The Five Stages of Being a Royals Fan, Using Only Blog Quotes.

Stage 1: Denial

“Let’s take a deep breath, everyone. Good teams lose six games in a row. The difference is they also win six games in a row.”

“So don’t panic. This is the AL Central, where the Royals can lose six games in a row in mid-May and still hold on to a share of first place.”

Stage 2: Anger

“I realize that pride goeth before a fall, but this is ridiculous.”

“Momentum means NOTHING.”

Stage 3: Bargaining

“So if the Royals get a favorable outcome today, they would need only a three-game sweep of the Tigers at home – with Meche, Greinke, and Davies starting – to be back atop the division by Wednesday night. That’s not likely, mind you. But the mere fact that it’s possible is testament to how silly it is to be giving up on the season already.”

“Yes, the Royals have the same record after 43 games that they had last year. But to argue that this means they’ve made no progress is as silly as arguing that they’re going win more than 102 games because – as Martin Manley points out – they have a better record after 43 games than the 1977 Royals did.”

Stage 4: Depression

“I have no idea if the Royals are going to turn things around, whether they’ll get back to .500 this year, whether they’ll contend again in 2009. On paper, there’s no obvious reason why the Royals can’t reverse course. But I know that the Royals aren’t going to win a damn thing so long as they’ve got a GM who isn’t willing to cut losses on a contract that was a mistake the moment it was signed, and a manager who doesn’t understand that just because you have a pitcher on your roster doesn’t mean you have to use him in tight situations.”

Stage 5: Acceptance

“I think the Royals should trade for Jeff Francoeur.”

This Crow Doesn't Taste So Bad.

As those of you who follow me on Twitter (@jazayerli) know, my initial reaction to the Aaron Crow was, shall we say, less than enthusiastic. This wasn’t a reflection on Crow so much as it was a reflection on Grant Green, who thanks to the Pirates’ late decision to go cheap yet again and select Boston College catcher Tony Sanchez – probably the 20^th-best player in the draft – at #4, the tumblers fell into place for Green to be available at #12.

The Royals selected Crow instead, and as MLB Network cut to commercial they gave us a look-in at the A’s war room, and it seemed like every person in that room had a big sh*t-eating grin on his face. Knowing exactly why those jerks looked so smug – and sure enough, the A’s took Green with the #13 pick – only made me more upset.

But then I started getting feedback from people in the industry who know a lot more about this stuff than I do, and started to warm up to the pick. Keith Law, ESPN’s draft guru, wrote me, “I don’t see how you can complain about that one!” Law uses exclamation points even more rarely than he praises the Royals, so that was something. Law had Crow as the 5^th-best player in the draft, and Green at just #13. Law isn’t afraid to voice scouting opinions that differ from the consensus – last year, he was maybe the only prospect maven in the world who thought that Pedro Alvarez was overrated, and that sentiment looks pretty smart at the moment. But Law isn’t the only draft expert who ranked Crow more highly than Green; Baseball America’s last draft ranking had Crow 7^th and Green 13^th. And While Kevin Goldstein had Green ranked higher, it was hardly a slam-dunk - #5 vs. #7.

Green’s strengths are obvious: he’s a polished college hitter who will be in the majors soon, and he gives you a good bat at a premium defensive position – a position the Royals have a particularly strong need to fill. But he’s not perfect. He hit just four home runs this season, and nine last year – while he hit for power in the wood-bat Cape Cod League, it’s not clear how much power he’ll have in the majors. A guy who hits .280 with 20 homers is a star at shortstop; a guy who hits .280 with 12 homers is just a good player.

Secondly, and maybe more importantly, there is a legitimate difference of opinions from scouts on how well he can play shortstop. Some feel he’ll be an average defensive player with no issues; some think he’ll be below average but playable; some think he’ll have to move off the position entirely. This is not a trivial concern for the Royals. If Green can handle shortstop, he fills a huge need. If he can’t, then he’s a third baseman or a second baseman, two positions where the Royals already have more than enough options as it is. If the Royals fall into the camp of people who think that he can’t play shortstop, then it would be hard for them to justify taking Green.

Still, I think that all things equal, the Royals should take the player at a position of need. But clearly the Royals did not feel that all things were equal between Green and Crow, and took the pitcher even though they had bigger needs elsewhere.

I can respect that. It’s easier to respect that decision when you consider that aside from Green, Crow was the best player on the board when the Royals picked. Looking at the three draft lists (BA, Law, Goldstein), the only players ranked higher than Crow who were still available were Tanner Scheppers (on two lists), Alex White (on one), and Kyle Gibson (on one). Gibson’s stress fracture manifested itself after he showed up 4^th on BA’s list, and Scheppers is coming off a shoulder injury and Will Carroll is scared to death of him. BA had White 6^th and Crow 7^th, but Goldstein had White 14^th and Law had him 10^th. If you were to put together a Wisdom of Crowds-style draft list, then Crow was absolutely the right pick.

Beyond the pure talent considerations, there’s a lot to like with this pick. Crow has been off the radar this year because, having failed to sign with the Nationals last year as the #9 pick, he didn’t pitch for anyone this year until starting his season with the Fort Worth Cats a month ago. A year ago, he was the best right-handed pitcher in college, with a 43-inning scoreless streak for Mizzou (yes, yes, not Missou, I get it, thanks everyone.) He didn’t sign with the Nationals, but this is one of those rare cases where you can blame the team as much as the player – the final negotiations had Crow wanting $4 million, the Nationals offering $3.5 million, but the lack of dialogue between the two sides until the last moment sank the negotiations. Aaron Crow has maintained the Hendricks brothers as his adviser. The Nationals, you might have noticed, have declined to maintain the services of Jim Bowden. I wouldn’t hold Crow’s decision to sit out a year against him that much. (Maybe he was worried that Bowden was going to skim some of his bonus.)

The comparisons between Crow and Luke Hochevar are too easy to make; both pitchers didn’t sign as college juniors, went the indy ball route and signed with Fort Worth, and then got drafted by the Royals. That comparison seems to bother some people, but frankly, I don’t see what the problem is. The disappointment with Hochevar doesn’t stem from his performance, but from the fact that he was the #1 overall pick. If the Royals had drafted Hochevar 12^th, no one would be complaining about his career path to this point. The Royals just had the misfortune of drafting #1 overall in a year when there was no clear #1 overall pick. The year before, they would have taken Justin Upton; the year after, they would have taken David Price. Instead, they had to pick from the best of many options, and given the turmoil in the front office at the time – Dayton Moore had just been hired but could not give his input in the draft – it’s not surprising that they chose a compromise pick in Hochevar.

The thing is, on pure stuff Crow might actually have a slight edge on Hochevar. Hochevar had better sink on his pitches, but Crow’s velocity is a tick better. Both rely on sliders as out pitches; it will be interesting to see whether the Royals force Crow to emphasize his curveball during his development as they did with Cool Hand.

Also, the fact that Crow went to college in Missouri and high school in Kansas gets back to the idea of knowing your backyard better than anyone else. Presumably the Royals have a better feel for Crow - his family, his work ethic, his health record - than most teams do. If they don't, they're doing something wrong.

Also keep in mind that if you’re still a believer in Project 2010 – and given the way the Royals are playing, I wouldn’t blame you if you weren’t – then Crow has the ability to be ready for a rotation spot as soon as this time next year. He’ll be the best pitching prospect in the organization the minute he signs. He’s not young – he’ll be 23 in the fall, which makes him older than, say, Dan Cortes – but then again, he’s a better pitcher than Cortes is right now.

I know it appears that the Royals have five quality starters already in their rotation, but even if they all maintain their effectiveness, the odds that all five starters will be off the DL a year from now is probably 50/50 at best. You can never have too much pitching.

What I like best about this pick is that the Royals drafted a signable player without skimping on quality at all. Crow was only available because so many teams ahead of the Royals drafted inferior talents to save money - the Pirates at #4, the Orioles at #5, the Braves at #7, and the Nationals at #10. The Rockies are getting all kinds of credit for drafting Tyler Matzek at #11, and the Cardinals for drafting Shelby Miller at #19. Both are great prospects, but both also have fairly ridiculous bonus demands. In Crow, the Royals got a pitcher who compares favorably to where guys like Matzek and Jacob Turner and Miller might be in three or four years, without worrying about some ridiculous $7 million demand. Crow would have taken $4 million last year, and probably will settle for somewhere in the $3-3.5 million this year. That’s not slot money, but it also doesn’t break the budget.

This is important, because what elevated the first day of the draft from good to very good was the decision to take North Carolina high school catcher Wil Myers in the 3^rd round. Myers was on my pre-draft list of guys the Royals were thinking of taking with their first pick – and while that would have been a reach, getting him in the third round is a steal. He’s a very athletic player who could play the outfield if he can’t handle things behind the plate. His bonus demands contributed to him falling to the third round, but given that the Royals kicked the tires on him in the first round, I’m sure they have a very good idea of what it will take to sign him, and they wouldn’t have taken him if they didn’t think they could afford him. Much like Tim Melville’s pick last year, Myers signals that the Royals are done playing chumps in the draft – they’ll take the best talent available and let other teams’ fear of spending money in the draft work to their advantage for a change.

And remember, last year the Royals spent $6 million on Eric Hosmer alone. If Crow gets $3.5 million and Myers gets, say, $1.5 million, they’ve still spent less on both of them than they did on Hosmer. Not to mention the money spent on their supplemental first-rounder and second-rounder last year; there should still be plenty of money left over for the international signing season.

The Royals started the second day of the draft by taking Chris Dwyer, a left-handed pitcher out of Clemson who turned 21 in April, making him the first draft-eligible freshman from a four-year college in draft history. That’s an interesting draft note, but what matters is that Baseball America ranked Dwyer as the #55 player available in this draft. With their first three picks, drafting #12, #91, and #122, the Royals nabbed BA’s #7, #31, and #55 best players. That’s strong work.

As Baseball America’s J.J. Cooper wrote this morning, “if Kansas City can sign both Myers and Dwyer they will have landed a pair of supplemental first/second-round talents despite lacking a second-round pick.”

The draft won’t finish up until tomorrow; as I write this they’re in the 12^th round, and the Royals draft has become remarkable for its reliance on pitching, and not the high school arms you’d expect to see. Of the Royals’ first 11 picks, two were catchers, one was a high school first baseman – and the other eight were all college pitchers. That’s just bizarre, but in a draft which everyone says is very weak in hitters, you have to admire the Royals’ decision to draft the guys they like best and figure out where to put them all later.

Ultimately, I’d give this draft a B at this point, which is an awfully strong grade given the lack of a second-round pick. Maybe the Royals didn’t select the guy I wanted them to pick. But they selected the guy that they wanted to pick, not the guy they settled for in order to save money, and ultimately that’s all you can ask for.

Draft Preview From A Non-Draft Expert.

I was hoping to do my usual long-winded draft preview, but time constraints this year force me to keep this rather short (well, by my standards). Given my complete lack of expertise on this subject, that’s probably for the best. Besides, if you want to get an expert opinion on the draft, I recommend you download the podcast of tonight’s episode, where you can listen to Kevin Goldstein break down the draft from the Royals’ perspective.

For the first time since 2004, the Royals will not be drafting in the top three – let that sink in for a moment – as they are lined up in the #12 slot. It may be fortuitous, then, that this draft is so wide open after the first two picks. Stephen Strasburg will go #1 and Dustin Ackley will go #2, barring unforeseen circumstances, because those are the two best talents in the draft. Strasburg, as you know, is the Greatest Draft Prospect Of All Time. Ackley is a line-drive machine who’s played mostly first base in college but should be able to handle center field; on paper he reminds me of former #1 overall pick Darin Erstad, and if that means the 2000 version of Erstad, that’s a heck of a player.

But the #3 pick tomorrow could be one of about a dozen different players, because the difference between the 3^rd-best and the 30^th-best player in this draft is as small as it’s been in a very long time. This should suit the Royals, because inevitably someone who’s a Top 6 or 7 pick on paper will fall to them at #12, and if the Royals are content to scoop up whoever falls to them unexpectedly, they should be able to grab a better player than the pick would suggest, with the added bonus that they’ll be negotiating from the position that the player wasn’t selected until 12^th overall, and isn’t entitled to Top 5 money.

The Royals can’t afford to screw this pick up, because thanks to Juan Cruz they don’t have a second-round pick, and thanks to the collapse of the subprime veteran market, they don’t have a supplemental pick as compensation for Mark Grudzielanek. The Royals’ second pick is 91^st overall. The Royals haven’t entered the draft in a worse position since 1993, when they surrendered their second-round pick for David Cone and their third-round pick for Greg Gagne. They still had the #5 overall pick, but naturally wasted it on Jeff Granger. (In 1990, thanks to the signing of the Davis Brothers the previous winter, the Royals didn’t draft in the first two rounds at all.)

It’s obviously not a good thing that the Royals draft just once in the first 90 picks, but there are certainly ways to alleviate the problem. Namely, the Royals can take the money they would have spent on the draft picks they don’t have and use it on the international market. The Royals already anticipated this situation a few months ago when they spent $600,000 – the equivalent of late second-round money – on a 17-year-old Korean catcher named Shin Jin-Ho. This is, I believe, the first time the Royals have ever spent significant money to sign an amateur player from the Pacific Rim area, and a very good sign for the future.

Also, in what appears to be a very good year for amateur talent in Latin America, the Royals are quite active. They aren’t frontrunners for any of the premier $2 million-and-up guys, but they are linked to a lot of the six-figure talents. As Goldstein points out, the Royals taking the approach that given the uncertainty of developing talent from Latin America, it’s better to sign a lot of good players than one great player. (This article from ESPN’s Jorge Arangure suggests that the Royals are “clearly in the lead” for a player named Cheslor Cuthbert, who is either one of Draco Malfoy’s henchmen or the best amateur player to come out of Nicaragua in recent years.)

So the lack of a second-rounder notwithstanding, the Royals are still in a position to add some talent to the farm. But their first-round pick is still the motherlode. So with that in mind, I’ll go down the list of Goldstein’s Top 50 draft talents and add some quick thoughts.

1) Stephen Strasburg, RHP, San Diego State. HAH!

2) Dustin Ackley, OF, North Carolina. Hah.

3) Donavan Tate, OF, Georgia HS. Incredibly toolsy outfielder, but not entirely sure he can hit, and it’s testament to how few sure things there are in this draft that he rates this high anyway. Also wants an enormous bonus. It’s actually possible he’ll be available at #12; actually, it’s possible that anyone except the two guys above will be there. A classic high risk/high reward talent. I don’t have a strong feeling one way or the other.

4) Jacob Turner, RHP, Missouri HS. I’ve been told that one of the things Dayton Moore is trying to do with the scouting staff is make sure that the Royals outscout every other team when it comes to players in their backyard, just like the Braves do in theirs. The talent level isn’t the same, but if there’s an obscure talent in Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa…the Royals need to know about them first – no more Albert Pujols debacles. On that note, it’s an incredibly positive sign that the Royals stole Tim Melville in the fourth round last year. That’s what the Royals need to do – take advantage of their location to evaluate these players better than anyone else, and in Melville’s case the Royals knew that he’d be signable at a reasonable price, and got a first-round talent three rounds later.

The Royals’ lack of success in finding major leaguers in their own backyard is just inexcusable. Everyone knows about Pujols, of course, but how about Shaun Marcum (3^rd round pick in 2003 out of Missouri State)? Or Ryan Howard (5^th round pick out of Missouri State in 2001)? Or Ian Kinsler, a Missou product who didn’t get drafted until the 17^th round in 2003?

Turner is probably not going to be available when the Royals pick. If he is, though, you can only hope the Royals have done their due diligence on him. He might have the best stuff of any high school pitcher in the draft, but he (like a lot of the high school pitchers out there) wants Porcello money. He’d be a steal at #12, but he won’t be a steal if the Royals have to fork over $7 million to sign him.

5) Grant Green, SS, USC. The Great White Whale of this draft; let the corks pop and the bubbly flow if he’s there at 12. Came into the season as a potential Top-3 pick, but had a disappointing year. He wasn’t bad, per se, he just didn’t hit quite as well as people were hoping. There’s a little concern that he won’t be able to stay at shortstop. Given what the Royals have been willing to put up with at shortstop of late, a guy who can hit like this can be forgiven some defensive foibles. I don’t know who to compare to him to offensively…Troy Tulowitzki, maybe?

Anyway, the guys at Baseball America have had me excited by projecting that Green will be available at 12 and that the Royals will clock him, but Goldstein dashed those dreams by reporting that there’s no way he’ll be available, as his recent slide down draft lists has been reversed. At the risk of turning colors on my team, I hope the BP guy is wrong and the BA guy is right. But I’m not counting on it.

6) Tanner Scheppers, RHP, St. Paul Saints (formerly Fresno State). Scheppers hurt his shoulder just before the draft last year; the Pirates kicked the tires on him in the second round but elected to pass. He’s healthy now and his velocity is back in the upper 90s. You have to worry about the arm, but he could be electric if healthy. Another unsigned collegiate guy turned indy ball pitcher, Max Scherzer, springs to mind.

7) Aaron Crow, RHP, Fort Worth Cats (formerly University of Missouri). Or maybe I should use the Scherzer comparison here, given that Scherzer is also a Missou guy. Crow doesn’t have the injury concerns; his velocity is a little lower but his command might be a little better. I have no idea who is better.

8) Mike Leake, RHP, Arizona State. Performance-wise he’s actually been better than Strasburg this year, pitching in a tough conference and in a hitter’s park. His velocity is average, but everything else – command, athleticism, and the ethereal pitchability that everyone wants – is off-the-charts. Could be in the majors this time next year. I like the idea of calling him Brian Bannister with better stuff…much better stuff. The only downside to this pick is that if you’re looking for a guy to make the majors quickly, the rotation is the only part of the team that the Royals don’t need instant relief for, so the value to the Royals might be less than for some other teams.

9) Tyler Matzek, LHP, California HS. Love this guy, he’s shooting up the charts based on his late-season performances, but don’t see him lasting to 12. If he does, I’d rather have him than every pitcher ahead of him on this list except for Strasburg. But I’m not a scout.

10) Matt Purke, LHP, Texas HS. Don’t like him nearly as much, and he seems to have the most inflated…dare I say delusional…perception of his market worth of anyone in this draft. Pass.

11) Zach Wheeler, RHP, Georgia HS. The Braves reportedly love him, and since they are required by state statute to draft only guys from Georgia in the first round, I don’t think he’ll make it to 12. No opinion on him either way.

12) Kyle Gibson, RHP, University of Missouri. Goldstein thinks this is the guy the Royals are most likely to take. A potential Top 5 guy before his velocity tanked in his last start, after which he was found to have a stress fracture in his arm and is out at least two months. It’s not the kind of injury that is career-threatening, but he definitely would be a gamble. I also wonder how likely the Royals would be to use another first-rounder on a college pitcher who relies heavily on his slider (like Hochevar) given the organizational focus on using the curveball.

Others of note:

20) Tony Sanchez, C, Boston College. A lot of rumors that the Royals (and a few other teams) might overdraft this guy a bit, because while he doesn’t have star potential, he’s a safe pick who gives you terrific defense and a fair amount of pop. (The best comparison I’ve heard is to Kelly Shoppach with a much better glove.) I can confirm that the Royals are considering him, but that they realize it would be an overdraft. My feeling here is that if the Royals want a right-handed hitting catcher who has decent power but a long swing, they could just stick with John Buck. Or Miguel Olivo. And then there's John Buck. Also, Miguel Olivo.

29) Garrett Gould, RHP, Kansas HS. Mentioned only because he’s a local product, but he would be an overdraft at this point, and doesn’t throw nearly as hard as the other high school arms that are likely to still be available at 12.

34) Wil Myers, C, North Carolina HS. I’ve seen at least one mock draft that had the Royals reaching for Myers. Myers’ draft stock would be a lot higher if teams were sure he could stay at catcher; he has the bat and athleticism to play the outfield. The upside comparison I’ve heard has been to Dale Murphy; keep in mind that Murphy had to move off the plate before his career took off. (Not to suggest that the second coming of Dale Murphy would be a bad thing.)

Goldstein’s list of the three most likely players the Royals will select was Gibson, followed by Crow, followed by Leake. You’ll notice a trend – they’re all college pitchers, which isn’t a huge need for the team at this point. Unfortunately, if you look at the list above, every player from 6 to 12 is a pitcher. You can’t force the draft – you have to let the draft come to you. If the best player available is a pitcher, you take the pitcher and figure out the ramifications later.

But based on need, if either of the two hitters listed – Green or Tate – are available, that’s a home-run pick, assuming they can sign them (both are Boras clients.) If they’re not there, then if the Royals want a hitter then by definition they’re going to have to reach. The next hitter on Goldstein’s list would be #15 Bobby Borchering, a switch-hitting third baseman out of a Florida high school who probably has the most power in the draft. Do the Royals need another corner infielder, though?

Ultimately I rate the odds of each player, and the preliminary grade, thusly:

Grant Green, Grade A, 15%

Tyler Matzek, Grade A-, 10%

Donavan Tate, Grade B+, 5%

Jacob Turner, Grade B+, 10%

Mike Leake, Grade B, 10%

Aaron Crow, Grade B-, 10%

Tanner Scheppers, Grade C+, 5%

Kyle Gibson, Grade C, 20%

Zach Wheeler, Grade C, 1%

The Field, Grade D+, 13%

Matt Purke, Grade D, 1%

But again: I am not a draft expert. Doesn’t stop me from pretending to be one every year, though.

Radical Situations Call For Radical Solutions.

Baseball is a funny game. The day after Zack Greinke channels his 2005 form en route to giving up seven runs in five innings, hurtling the Royals ever deeper into the bottomless pit they fell into four weeks ago, the Royals have close to a perfect day. The day certainly had a perfect start, when Dayton Moore decided that Horacio Ramirez’s contract was less unpalatable than his performance, and chose to eat the rest of it. Fifth starter Luke Hochevar then returned with a start that reminded us why we were so excited about this team a month ago: say what you will about the rest of this team, but every pitcher in the starting rotation projects to have a long and successful career ahead of him.

The Royals’ metronomic out-making on offense – Scott Richmond faced the minimum through four innings – suddenly came to an end in the fifth when Mark Teahen homered to the opposite field – you know, that thing he used to do back when the Royals started 18-11. Alberto Callaspo followed with a double – also a blast from the past, if by “past” you mean April. Then Mitch Maier and David DeJesus followed with walks – you may remember the Royals had some success with that earlier this year – and finally the Spork himself, Willie Bloomquist, cleared the bases with a triple, his fourth of the season (only Coco Crisp has more in the AL!), the first 3-RBI hit for the Royals since Miguel Olivo hit a three-run homer back on May 15^th.

And when Hochevar got into a spot of trouble in the seventh inning, he was rescued by the remarkable Kyle Farnsworth, who completed his redemption story from bullpen pariah to set-up savior by retiring all four batters he faced in the seventh and eighth. Five appearances into his Royals career, the Professor already had three losses along with an 18.90 ERA. Since then, working entirely in garbage relief, Farnsworth had thrown 15.1 scoreless innings, allowing just nine hits and two walks while striking out 15. He actually got the win in the Miguel Olivo Walks! comeback game when the Royals scored four in the ninth, but Hillman was understandably so reluctant to trust Farnsworth in key situations that not one of his last 15 appearances came with a Leverage score of more than 0.30 – where 1.00 is average, and a “key” situation might easily rate 2 or higher.

Maybe Bob McClure fixed a flaw, or maybe Farnsworth pitches better when the pressure is off, but the only way to find out was to do what the Royals did today, and bring him into a game that was on the line. I’ve been waiting for this move since at least last Sunday, when I was sitting behind home plate at Kauffman Stadium as John Bale got into a mess in the ninth, Hillman called for the righty in the bullpen – and I realized with much discomfort that I was actually disappointed to see Juan Cruz, not Farnsworth, entering through the bullpen gate.

Farnsworth didn’t get the call then, but he got the call today, and pitched with the same sense of purpose that he has for the past six weeks, retiring four batters on just 11 pitches. With Cruz tanking, with Jamey Wright hit or miss, with Robinson Tejeda on the DL, we’ve reached the point where Farnsworth isn’t just the go-to guy in set-up situations…he’s clearly the go-to guy in set-up situations.

Like I said: baseball is a funny game.

But that’s not really want to talk about right now. I have bigger fish to fry. As I write this, the Royals are 24-31, amazingly just 5.5 games out of first place, but also just 1.5 games out of last. The offense is next-to-last in the league, and the once-vaunted pitching staff had fallen to 8^th in the league in runs allowed (although the rankings are so tight that the strong performance today bumped the Royals back up to 6^th in that category). And as Sam Mellinger points out, neither the offense nor the pitching is the team’s real problem – it’s the defense.

Anyway, the point is that despite what Dayton Moore might say publicly, privately he must be looking to make some changes. Maybe he doesn’t want to take a bomb and blow up the clubhouse, but perhaps he’s looking to make a surgical strike and change the complexion of the team with a single move.

If he is, well, I have a move I’d like to suggest. I also would like to suggest that those of you who are reading this right now ought to take a seat, because you’re about to read something that might disturb you. Rest assured, this is not some cockamamie idea I came up with today. Well, it might be a cockamamie idea, but it’s an idea I’ve been considering since spring training.

I think the Royals should trade for Jeff Francoeur.

Yeah, that Jeff Francoeur. The one that’s become the bane of Atlanta Braves fans and the laughingstock of baseball.

Some players get called “underrated” so much that they become overrated in the process. And for some, the opposite occurs: they get labeled overrated, and that label sticks to them so tightly that the pendulum swings too far the other way.

I’m not arguing that Francoeur’s performance as a ballplayer the last two years has become underrated: he really has been as bad as everyone thinks. But here’s the thing: Francoeur’s performance has become so maligned that I feel the public has lost sight of the fact that underneath those numbers still lies an enormous bundle of talent.

Talent can be a curse if you can’t convert that talent into performance, but let’s not forget: Francoeur has already performed at the major league level. In 2005, he made his major league debut on July 7^th, and within two months was on the cover of Sports Illustrated. He hit .300/.336/.549 for the season, and finished 3^rd in Rookie of the Year voting despite playing in just 70 games. It helped that in just 67 games in the outfield, he threw out 13 baserunners.

Granted, Miss South Carolina could explain the strike zone more coherently than he could. But he was just 21 years old. The following year, in full-time play he hit 29 homers. The year after that, he hit .293 with 19 homers and 40 doubles – and walked a respectable 42 times. He also won a Gold Glove. He played in every single game both years.

As recently as 14 months ago, Francoeur was a trendy breakout pick among some analysts. Instead, everything has gone to hell in a handbasket for Francoeur; he’s stopped hitting, the fans have turned on him, and the Braves are openly shopping him.

As Warren Buffett recently said, “be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful.” The collapse in Francoeur’s market value rivals that of any bank or automotive company. But while the stock market is nowhere near its peak value, those who invested near the market bottom on March 9^th has done very well for themselves – and while Francoeur may never reach the heights once expected from him, I suspect that anyone who trades for him now will get a very good return on their dollar.

Since the start of last season, Francoeur is hitting .241/.289/.357. He’s a mess at the plate. He famously – though perhaps not entirely seriously – said a month ago that “If on-base percentage is so important, then why don’t they put it up on the scoreboard?” His defense has gone to pot as much as his offense – according to Ultimate Zone Rating, Francoeur has been about 6 runs below average on defense over the last year-plus, after being +17 in his Gold Glove year of 2007.

So yes, pretty much every number you look at suggests that Francoeur is a waste of a roster spot. Except for one, which is the most important number for any player.

25. As in, Jeff Francoeur is just 25 years old. It’s waaay too early to give up on him. If you don’t believe me, you might want to consider the history of a very similar player. I am frankly stunned that I have not seen this comparison made before, though it’s possible I just haven’t looked in the right places.

Once upon a time, the Braves had a right fielder who, like Francoeur, met with immediate acclaim, stepping right into the lineup in mid-season and hitting .281/.304/.459 in 98 games, garnering a few Rookie of the Year votes. Like Francoeur, he was young (22) and considered an all-around talent despite the lack of speed (just one stolen base as a rookie). And like Francoeur, he swung at everything. He walked just eight times all season.

This right fielder struggled terribly the next two seasons, largely because opposing pitchers learned to exploit his impatience at the plate. In his sophomore season, he walked just 17 times in 75 games; in his third year he regressed even more, drawing just 11 walks in 60 games. He hit .235/.277/.354 combined.

The wrinkle is this: after his rookie season, this right fielder was traded, a trade that looked brilliant for the Braves when he struggled over the next two years. The team that traded for him looked like a bunch of morons.

That team was the Kansas City Royals. That player was Jermaine Dye.

Everything that has been written about Jeff Francoeur over the last year could have been written about Dye. I know, because I was the one writing about Dye 12 years ago. The comment I wrote about Dye in the 1999 Baseball Prospectus ended with the line, “His window of opportunity is just about closed.” Yeah, I missed a little with that one. Dye hit .294/.354/.526 for the Royals that year. He also drew 58 walks. Ten years later, he’s still hitting.

Look, there’s obviously a good chance that Francoeur’s problems are terminal. As a professor of mine used to say, the plural of anecdote is not data. The fact that Dye turned into a star doesn’t mean that Francoeur is destined to do the same. But he has a chance to turn into a star. Go ahead and write down a list of every player in baseball who has the chance to become a star in the not-too-distant future, and is available to acquire for next to nothing. I’m guessing it’s a short list.

I thought the Greinke-for-Francoeur rumors this winter were ridiculous, and I mean that literally – I thought they were fabricated or at least exaggerated, because Dayton Moore is not that dumb. Today, you could probably pry Francoeur from the Braves with Greinke – Luke Greinke.

In a Facebook exchange – I can’t believe I just wrote that – Craig Calcaterra, the brilliant writer and authoritative Braves fan, put the price tag on Francoeur thusly:

“If I were running the Braves I’d accept a nice thank you card from Moore and call it a deal. Wait, that’s not true. I’d accept a slightly shabby thank you card if that’s all he had. I just can’t stand the sight of that guy in right field anymore.”

That is not the voice of a 15-year-old fan on an anonymous message board – that is the voice of someone who speaks on behalf of all Braves fans: they are sick of Frenchy.

Every baseball team has some sort of niche that they alone occupy, some unique strength that they can exploit to build a better baseball team. The Yankees are able to offer their players the personal use of a Brinks truck to haul all of the cash they’re being paid to the bank every two weeks. The Braves are the boyhood team of almost every young player that grows up in the southeast, and they mine the talent in their backyard with uncanny ability. The Cardinals offer players the chance to play in front of The Greatest Fans In Baseball™. And so on.

The Royals offer something to. They offer a player the chance to get away from the crush of overwhelming expectations. The team’s biggest weakness – its lack of a fan base – can become its biggest strength. A player that has fallen on their face somewhere else, with the bright glare of public scrutiny directly on them, can come to Kansas City and play in front of a small but loyal group of fans, a small and mostly non-threatening local media, and for a team whose expectations have already been ground down to nothing by the weight of 15 years of non-stop losing. For a player whose talent remains untapped, whose potential has become a curse, the Royals are the perfect team to rehabilitate that talent in a low-pressure environment.

As much as Francoeur reminds me of Dye, if the Royals trade for him he could equally remind us of Jose Offerman. Offerman, remember, was considered one of the best prospects in baseball in 1990, when he hit .326 in Triple-A and played dazzling shortstop at age 21. Offerman’s bat was almost as advertised, but his glove wasn’t; in his first full season in 1992, he made an amazing 42 errors, and 37 the year after that. The fans turned on him, he started to press, he hit just .210 in 1994, and despite rebounding to .287/.389/.375 in 1995, both the Dodgers and their fans were sick of him.

Which is where the Royals come in. Dye-for-Michael Tucker was Herk Robinson’s best trade – a direct challenge of two outfielders in which the Royals clearly came out on top. But the trade for Jose Offerman was Robinson’s most brilliant trade, because there was no downside. The trade worked beautifully – the Royals did what the Dodgers should have done years before and moved Offerman off of shortstop. He made a decent second baseman – although Bob Boone, God bless him, thought he had more value as a rangy first baseman – and in three years with the Royals Offerman hit .306/.385/.419. (And when he left as a free agent the Royals got two draft picks, one of whom was Mike MacDougal, who was later traded for Dan Cortes and Tyler Lumsden, who was then traded for Jordan Parraz. The shadow of Robinson’s trade can still be found in Northwest Arkansas today.)

But I didn’t explain why this trade was so brilliant. It was brilliant because the Dodgers were so desperate to get rid of Offerman that they were willing to take almost anything for him. All Robinson gave up was Billy Brewer, a former Rule 5 pick who as a lefty reliever was coming off a 5.56 ERA in 1995. Offerman turned out to be a perfect fit in Kansas City – but suppose he hadn’t. Suppose he was so bad that after two months the Royals finally called uncle and just released him. In which case, all the Royals would have lost in the trade was…Billy Brewer? Who cares?

I suspect that the Braves are close to that point with Francoeur. And Francoeur is close to that point with the Braves. Keep in mind, as much as any player would feel the pressure that comes with being anointed as “The Natural” at age 21, Francoeur must feel it worse. He was born in Atlanta. In the SI article about his rookie season it talks about the razzing he got from his high school buddies who – just three years after graduation – were coming to his games.

As perfect as everything must have been for him when he was playing well, it must be an absolute nightmare now for him to be struggling the way he is, in his hometown, for his favorite team, after being a first-round pick and potential franchise savior just a few short years ago. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that his defensive numbers have collapsed along with his offensive ones. If it was just his offense that deteriorated, you could blame that on a poor approach at the plate. That his performance has declined in every phase suggests that the problem is psychological as much as it is physical.

Jeff Francoeur needs a new start, and Kansas City is just the place to give it to him. Working with Kevin Seitzer can’t hurt. Terry Pendleton, the Braves’ hitting coach, has come under a lot of fire of late in part because of Francoeur’s struggles. Pendleton may be a good hitting coach, but he’s not the right guy to be teaching plate discipline – just once in his career did he walk even 45 times. The Royals have already handed Seitzer a bunch of impatient hacks – why not turn the degree of difficulty up a notch?

Maybe Francoeur learns the strike zone and turns into Dye. If he doesn’t, he still could carve out a career as an overrated but still useful RBI guy, a la Joe Carter. Carter is one of the most overrated baseball players of my lifetime, but he wasn’t a bad player. You could win a world championship with him. Legend has it that he even had a big role to play in one.

Bottom line is this: the rumor du jour is that the Boston Red Sox are interested in Francoeur. Let me repeat that: THE BOSTON RED SOX ARE INTERESTED IN FRANCOEUR. If that isn’t a big flashing neon sign that the public opinion of Francoeur has shifted to the point where he’s now an underpriced commodity, I don’t know what is.

In a dream world, I’d like to see if Moore could interest the Braves in a swap of Francoeur for Jose Guillen. I mean, the Braves are going for it this year – they just traded for Nate McLouth – and Guillen can help them in the here and now. I suspect Guillen’s bat will translate nicely to the inferior league, Bobby Cox knows how to keep players like him in line, and as Guillen is a medicine best taken in small doses, the fact that they only have him under contract for a year-and-a-half minimizes their risk. I doubt this could be done straight up, because while Francoeur has negligible value, Guillen has negative value the way his contract stands. But if the Royals were able to pick up, say, the rest of Guillen’s contract for this year, I think that’s a gamble the Braves might consider. They get a free Jose Guillen for 2009, who along with McLouth dramatically upgrades their lineup, and they only have one year left on his contract to pay.

For the Royals, this move has the advantage of freeing up payroll in the future, clearing up the clubhouse in the present and the future. And it does so without significantly hurting the team on the field in the short term.

Guillen’s defense is so bad that he’s become almost unplayable. Alex Gordon returns in a month, and it’s becoming increasingly clear that the best lineup when he returns is one that has Gordon at third base, Mark Teahen in right field, and Guillen platooning with Jacobs at DH. But Guillen’s personality threatens to blow up the clubhouse if he is relegated to a bench role. Better to move him now if the Royals can do so.

Even if the Royals can’t interest Atlanta in Guillen, though, they should see if some collection of second-tier talent can fetch Frenchy. Carlos Rosa, anyone? Rosa’s been hit hard in Omaha, but there’s a bunch of relief prospects in Double-A and below, and I’d be willing to give up any of the non-Disco variety. The Braves took a high-school pitcher drafted in the second round (Eric Cordier) in exhange for Tony Pena Jr; I wonder if they’d take another one – the disappointing Sam Runion – as part of their haul for Francoeur.

If the Royals do get Francoeur, they have the additional option of letting him figure things out in Triple-A for the rest of the year. He has options remaining, and my front office sources tell me that a player can not refuse an option until he has five years of service time accrued. Frenchy came into the season with 3 years, 88 days of service time, so depending on how long he stays in Omaha, it’s possible that a demotion will keep him in Kansas City an additional year. As it is, Francoeur would be under contract for 2010 and 2011, and if you can find three players under contract to the Royals who are likely to be better outfielders over those two seasons, you have better vision than I do.

Come on, Dayton. I appreciate you heeding my last suggestion, but this is much bigger. We all know you want to trade for him – he’s an ex-Brave, and you were reportedly very fond of him while you were in Atlanta. Not that one fan’s opinion means anything, but you’ll have my full support if you do. Even if every other fan out there thinks this particular fan is off his rocker.

Horacio Ramirez Sucks. Get Over It.

Come with me, if you don’t mind, on a tour of recent history.

May 21^st: Zack Greinke allows two runs in six innings, departing the game with a slender 3-2 lead against the Indians. Horacio Ramirez, who comes into the game with a sparkling 5.84 ERA (his lowest at any point this season), starts the top of the seventh. He allows a leadoff single, and after a bunt and a groundout, surrenders another single to blow the lead. Jamey Wright comes in and allows a go-ahead RBI double; Ramirez is eventually saddled with the loss.

May 22^nd: With the Royals now in St. Louis, Kyle Davies follows Greinke’s effort with a six-inning, two-run performance of his own, but his teammates fail to score a run for him. Ramirez once again starts the seventh. After getting two quick outs, Ramirez surrenders a home run to the mighty Tyler Greene. Nonetheless, Ramirez is brought out to pitch the eighth as well, and gives up a single to Skip Schumaker, followed by a double to Brian Barden. He IBB’s Albert Pujols, retires Chris Duncan, and then heads to the showers as Kyle Farnsworth gives up a two-run single to put the game out of reach.

May 24^th: Two days later, the Royals once again get a six-inning, two-run effort from their starting pitcher, this time it being Brian Bannister. With the Royals holding a 3-2 lead on St. Louis going to the bottom of the seventh, once again Trey Hillman inexplicably calls on Ramirez. Ramirez retires the first two batters in order, then intentionally walks Pujols with the bases empty. He then allows a wild pitch on his way to walking Chris Duncan, forcing Hillman to make the unconventional move of replacing one lefty reliever with another. In his season debut, John Bale, uh, bales out Ramirez by whiffing Rick Ankiel on three pitches; the Royals would hold on for the win.

May 27^th: Ramirez is called on with two outs in the sixth inning to rescue Davies, who has allowed seven runs so far and leaves a man on first base. Ramirez gives up a single to Josh Anderson, and is immediately replaced by Roman Colon, who gives up another single to plate the eighth run before ending the inning.

June 2^nd: Once again, Davies is on the mound. Once again, the Royals’ starter has allowed two runs, only in this instance the game is tied, and instead of being called upon to start an inning, Ramirez is brought in with two outs in the sixth – and men on first and second. The first batter he faces, Matt Joyce, hits a two-run double that effectively ends the game. Ramirez would pitch a scoreless seventh, but the game is already over.

Over his last five appearances, Ramirez has pitched four innings, allowed eight hits and five runs. He blew a one-run lead in one game, gave up the tie-breaking runs in another game, allowed a 2-0 deficit to get out of hand in a third game, had to be rescued by another pitcher to preserve a lead in a fourth game, and gave up a hit to the only batter he faced in mop-up relief in the fifth game.

And before this stretch, he had a 5.74 ERA.

It’s now June, and Horacio Ramirez has a 6.86 ERA for the season. He has allowed 27 hits in 19.2 innings. He only has 12 strikeouts. He has walked 10 batters (granted, three intentionally). He has allowed three homers. There is absolutely nothing on his statistical record that is positive.

Lefties are hitting .261/.306/.348, which isn’t bad, but not particularly good. Right-handers are hitting .405/.500/.811. Even Jimmy Gobble thinks that’s bad.

And still Hillman sends him out there, in key situations, gambling that Ramirez won’t cost the Royals yet another game.

I guess it would make sense if the Royals were desperate for a LOOGY, even though Ramirez, you know, doesn’t even make for a good LOOGY. Except last I checked, the Royals have both Ron Mahay and John Bale on the roster, meaning that they’re keeping Ramirez around even though they have two better left-handers in the bullpen.

Look, guys, I know you invested a lot of money in Ramirez. I don’t know why you invested a lot of money, mind you, because he had done nothing to deserve the money, and no other team was particularly interested in offering him a comparable deal. But you did. You blew $1.8 million on a pitcher who doesn’t belong in the major leagues any more. It happens. Teams make mistakes.

But the money is gone, and no amount of putting Ramirez on the mound to justify that contract is going to bring the money back. All you’re accomplishing by keeping Ramirez on the roster is proving that you can’t resist throwing good games after bad money.

I have no idea if the Royals are going to turn things around, whether they’ll get back to .500 this year, whether they’ll contend again in 2009. On paper, there’s no obvious reason why the Royals can’t reverse course. But I know that the Royals aren’t going to win a damn thing so long as they’ve got a GM who isn’t willing to cut losses on a contract that was a mistake the moment it was signed, and a manager who doesn’t understand that just because you have a pitcher on your roster doesn’t mean you have to use him in tight situations.

Horacio Ramirez sucks, guys. The sooner you accept that fact, the sooner we can get around to the business of putting together a winning roster.

Kauffman Stadium.

Alright, the intervention didn’t work. Time to call in Father Merrin.

I’m writing this from the American Eagle flight back to Chicago, a flight that I came precariously close to being bumped from. So I’m calling the fact that I made the flight home a win. It’s pretty much my only victory of the day.

We’ll get to the game later; I figure some of you will want my impressions of the park itself. Fortunately, a trip that had me leaving my house just before 8 AM had me at the ballpark around 11:20 – no longer a trip than it used to take to drive from Wichita, really – which gave us plenty of time to explore K2* before game time.

*: Sam Mellinger’s quest to name the renovated park The Kougar has gained sufficient traction within the clubhouse that I feel it would be inappropriate to try to fasten another name to the stadium – particularly given my own shameless attempts to make other nicknames into canon. But I understand and respect that the reaction to The Kougar is almost visceral with some fans. So you will see me occasionally slip in a K2 reference, which I think is by far the best of the other nicknames suggested. I love nicknames that convey multiple meanings, and K2 is not only a nod to the 2^nd iteration of Kauffman, but conjures images of a massive and foreboding mountain for opposing teams to climb. But the nickname requires that Kauffman Stadium actually becomes a place that causes opponents to tremble in fear. The way the Royals played on this homestand, Kauffman Stadium was less K2 than Flint Hills.

I was surprised by just how different the ballpark looked from the highway as you turn into the complex – the new jumbo-jumbotron, the outfield seats, and the reconfigured fountains serve to create a tangibly different look from a distance. Parking’s the same – and that’s a compliment – but up close the exterior of the park was different in places, less concrete and more glass and steel, adding a little character to what previously was a somewhat soulless shell.

Once inside, the gestalt I got of the new Kauffman Stadium was that of the old Kauffman Stadium, only better. We walked along the narrow inner concourse from home plate all the way around the park. We stopped in left field to check out the Hall of Fame, where we told by an usher (who was surprisingly helpful and talkative; the years in Chicago have clearly jaded me) that construction would not be completed until after the All-Star Break. Immediately past the Hall of Fame came the kids’ section, which you occasionally get glimpses of during live look-ins on Royals broadcasts: the mini-K where kids can take their hacks, the speed pitch guns, the batting cages, the carousel, and the running lanes where kids can compare their 90-foot dash times against a variety of Royals players. (Though unfortunately not Jose Guillen. Perhaps there’s a section for toddlers that I missed.)

A carnival-like section for children is de rigueur at major league stadiums today, but it’s hard to balance the desire to keep kids happy and separate their parents from their wallets with the need to keep the focus on the baseball game being played. What I liked about the Royals’ setup was that while you could not see the field of play from most of these events – most of them are located beyond the batters’ eye in dead center field – you only need to move 40 or 50 feet to see the field in most places. Contrast that with Comerica Park in Detroit, where they have a kids area (including a much larger carousel – I believe it’s a double-decker) that is cordoned off from the rest of the stadium to the point where it’s easy to forget that you’re at a ballpark.

Continuing our walk around to right-center field, the view from directly above the fountains was excellent – I imagine the view from the Dri-Duck seats is terrific. We only glanced inside Rivals Sports Bar, but clearly the view from inside is more than adequate to watch the game – particularly for the type of people who want to sit down in a restaurant while a game is in progress.

We then headed around the outer (i.e. enclosed) concourse, which was wider than before (and enormous compared to the ones at U.S. Cellular Field) and featured the usual array of different food stations and menu items. Our tour ended in the Diamond Club behind home plate, where our seats were located thanks to my friends at WHB.

I hesitate to even talk about our experience in the Diamond Club, because I’m sure I’ll sound like the person raving about the width of the seats in first class, but…it was impressive. The Club, which I believe is accessible only to fans sitting in the four sections immediately behind home plate (126-129), is an air-conditioned, glass-partitioned sitting area with several food stations, and tables to eat at that face directly out towards home plate. The view was good enough that you could watch the entire game there without complaint – and in point of fact I did watch a few innings from this spot once it became clear that my pasty-white skin couldn’t take any more sun exposure without risking a nasty (and, for a dermatologist, embarrassing) sunburn.

Before gametime I ordered an $8.50 reuben off the menu, and while it wasn’t the best reuben I’ve ever had, it was very good - better than a lot of reubens I’ve ordered from actual restaurants (ones that charged more than $8.50) in the past. It came with a side of chips, which was enough to keep me from being hungry for the rest of the game.

Fluid intake was another matter. For some reason the Royals have decided to serve soft drinks in one size only. I understand that I’m going to get ripped off at a ballpark, but at least give me the choice of how I get ripped off – I’d rather pay $5 for a 48-ounce bucket than $4 for the 32-ounce ice-filled cup that I’m going to polish off in 10 minutes on a hot day.

But that’s a minor gripe. Kauffman Stadium has always been one of the most underrated places in baseball to watch a game, and if that changes in the new Kauffman Stadium, it’s only because people will stop underrating the park and realize that it is one of the very best baseball stadiums in the country.

The best thing I can say about the new park is that it feels like many of the other new parks in the majors. I’ve been fortunate enough to enjoy the unveiling of two new ballparks in my backyard. In 1992, at the end of my freshman year at Johns Hopkins, the Orioles unveiled Camden Yards. I was on hand when the future of American stadium design was opened to the public (granted, it was an exhibition game against the Pirates), and it was immediately clear to me and everyone else there that day that every other ballpark in the major leagues had suddenly become obsolete. I moved to Michigan for medical school in 1995, and enjoyed the quirks of Tiger Stadium (old, lots of obstructed view seats, but the most intimate stadium I’ve ever been to) for several years before Comerica opened.

My point is that over the last 20 years, the standard for ballparks has shifted, not just in terms of design and architecture but in terms of things like culinary offerings. And on every issue, the new stadium appeared to at least meet that standard. I don’t know if it exceeds that standard, at least in terms of food – I would need a lot of trips to sample ballpark fare, and even then you would want a less gastronomically inhibited person to try all the pork-based barbecue items. But the new stadium does not appear to be deficient in any way. The infrastructure of the park is 21^st-century caliber, while the soul of Kauffman Stadium has been kept intact.

And by overlaying the new stadium design on an existing structure, the cost of the project came in at roughly half of what most other municipalities have spent on new ballparks. That’s what makes the Kougar (sorry!) so impressive to me – the park itself may not be better than places like Comerica and Miller Park and Jacobs Field (though it’s certainly better than the Cell) – it’s that the new Kauffman is a hell of a lot cheaper than pretty much every ballpark built in the last 20 years, while measuring up in every other way.

I sympathize with the people who wanted the Royals to build a downtown stadium, and frankly if Kauffman Stadium had been destroyed by aliens or something and the team had to start from scratch, I would think a downtown location would make the best sense. But it’s hard to argue, even for someone like me who’s an out-of-towner and doesn’t bear the tax burden, that it makes sense to build a downtown stadium when you can get the same structure built at the Truman Sports Complex for half the price.

The bottom line is this: when it comes to everything I look for in a new ballpark – good views from everywhere, wide concourses, an open design that allows you to walk all the way around the stadium and watch the game from multiple venues, a variety of high-quality menu items, amenities for the children and non-baseball fans who must inevitably attend games without distracting from the stadium’s central purpose – the new Kauffman Stadium does not appear to suffer any fatal, or even sickening, flaws.

The product in the middle of that stadium is a different story. We can talk about the product that I saw on Sunday at a later date.

Day Trip!

I think it’s time I witness this carnage for myself.

In a plan that was hatched late Thursday night, agreed to by exasperated wives on Friday afternoon, and finalized on Saturday morning, I am booked on a flight to Kansas City early Sunday morning with my friend Eiman and his ten-year-old son Yusuf. (Tragically, both father and son are White Sox fans. I can report that, at least judging from their complete lack of tattoos and avoidance of alcohol, they have no relation to the Ligue family – Rusty Kuntz has nothing to fear. In fact, judging from their overall pleasant demeanor and attention to grooming, it is entirely possible that they are not White Sox fans at all.)

The singular purpose of this trip is to see the Zack Greinke Experience up close and personal. Mind you, this trip does not come without risk. I don’t think I’ve ever seen Greinke win a game when I’ve been present, and the last time I saw him pitch live was this game. This risk is mitigated by the fact that Yusuf is something like 0-for-9 in watching the White Sox at U.S. Cellular Field. We’ve never watched a Royals-White Sox tilt together, and now that the irresistible force and the immovable object meet, it’s quite possible that the outcome will turn out something like this, with the game not decided until after we’ve had to return back to the airport.

If Greinke puts up his first stinker of the season tomorrow, you’ll know who’s responsible for the smell. But the way things have gone the last three weeks, I’m thinking it’s time for an intervention. If not an exorcism.