Saturday, February 12, 2011

Digital Digest.

Well, another Arab dictator has been sent packing, which means it’s time to get back to baseball. And not a moment too soon, what with Pitchers And Catchers Reporting on Monday (I capitalize the event out of respect).

I’m pretty sure I’m the last Royals blogger to chime in on the Royals’ promotional idea of conducting a contest which allowed bloggers to be credentialed, and hold their own press conference with Royals’ officials, for the Royals Fanfest on January 21st and 22nd.

I thought it was a good idea, if not a ground-breaking one – I think the Pirates and Giants held similar events for their bloggers. It’s a sign that the Royals – along with a lot of sports franchises – are slowly catching on to the idea that sports coverage in this century is a lot different than in the last. Every year, more and more fans are getting news and analysis of their favorite teams from what we might call “non-professional” sources: sources that have no insider access but are informed, opinionated, and well-written. And more and more fans are using the opportunity to engage with other passionate fans online.

In the long run, having a more involved fan base can only be a good thing for a sports franchise. In the short run, teams have to figure out how to encourage that involvement while still keeping some sort of barrier that prevents any Joe Fan from starting a blog that’s profane, uninformed, and unread, then crashing the press box at Kauffman Stadium.

I was worried that this might be a window dressing event, where the Royals randomly pick fans with no blogging experience, or where they hand-select the five people in the blogosphere who praised Dayton Moore for the Jason Kendall signing. Fortunately, judging from the winners, the contest was legitimate. The guys (and one gal) who were picked are, for the most part, well-known members of the Royals’ online community, and they don’t just blow rainbows and sunshine when they write.

I have to give the Royals extra credit, as well, for the truly inspired lineup they trotted out there. As expected, Dayton Moore was the first to take questions, and then Ned Yost held court. But the Royals finished with a pair of players – Billy Butler, an obvious choice…and Jeff Francoeur.

My initial reaction was to Frenchy’s inclusion, I must admit, kind of juvenile – I reveled in the train-wreck image of bloggers asking Francoeur to his face variations of the question, “why do you suck so bad?” But after some reflection, I realized how diabolically brilliant a move this was. Knowing how the blogosphere felt towards Francoeur, the Royals (specifically VP of Communications Mike Swanson and Director of Media Relations Dave Holtzman) decided to unleash the full force of Francoeur’s intangibles on his biggest critics.

Friendliness? Articulate, well-thought-out answers? A willingness to admit his weaknesses as a player and recognize the criticisms leveled against him? The confidence that he is addressing those weaknesses and will prove his doubters wrong this season? It was all there – a tour de force of an interview. By the time he finished speaking – and you can download the entire press conference here, courtesy of Nick Scott from Broken Bat Single – you couldn’t help but root for Francoeur to prove his doubters wrong. Not even if you were one of those doubters, and not even if – judging from what the Braves’ and Mets’ contingent of bloggers have written – you knew he’s played this act before.

Like I said: diabolical. Well-played, guys. Well-played.

I don’t know if this will become a regular event, but I hope it will. I think the Royals understand that independent bloggers are an inexorable part of the future of sports coverage, and they might as well embrace it. When Swanson and I met and buried the hatchet at the Winter Meetings in December 2009 – over a year ago – he told me even then that he was hoping to plan blogger-specific media events in the future. This was clearly a premeditated event, so I’m hopeful that it won’t be an isolated one.

And from my vantage point here in Chicago, it seemed like it went well – with the exception of one borderline-creepy question asked of Billy Butler, the bloggers acquitted themselves well in asking pointed but respectful questions, and the Royals acquitted themselves well by answering those questions with the same seriousness that they would answer questions from the mainstream media. That doesn’t necessarily mean answering the questions head-on – as Scott put it, Moore did a terrific job of “filibustering” to answer the question he wanted to answer. But then, Moore does that when he’s answering questions from Soren Petro or Sam Mellinger as well. Being a part of the media means accepting that sometimes the answers you get aren’t the answers you’re looking for – but even those answers are revealing in their own way.

Judging from what those bloggers felt about the event afterwards, it seems like it accomplished what the Royals wanted it to: they gave bloggers credibility, earned goodwill from a community of their most devoted fans, presented the Royals as a transparent organization unafraid of a little criticism, and did so without compromising anyone’s integrity. There are precious few win-win situations in sports, so even though this wasn’t a momentous event, it’s worth tipping your cap to the Royals for thinking outside the box a little and coming up with one.

The event also resurrected the topic of whether bloggers should be treated like full-fledged members of the sports media, which is to say whether they should receive press credentials, be allowed to sit in the press box, etc. How you answer that question depends in large part on whether you feel that press credentials are a perk of the job, or a prerequisite. If you think that press credentials are some kind of an award for hard work, then you can make a solid case that the most passionate bloggers, who spend as many hours a week covering the Royals as most professional sportswriters, deserve credentials as compensation for their services.

But if you think that the press box and clubhouse access are there simply to facilitate the job of people who cover the team from an up-close perspective, then it’s hard to make the case that bloggers need that kind of access. By definition, a blogger doesn’t need that access; the fact that we are capable of blogging in the first place is proof of that.

I don’t think that bloggers need access to do our job, but I do think that we can do our job better with it. I was in the press box for the four-game series against Baltimore at Kauffman Stadium last July. My credentials came courtesy of my work with 810 WHB, and it certainly made that job easier – for one thing, we broadcast our trade deadline show from inside the stadium, from the very room that the press conference was held in. And there’s no better place to write a column while watching a ballgame than in a press box. But truthfully, the most valuable part of being credentialed for me wasn’t the access to the press box or even the clubhouse – it was the access to the writers and broadcasters and other people who cover the team. The ability to network and meet with people who cover the game professionally – that’s the kind of access that a blogger can benefit from.

I could name a half-dozen Royals bloggers (I don’t want to name names and inadvertently leave someone out) who deserve the same opportunities that I’ve had. And I think that the Royals (and all of MLB) should begin re-considering their across-the-board denial of credentials for all bloggers. But I don’t blame them for taking it slow. There are benefits to giving bloggers credentials, but they are modest compared to the potential harm that would come from giving the wrong person access.

And I think as bloggers we need to remember that press credentials are a double-edged sword. Yes, it means you have access to the players and front office types that you write about every day – but it also means the players and front office types have access to you. Would I write the harsh (but fair!) criticisms of people like Jason Kendall and Yuniesky Betancourt and Nick Swartz if I knew I was going to see them every day?

On the one hand, you probably should never write something about a person that you wouldn’t be willing to say to their face. On the other hand, it’s one thing to say something personal about a person’s conduct or character, and quite another to simply point out how ineffective they are at playing a game. Implicit in my criticisms of Betancourt is that he is still 100 times better at playing baseball than I am – criticizing his performance in no way ought to suggest that he is a lousy human being. Whatever I say about the effectiveness of a player or a trainer or a general manager, I try not to comment about their off-field behavior or character – and when I do, it almost invariably is something that has already been reported by a reputable news source.

I think that saying that Player X is a terrible player is completely within my rights as a blogger, because Player X’s ability to play baseball only matters if you accept the fictional construct that baseball actually matters. Professional sports only have as much meaning as its fans give it. If you don't care about how good a player is, you are tearing down the construct that it matters how good any player is. It’s far better for Yuniesky Betancourt that I rail about how bad he is – and by railing about how bad he is, I give relevance to the game of baseball that he is so bad at, which draws fans to the ballpark and keeps television sets on and pays his salary – than for me to ignore his performance and spend my summer evenings at the movie theater or playing golf instead.

But I’m human, and it would be hard for me to write unflattering things about a person who I run into regularly, even if they are unflattering things about his ability to play an ultimately meaningless game. Being a blogger is liberating because we can be brutally honest without repercussions, but sometimes being brutally honest means being, well, brutal. I enjoy having press credentials every now and then, but I wouldn’t want to have them all the time. When you’re in the press box, you’re a journalist first and a fan second. But I’m a fan first and a journalist second, and I want to stay that way. I suspect most bloggers feel the same.

Monday, February 7, 2011

The Roots of a Revolution.

(It’s been over six months since I went off-topic on my blog, so in light of current events, I hope you’ll forgive me if I grab hold of the third rail once again. You’ve been warned.)

Every few years I travel to Damascus, Syria, where my parents were born and grew up, and where I still have my maternal grandmother and dozens of relatives on both sides of my family. These trips are an obligation more than a vacation; I never learned to speak Arabic as a child, and it’s hard not to feel like a fish out of water in a country where you don’t speak the language. But I go, because I have family to see. My parents left their entire life behind to move to America 40 years ago; the least I can do is to repay the favor for a fortnight every couple of summers.

My last trip to Damascus was in the summer of 2006, when public opinion in the Middle East towards America was at its absolute nadir. To be clear, the frustration and anger towards America has almost always been directed at our government, and almost never directed at its citizens. The only reactions I’ve ever received as an American in the Arab world are respect and occasionally a little jealousy. But there’s no question that there was an unpleasant vibe in the air the last time I visited. America’s nation-building adventure in Iraq was, at the time, a fiasco wrapped in a disaster stuffed into a catastrophe.

It will be decades before any kind of final judgment can be written about the invasion of Iraq, but in 2006, anarchy reigned, innocent civilians were being slaughtered by the hundreds each day, terrorist groups had seized the upper hand, and the face of America in the Arab world was the pictures of the tortures at Abu Ghraib. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees had swarmed into Syria seeking asylum. The week after I returned home from Damascus, war erupted between Israel and Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, and soon thousands of Lebanese refugees were crossing into Syria from the other side. It was a bad time.

On the last day of my trip, my parents had invited the entire extended family over for dinner. Sitting outside in the backyard on a peaceful night, it was easy to forget the chaos that was hemming the country in from all sides. I struck up a conversation with my uncle, Mohammad Ali. (Yes, Mohammad Ali. There’s a reason Cassius Clay chose that name – they are the two most common names in the Muslim world.) Mohammad Ali has always been the uncle I’ve been closest with; the youngest of my mom’s seven siblings, he came to America for college when I was a young child, learned English fluently, graduated from Ohio State – I’ve learned to forgive him – and then moved to Wichita to work as an aeronautical engineer. After almost 15 years in America, he returned to Syria to raise his family and serve his country, and started a successful software company.

Eventually the conversation turned – as all conversations in the Arab world do – towards politics. I asked Mohammad Ali what he thought of the United States’ decision to invade Iraq. By way of background, I will admit to being deeply, deeply ambivalent about the run-up to war in 2003, which is to say I was much less anti-war than most of my friends. I had no illusions that the stated reasons for war – the weapons of mass destruction, to say nothing of the fictional but oft-repeated links between Saddam Hussein and 9/11 – were anything but convenient excuses. I had no doubts that the Bush administration was motivated by realpolitik – pure national self-interest, the desire to gain a base of power in the region, secure oil reserves, and eliminate a man who had been a thorn in the side of U.S. foreign policy for fifteen years.

And still, in the end, I reluctantly supported the invasion. I supported it because I saw no internal solution for the fundamental problem of the Arab world: the political oppression of its people.

There was a time, in the 1950s, when Syria was a democracy. It wasn’t a particularly stable democracy, with presidents that changed with the seasons, but it was a democracy. Elections were held, checks and balances were in place, and a judge’s ruling could not be overturned on the whim of a politician. And then a coup brought to power a cadre of men who wanted power for power’s sake and had the military force needed to keep it. Not only in Syria; a coup established dictators in Iraq (Saddam Hussein) and Libya (Muammar Qaddafi) and Algeria and Tunisia and Yemen and elsewhere. In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser was a national hero for helping to push the British out of the country in 1952, but soon he established a lineage of rulers with absolute power. When Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1982, his successor Hosni Mubarak took advantage of the security crisis by claiming vast, unchecked “emergency” powers for himself. Those “emergency” laws have been in effect for nearly three decades.

In 2003, the only country in the Arab world with anything that remotely resembled a democracy was Lebanon, where instead a civil war was fought for 15 years from 1975 to 1990. Every other country was either a monarchy de facto, where a leader only left office in a coffin and was succeeded by his son, or by a monarchy de jure, as in the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the smaller states in the Persian Gulf.

It had been this way my entire life. Hafez al-Assad was the President of Syria since before I was born. He continued to rule Syria with an iron fist until he died in 2000. At the time of his death, his son Bashar was only 34, and Syria’s constitution required the President to be at least 40. The day after Hafez died, an emergency council convened and voted to change the constitution to lower the age requirement to – surprise! – 34. Bashar has been President ever since.

And over the past 40 years, the Arab world has hardly progressed economically, educationally, or technologically while the rest of the world passed them by. In 1950, most of the countries in the Arab world had a higher GDP than South Korea. Today South Korea exports cars and computers to America; the main exports from the Arab world are oil, oil, oil, and maybe olives and dates.

It’s no great mystery why the economies of the region have been so stagnant. In Syria, the reward for creating a successful business is that someone connected to the government pays you a visit and says, “What a wonderful business you’ve built. Give me ownership of half of your company, or I’ll shut it down.” (Please don’t try to conflate this with taxation; this was protection money to the mafia that ran the country.) More than the political oppression, the crushing corruption that seeped down from the top of the government to the lowest levels, such that you can’t cross the border from Syria to Lebanon and back without paying a bribe to the customs officials, castrated a nation.

A well-armed and loyal military was able to castrate any opposition to the regime. Most notoriously, in 1982 there was an armed uprising in Syria, in the city of Hama, which was led by members of the Muslim Brotherhood – you’ve probably heard that group in the news. Hafez al-Assad sent the army to the outskirts of the city, and the order was given to open fire. The city was bombarded by air and by artillery for three weeks before the army moved in; the military didn’t distinguish between militants in the street and people hiding in the homes. Somewhere between 20,000 and 40,000 people, mostly innocent bystanders, were killed. One of my best friends' mother is from Hama; she lost several of her brothers in the attack. It has been described as “the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its own people in the modern Middle East”. In America, news of the massacre was buried in the back pages, in small font.

The people’s ultimate weapons against a tyrant are time and mortality, but even those weapons are ineffective against familial succession. Hosni Mubarak has long been planning to transfer power to his son Gamal upon his death. The only two men more frightening to the Iraqi people than Saddam Hussein were his sons Uday and Qusay. The Syrian people thought things might be different when Bashar took over for his father. Bashar was, in fact, not originally meant to be the successor; his older brother Bassel had long been groomed for that role. Bashar went to medical school in Syria, and was finishing his ophthalmology residency in England when Bassel died in a one-vehicle car accident.

So the expectation is that Bashar, having seen the virtues of democracy up close, having been thrust into absolute power unexpectedly, would be uncommonly willing to make reforms that might the people a greater voice. Ten years later, Syria has opened up economically from the Soviet-inspired ways of the 1980s, when my dad had to pay a smuggler to bring his mother a new refrigerator from Lebanon. (When I was a kid in the early 1980s, the currency exchange rate was 8 Syrian pounds to one dollar. By the time Hafez Al-Assad died, the exchange rate was close to 50 to 1.) But it’s as corrupt as ever, and speaking out against the government is as dangerous as ever.

Which is why, in 2003, I came to the conclusion that an invasion of Iraq might, in the long term, lead to a better outcome than the status quo. No Arab leader had been more brutal to his people than Saddam Hussein. Sanctions to Iraq had only led to crippling poverty and a devastating public health crisis that had killed thousands, without weakening Hussein’s grip on the country. Without external pressure, Hussein was going to terrorize his country until the day he died, at which point he would be succeeded by one of his sons, who inherited their father’s brutality but missed out on his intelligence. So I decided that a war, even a bloody war and the unrest that would likely follow, was a better outcome than another 40 years like the 40 years that had just passed. I thought that this was the right war, even though it was fought for all the wrong reasons.

I would soon come to regret my position. I learned that there is no such thing as the right war fought for the wrong reasons. I learned that there is one form of government that is worse than totalitarianism, and that’s unbridled anarchy. I was astonished by our government’s plan for what to do with Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, a plan which apparently involved unicorns and rainbows and a mass singing of Kumbaya. I was dumbfounded by the atrocities that American soldiers were capable of, and were permitted to do by their superiors, in Abu Ghraib and other places.

And still, in the summer of 2006, I wasn’t convinced that the Iraq War was a bad idea. I still saw no other alternative for the people of Iraq and the entire Arab world other than continued dictatorship, continued political oppression, and the continued squandering of an entire region’s human potential.

I shared this opinion with my uncle, before asking him for his. He had lived in America long enough to understand the complexities and contradictions of our nation. I figured he might understand.

He sighed deeply. “Rany, I want democracy to come to the Middle East as much as you. But this –” he gestured theatrically – “this is not the way to bring democracy to the Arabs. I don’t understand why America didn’t just give them time to work.”

“Well in that case, Khalo,” I said, “how do you expect democracy to happen? You’ve been stuck with brutal dictators since before I was born – why should I expect anything different before I die?”

“Have faith, Rany.” My uncle, a devout Muslim, pointed his index finger towards the sky. “Give them time to work.”

“Them? God and His angels?”

He looked at me strangely, and then laughed. “The satellites.”

There are many methods a dictator uses to keep himself in power. Fear is Plan A, of course. It’s not enough for the people to be afraid of standing up to the government; the people must be afraid of saying anything remotely critical of the government. Freedom of speech is truly the most basic of freedoms; without it, the people can not organize to defend every other freedom they hold dear.

In the 1980s, during the darkest era of the Syrian regime, the government didn’t bother to imprison people who spoke out against it. That was far too civilized a response. They went one better: they imprisoned the dissidents’ children instead. They tortured and, all too frequently, eventually killed them. (When Hafez al-Assad lost his own son in a car accident, well, you can guess what the reaction was. Id quot circumiret, circumveniat.)

I have a close friend here in Chicago – it’s probably better that I not identify him by name – whose grandfather back in Syria made the mistake of denouncing the Syrian government in the early 1980s. They came for his son and threw him in prison. His son was 16 at the time.

The son – my friend’s uncle – was one of the lucky ones. He was released after ten years; his sister in America got him a visa to emigrate here. He’s been married almost 15 years, has four kids, and owns a gas station on the south side. Not bad for someone who went from high school sophomore to the gulag overnight. (And you thought your high school years sucked.)

Fear is a powerful weapon, but eventually fear can be overcome. Add ignorance, though, and the synergy between the two is formidable. If the people don’t know there’s a better way to live, they have no reason to fear in the first place. I’m sure “1984” is on the required reading list at Dictator Finishing School.

I’m not an expert on these things, but I suspect that nowhere on Earth has a dictatorship been more successful at keeping its people ignorant than in North Korea. The average North Korean probably thinks that not only is the world flat, but that it ends abruptly at the demilitarized zone. I don’t think most North Koreans have any idea that the rest of the world looks upon their nation as the biggest hellhole on the planet. That level of ignorance is horrifying, and a horrifyingly effective way to maintain power.

The Arab people were never that cut off from the world, but they were close. In the 1980s, your television choices were Syria Channel 1 and Syria Channel 2. Channel 2 might show the occasional inoffensive US drama – “Little House on the Prairie” – with Arabic subtitles. If you were really lucky, you might be able to pick up Lebanese television.

And then the satellites came.

There was no specific moment when the satellite revolution began. But at some point in the early 1990s, as technology made satellite dishes progressively cheaper and smaller, eventually they reached the point where most Arabs could afford one, and could fit one onto their balcony or install it on a perch outside a window. There was no such thing as cable TV; if you wanted TV choices, you needed a dish. By the mid-1990s, an apartment building looked from the outside like a satellite dish farm.

The authorities didn’t like this new development, but they didn’t resist it too much. More TV choices meant more bland entertainment, which meant more ways for the masses to while away their time without resisting the government. There was no danger that the people would take to the streets because they had seen too many episodes of Baywatch. So the Arab governments mostly looked the other way as their people feasted on American action movies and European soccer matches.

And then, in 1996, Al Jazeera arrived.

The Al Jazeera channel has long been misunderstood in America. This wasn’t always the case. In March of 2001, six months before 9/11, 60 Minutes ran a long and flattering piece on how Al Jazeera was helping to open up the Arab world. But then 9/11 happened, and then Osama bin Laden sent his videotapes to Al Jazeera, and soon the network was branded in the United States as Al-Qaeda’s mouthpiece.

The best analogy I’ve seen for why bin Laden would send his tapes to Al Jazeera is the case of Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, who sent his Manifesto to the New York Times. Granted that Kaczynski’s politics were dosed with a generous amount of crazy pills, his anti-government stance is generally classified as right-wing. The New York Times is generally characterized as a left-of-center newspaper. Kaczynski sent his Manifesto to the New York Times not because they shared his point of view, but because they were the Paper of Record, the most respected news source in America. He figured sending his Manifesto to the Times (and the Washington Post) would grant him the maximum exposure, and he was right; the Times published his rant, his own brother read it and realized who the author was, and now Kaczynski spends his days in an 8-by-8 cell.

So it goes with bin Laden, who sends his tapes to Al Jazeera not because they sympathize with his Islamic nihilism, but because by 2001, they were the most respected news source in the Arab world. And just as the Times’ publication of Kaczynski’s Manifesto gave him what he wanted – publicity – but also gave the world clues to his identity, Al Jazeera’s airing of those tapes serves a double purpose. The US government condemns those tapes – but you can’t tell me they’re not also watching them frame-by-frame, looking for clues as to bin Laden’s whereabouts and intentions.

Labeling Al Jazeera as simply a tool of Al-Qaeda misses the entire point. Al Jazeera was, from its first day on the air, something the Arab world had never seen before: a television channel in Arabic, available to almost everyone in the Arab world, that provided a frank and reasonably unbiased source of news. It provided the unvarnished truth, and that made it extremely dangerous. If there was corruption going on in Jordan, it was reported. If there was a government crackdown in Egypt, it was reported. If a Saudi dissident living in exile in England had some scandalous information about the Saudi royal family, it was reported. All you need to know about Al Jazeera is that its greatest critics are the Arab governments, who have applied all kinds of pressure on Qatar – where Al Jazeera is based – to tone down the rhetoric.

It was not and is not a perfect news source. Al Jazeera has its own biases, and has been criticized for having a staunch pro-Arab stance in its reporting, particularly when it comes to Israel and Palestine. It’s been described, not inaccurately, as the Arab version of Fox News. And that’s not a bad thing. Whatever your feelings are about Fox News, I think we can all agree that in a world where the government had banned from the airwaves any news reports other than what’s shown on PBS, Fox News would be a breath of fresh air. In a world where Lyndon LaRouche had deposed the federal government and established autocratic rule, Fox News would be the voice of the resistance. That’s what Al Jazeera is to the Arab world, and the demonization of the network in America has been both profoundly sad and counterproductive – counterproductive in the sense that ignoring Al Jazeera’s positive impact on the region is part of the reason why our government has been caught so off-guard by the events of the last six weeks.

(Full disclosure: when Al Jazeera launched its English channel in 2006, my sister Rana briefly worked out of Washington DC in their department of public relations for North America. Yes, I know – she worked in PR for Al Jazeera. The punchlines write themselves.)

For the last 15 years, then, the Arab world has had the access that was denied them for so long. They’ve seen the truth about how oppressive and hypocritical their own governments are, and they’ve seen the truth about how messy and imperfect and yet ultimately how ennobling and empowering Western democracies are. (In the words of Winston Churchill, “It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except all the others that have been tried.”) And having already opened the barn door to letting the masses own satellite dishes, the governments of the region were mostly helpless to do anything about it. Baywatch, it turns out, was a Trojan horse.

The seeds that were planted 15 years ago took a long time to bear fruit, but they’re blooming now, and the fruit is sweet. Six weeks ago, the Arab world was an unbroken chain of dictatorships. On December 17th, protests a Tunisian man named Muhammad Bouazizi, a college graduate who had been reduced to working as a fruit vendor – illegally – set himself on fire to protest the hopelessness of his plight. Bouazizi, who died of his burns a few weeks later, is the Archduke Ferdinand of the Arab revolution – for a region that was fuel-soaked kindling, he was the spark.

Al Jazeera – and other satellite channels which have followed in its wake – supplied the fuel, broadcasting the protests in Tunisia to an enraptured Arab world – nowhere more enraptured than Tunisia itself. Protests which began in the small town of Sidi Bouzid soon spread to the capital of Tunis; on January 6th most of the nation’s lawyers went on strike, followed by teachers the next day. The protests were also fueled by, speaking of maligned news sources, a Wikileaks cable that described rampant corruption by the Tunisian government, mostly by the family of “President” Ben Ali. On January 14th, Ben Ali and his family – along with a rumored 1.5 tons of gold – were on a plane out of the country. I’m 35 years old, and this is the first time I’ve ever seen an Arab dictator deposed by the will of the people.

Eleven days later, a revolution began in Egypt which might – emphasize might – depose another one. And while Tunisia is the pinky finger of the Arab world, Egypt is its heart. The population of Egypt is approximately 80 million, four times that of Syria and nearly eight times larger than Tunisia’s. I presume I don’t have to go into details about the Egyptian revolution; whereas the Tunisian revolution was almost completely ignored by Western media until the final days, they’ve been a little bit quicker to catch on to the fact that what’s going on in Egypt is potentially momentous.

The speed and finality of the Tunisian revolution caught everyone – thankfully, the Tunisian government included – off-guard. When the protesters hit the streets of Cairo on January 25th, the Egyptian government was more prepared. It took aim at what it deemed to be the root source of the protests: technology. They tried to shut down Al Jazeera (threatening the journalists who work at the station, briefly imprisoning some of them, forcing the network off the air for a time, even burning down their station), Twitter and Facebook (turning off the nation’s entire internet), and cell phone communication (shutting down all cell phone networks).

It almost worked. But it’s hard to put out a fire once it’s lit. It’s especially hard to put down a revolution when the army, as it did in Tunisia, refuses to open fire on peaceful protesters. Meanwhile, in the last two weeks, there have been staged protests in Yemen, and in Jordan, and in Algeria. (In Syria, for a variety of reasons that are too complicated to get into here, attempts to form protests fizzled badly.) I feel like I’ve stepped into an alternate universe, one in which the Arab people are not doomed to living their lives without political expression, without recourse for their grievances, without due process when their rights are infringed upon. It’s a heady experience.

And suddenly Al Jazeera is being appreciated in a new light. Americans are even starting to ask why Al Jazeera English, which was just launched in 2006 and is one of the most-watched TV networks in the world, is almost completely unavailable in America. Over the past 10 days, the web traffic to Al Jazeera English, which streams online, has increased over 2000% – and over half of that traffic comes from America.

Where does it go from here? If only I knew. Mubarak has proven far more difficult to dislodge than Ben Ali, leading to an impasse that shows no signs of being broken. The American response to the Egyptian revolution has been predictably pathetic. I say “pathetic” because, presented with an opportunity to support a populist uprising against a dictator, a genuinely grassroots movement to establish a democracy in the Arab world, the greatest democracy on Earth has dithered and hemmed and hawed, trying to find a way to support the protesters without pissing off Mubarak too much. I say “predictably” because the reason the United States is trying to play both sides is because while Mubarak is a dictator, he’s our dictator. Egypt has been a reliable ally to the United States, for the past 30 years, and in return our government has looked the other way while he’s ruled over his people with impunity.

It’s telling that there has been very little criticism of the President by the Republican leadership regarding his Egyptian policies – there seems to be a consensus across the political spectrum that the path Obama is following is not only the right path, it’s the only path. That this path involves the USA telling the Egyptian people to be patient about their pesky grievances like liberty and freedom and democracy is simply a manifestation of how morally bankrupt our foreign policy towards the Arab world has been for the last half-century.

You know all those Arab dictatorships? With a few exceptions (Libya, Syria), they’re all allies of America. While we fought two wars against Saddam Hussein, we originally supported him when he launched a pointless and bloody war against Iran for eight years. They keep the oil flowing and keep the Israel/Palestine conflict from escalating, and for them we suspend the bedrock principle of western democracy, the one that says that rulers require the consent of the governed. Hell, we might even suspend reality long enough to claim that they have the consent of the governed.

Barely a week ago, Vice President Joe Biden said of Hosni Mubarak, “I would not refer to him as a dictator.” (Personally, I thought Biden really went beyond the pale when he continued, “And I would not refer to Yuniesky Betancourt as a defensive liability.”) On the other side of the aisle, Dick Cheney went one further, saying of Mubarak, “He’s been a good man, he’s been a good friend and ally of the United States.” With allies like these…well, as an Egyptian tweeted on Thursday: “Dear US government: We don’t hate you because we hate your freedom; we hate you because you hate our freedom.”

The refusal by the US to force Mubarak out of office is partly out of recognition for his allegiance these past three decades, and partly out of fear for what the alternative might be. Specifically, the Western world is freaked out about the possibility that if the Egyptian people are free to choose their rulers, they might choose to give power to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood is not a benevolent organization, but neither is it Al-Qaeda. Despite what you may have read, it is not a nihilistic movement that seeks to subjugate the world under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism. It is a political Islamic movement, in a country where all political dissent is suppressed, and where many of its adherents are or have been imprisoned for their beliefs. Oppression radicalizes dissenters, so it is not surprising that extremist branches have splintered off of the main movement.

It’s one thing to be wary of the Muslim Brotherhood. It’s quite another to be so afraid of them that you would prefer to put the Egyptian people’s chance for democratic representation on hold – indefinitely. One of the reasons the Muslim Brotherhood has so much popularity is because, having never been given the opportunity to govern, they can offer a utopian vision of the future to their supporters without ever having to deliver. Whatever power they might gain in democratic elections comes attached with the responsibility to deliver on their promises. If they don’t create jobs and make the trains run on time, they’ll be thrown out of office in the next election just like every other political party. And it becomes impossible for Islamists to lash out at the government when they’re part of the government.

On the other side of this, let’s say you were a oppressive dictator – let’s call you “Hosni Mubarak” – who enjoys good relations with America, and the American government tried to gently nudge you towards relinquishing some of your power. Let’s say that the American government considers Muslim terrorism to be its greatest existential threat. Let’s say that there was a small but vocal minority of Muslim activists in your country. Wouldn’t you do everything in your power to convince your American friends that you were the only person keeping those Muslim activists from becoming Muslim terrorists, facts be damned? Machiavelli would approve, and I’m pretty sure that “The Prince” is the first book on that dictator reading list.

Fortunately, after buying Mubarak’s act for so long, our government (and many journalists) are coming to the realization that the Muslim Brotherhood has a place in a future democratic Egypt. The comparisons of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt with the Iranian revolution are incredibly facile. Aside from the fact that the Brotherhood does not have nearly as much popular support as the Ayatollah Khomeini did, Iran is a Shi’ite country, while the Muslims of Egypt are mostly Sunni. It’s like saying that Baptists are going to take their cue from the Vatican.

As for the notion that a new government might refuse to honor the peace agreements that Egypt has signed with Israel, and might threaten Israeli security, I can only say this: a true and lasting peace can only occur by the consent of the people on both sides. A peace treaty signed with a dictator is, by its very definition, an unstable one. Unless you plan to consign the Egyptian people to being ruled by dictators in perpetuity, at some point you have to let democracy flourish and take your chances. The Egyptian people are dealing with raging unemployment, a moribund economy, food shortages – but they have had, for over three decades, peace with Israel. I think it unlikely that they want to add a new war with a more-powerful neighbor to their list of miseries.

Last weekend, a group of friends of mine had a spirited argument over a single question: Did George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq help to accelerate the move towards democracy in the Arab world, by trying to implant a democracy where once an odious tyrant ruled? Or did it hinder the democratic impulse in the region, because Iraq descended into such chaos that it made dictatorships look stable by comparison? I can tell you that we didn’t reach any kind of consensus.

But I can also tell you that, after thinking about it some more, I think the question is kind of a red herring. I think that our intervention in Iraq has little bearing on the events in Tunisia and Egypt that have every leader in the Arab world soiling his pants. What has happened these last six weeks would have happened whether or not we invested a trillion dollars and thousands of American lives in Iraq.

I think that my uncle was right. A satellite can do what an army can’t. An army can overthrow a government, but a satellite can empower the people to do it themselves. An army can only coerce; a satellite can convince. It’s too early to know whether this really is the Berlin Wall moment for the Arab world, or just their Tiananmen Square. It’s too early to know whether our government will support the green shoots of democracy in the Middle East, or sell out its principles and the Arab people in favor of “stability” once again. But if the Arab people are now convinced that they control their own destiny; that they’re entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and refuse to settle for anything less than a government of the people, by the people, and for the people: well, I’d say 2011 is shaping up to be a pretty good year.

I can only pray that our own government remembers that the principles worth fighting for in 1776 are still worth defending – or at least not worth compromising – today.

UPDATE: If you're still unsure of the power of satellite TV and instant communication to the people, consider this. Over the past few days, it seemed that the power of the protests was flagging a little, after the Obama administration (foolishly, in my opinion) decided to throw its support to a very slow transition led by Vice President (and Army general) Omar Suleiman. Then yesterday, Wael Ghonim, one of the bloggers who helped to spark the protests with his Facebook page, (and who is a high-ranking executive for Google in the region,) went on satellite TV hours after he was released from custody, where he had been detained for the past 12 days. Today, this is the response in Tahrir square.

Saturday, January 29, 2011

The Butler Signed It.

God, what an awful pun. Naturally, I couldn’t resist.

Continuing my quest to remain three news cycles behind the times, it’s time to discuss the Billy Butler contract even while all the news is about the Royals’ farm system. Specifically, Baseball America officially ranked the Royals as having the #1 farm system in all of baseball on Monday; Keith Law of ESPN.com acknowledged his agreement (but with the Tampa Bay Rays not far behind) on Wednesday. Law also issued his Top 100 Prospects list on Thursday, and The Big Five – Hosmer, Myers, Moustakas, Montgomery, and Lamb – were all in his Top 41. (The only other Royal on the list was Danny Duffy at #98, although both Jake Odorizzi and Chris Dwyer were on Law’s list of ten “just missed” prospects.)

And to top it off, MLB.com unveiled their Top 50 Prospects on Tuesday, which included six Royals – The Big Five and, somewhat surprisingly, Odorizzi.

I think my word count on the subject of the farm system over the past 12 months is well into six figures at this point, so I don’t have much to add right now. The most important thing to take from all the accolades is that they were so expected that they almost felt anticlimactic. That the most well-respected prospect analysts in the business acknowledged that the Royals had the best farm system in baseball wasn’t a revelation. It was a coronation. Now comes the hard part: turning promise into production.

When it comes to that very transmutation, Billy Butler represents a nearly best-case scenario. Butler was a Top 30 Prospect twice – #29 by Baseball America in 2006, #25 in 2007 – who only ranked that low because of his almost comical lack of defensive value. As a hitter, Butler compares favorably with anyone in the Royals’ farm system today, or frankly, anyone in the Royals’ farm system ever. Eric Hosmer hit .338/.406/.571 in his breakout 2010 season. Butler’s career line in the minors was .336/.416/.561, and he was in the majors less than two months after he turned 21.

Butler was back in the minors for a brief refresher course less than two months after he turned 22, which should serve as a reminder that even for the best of prospects, even for the ones that ultimately make it, setbacks are the norm. It was easy to assume on his way up the chain that there was no way that Butler wouldn’t make it, that he was too talented to fail. He didn’t fail, but it’s a testament to his work ethic as much to his talent that he was rewarded with the contract he signed earlier this week.

In his first two seasons in the majors, Butler hit .282/.334/.420. In his first two seasons – the same two seasons (2006 and 2007) – Alex Gordon hit .253/.332/.421. Butler and Gordon had the exact same OPS+ (99) in that span. But while Gordon floundered in 2008 and 2009, over the last two years Butler hit .309/.375/.480, and his 96 doubles in that span are the most in Royals history by a player in back-to-back seasons. We knew four years ago that Butler had a boatload of talent, but we didn’t know if his potential was a promise or a curse. Today we no longer have to wonder about what Butler will be, because what he already is is good enough.

Which isn’t to say that he doesn’t have the potential to get even better. Butler will still be 24 until a few weeks after Opening Day. Unless someone like Moustakas forces his way onto the roster, the only hitter on the Opening Day roster younger than Butler will be Alcides Escobar. He’s the best hitter in the lineup, and the second-youngest.

So the answer to the question, “Was Butler worthy of a long-term deal?” is a pretty resounding yes. The specific cost-benefit analysis has already been done by Matt Klaassen here, so I won’t try to reinvent the wheel. I’ll just say that as long as Butler remains reasonably healthy, and as long as he doesn’t undergo a shocking collapse at the plate, the worst the Royals can do on this deal is break even.

We can’t completely discount the possibility of a collapse. Butler is a hitting savant, but he’s not the most athletic guy in the world. It’s a well-established principle that young hitters with “old hitters’ skills” – guys that can’t run well or play defense or hit for average, but can take pitches and occasionally hit one into the next county – tend to peak at a young age.

The worst-case scenario for this would be someone like Ben Grieve, who was the #2 overall pick in the draft out of high school, in the majors at 21, the AL Rookie of the Year at 22. After three eerily consistent seasons as a borderline star hitter for the A’s, they traded him to Tampa Bay in the massive three-way deal that sent Johnny Damon out of Kansas City and brought us (joy!) Angel Berroa and Roberto Hernandez. The A’s must have known something, because Grieve was never more than an average hitter after that; he was done as a full-time player at age 27 and out of the majors at age 29.

Grieve comes to mind when I think of Butler because, like Butler, Grieve’s main flaw even at his peak was that he hit too many ground balls. And just like Butler, when Grieve was 24 years old – his last year with Oakland, and his last good year – he led the American League by grounding into 32 double plays.

That eerie coincidence aside, the comparison isn’t really fair to Butler, because while Butler may have the physique of an older player, he doesn’t have the batting style of one. Grieve hit .288 as a rookie and that was his career high; Butler has hit over .300 each of the last two seasons. In his five seasons as a regular, Grieve drew at least 63 walks and struck out at least 108 times each year; Butler has slowly learned plate discipline, topping out at 69 walks last year, but his career high in whiffs is 103 – and he struck out just 78 times last season.

Butler has an unusual blend of skills: he’s a right-handed hitter with no speed and, owing to his propensity for groundballs, only mid-range power – but despite his lack of speed, he succeeds in hitting for a high average. The first two comps I thought of were Carney Lansford and Bill Madlock, but both Lansford and Madlock had pretty decent speed – both guys stole 30 bases in a season once. (Lansford stole 37 bases in 1989, at the age of 32, which shocked the hell out of me when I looked it up.)

A look at Butler’s ten most comparable players (through age 24) on Baseball-Reference.com only confirms the notion that he’s a historically unusual player. The ten players are all either left-handed hitters (John Olerud, Kent Hrbek, Nick Markakis, Carlos May, Carl Yastrzemski, Keith Hernandez), athletic guys who played good defense (Chet Lemon, Ellis Valentine), or an exact contemporary (Delmon Young). The presence of Yaz on the list makes me feel good, as I spent some time comparing the two players last season.

I’m ignoring Tony Horton as a comparison, as Horton’s career came to an abrupt end in 1970, at the age of 25, when he attempted suicide; while he survived, the emotional stress of the game prevented him from ever returning to the majors. But even ignoring Horton, it has to worry you a little that two of Butler’s comps – May and Valentine – were basically done as everyday players in their mid-20s, after playing at an All-Star level for several years.

I don’t think that the experiences of players like May and Valentine and Grieve are specifically relevant to Butler, because I think he’s a different kind of player than all of them. But I think their struggles are generally relevant, in that they serve as a reminder that not all players follow the aging curve faithfully; they don’t all peak at the age of 27 and then slowly decline. Butler is 24 years old, he’s improved as a hitter in almost every season, and it’s tempting to think that the parabola of his career is still sloping upwards. But there’s always a risk that it’s not.

As Jeff Zimmerman details here, if Butler has tried to change his approach to hit more balls in the air, it’s not showing up in the results. While I personally think that Butler is as comparable to Edgar Martinez as anyone else – and Martinez wasn’t even an everyday player in the majors until he was 27 – there’s a risk Butler will never be a better hitter than he is now.

All those risks, though, are fairly priced into his contract. Butler makes $5 million this season, counting his signing bonus, and $8 million in each of the next three seasons. (There’s also a $1 million option on the fifth year.) The way the contract is structured is interesting; it’s more front-loaded than most contracts given to arbitration-eligible players. When the terms of 4 years, $30 million were first announced, I expected the breakdown to be something along the lines of $4/6/9/11, steadily increasing as he got closer to free agency.

From an owner’s perspective, in a perfectly rational world you would always want a contract to be as back-loaded as possible – ideally you’d pay Butler the league minimum for three years and then $28.8 million in 2014. Inflation will make the money at the end of a contract worth less, and you can invest the money now and pocket the interest you make in the interim.

But in the real world, where teams rarely are allowed to carry a budget surplus from one year into the next, front-loading this contract makes a lot of sense. Thanks to Gil Meche’s retirement the Royals had plenty of payroll space for 2011, and they famously had almost no payroll obligations in 2012 – Butler is now the only player on the major league roster who has a guaranteed contract beyond the upcoming season. The Royals could afford to pay him a little more this season – in fact, they very well might perceive the need to up the payroll in 2011 just to get the Players’ Association off their backs – and in return they have a more manageable salary in 2013 and 2014, when presumably they will want to be aggressive in free agency to add the final pieces for a team that’s in playoff contention.

Speaking cynically, keeping Butler’s salary lower towards the back end of the contract would also make him easier to trade, should the Royals decide to do so. I don’t think this is particularly likely, but if Kila Ka’aihue proves to be as capable a hitter as I think he can be, the Royals will face a difficult decision once they decide Eric Hosmer is ready. The easy – and likely – solution will be to trade Ka’aihue for whatever they can get for him. The bold decision would be to move Hosmer to the outfield and try to get all three bats in the lineup.

But I wouldn’t discount a Butler trade. The Royals have spent much of the last six months trying to add more right-handed bats to the system, anticipating a need to protect Hosmer and Moustakas from a wave of left-handed pitching. But after the Greinke trade, the Royals’ future lineup has right-handed hitters at shortstop (Escobar), center field (Cain), second base (Colon or Giavotella), and now right field and catcher a well, as Wil Myers has formally moved to the outfield, leaving Salvador Perez as the reigning catcher of the future. Hosmer and Moustakas are actually the only two left-handed hitters in the projected lineup. If the Royals commit to Butler and trade Ka’aihue, then they will have at least six right-handed hitters in the everyday lineup, with left field still to be determined. That’s a potential problem lurking down the road.

It’s a problem that can be addressed down the road, because with this contract the Royals have locked up their best hitter while still maintaining flexibility, both in terms of personnel and in terms of money. I was happy when I thought it was a four-year deal for $30 million; I was ecstatic when it turns out it was a five-year deal for $41.5 million and a voidable fifth year. It’s reported as “four years with a club option”, but it’s better to think of it as a five-year deal, one that buys out not one but two years of Butler’s free agency, only with the added bonus that the team can opt out early if things turn sour. Even at five years, the contract ends before Butler’s 30th birthday, and the horror stories above notwithstanding, most of the guys with “old players’ skills” – guys like Alvin Davis and Travis Hafner and the like – didn’t really lose it until they turned 30.

This is, I believe, only the second contract of the Dayton Moore Era that involved a true club option – as opposed to the mutual options which get handed out like candy. The other contract with a club option is a doozy – Joakim Soria’s guaranteed contract ends after this year, but the Royals have options for 2012, 2013, and 2014.  A club option is one of the greatest weapons in a GM’s financial arsenal – it grants the team a big upside with minimal downside. While I’d like to see the Royals bargain their way to more club options in the future, at least Moore had the wherewithal to deploy those club options for two of his best players.

As an analyst, I love the contract, because I think that the Royals got a substantial risk discount on this contract – the odds Butler doesn’t earn his money are dwarfed by the odds that he plays at such a high level that he would have made millions more going year to year. That’s not to say that Butler got hosed – he’s guaranteed 30 million dollars, and that’s past the threshold it should take for any player with a modicum of financial sense to be set for life. But it was definitely a win for the club.

As a fan, I love the contract, because it helps to wash away the bitter taste in my mouth of watching Zack Greinke force his way out of a town, replacing one star player under a long-term deal with another, albeit lesser star. I love the deal because it only continues the momentum that Moore has established this off-season, making a serious of shrewd short-term plays without putting up any roadblocks, or even speed bumps, for his cache of prospects. I love it because I think Butler has stepped up into a leadership role in the clubhouse, and has not only embraced the promise of the team’s farm system, he seems committed to helping to nurture that promise along.

Mostly, I love the deal because I love watching Billy Butler hit. And I’m looking forward to watching him do that – and eventually I’m going to get all of you to start calling him “Bam Bam”, dammit – for the next five years.

Saturday, January 22, 2011

Meche Is A Mensch.

I’m not sure what there is to say about Gil Meche’s retirement. His decision defies analysis.

A 32-year-old pitcher, who was legally and morally owed $12 million for his services in the 2011 season, came to the conclusion that he would be unable to provide said services in 2011. This conclusion ought to have had no impact on his entitlement to that 12 million dollars – not legally, given that he had signed a guaranteed contract that paid him regardless of his ability to pitch, and not morally, because virtually everyone (though not Meche himself) is in agreement that his inability to pitch was the fault of his employer.

(As the great Old Hoss Radbourn tweeted: “It was most gentlemanly of G. Meche to save money for the team that obliterated his career.”)

Nonetheless, Meche decided that since he was physically unable to perform the services that the Royals had signed him for – to make 30+ starts a year – that he was not entitled to the money his contract owed him. And so he walked away from Twelve. Million. Dollars.

Gil Meche is a better man than I. He’s a better man than you. There’s no way that you or I would walk away from 12 million dollars that we were entitled to.

Gil Meche is a much, much, much richer man than you or I as well, and I’m sure that made his decision much, much, much easier. Meche has made roughly $43 million in his contract with the Royals, and roughly $52 million overall. Unless he’s a complete dope with his money – and I’m pretty sure he isn’t – he probably has $25 million or more in assets to his name. Which is to say, he could spend a million dollars a year for the rest of his life and never dip into his principal.

Still, other players have made as much money as Meche has, and some have made a lot more – and none of them ever walked away from an eight-figure sum. As Joe Posnanski pointed out, Mark McGwire had a two-year, $30 million extension on the table when he retired, but that extension had been offered prior to his disappointing, injury-riddled final season, and signing that extension might have created more controversy than it was worth. Otherwise, I can’t think of a player who left that much money on the table. I know of teams that released a player who they owed $10 million or more to – the first example was Damion Easley, who the Tigers released after the 2002 season even though they still owed him $14.3 million.

But what Meche did? That might be unprecedented. Which is why it was also literally unbelievable – as in, people literally did not believe it. From the moment the news was announced, there was a general assumption that Meche was getting at least some of the money owed him. I know that’s what I thought. Even if Meche could pitch, the assumption was that he’d be working in relief, and even a good set-up man wouldn’t be worth $6 million. Meche offers to give back half his contract in order to retire early, the Royals decide they’d rather have the $6 million than a middle reliever who might or might not get through the season, and everyone’s happy.

I have no doubt that if Meche wanted that kind of settlement, the Royals would have given it to him. I also have no doubt that Meche didn’t want that kind of settlement, and is not being paid a penny of his 2012 salary of his own free will. Either that, or given Dayton Moore’s air of astonishment at discussing the news, both Meche and Moore are Oscar-quality actors. I don’t think they are.

My admiration for Meche only increased as a result of his decision, of course, but what also increased was my sense of frustration – it didn’t have to end this way. It shouldn’t have ended this way, and that it has is solely the blame of the team.

In the wake of his retirement, everyone is focusing on his 132-pitch complete game shutout – being allowed to pitch the ninth despite a 5-0 lead – on June 16, 2009. As I’ve written before, blaming the Royals for letting him pitch a complete game that day is unfair. While there are certainly circumstances in which a 132-pitch outing can be destructive, that game – without the benefit of hindsight – was not one of them. You had a 30-year-old pitcher on the mound, who was making his 82nd consecutive start without missing a return in the rotation – a pitcher who had led the league in starts in both 2007 and 2008 – and who had shown no signs of fatigue to that point. A decade ago, no one would have thought twice about letting a veteran pitcher throw 132 pitches in a shutout. It’s a testament to how much the game has changed that it became an issue afterwards.

It so happens that Meche wound up with a sore arm after that start, but again: there was no reason to think, ahead of time, that letting Meche throw that many pitches on that particular night was dangerous. The mistake wasn’t letting Meche throw 132 pitches on June 16. The mistake was pretty much everything that happened after that.

Had Meche gone on the DL for a few weeks as a precautionary move after that start, I might not be writing this column. But instead, despite some soreness in his arm, the Royals let Meche start on June 21st, when he gave up 9 runs in less than 4 innings against the Cardinals (RED FLAG). They let him start on June 26th, when he allowed 4 runs in 5 innings to the Pirates (RED FLAG). They let him start on July 1st, even though after his start against the Pirates Meche complained of a dead arm (BLEEDING CRIMSON FLAG). And they let him throw 121 pitches and face Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau in a tie game in the sixth inning, while letting Meche give up the tie-breaking run (THEY HAVE YET TO INVENT THE WORD THAT DESCRIBES JUST HOW BRIGHT RED THIS FLAG IS).

The events of July 1st rank as the worst in-game managerial blunder by a Royals manager since, I dunno, Whitey Herzog running through five pitchers in the 8th and 9th innings of Game 5 of the 1977 ALCS? Dick Howser not bringing in Dan Quisenberry in the ninth inning of Game 1 of the 1985 World Series? Many people have said that Steve Busby’s career was ruined by a specific start (I can’t remember which) when Jack McKeon left Steve Busby in to pitch when he was clearly hurting. Letting Jose Rosado pitch when he was complaining of a dead arm – which turned out to be the final start of his career – was pretty dumb. What the Royals did to Meche on July 1st of 2009 ranks with any of them, particularly since in the moment, without any need for hindsight, people – specifically Joe Posnanski – wrote about just how awful it was.

And with hindsight, of course, it looks worse. Meche was actually sent out there for two more turns in the rotation – in which he allowed 10 runs in 9.1 innings – before finally getting shut down. He returned a month later, made four starts, allowed 19 runs in 21 innings, and was shut down for the year. He returned the following April, made nine starts, had a 6.66 ERA and walked more batters than he struck out, and was shut down again – and this time told he needed major surgery if he was ever to pitch again. He chose to try to make a comeback as a reliever, and allowed just three runs in 13 innings in September – but either the pain or the risk of re-injury was too great for him to come back in 2011.

And he’s the one giving back the money.

What’s done is done, of course, and we can only hope the Royals learned from the events of July 1st. Trey Hillman is no longer with the team, and neither is trainer Nick Swartz. Bob McClure, who as the pitching coach deserves at least some of the blame for what happened, and Dayton Moore, who oversaw the whole thing, still are. Maybe Meche’s retirement serves as one final reminder to them that when a pitcher complains of shoulder pain, take it seriously.

(And regarding comments that Meche himself deserves some of the blame for insisting he was able to pitch through it – it’s his job to insist he can pitch through it. The pitcher who says he can’t pitch through pain is a pitcher who will very quickly develop a reputation as a malingerer. What Meche did was no different than what the vast majority of veteran starters in the majors do. It’s the manager’s job to, you know, manage his players, and that includes knowing when to tell his veteran starter “no”.)

The past is what it is; regarding the future, Meche’s retirement is a big positive for the Royals, freeing up $12 million that can be used in a variety of ways. (I originally wrote “a huge positive”, but after what Alex Anthopoulos did yesterday, shedding $12 million suddenly doesn’t seem like such an accomplishment.) The timing of his retirement complicates things a little, as it’s late enough in the off-season that almost all of the quality free agents are already spoken for.

This might be a good thing, though. Notwithstanding my suggestion that the Royals should have made a play for Carl Crawford – and God knows they certainly have the payroll space for him now – that would have been a long shot even if they had shown interest. Getting to play with $12 million after all the free agents have signed only means that Moore won’t be tempted to spend that money on the likes of Carl Pavano or Jayson Werth. The only place I want to see that money spent is on draft picks and international talent and…what’s that?

“...budgets for the draft and international scouting could get a boost.”

Oh my. (And Bob Dutton’s not speculating; I’ve heard word that Dayton Moore said that explicitly.) Understand – every time a team has extra money to spend, analysts want them to spend that money on acquiring amateur talent, and for good reason: studies show that amateur talent is the most efficient use of your money, even if the payoff is long-term. Only teams never seem to spend quite as much money on amateur talent as you’d like.

And there’s a limit to how much the Royals can spend on amateur talent, as they don’t have any extra picks in the draft – they draft 5th overall, and then not again until #65 or so. (By which point the Tampa Bay Rays will have drafted ten players.) But if you do the math, that means we can rightfully expect the Royals to be huge players in Latin America this summer, and possibly along the Pacific Rim as well. (For the record: I would also accept a Yu Darvish bid next winter, Dayton.)

A wronged pitcher magnanimously gifts the Royals with 12 million dollars. The Royals indicate they will be spending that money in a wise and cost-effective manner. It’s almost enough to make you wonder if maybe, just maybe, the Royals really are headed in the right direction.

(I realize I’m about four news cycles behind at the moment, which I blame on a really nasty flu/strep throat sort of thing that I’m still trying to shake. I still intend to get to things like the Royals’ Digital Digest contest; the Kyle Farnsworth signing; and now the Billy Butler extension. Please be patient.)

Sunday, January 16, 2011

Two Lefties Make It Right.

Hey, actual news!

I have only one problem with the Jeff Francis signing: I have no problem with the Jeff Francis signing.

In fact, it seems like no one has a problem with the Jeff Francis signing. No one has a problem with Jeff Francis, who as reclamation projects go is as good a risk as anyone on the market. Francis, a Canadian left-hander taken with the #9 overall pick in the 2002 draft, shot to the majors in barely two years with impeccable minor league numbers. After an uneven rookie season in 2005, Francis became the putative ace of the Rockies’ staff, with a 4.16 and a 4.22 ERA in 2006 and 2007 (in Coors Field, remember). He started Game 1 of the 2007 World Series against the Red Sox.

Then his shoulder went kablooey. Francis tore the labrum in his shoulder, an injury which was an almost certain career-ender just a few years ago. It took him two years to get back, but he returned in 2010 almost as good as new. His ERA wasn’t good (5.00), but his peripherals were. His strikeout rate dropped just a tick to 5.8 Ks per nine innings, not surprising for someone coming off major arm surgery – although, according to Fangraphs, his fastball velocity actually was up a tick (87.2) from his pre-surgery form (86.8). He showed the best command of his career – just 2.0 walks per nine innings – as well as the highest groundball rate of his career (47%). Add it all up, and his xFIP – a stat which estimates what a pitcher’s ERA ought to be with normal luck on balls in play – was just 3.94. That’s actually the best number of Francis’ career, and would make him an above-average pitcher.

Francis just turned 30 last week, and he’s a lefty, so it’s quite possible he has another decade left in the tank. He’s moving to the more difficult league, but he’s also moving from Coors Field to Kauffman Stadium. From a pure performance standpoint, there’s no reason to think Francis won’t help the Royals. The concern with Francis, if there is one, comes from a medical standpoint.

Labrum surgery is no joke, and as successful as Francis’ comeback has been to this point, it will be years before I’d feel comfortable about the long-term health of his shoulder. Francis returned to the Rockies’ rotation in mid-May, and made 16 starts without missing a beat, before he developed a sore shoulder and was out for a month. He returned on September 13 and made four appearances, and allowed 21 hits and 12 runs in 11.2 innings. He says his shoulder feels fine now. Gil Meche said the same thing.

But the Royals don’t have to worry about the long-term health of his shoulder, because they signed him for only one year (no surprise) and only $2 million guaranteed (mild surprise). That’s a terrific base salary for a pitcher with Francis’ track record, even one with his medical dossier.

It’s not the only bargain contract between a veteran pitcher and an AL Central team this week – the Tigers signed Brad Penny, who when healthy is probably better than Francis, for $3 million guaranteed. But it’s a very good deal in the grand scheme of things. For whatever reason, starting pitchers seem to be underpriced and relievers seem to be wildly overpriced, so good on the Royals for dipping their toes on only one side of the pool.

That’s the Yankees’ problem. Dayton Moore did good here. If Francis pitches poorly, the Royals are out no more than $2 million. (Remember, Moore guaranteed Horacio Ramirez $1.8 million to fill the same role two winters ago. For an extra $200,000, this time Moore signed an actual major league pitcher.) If Francis pitches well, or even sorta well, the Royals have a left-handed starting pitcher on the trade market come July – southpaws are catnip to GMs – right around the time they’ll need to open up a roster spot for another left-handed starter to be named later.

What’s not to love about the deal? Just one thing – the fact that everyone loves the deal. Given the last deal that everyone loved, that makes me nervous.

The Royals signed a second left-hander for their rotation in the span of 48 hours yesterday, when they brought back Bruce Chen on a one-year deal. Chen will be working under almost the same contract that Francis signed; both players are getting $2 million guaranteed, but Chen has $1.5 million in incentives to Francis’ $2 million.

Given that the money is the same, there’s little question that Chen’s contract isn’t nearly as favorable as Francis, because Chen doesn’t project to pitch as well. That might surprise you if you’re fixated on Chen’s team-leading 12 wins, or even his team-leading 4.17 ERA. But Chen is a good candidate to regress for the same reason that Francis is a good candidate to improve; he didn’t pitch nearly as well as his ERA would suggest.

Chen struck out 6.3 batters per nine innings, which is right in line with his average strikeout rate going back to 2004 (prior to that he struck out 7 to 8 batters per nine innings, before his arm woes started to take their toll). He unintentionally walked 3.4 batters per nine, right around his career average of 3.3. And Chen, who has long been one of the most extreme flyball pitchers in the majors, continued that trend, getting groundballs on only 34% of balls in play.

So why was he so effective? Because only 8.1% of the flyballs he surrendered cleared the fence, well below his average of 13.3% going back to 2002 (when Fangraphs’ data starts). He was lucky. His xFIP was 5.01, which is to say, Chen really should have had Francis’ ERA, and Francis really should have had Chen’s ERA.

Having said all that, I still like the deal. The general expectation was that Chen would be looking for a multi-year contract after his season, and I have no doubt that he was. But he was unable to find one, and Moore was wisely unwilling to offer one. A one-year deal fits both Chen’s talent level and the long-term needs of the franchise. Chen lost about 1 mph on his fastball after Tommy John surgery; if he regains any velocity in his second full season after surgery, he may have some upside here. Even if he doesn’t, he still represents an improvement on whomever the Royals would have started in his place.

Prior to these two signings, the Royals had only four major league-caliber starters on their roster, and that’s only if your definition of “major league-caliber” is liberal enough to include Sean O’Sullivan. Now O’Sullivan is the nominal sixth starter, and hopefully ticketed for some remedial work in Triple-A where he can repeat Missing Bats 101.

The Royals just signed 40% of their starting rotation for $4 million guaranteed. That’s barely a third of what the Yankees – who are still two starters short of a rotation – will be paying Rafael Soriano in 2011 alone. That’s less than the Tigers will be paying Joaquin Benoit in 2011 alone. That’s the same money that the Dodgers will be paying Matt Guerrier for each of the next three years. And now the Royals’ rotation, while conspicuously missing anyone that remotely resembles an ace – or even a #2 starter – is at least filled.

I suspect Luke Hochevar will be given every opportunity to start Opening Day, both because the team wants to make their #1 overall pick in 2006 look good, and because Yost wants to continue to pump Hochevar full of confidence. Behind Hochevar, it will likely go Francis, Davies, Chen, and Mazzaro, with O’Sullivan as an emergency starter/injury replacement. And the Royals are perfectly situated to overhaul the rotation at mid-season.

Davies, Francis, and Chen will all be free agents at year’s end, and the Royals have half a dozen starters that may be knocking on the door of the majors at some point in 2011. By August 1st, I fully expect to see a rotation of Hochevar, Mazzaro, and three pitchers selected out of the Montgomery/Lamb/Crow/Dwyer/Duffy pile. I also expect that the Royals will have added a few more prospects to the stable.

But in the meantime, at least the Royals can field five major league-caliber starters. Along with a below average but not abominably bad lineup, and a bullpen that could be a lot stronger than most people expect, I imagine that the predictions that the Royals will lose 110 games this season will abate. And if they don’t, I expect that they will be wrong.

That’s not a bad deal for $4 million. Right now, the Royals’ payroll looks to settle at just under $50 million for 2011. That’s nothing to brag about, unless your David Glass’ accountant, but the combination of a low payroll and no salary commitments beyond 2011 gives Dayton Moore an uncommon amount of flexibility. He can go aggressive in the free agent market next winter; he can trade for overpaid, but still useful players without surrendering prospects in return; he can spend wildly in the draft and in Latin America.

If this is it for the off-season, I’m good. The Royals won’t be a good team in 2011, and they might be really bad. But at least they’ll be interesting. Last season, six of the nine guys in the Opening Day lineup were on the wrong side of 30 – David DeJesus, Jose Guillen, Rick Ankiel, Scott Podsednik, Jason Kendall, and Willie Bloomquist.

This year, the oldest hitter on the entire Opening Day roster will probably be Mike Aviles, who turns 30 in March. The only reliever over the age of 30 is Gil Meche. Only the rotation, where Francis is 30 and Chen is 33, isn’t overrun with youth – at least not yet.

With everyone looking towards 2012, Moore had a simple mandate for this off-season: fill some obvious holes without making any substantial commitments in terms of time or money. He was then thrown a curveball when the Zack Greinke situation became untenable. In the end, Moore signed a pair of outfielders in their mid-twenties to one-year contracts; signed a pair of left-handed starters on the comeback trail to one-year deals; and traded Greinke for four young players, two of whom figure to upgrade the team’s up-the-middle defense immediately.

In retrospect, the Melky Cabrera signing looks like a waste, since the Royals wound up trading for their long-term solution in center field in Lorenzo Cain just a few days afterwards. And the potential is there for the Royals to hamstring the rebuilding process slightly by playing Cabrera over Cain in center field, at least to start the year, if for no other reason than to game Cain’s service time.

But otherwise, it’s hard to fault with Moore’s winter. He has not made a move to – and has made no indications that he will – sign a veteran catcher to replace Kendall’s intangibles. He has committed to Alex Gordon in left field, and Kila Ka’aihue as his DH. He got rid of Yuni Effing Betancourt, for God’s sake. And in signing Francis and Chen, he has reduced the temptation to rush his young starters without blocking their path to the majors the minute they are deemed ready.

It wasn’t a perfect off-season, but it was as good as I could have hoped. I’m ready to wind this team up and watch it go. The sooner it departs, the sooner 2012 will arrive.

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Royals Today: 1/11/2011.

There’s not much substantial going on during the winter doldrums of the off-season, but I have plenty of experience in writing thousands of words on insubstantial subjects, so let’s press on.

- The biggest piece of news from the last two weeks concerning the Royals has nothing to do with the Royals. When the Tampa Bay Rays traded Matt Garza to the Cubs for five prospects, it led to unavoidable comparisons with the haul that the Royals got for Zack Greinke.

If we ignore the throw-ins on both sides of the deal (Fernando Perez and Zach Rosscup from the Rays, Sam Fuld from the Cubs), the Rays got four prospects for Garza: right-hander Chris Archer, shortstop Hak-Ju Lee, outfielder Brandon Guyer, and catcher Robinson Chirinos.

At least two analysts, Keith Law and Jim Callis, have weighed in that the Rays’ haul of talent for Garza was more valuable than the package the Royals got for Greinke. (Although Callis called it “close”.) Take my opinion for what it’s worth, given my inherent biases, but I’m not sure that I agree.

Archer was the Cubs’ #1 prospect at the time of the trade, a pitcher who blossomed after Cubs’ GM Jim Hendry cannily acquired him from the Indians as part of the Mark DeRosa trade. The problem is that no one’s entirely sure whether he’s a starter or a reliever in the end. He’s been described as “either a #2 starter or a closer”, but those two entities have very different values.

A comparison to Jeremy Jeffress and Jake Odorizzi is instructive. As a #2 starter, Archer represents Odorizzi’s best-case upside, only Archer is closer to the majors and is a much safer bet to reach his potential. As a closer, though, I’m not sure that Archer is any more valuable than Jeffress is going to be. For now, I’d rank Archer ahead of Jeffress and Odorizzi as a prospect, but he’s not that far ahead.

Hak-Ju Lee, as a shortstop prospect, is directly comparable to Alcides Escobar. This, I think, is where my opinion diverges from those of Law and Callis. Lee, as a 19-year-old in the Midwest League, hit .282/.354/.351 and got rave reviews for his defense. But there’s no way I’d trade Escobar for him. I speak from painful experience as a Royals fan - there is tremendous risk in projecting a player from low-A ball all the way to the majors. I mean, if Lee avoids any pitfalls in his development path, he’ll be an above-average defensive shortstop in the majors, hit for a good average, steal some bases, and draw some walks. He’s unlikely to ever hit for power. In other words, his upside – while still all the way in the Midwest League – is only slightly better than what Escobar was expected to do in 2010 in the majors.

Escobar didn’t do what he was expected to do in 2010, which is why the Royals were able to acquire him. But Escobar is, if nothing else, already a plus defensive shortstop with above-average speed. A year ago he was one of the 20 best prospects in baseball. His stock has fallen, but not nearly so far that you’d prefer Lee, who was ranked by Baseball America as the #4 prospect in a not-particularly-strong Cubs system, over him. The odds that Lee craps out in the minors and never plays regularly in the majors is at least as high as the odds that he develops into a better player than Escobar.

So at the very least, Archer and Lee combined are no more valuable than Escobar and Odorizzi. Then there’s Guyer, who had a statistically beautiful season in Double-A in 2010, hitting .344/.398/.588 and stealing 30 bases in 33 attempts. The problem – other than the fact that Guyer was 24 years old – was that in 2009, he hit .190/.236/.291 in 57 games in Double-A. Last season represented the peak of his performance, and at that he projects as a slightly above-average corner outfielder.

Lorenzo Cain, who is a few months younger than Guyer, hit .317/.402/.432 last season between both Double-A and Triple-A, hit well in his major league debut, plays plus defense in centerfield, and has the tools to improve more than Guyer is likely to. Guyer’s an interesting player, but there’s no doubt which of the two I’d rather have.

Chirinos is an even more fascinating player. On the one hand, he hit .326/.416/.583 in minors last year, and made a stunningly successful position switch, catching in every game after being a utility infielder two years ago. (As an aside, while the Cubs are far from the best-run organization in baseball, they’re as good as any organization in baseball when it comes to converting players at other positions to catcher.) The problem is that Chirinos has yet to play in the majors, and he turns 27 in June.

Chirinos’ performance doesn’t appear to be a fluke; he has steadily improved as a hitter since 2007. His OPS over the last four years reads 715, 834, 915, and 999. At the very least, he projects as an excellent sidekick in a platoon with John Jaso, and may well be an above-average starter in the majors for a few years.

If I were certain that Chirinos could be an everyday catcher, or that Archer was a future starter, I might rank the Rays’ haul over the Royals. But I’m not, and so from my perspective I’d rather have the four players the Royals got. I can certainly understand the other perspective, though.

The question, though, is whether it should really matter if the Rays got more for Garza than the Royals got for Greinke. Yes, Matt Garza is not the pitcher that Greinke is, but on the other hand, the Cubs got three years of Garza, while the Brewers got only two of Greinke. Greinke will be paid about $27 million over the next two years; unless Garza pitches at a Greinkesque level over the next two years and earns an arbitration fortune in 2013, he’ll probably make in the neighborhood of $30 million over the remainder of his tenure. So the Cubs are getting an additional year of Garza at a minimal additional cost.

And the difference between Garza and Greinke may be overstated a little. Over the past three seasons, Greinke has made 98 starts with a 3.25 ERA; Garza has made 94 starts with a 3.86 ERA, plus five postseason starts with a 3.48 ERA. But I’m sympathetic to the argument that Garza is a better pitcher than he appears because of the competition he has to face.

As analysts, we have done a very good job over the last 15-20 years in getting people to adjust a player’s performance for his ballpark, for the offensive context of his era, and even to take into account in recent years that the AL has a higher difficulty factor than the NL. But we have not, I think, put enough emphasis on the fact that the strength of competition can vary from one player to another, even if they’re in the same league. This is a long way of saying that the fact that the Rays are in the same division as the Red Sox and Yankees is a mark in Garza’s favor.

As Christina Kahrl pointed out, in 2010 Garza threw 204 innings, exactly one-quarter of them (51) against Boston and New York. In those 51 innings he had a 6.10 ERA; against all other opponents he combined for a 3.18 ERA. I don’t want to make too much of this – between 2008 and 2009, Garza’s ERA against the Twin Towers of the AL East was actually a little lower than his overall ERA. But after throwing 51 innings against them in 2010, and 69 (!) innings against them in 2009, I think it’s fair to wonder what Garza will do in 2011 when he doesn’t have to face the Red Sox or Yankees at all.

All that aside, there’s no doubt that the Rays got a better deal for their pitcher than the Royals got for theirs. If both teams got roughly the same amount of talent, and Greinke is more valuable than Garza, then the Rays made a better trade, QED. But if there’s a loser here, it’s not the Royals; it’s the Cubs. The Cubs gave up a ton of talent for a pitcher who, good as he is, seems unlikely to deliver a 75-win team in 2010 into the playoffs in 2011. Jim Hendry is a bundle of contradictions as a general manager; he’s widely considered to be an excellent judge of amateur talent (and his acquisition of Chris Archer in the first place was a steal), and yet he keeps trying to put together a winning team by overpaying for free agents.

Perhaps it’s the curse of working for a franchise that has both money and expectations in abundance, but Hendry is trying to build a team with a method that runs counter to his own core competencies. He’s great at player development, but is unwilling or unable to build his roster that way. Say what you want about Dayton Moore, but he understands that if your strength is drafting and developing players, you’re better off using those players to build a winning team. After some initial missteps in his first few years on the job – when the Royals, to be frank, didn’t have any prospects that the likes of Jose Guillen and Gil Meche were blocking – Moore has dialed back on the veterans over time, particularly this winter. Moore is finally playing to his strengths, something Hendry would be wise to do. Assuming the Cubs’ ownership would ever let him.

The Rays made a great trade when they moved Garza. That doesn’t change the fact that the Royals made a good trade when they moved Greinke.

- The other thing to keep in mind is that the Rays could trade Garza to anyone they wanted; the Royals couldn’t do the same with Greinke. In particular, after looking at the players in a little more detail, I think that – if Derek Norris was the fourth guy in the deal, as I think he was – I’d take the Nationals’ package over what the Brewers gave us.

The Nationals reportedly offered Jordan Zimmermann, Drew Storen, and Danny Espinosa in addition to Norris. Zimmermann is a potential #2 starter – not in 2013, but right now. He had a sterling track record in the minors, had an excellent debut season with the Nats in 2009, and after blowing out his elbow made a successful return from Tommy John surgery last August. In 122 career major league innings, he has 119 strikeouts and just 39 walks. Odorizzi can only hope he’ll have that track record in two or three years.

Storen doesn’t have Jeffress’ stuff, but he’s a very good set-up man who’s already proven he can pitch in the majors. My initial concern with Espinosa was that he didn’t have the defensive chops to play shortstop, and the Royals already have a ton of second basemen. But researching the issue a little has convinced me that Espinosa, while he’ll likely play second base for the Nationals because they also have Ian Desmond, has the tools to be a solid-average defender at shortstop – and could hit 20-25 homers in the majors.

And that leaves Norris, who might be the best prospect of the four. Norris, who’s a native of Goddard, Kansas, suffered through an injury-plagued 2010 season, with a wrist problem that didn’t really allow him to hit for power until the Arizona Fall League, where he mashed. Even so, he hit .235/.419/.419 as a 21-year-old in high-A ball. And despite getting mixed reviews about his defense behind the plate, he threw out 51% of baserunners who attempted to steal.

It’s not a consensus that he can remain behind the plate, but the consensus is a lot stronger that he can that it is for Wil Myers, or for Jesus Montero for that matter. If he can, Norris could be this generation’s version of Mickey Tettleton. He’ll probably be a .270 hitter at best, but he could hit 25 homers and walk 80 or 90 times a year. That’s a player.

So yeah, that probably beats the Brewers offer. Espinosa counters Escobar’s superior glove with a better bat, Zimmermann is better than Odorizzi, and Norris – while farther from the majors – is better than Cain. Storen has less upside than Jeffress, but also less risk. That would have been a better trade, maybe substantially better.

And it doesn’t matter, because Greinke vetoed it. He refused to waive his no-trade clause to Washington; Jon Heyman reported that the Nationals even tried to sweeten the deal by extending him a long-term contract. No dice. Greinke wants to play for a winner, and – not unreasonably, I might add – determined that the Nationals’ shot at winning in the NL East the next few years isn’t much better than the Royals’ chances in the AL Central.

So with only a few teams willing to meet the Royals’ price, and fewer teams that Greinke was willing to go to, and with rumors now floating that Greinke was so dissatisfied with his situation that he was considering being a no-show to spring training – Dayton Moore had to make a trade with one hand tied behind his back. Maybe it wasn’t a great trade, but I’m still convinced that it was the best trade that he could make.

I’ve got a half-dozen other topic ideas I wanted to get to, but I’m over 2200 words already, so let’s just call this Part 3 of the Greinke Trade Analysis Epic, and I’ll try to be back soon to hit on some of the other points.