan Cortes – but then again, he’s a better pitcher than Cortes is right now.

I know it appears that the Royals have five quality starters already in their rotation, but even if they all maintain their effectiveness, the odds that all five starters will be off the DL a year from now is probably 50/50 at best. You can never have too much pitching.

What I like best about this pick is that the Royals drafted a signable player without skimping on quality at all. Crow was only available because so many teams ahead of the Royals drafted inferior talents to save money - the Pirates at #4, the Orioles at #5, the Braves at #7, and the Nationals at #10. The Rockies are getting all kinds of credit for drafting Tyler Matzek at #11, and the Cardinals for drafting Shelby Miller at #19. Both are great prospects, but both also have fairly ridiculous bonus demands. In Crow, the Royals got a pitcher who compares favorably to where guys like Matzek and Jacob Turner and Miller might be in three or four years, without worrying about some ridiculous $7 million demand. Crow would have taken $4 million last year, and probably will settle for somewhere in the $3-3.5 million this year. That’s not slot money, but it also doesn’t break the budget.

This is important, because what elevated the first day of the draft from good to very good was the decision to take North Carolina high school catcher Wil Myers in the 3^rd round. Myers was on my pre-draft list of guys the Royals were thinking of taking with their first pick – and while that would have been a reach, getting him in the third round is a steal. He’s a very athletic player who could play the outfield if he can’t handle things behind the plate. His bonus demands contributed to him falling to the third round, but given that the Royals kicked the tires on him in the first round, I’m sure they have a very good idea of what it will take to sign him, and they wouldn’t have taken him if they didn’t think they could afford him. Much like Tim Melville’s pick last year, Myers signals that the Royals are done playing chumps in the draft – they’ll take the best talent available and let other teams’ fear of spending money in the draft work to their advantage for a change.

And remember, last year the Royals spent $6 million on Eric Hosmer alone. If Crow gets $3.5 million and Myers gets, say, $1.5 million, they’ve still spent less on both of them than they did on Hosmer. Not to mention the money spent on their supplemental first-rounder and second-rounder last year; there should still be plenty of money left over for the international signing season.

The Royals started the second day of the draft by taking Chris Dwyer, a left-handed pitcher out of Clemson who turned 21 in April, making him the first draft-eligible freshman from a four-year college in draft history. That’s an interesting draft note, but what matters is that Baseball America ranked Dwyer as the #55 player available in this draft. With their first three picks, drafting #12, #91, and #122, the Royals nabbed BA’s #7, #31, and #55 best players. That’s strong work.

As Baseball America’s J.J. Cooper wrote this morning, “if Kansas City can sign both Myers and Dwyer they will have landed a pair of supplemental first/second-round talents despite lacking a second-round pick.”

The draft won’t finish up until tomorrow; as I write this they’re in the 12^th round, and the Royals draft has become remarkable for its reliance on pitching, and not the high school arms you’d expect to see. Of the Royals’ first 11 picks, two were catchers, one was a high school first baseman – and the other eight were all college pitchers. That’s just bizarre, but in a draft which everyone says is very weak in hitters, you have to admire the Royals’ decision to draft the guys they like best and figure out where to put them all later.

Ultimately, I’d give this draft a B at this point, which is an awfully strong grade given the lack of a second-round pick. Maybe the Royals didn’t select the guy I wanted them to pick. But they selected the guy that they wanted to pick, not the guy they settled for in order to save money, and ultimately that’s all you can ask for.

Draft Preview From A Non-Draft Expert.

I was hoping to do my usual long-winded draft preview, but time constraints this year force me to keep this rather short (well, by my standards). Given my complete lack of expertise on this subject, that’s probably for the best. Besides, if you want to get an expert opinion on the draft, I recommend you download the podcast of tonight’s episode, where you can listen to Kevin Goldstein break down the draft from the Royals’ perspective.

For the first time since 2004, the Royals will not be drafting in the top three – let that sink in for a moment – as they are lined up in the #12 slot. It may be fortuitous, then, that this draft is so wide open after the first two picks. Stephen Strasburg will go #1 and Dustin Ackley will go #2, barring unforeseen circumstances, because those are the two best talents in the draft. Strasburg, as you know, is the Greatest Draft Prospect Of All Time. Ackley is a line-drive machine who’s played mostly first base in college but should be able to handle center field; on paper he reminds me of former #1 overall pick Darin Erstad, and if that means the 2000 version of Erstad, that’s a heck of a player.

But the #3 pick tomorrow could be one of about a dozen different players, because the difference between the 3^rd-best and the 30^th-best player in this draft is as small as it’s been in a very long time. This should suit the Royals, because inevitably someone who’s a Top 6 or 7 pick on paper will fall to them at #12, and if the Royals are content to scoop up whoever falls to them unexpectedly, they should be able to grab a better player than the pick would suggest, with the added bonus that they’ll be negotiating from the position that the player wasn’t selected until 12^th overall, and isn’t entitled to Top 5 money.

The Royals can’t afford to screw this pick up, because thanks to Juan Cruz they don’t have a second-round pick, and thanks to the collapse of the subprime veteran market, they don’t have a supplemental pick as compensation for Mark Grudzielanek. The Royals’ second pick is 91^st overall. The Royals haven’t entered the draft in a worse position since 1993, when they surrendered their second-round pick for David Cone and their third-round pick for Greg Gagne. They still had the #5 overall pick, but naturally wasted it on Jeff Granger. (In 1990, thanks to the signing of the Davis Brothers the previous winter, the Royals didn’t draft in the first two rounds at all.)

It’s obviously not a good thing that the Royals draft just once in the first 90 picks, but there are certainly ways to alleviate the problem. Namely, the Royals can take the money they would have spent on the draft picks they don’t have and use it on the international market. The Royals already anticipated this situation a few months ago when they spent $600,000 – the equivalent of late second-round money – on a 17-year-old Korean catcher named Shin Jin-Ho. This is, I believe, the first time the Royals have ever spent significant money to sign an amateur player from the Pacific Rim area, and a very good sign for the future.

Also, in what appears to be a very good year for amateur talent in Latin America, the Royals are quite active. They aren’t frontrunners for any of the premier $2 million-and-up guys, but they are linked to a lot of the six-figure talents. As Goldstein points out, the Royals taking the approach that given the uncertainty of developing talent from Latin America, it’s better to sign a lot of good players than one great player. (This article from ESPN’s Jorge Arangure suggests that the Royals are “clearly in the lead” for a player named Cheslor Cuthbert, who is either one of Draco Malfoy’s henchmen or the best amateur player to come out of Nicaragua in recent years.)

So the lack of a second-rounder notwithstanding, the Royals are still in a position to add some talent to the farm. But their first-round pick is still the motherlode. So with that in mind, I’ll go down the list of Goldstein’s Top 50 draft talents and add some quick thoughts.

1) Stephen Strasburg, RHP, San Diego State. HAH!

2) Dustin Ackley, OF, North Carolina. Hah.

3) Donavan Tate, OF, Georgia HS. Incredibly toolsy outfielder, but not entirely sure he can hit, and it’s testament to how few sure things there are in this draft that he rates this high anyway. Also wants an enormous bonus. It’s actually possible he’ll be available at #12; actually, it’s possible that anyone except the two guys above will be there. A classic high risk/high reward talent. I don’t have a strong feeling one way or the other.

4) Jacob Turner, RHP, Missouri HS. I’ve been told that one of the things Dayton Moore is trying to do with the scouting staff is make sure that the Royals outscout every other team when it comes to players in their backyard, just like the Braves do in theirs. The talent level isn’t the same, but if there’s an obscure talent in Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa…the Royals need to know about them first – no more Albert Pujols debacles. On that note, it’s an incredibly positive sign that the Royals stole Tim Melville in the fourth round last year. That’s what the Royals need to do – take advantage of their location to evaluate these players better than anyone else, and in Melville’s case the Royals knew that he’d be signable at a reasonable price, and got a first-round talent three rounds later.

The Royals’ lack of success in finding major leaguers in their own backyard is just inexcusable. Everyone knows about Pujols, of course, but how about Shaun Marcum (3^rd round pick in 2003 out of Missouri State)? Or Ryan Howard (5^th round pick out of Missouri State in 2001)? Or Ian Kinsler, a Missou product who didn’t get drafted until the 17^th round in 2003?

Turner is probably not going to be available when the Royals pick. If he is, though, you can only hope the Royals have done their due diligence on him. He might have the best stuff of any high school pitcher in the draft, but he (like a lot of the high school pitchers out there) wants Porcello money. He’d be a steal at #12, but he won’t be a steal if the Royals have to fork over $7 million to sign him.

5) Grant Green, SS, USC. The Great White Whale of this draft; let the corks pop and the bubbly flow if he’s there at 12. Came into the season as a potential Top-3 pick, but had a disappointing year. He wasn’t bad, per se, he just didn’t hit quite as well as people were hoping. There’s a little concern that he won’t be able to stay at shortstop. Given what the Royals have been willing to put up with at shortstop of late, a guy who can hit like this can be forgiven some defensive foibles. I don’t know who to compare to him to offensively…Troy Tulowitzki, maybe?

Anyway, the guys at Baseball America have had me excited by projecting that Green will be available at 12 and that the Royals will clock him, but Goldstein dashed those dreams by reporting that there’s no way he’ll be available, as his recent slide down draft lists has been reversed. At the risk of turning colors on my team, I hope the BP guy is wrong and the BA guy is right. But I’m not counting on it.

6) Tanner Scheppers, RHP, St. Paul Saints (formerly Fresno State). Scheppers hurt his shoulder just before the draft last year; the Pirates kicked the tires on him in the second round but elected to pass. He’s healthy now and his velocity is back in the upper 90s. You have to worry about the arm, but he could be electric if healthy. Another unsigned collegiate guy turned indy ball pitcher, Max Scherzer, springs to mind.

7) Aaron Crow, RHP, Fort Worth Cats (formerly University of Missouri). Or maybe I should use the Scherzer comparison here, given that Scherzer is also a Missou guy. Crow doesn’t have the injury concerns; his velocity is a little lower but his command might be a little better. I have no idea who is better.

8) Mike Leake, RHP, Arizona State. Performance-wise he’s actually been better than Strasburg this year, pitching in a tough conference and in a hitter’s park. His velocity is average, but everything else – command, athleticism, and the ethereal pitchability that everyone wants – is off-the-charts. Could be in the majors this time next year. I like the idea of calling him Brian Bannister with better stuff…much better stuff. The only downside to this pick is that if you’re looking for a guy to make the majors quickly, the rotation is the only part of the team that the Royals don’t need instant relief for, so the value to the Royals might be less than for some other teams.

9) Tyler Matzek, LHP, California HS. Love this guy, he’s shooting up the charts based on his late-season performances, but don’t see him lasting to 12. If he does, I’d rather have him than every pitcher ahead of him on this list except for Strasburg. But I’m not a scout.

10) Matt Purke, LHP, Texas HS. Don’t like him nearly as much, and he seems to have the most inflated…dare I say delusional…perception of his market worth of anyone in this draft. Pass.

11) Zach Wheeler, RHP, Georgia HS. The Braves reportedly love him, and since they are required by state statute to draft only guys from Georgia in the first round, I don’t think he’ll make it to 12. No opinion on him either way.

12) Kyle Gibson, RHP, University of Missouri. Goldstein thinks this is the guy the Royals are most likely to take. A potential Top 5 guy before his velocity tanked in his last start, after which he was found to have a stress fracture in his arm and is out at least two months. It’s not the kind of injury that is career-threatening, but he definitely would be a gamble. I also wonder how likely the Royals would be to use another first-rounder on a college pitcher who relies heavily on his slider (like Hochevar) given the organizational focus on using the curveball.

Others of note:

20) Tony Sanchez, C, Boston College. A lot of rumors that the Royals (and a few other teams) might overdraft this guy a bit, because while he doesn’t have star potential, he’s a safe pick who gives you terrific defense and a fair amount of pop. (The best comparison I’ve heard is to Kelly Shoppach with a much better glove.) I can confirm that the Royals are considering him, but that they realize it would be an overdraft. My feeling here is that if the Royals want a right-handed hitting catcher who has decent power but a long swing, they could just stick with John Buck. Or Miguel Olivo. And then there's John Buck. Also, Miguel Olivo.

29) Garrett Gould, RHP, Kansas HS. Mentioned only because he’s a local product, but he would be an overdraft at this point, and doesn’t throw nearly as hard as the other high school arms that are likely to still be available at 12.

34) Wil Myers, C, North Carolina HS. I’ve seen at least one mock draft that had the Royals reaching for Myers. Myers’ draft stock would be a lot higher if teams were sure he could stay at catcher; he has the bat and athleticism to play the outfield. The upside comparison I’ve heard has been to Dale Murphy; keep in mind that Murphy had to move off the plate before his career took off. (Not to suggest that the second coming of Dale Murphy would be a bad thing.)

Goldstein’s list of the three most likely players the Royals will select was Gibson, followed by Crow, followed by Leake. You’ll notice a trend – they’re all college pitchers, which isn’t a huge need for the team at this point. Unfortunately, if you look at the list above, every player from 6 to 12 is a pitcher. You can’t force the draft – you have to let the draft come to you. If the best player available is a pitcher, you take the pitcher and figure out the ramifications later.

But based on need, if either of the two hitters listed – Green or Tate – are available, that’s a home-run pick, assuming they can sign them (both are Boras clients.) If they’re not there, then if the Royals want a hitter then by definition they’re going to have to reach. The next hitter on Goldstein’s list would be #15 Bobby Borchering, a switch-hitting third baseman out of a Florida high school who probably has the most power in the draft. Do the Royals need another corner infielder, though?

Ultimately I rate the odds of each player, and the preliminary grade, thusly:

Grant Green, Grade A, 15%

Tyler Matzek, Grade A-, 10%

Donavan Tate, Grade B+, 5%

Jacob Turner, Grade B+, 10%

Mike Leake, Grade B, 10%

Aaron Crow, Grade B-, 10%

Tanner Scheppers, Grade C+, 5%

Kyle Gibson, Grade C, 20%

Zach Wheeler, Grade C, 1%

The Field, Grade D+, 13%

Matt Purke, Grade D, 1%

But again: I am not a draft expert. Doesn’t stop me from pretending to be one every year, though.

Radical Situations Call For Radical Solutions.

Baseball is a funny game. The day after Zack Greinke channels his 2005 form en route to giving up seven runs in five innings, hurtling the Royals ever deeper into the bottomless pit they fell into four weeks ago, the Royals have close to a perfect day. The day certainly had a perfect start, when Dayton Moore decided that Horacio Ramirez’s contract was less unpalatable than his performance, and chose to eat the rest of it. Fifth starter Luke Hochevar then returned with a start that reminded us why we were so excited about this team a month ago: say what you will about the rest of this team, but every pitcher in the starting rotation projects to have a long and successful career ahead of him.

The Royals’ metronomic out-making on offense – Scott Richmond faced the minimum through four innings – suddenly came to an end in the fifth when Mark Teahen homered to the opposite field – you know, that thing he used to do back when the Royals started 18-11. Alberto Callaspo followed with a double – also a blast from the past, if by “past” you mean April. Then Mitch Maier and David DeJesus followed with walks – you may remember the Royals had some success with that earlier this year – and finally the Spork himself, Willie Bloomquist, cleared the bases with a triple, his fourth of the season (only Coco Crisp has more in the AL!), the first 3-RBI hit for the Royals since Miguel Olivo hit a three-run homer back on May 15^th.

And when Hochevar got into a spot of trouble in the seventh inning, he was rescued by the remarkable Kyle Farnsworth, who completed his redemption story from bullpen pariah to set-up savior by retiring all four batters he faced in the seventh and eighth. Five appearances into his Royals career, the Professor already had three losses along with an 18.90 ERA. Since then, working entirely in garbage relief, Farnsworth had thrown 15.1 scoreless innings, allowing just nine hits and two walks while striking out 15. He actually got the win in the Miguel Olivo Walks! comeback game when the Royals scored four in the ninth, but Hillman was understandably so reluctant to trust Farnsworth in key situations that not one of his last 15 appearances came with a Leverage score of more than 0.30 – where 1.00 is average, and a “key” situation might easily rate 2 or higher.

Maybe Bob McClure fixed a flaw, or maybe Farnsworth pitches better when the pressure is off, but the only way to find out was to do what the Royals did today, and bring him into a game that was on the line. I’ve been waiting for this move since at least last Sunday, when I was sitting behind home plate at Kauffman Stadium as John Bale got into a mess in the ninth, Hillman called for the righty in the bullpen – and I realized with much discomfort that I was actually disappointed to see Juan Cruz, not Farnsworth, entering through the bullpen gate.

Farnsworth didn’t get the call then, but he got the call today, and pitched with the same sense of purpose that he has for the past six weeks, retiring four batters on just 11 pitches. With Cruz tanking, with Jamey Wright hit or miss, with Robinson Tejeda on the DL, we’ve reached the point where Farnsworth isn’t just the go-to guy in set-up situations…he’s clearly the go-to guy in set-up situations.

Like I said: baseball is a funny game.

But that’s not really want to talk about right now. I have bigger fish to fry. As I write this, the Royals are 24-31, amazingly just 5.5 games out of first place, but also just 1.5 games out of last. The offense is next-to-last in the league, and the once-vaunted pitching staff had fallen to 8^th in the league in runs allowed (although the rankings are so tight that the strong performance today bumped the Royals back up to 6^th in that category). And as Sam Mellinger points out, neither the offense nor the pitching is the team’s real problem – it’s the defense.

Anyway, the point is that despite what Dayton Moore might say publicly, privately he must be looking to make some changes. Maybe he doesn’t want to take a bomb and blow up the clubhouse, but perhaps he’s looking to make a surgical strike and change the complexion of the team with a single move.

If he is, well, I have a move I’d like to suggest. I also would like to suggest that those of you who are reading this right now ought to take a seat, because you’re about to read something that might disturb you. Rest assured, this is not some cockamamie idea I came up with today. Well, it might be a cockamamie idea, but it’s an idea I’ve been considering since spring training.

I think the Royals should trade for Jeff Francoeur.

Yeah, that Jeff Francoeur. The one that’s become the bane of Atlanta Braves fans and the laughingstock of baseball.

Some players get called “underrated” so much that they become overrated in the process. And for some, the opposite occurs: they get labeled overrated, and that label sticks to them so tightly that the pendulum swings too far the other way.

I’m not arguing that Francoeur’s performance as a ballplayer the last two years has become underrated: he really has been as bad as everyone thinks. But here’s the thing: Francoeur’s performance has become so maligned that I feel the public has lost sight of the fact that underneath those numbers still lies an enormous bundle of talent.

Talent can be a curse if you can’t convert that talent into performance, but let’s not forget: Francoeur has already performed at the major league level. In 2005, he made his major league debut on July 7^th, and within two months was on the cover of Sports Illustrated. He hit .300/.336/.549 for the season, and finished 3^rd in Rookie of the Year voting despite playing in just 70 games. It helped that in just 67 games in the outfield, he threw out 13 baserunners.

Granted, Miss South Carolina could explain the strike zone more coherently than he could. But he was just 21 years old. The following year, in full-time play he hit 29 homers. The year after that, he hit .293 with 19 homers and 40 doubles – and walked a respectable 42 times. He also won a Gold Glove. He played in every single game both years.

As recently as 14 months ago, Francoeur was a trendy breakout pick among some analysts. Instead, everything has gone to hell in a handbasket for Francoeur; he’s stopped hitting, the fans have turned on him, and the Braves are openly shopping him.

As Warren Buffett recently said, “be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful.” The collapse in Francoeur’s market value rivals that of any bank or automotive company. But while the stock market is nowhere near its peak value, those who invested near the market bottom on March 9^th has done very well for themselves – and while Francoeur may never reach the heights once expected from him, I suspect that anyone who trades for him now will get a very good return on their dollar.

Since the start of last season, Francoeur is hitting .241/.289/.357. He’s a mess at the plate. He famously – though perhaps not entirely seriously – said a month ago that “If on-base percentage is so important, then why don’t they put it up on the scoreboard?” His defense has gone to pot as much as his offense – according to Ultimate Zone Rating, Francoeur has been about 6 runs below average on defense over the last year-plus, after being +17 in his Gold Glove year of 2007.

So yes, pretty much every number you look at suggests that Francoeur is a waste of a roster spot. Except for one, which is the most important number for any player.

25. As in, Jeff Francoeur is just 25 years old. It’s waaay too early to give up on him. If you don’t believe me, you might want to consider the history of a very similar player. I am frankly stunned that I have not seen this comparison made before, though it’s possible I just haven’t looked in the right places.

Once upon a time, the Braves had a right fielder who, like Francoeur, met with immediate acclaim, stepping right into the lineup in mid-season and hitting .281/.304/.459 in 98 games, garnering a few Rookie of the Year votes. Like Francoeur, he was young (22) and considered an all-around talent despite the lack of speed (just one stolen base as a rookie). And like Francoeur, he swung at everything. He walked just eight times all season.

This right fielder struggled terribly the next two seasons, largely because opposing pitchers learned to exploit his impatience at the plate. In his sophomore season, he walked just 17 times in 75 games; in his third year he regressed even more, drawing just 11 walks in 60 games. He hit .235/.277/.354 combined.

The wrinkle is this: after his rookie season, this right fielder was traded, a trade that looked brilliant for the Braves when he struggled over the next two years. The team that traded for him looked like a bunch of morons.

That team was the Kansas City Royals. That player was Jermaine Dye.

Everything that has been written about Jeff Francoeur over the last year could have been written about Dye. I know, because I was the one writing about Dye 12 years ago. The comment I wrote about Dye in the 1999 Baseball Prospectus ended with the line, “His window of opportunity is just about closed.” Yeah, I missed a little with that one. Dye hit .294/.354/.526 for the Royals that year. He also drew 58 walks. Ten years later, he’s still hitting.

Look, there’s obviously a good chance that Francoeur’s problems are terminal. As a professor of mine used to say, the plural of anecdote is not data. The fact that Dye turned into a star doesn’t mean that Francoeur is destined to do the same. But he has a chance to turn into a star. Go ahead and write down a list of every player in baseball who has the chance to become a star in the not-too-distant future, and is available to acquire for next to nothing. I’m guessing it’s a short list.

I thought the Greinke-for-Francoeur rumors this winter were ridiculous, and I mean that literally – I thought they were fabricated or at least exaggerated, because Dayton Moore is not that dumb. Today, you could probably pry Francoeur from the Braves with Greinke – Luke Greinke.

In a Facebook exchange – I can’t believe I just wrote that – Craig Calcaterra, the brilliant writer and authoritative Braves fan, put the price tag on Francoeur thusly:

“If I were running the Braves I’d accept a nice thank you card from Moore and call it a deal. Wait, that’s not true. I’d accept a slightly shabby thank you card if that’s all he had. I just can’t stand the sight of that guy in right field anymore.”

That is not the voice of a 15-year-old fan on an anonymous message board – that is the voice of someone who speaks on behalf of all Braves fans: they are sick of Frenchy.

Every baseball team has some sort of niche that they alone occupy, some unique strength that they can exploit to build a better baseball team. The Yankees are able to offer their players the personal use of a Brinks truck to haul all of the cash they’re being paid to the bank every two weeks. The Braves are the boyhood team of almost every young player that grows up in the southeast, and they mine the talent in their backyard with uncanny ability. The Cardinals offer players the chance to play in front of The Greatest Fans In Baseball™. And so on.

The Royals offer something to. They offer a player the chance to get away from the crush of overwhelming expectations. The team’s biggest weakness – its lack of a fan base – can become its biggest strength. A player that has fallen on their face somewhere else, with the bright glare of public scrutiny directly on them, can come to Kansas City and play in front of a small but loyal group of fans, a small and mostly non-threatening local media, and for a team whose expectations have already been ground down to nothing by the weight of 15 years of non-stop losing. For a player whose talent remains untapped, whose potential has become a curse, the Royals are the perfect team to rehabilitate that talent in a low-pressure environment.

As much as Francoeur reminds me of Dye, if the Royals trade for him he could equally remind us of Jose Offerman. Offerman, remember, was considered one of the best prospects in baseball in 1990, when he hit .326 in Triple-A and played dazzling shortstop at age 21. Offerman’s bat was almost as advertised, but his glove wasn’t; in his first full season in 1992, he made an amazing 42 errors, and 37 the year after that. The fans turned on him, he started to press, he hit just .210 in 1994, and despite rebounding to .287/.389/.375 in 1995, both the Dodgers and their fans were sick of him.

Which is where the Royals come in. Dye-for-Michael Tucker was Herk Robinson’s best trade – a direct challenge of two outfielders in which the Royals clearly came out on top. But the trade for Jose Offerman was Robinson’s most brilliant trade, because there was no downside. The trade worked beautifully – the Royals did what the Dodgers should have done years before and moved Offerman off of shortstop. He made a decent second baseman – although Bob Boone, God bless him, thought he had more value as a rangy first baseman – and in three years with the Royals Offerman hit .306/.385/.419. (And when he left as a free agent the Royals got two draft picks, one of whom was Mike MacDougal, who was later traded for Dan Cortes and Tyler Lumsden, who was then traded for Jordan Parraz. The shadow of Robinson’s trade can still be found in Northwest Arkansas today.)

But I didn’t explain why this trade was so brilliant. It was brilliant because the Dodgers were so desperate to get rid of Offerman that they were willing to take almost anything for him. All Robinson gave up was Billy Brewer, a former Rule 5 pick who as a lefty reliever was coming off a 5.56 ERA in 1995. Offerman turned out to be a perfect fit in Kansas City – but suppose he hadn’t. Suppose he was so bad that after two months the Royals finally called uncle and just released him. In which case, all the Royals would have lost in the trade was…Billy Brewer? Who cares?

I suspect that the Braves are close to that point with Francoeur. And Francoeur is close to that point with the Braves. Keep in mind, as much as any player would feel the pressure that comes with being anointed as “The Natural” at age 21, Francoeur must feel it worse. He was born in Atlanta. In the SI article about his rookie season it talks about the razzing he got from his high school buddies who – just three years after graduation – were coming to his games.

As perfect as everything must have been for him when he was playing well, it must be an absolute nightmare now for him to be struggling the way he is, in his hometown, for his favorite team, after being a first-round pick and potential franchise savior just a few short years ago. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that his defensive numbers have collapsed along with his offensive ones. If it was just his offense that deteriorated, you could blame that on a poor approach at the plate. That his performance has declined in every phase suggests that the problem is psychological as much as it is physical.

Jeff Francoeur needs a new start, and Kansas City is just the place to give it to him. Working with Kevin Seitzer can’t hurt. Terry Pendleton, the Braves’ hitting coach, has come under a lot of fire of late in part because of Francoeur’s struggles. Pendleton may be a good hitting coach, but he’s not the right guy to be teaching plate discipline – just once in his career did he walk even 45 times. The Royals have already handed Seitzer a bunch of impatient hacks – why not turn the degree of difficulty up a notch?

Maybe Francoeur learns the strike zone and turns into Dye. If he doesn’t, he still could carve out a career as an overrated but still useful RBI guy, a la Joe Carter. Carter is one of the most overrated baseball players of my lifetime, but he wasn’t a bad player. You could win a world championship with him. Legend has it that he even had a big role to play in one.

Bottom line is this: the rumor du jour is that the Boston Red Sox are interested in Francoeur. Let me repeat that: THE BOSTON RED SOX ARE INTERESTED IN FRANCOEUR. If that isn’t a big flashing neon sign that the public opinion of Francoeur has shifted to the point where he’s now an underpriced commodity, I don’t know what is.

In a dream world, I’d like to see if Moore could interest the Braves in a swap of Francoeur for Jose Guillen. I mean, the Braves are going for it this year – they just traded for Nate McLouth – and Guillen can help them in the here and now. I suspect Guillen’s bat will translate nicely to the inferior league, Bobby Cox knows how to keep players like him in line, and as Guillen is a medicine best taken in small doses, the fact that they only have him under contract for a year-and-a-half minimizes their risk. I doubt this could be done straight up, because while Francoeur has negligible value, Guillen has negative value the way his contract stands. But if the Royals were able to pick up, say, the rest of Guillen’s contract for this year, I think that’s a gamble the Braves might consider. They get a free Jose Guillen for 2009, who along with McLouth dramatically upgrades their lineup, and they only have one year left on his contract to pay.

For the Royals, this move has the advantage of freeing up payroll in the future, clearing up the clubhouse in the present and the future. And it does so without significantly hurting the team on the field in the short term.

Guillen’s defense is so bad that he’s become almost unplayable. Alex Gordon returns in a month, and it’s becoming increasingly clear that the best lineup when he returns is one that has Gordon at third base, Mark Teahen in right field, and Guillen platooning with Jacobs at DH. But Guillen’s personality threatens to blow up the clubhouse if he is relegated to a bench role. Better to move him now if the Royals can do so.

Even if the Royals can’t interest Atlanta in Guillen, though, they should see if some collection of second-tier talent can fetch Frenchy. Carlos Rosa, anyone? Rosa’s been hit hard in Omaha, but there’s a bunch of relief prospects in Double-A and below, and I’d be willing to give up any of the non-Disco variety. The Braves took a high-school pitcher drafted in the second round (Eric Cordier) in exhange for Tony Pena Jr; I wonder if they’d take another one – the disappointing Sam Runion – as part of their haul for Francoeur.

If the Royals do get Francoeur, they have the additional option of letting him figure things out in Triple-A for the rest of the year. He has options remaining, and my front office sources tell me that a player can not refuse an option until he has five years of service time accrued. Frenchy came into the season with 3 years, 88 days of service time, so depending on how long he stays in Omaha, it’s possible that a demotion will keep him in Kansas City an additional year. As it is, Francoeur would be under contract for 2010 and 2011, and if you can find three players under contract to the Royals who are likely to be better outfielders over those two seasons, you have better vision than I do.

Come on, Dayton. I appreciate you heeding my last suggestion, but this is much bigger. We all know you want to trade for him – he’s an ex-Brave, and you were reportedly very fond of him while you were in Atlanta. Not that one fan’s opinion means anything, but you’ll have my full support if you do. Even if every other fan out there thinks this particular fan is off his rocker.

Horacio Ramirez Sucks. Get Over It.

Come with me, if you don’t mind, on a tour of recent history.

May 21^st: Zack Greinke allows two runs in six innings, departing the game with a slender 3-2 lead against the Indians. Horacio Ramirez, who comes into the game with a sparkling 5.84 ERA (his lowest at any point this season), starts the top of the seventh. He allows a leadoff single, and after a bunt and a groundout, surrenders another single to blow the lead. Jamey Wright comes in and allows a go-ahead RBI double; Ramirez is eventually saddled with the loss.

May 22^nd: With the Royals now in St. Louis, Kyle Davies follows Greinke’s effort with a six-inning, two-run performance of his own, but his teammates fail to score a run for him. Ramirez once again starts the seventh. After getting two quick outs, Ramirez surrenders a home run to the mighty Tyler Greene. Nonetheless, Ramirez is brought out to pitch the eighth as well, and gives up a single to Skip Schumaker, followed by a double to Brian Barden. He IBB’s Albert Pujols, retires Chris Duncan, and then heads to the showers as Kyle Farnsworth gives up a two-run single to put the game out of reach.

May 24^th: Two days later, the Royals once again get a six-inning, two-run effort from their starting pitcher, this time it being Brian Bannister. With the Royals holding a 3-2 lead on St. Louis going to the bottom of the seventh, once again Trey Hillman inexplicably calls on Ramirez. Ramirez retires the first two batters in order, then intentionally walks Pujols with the bases empty. He then allows a wild pitch on his way to walking Chris Duncan, forcing Hillman to make the unconventional move of replacing one lefty reliever with another. In his season debut, John Bale, uh, bales out Ramirez by whiffing Rick Ankiel on three pitches; the Royals would hold on for the win.

May 27^th: Ramirez is called on with two outs in the sixth inning to rescue Davies, who has allowed seven runs so far and leaves a man on first base. Ramirez gives up a single to Josh Anderson, and is immediately replaced by Roman Colon, who gives up another single to plate the eighth run before ending the inning.

June 2^nd: Once again, Davies is on the mound. Once again, the Royals’ starter has allowed two runs, only in this instance the game is tied, and instead of being called upon to start an inning, Ramirez is brought in with two outs in the sixth – and men on first and second. The first batter he faces, Matt Joyce, hits a two-run double that effectively ends the game. Ramirez would pitch a scoreless seventh, but the game is already over.

Over his last five appearances, Ramirez has pitched four innings, allowed eight hits and five runs. He blew a one-run lead in one game, gave up the tie-breaking runs in another game, allowed a 2-0 deficit to get out of hand in a third game, had to be rescued by another pitcher to preserve a lead in a fourth game, and gave up a hit to the only batter he faced in mop-up relief in the fifth game.

And before this stretch, he had a 5.74 ERA.

It’s now June, and Horacio Ramirez has a 6.86 ERA for the season. He has allowed 27 hits in 19.2 innings. He only has 12 strikeouts. He has walked 10 batters (granted, three intentionally). He has allowed three homers. There is absolutely nothing on his statistical record that is positive.

Lefties are hitting .261/.306/.348, which isn’t bad, but not particularly good. Right-handers are hitting .405/.500/.811. Even Jimmy Gobble thinks that’s bad.

And still Hillman sends him out there, in key situations, gambling that Ramirez won’t cost the Royals yet another game.

I guess it would make sense if the Royals were desperate for a LOOGY, even though Ramirez, you know, doesn’t even make for a good LOOGY. Except last I checked, the Royals have both Ron Mahay and John Bale on the roster, meaning that they’re keeping Ramirez around even though they have two better left-handers in the bullpen.

Look, guys, I know you invested a lot of money in Ramirez. I don’t know why you invested a lot of money, mind you, because he had done nothing to deserve the money, and no other team was particularly interested in offering him a comparable deal. But you did. You blew $1.8 million on a pitcher who doesn’t belong in the major leagues any more. It happens. Teams make mistakes.

But the money is gone, and no amount of putting Ramirez on the mound to justify that contract is going to bring the money back. All you’re accomplishing by keeping Ramirez on the roster is proving that you can’t resist throwing good games after bad money.

I have no idea if the Royals are going to turn things around, whether they’ll get back to .500 this year, whether they’ll contend again in 2009. On paper, there’s no obvious reason why the Royals can’t reverse course. But I know that the Royals aren’t going to win a damn thing so long as they’ve got a GM who isn’t willing to cut losses on a contract that was a mistake the moment it was signed, and a manager who doesn’t understand that just because you have a pitcher on your roster doesn’t mean you have to use him in tight situations.

Horacio Ramirez sucks, guys. The sooner you accept that fact, the sooner we can get around to the business of putting together a winning roster.