Saturday, July 17, 2010

Royals Today: All-Star Break Edition.

The All-Star Break is a good time to reflect, so here are some reflections on the Royals over the season’s first half.

- I’ll admit to thinking that the sky was caving in when Zack Greinke was scratched from his Sunday start, after we had already learned that he had felt something weird in his shoulder after he had made an awkward throw on a fielding play in his previous start.

But he made his start as promised last night, and while the results were ugly early, he retired nine of the last ten batters he faced, three by strikeout. I was unable to watch the game, but the reaction I got from Royals fans on Twitter was that he was just missing his spots early in the game. My hope is that he was just tentative early on, and once he realized that he wasn’t feeling any pain on his throws, he felt more confident as the game progressed.

Greinke insisted after his start that his shoulder felt fine, but we’ll have to see if he has any flare-ups of his shoulder pain over the next start or two. But if he doesn’t, then we have to credit the Royals for learning their lesson, and doing the cautionary and sensible thing last Sunday. Ideally, such a lesson wouldn’t have cost them the services of their second-best starter, and the last half of a $55 million contract. But at least they learned their lesson well.

- It’s a compliment to Billy Butler, I suppose, that he’s hitting .321 (just a point outside of the league’s top 10), he’s hit 26 doubles (fifth in the league), he’s missed just one game all year…and his season still has the faint whiff of a disappointment.

Maybe we expect too much from Butler. I mean, he’s hitting .321/.388/.480; his 868 OPS is higher than last year, and that’s even though offense is significantly down in the AL as a whole – his OPS+ has jumped from 124 to 135. His defensive numbers, if you trust those things, are much better as well. He wasn’t a deserving All-Star, not when you compare him to the other first baseman in the American League. But he’s a heck of a player.

Quietly, he has cut his strikeout rate by 27% from last year – he’s on pace to strike out 74 times this year after 104 strikeouts last year – while walking at a slightly higher rate. That’s not a small thing, and speaks highly to his ability to continue to hit .320 or better in the future.

But there is one downside to making so much contact, and that’s where the whiff of a disappointment is coming from. More contact means more double play opportunities, and Butler leads the major leagues with 21 GIDPs. Pablo Sandoval, who’s pretty similar as a hitter to Butler, is the only other player with more than 16 GIDPs.

Butler, in fact, had grounded in 21 double plays just 76 games into the season. By comparison, in 1991, John Olerud led the AL with 21 GIDPs for the entire season. We have GIDP data going back to at least the mid-1950s, and only two players in history have grounded into that many double plays in his team’s first 76 games. Jim Rice, of course, did it in both 1984 (23) and 1985 (26). Rice would finish those two seasons with 36 and 35 GIDPs – which are still the two highest GIDP totals in history. The other was a guy named Sid Gordon, who as a rookie third baseman for the New York Giants had 22 GIDPs in his team’s first 76 games in 1943.

Gordon would play in 58 more games the rest of the season and would only have 4 more GIDPs, which speaks to an important point – GIDPs are the result of luck and circumstance as well as “talent”, and it’s unrealistic to expect Butler to continue to ground into double plays at this rate. In fact, Butler hasn’t hit into one in his last 13 games.

Still, this is the player Butler has always been – he’s right-handed, he’s slow, and he hits the ball on the ground a lot. He ranked sixth in the league with 23 GIDPs in 2008, and only played 124 games. Last year, he ranked ninth with 20 GIDPs. Even when he was winning a batting title in Double-A at the age of 20, he hit into 25 double plays in just 119 games. (Alex Gordon was batting in front of him all season, so he certainly batted with a man on first base a lot.) While it’s unlikely that Butler will continue on his current pace, which would have him breaking Rice’s all-time record*, he’ll probably end up with around 32 GIDPs, which would tie him for third on the single-season list.

*: After all these years of waiting for some Royal to break Steve Balboni’s sad record of 36 homers in a season, how awesome would it be if someone broke Jim Rice’s GIDP record first? If the Royals can’t have a player hit 37 homers, at least they can have one that hits into 37 double plays.

Butler may be doomed to always hurt his teams by grounding to a couple dozen double plays a season, like Rice, or like Gordon, who would lead the NL in GIDPs three times in his career. But there is another path he can follow, a path best represented by Carl Yastrzemski.

I don’t want to overstate the similarities between Butler and Yaz, who after all was a left-handed hitter and was considerably more athletic than Billy. But as young hitters, they are eerily alike. Both were rookies at the age of 21. At the age of 22 and 23, Yaz hit a combined 33 homers, Butler 22. At the age of 23, Yaz hit .321 and led the league with 40 doubles. At the age of 23, Butler hit .301 and finished second in the league with 51 doubles.

At the age of 22, Yaz led the league with 27 GIDPs; Butler might well have led the league two years ago if he hadn’t spent a month in Triple-A. And at the age of 24, both players hit into their 21st GIDP of the season in their 75th game.

Yaz would finish the season with 30 GIDPs, which at the time was the second-highest total on record, behind Bobby Doerr’s 31 in 1949. (What is it with Red Sox and high GIDP totals?)

But Yaz would never hit into 30 double plays again. He would never hit into even 20 double plays again. The following year he had 16 GIDPs, then 17, and then, in his Triple Crown year of 1967, he hit into just 5. After hitting 15 homers at age 24, he hit 20 and 16 the following two years (but led the league in doubles both years), and then broke out with 44 homers.

So without doing extensive research into Yastrzemski’s groundball/flyball tendencies, I’m going to go out on a limb here and say that as he got older, as he matured as a hitter, Yaz learned to elevate the ball more. It remains to be seen if Butler can do the same, but he’s an immensely talented hitter, and as Yaz showed, it has been done before.

- After losing again last night, the Royals are back to .500 under Ned Yost, at 27-27. That’s still an impressive accomplishment, to take a team that was 12-23 when he was hired and have them play .500 ball for nearly two months.

The biggest difference between the Trey Hillman Royals and the Ned Yost Royals appears to be the performance of the bullpen, whose struggles under Hillman, as you might recall, was the subject of at least one article here.

Except I’m not sure that the improvement in the bullpen can be traced to the managerial switch. For one thing, the bullpen’s improvement started not when Hillman was fired on May 13th, but on May 1st, when the relievers combined for five scoreless innings in an 11-inning win against Tampa Bay.

In April, the bullpen combined to give up 87 hits and 51 walks in 73 innings, leading to a 6.16 ERA and 7 bullpen losses. And that includes Joakim Soria, who allowed just 3 runs and 10 baserunners in 11 innings.

But from May 1st until the day Hillman was fired, the bullpen had a 3.22 ERA in 36 innings, and the only blown save and loss in that span can be pinned on Soria, who allowed back-to-back homers to the Rangers in that wild 12-11 game in Arlington.

Since Yost took over, the bullpen has continued to pitch very well, despite some recent hiccups – since May 14th, the bullpen has thrown 160 innings, allowed 148 hits and 54 walks, struck out 111 men, and allowed a 3.26 ERA (and just one unearned run.) A bullpen that was on a record pace of futility a month into the season now has a 4.04 ERA for the year, just a fraction off the AL bullpen average of 3.98.

But is this really the manager’s doing? Compare the bullpen of today with the bullpen of Opening Day:

Same: Soria, Robinson Tejeda, Kyle Farnsworth, Dusty Hughes

Shipped out: Luis Mendoza, Juan Cruz, Roman Colon, John Parrish

Brought in: Blake Wood, Kanekoa Texeira, Victor Marte

Of the four holdovers, Soria is Soria, but the other three saw dramatic turnarounds after April. Dusty Hughes got off to a rough start, allowing six runs in his first six appearances, but started to turn the corner on April 20th, throwing 5.2 scoreless innings the rest of the month.

Farnsworth was pretty bad in April – 13 hits, 4 walks in 10 innings with a 4.82 ERA – but was Marianish relative to Tejeda, who in 9 innings allowed 14 hits and 13 walks. Batters hit .368/.519/.533 against Tejeda in April. Since May 1st, Farnsworth has allowed just 20 hits and 6 walks in 29 innings, with a 1.55 ERA; Tejeda has been even better, allowing 20 hits and 9 walks in 32 innings, and he has an 0.84 ERA since the beginning of May.

But again, all three pitchers started turning their seasons around before Hillman was fired. (The rumor with Tejeda is that he started pitching lights-out after the Royals essentially forbade him from shaking off Jason Kendall ever again. Farnsworth’s improvement has been linked to him throwing a two-seam fastball, although that wouldn’t explain his April struggles.)

If you’re looking for a specific impetus that might have triggered the improvement in the bullpen, your best isn’t when the Royals let Trey Hillman go, but when the Royals let Juan Cruz go. Cruz, in addition to pitching terribly – which it turns out was the result of an undiagnosed shoulder injury he had probably been pitching with since last year – was an enormous PITA by all accounts. Particularly in the closed-in world of the bullpen, where six or seven guys spend the entire game together in a walled-off area away from the rest of the team, having to hang out with a guy that was a Grade-A prick can’t have been good for the bullpen’s psychology.

This is one of those unquantifiable issues that can’t be adequately evaluated by analysts like me, but with the Braves’ recent trade of Yunel Escobar to the Blue Jays, the issue of team chemistry has come up again. Consider the rejuvenation of guys like Farnsworth and Tejeda after Cruz was released a data point in favor of chemistry.

But the bigger improvement in the bullpen was that the Royals got rid of Cruz, and Luis Mendoza, and the inexplicable Roman Colon, and replaced them with pitchers who actually deserve to be in the majors. It took a while; the Royals had to cycle through Josh Rupe and Bryan Bullington and Brad Thompson before they decided Blake Wood was ready, and before they very shrewdly claimed Texeira off waivers from the Mariners*.

*: Adding to the argument that the Mariners, as an organization, were very overrated going into the season, is the fact that the Mariners waived Texeira – much to the consternation of their fans – about 48 hours before Ken Griffey finally read the writing on the wall and retired. Since the Royals picked him up, Texeira has a 2.00 ERA, thanks to a good sinker and good control. Thanks, Ken!

Here’s the combined numbers of Cruz, Mendoza, Colon, Rupe, Thompson, and Bullington this year:

44 IP, 70 H, 25 BB, 29 K, 10 HR, and an 8.24 ERA.

And here are the combined numbers of Wood, Texeira, and Victor Marte:

66 IP, 62 H, 24 BB, 31 K, 9 HR, and a 3.97 ERA.

The new guys aren’t perfect by any means. I remain mystified as to how a pitcher with Blake Wood’s fastball has struck out just 8 batters in 25 innings. And I’ve been saying since last year that Marte’s combination of poor control and flyball tendencies were a bad mix, and reality has set in as he’s allowed 8 runs in his last four outings. Still, the low end of the bullpen totem pole has combined for a 3.97 ERA. That’s why the bullpen has gone from an enormous weakness to, arguably, an asset.

On April 27th, at the bullpen’s low point, I wrote “I stand by my position that Hillman is mostly an innocent bystander in all this. It’s hard for any manager to look smart when he has exactly one reliable reliever. Hillman deserves better than to be scapegoated because his GM has made such a mess of things.”

I still stand by those words, with the caveat that I didn’t appreciate at the time what kind of influence Cruz had on the bullpen, or that Kyle Farnsworth was redeemable. But the difference between the bullpen of today and the bullpen of April has less to do with the manager and more to do with the personnel. That’s not to defend Hillman, but it is to lay the blame on Dayton Moore. And by the same token, the credit for the bullpen’s improvement belongs less to Yost than it does to Moore for finally giving up on his pet projects and giving opportunities to rookies who deserved it.

Tuesday, July 13, 2010

Abd el-Kader and the Massacre of Damascus.

The year was 1860, and the world was, as usual, in upheaval. In China, the Second Opium War was coming to an end. America was preparing itself for major surgery, in the form of the Civil War, that would finally cure the young nation of its congenital defect of slavery. And in the heart of the Middle East, in a province of the Turkish Ottoman Empire that would later become modern-day Syria, an unholy concoction was brewing. That’s right: politics was mixing with religion.

Christians and Muslims had lived side-by-side in the holy land for over a thousand years. Muslim armies had conquered modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt in the middle of the seventh century, and while the Muslims maintained full political authority, Christians and Jews were allowed to freely practice their religion. The notion that non-Muslims were forced to convert at the point of a sword is laughable – in Egypt, for instance, it is estimated that Muslims made up only half of the population in the year 1200 – five hundred years later.

The area around Lebanon and Syria, in particular, was as religiously diverse as anywhere in the world in the mid-19th century. In addition to substantial numbers of Muslims (both Sunni and Shiite), Christians (Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Chaldean, Syriac, and others), and Jews, there were also religious groups like the Alawi and Druze, who had splintered out of mainstream Islam centuries earlier and were now considered their own religions.

By the standards of that era, these groups lived in relative harmony. Which is to say, by the standards of that era, the fact that these groups co-existed at all was a miracle. If you were a religious minority anywhere in the world, your life was in peril. Just the year before, the very first pogrom in Russia took place in Odessa, claiming the lives of many Jews. Not even America was immune to this sort of religious violence; in 1838, 18 Mormon men were killed in the Haun’s Mill Massacre in Missouri.

The Druze and Maronite Christians were concentrated in Lebanon. The two groups had never liked each other, and their relationship was getting worse. It didn’t help that outside powers were encouraging both sides. The French supported the Christians, the British supported the Druze, and with the Ottoman Empire crumbling by the day, the Turkish rulers were unable or unwilling to end the conflict.

In 1858, Christian peasants in Lebanon mounted an uprising against their Druze feudal lords. The Druze retaliated. The patriarch of the Maronite Christians then threatened to forcibly remove the Druze from the Lebanese mountains. Then things got ugly.

In May of 1860, a group of Christians fired upon a group of Druze outside Beirut, killing one. In the wave of violence that followed on both sides, dozens of villages were burned to the ground, and hundreds of people were killed. The violence spread outside Lebanon and into Syria, towards Damascus, where ambitious men were plotting to shape this heretofore random violence into something much more sinister.

Chief among them was the Turkish governor of Damascus, Ahmed Pasha, who wanted nothing more than to give his population a “correction” – today we would call it ethnic cleansing. In March, he had already begun meeting in secret with two chiefs from the Druze and the mufti of Damascus. Together they hatched a plan to bring about a full-on war in the Christian quarter of the city.

The plan appears to have been this: that the Druze would incite attacks against Christians, “forcing” the Turks to step in and escort the Christian community to a citadel outside the city for their protection. There, Druze conspirators would be waiting to slaughter them all.

With tensions rising between the two sides every day, it would only take a single match to light the fire. That match was lit on July 8th. Pasha arranged for some Muslim boys to draw images of crosses at the edge of the Christian quarter of the city, then to desecrate those images by spitting and throwing garbage at them. The bewildered kids were immediately arrested, with their punishment designed to provoke the rage of the greater Muslim community.

“On July 9, the culprits, mere props in a scenario planned by Ahmed Pasha, were ordered to be publicly beaten, then forced on their hands and knees to wash the streets they had slopped with garbage. Provocateurs did the rest.”

The massacre of Damascus had begun.

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“I was told Abd el-Kader was the Algerian George Washington, the father of modern Algeria…Abd el-Kader was the first Arab to create a semblance of tribal unity in order to combat the French occupation. But in defeat, I noted a resemblance to Robert E. Lee. He was gracious, magnanimous, respected by his enemies, and deeply religious.”

Abd el-Kader was one of those men who, in Shakespeare’s words, had greatness thrust upon him. He certainly was not born into it. He was born in a remote region of the Turkish province of what we now call Algeria, in 1808, to a tribal family living on the edges of the Sahara desert. You would be hard pressed to find a region on Earth from which one of the century’s most influential men would be less likely to emerge.

Abd el-Kader was born into a tribe of warriors, men who for centuries had valued valor above all else, and prized nothing more than a fast and sturdy horse. His father Muhi al-Din was a marabout, a religious leader for his tribe, and a leader of a Sufi Muslim tradition known as the Kadiriyya order. It was expected from the time of his birth that Abd el-Kader would follow in his father’s footsteps. “His destiny, had it been his to guide, would have been that of a married monk, living a life of prayer, meditation, and teaching.”

Like all men of his tribe, Abd el-Kader was trained in horsemanship and swordplay and the other arts of warfare, but his primary training was in his religious studies. As a teenager he was sent by his father to the city of Oran to continue his studies. He would return home when he as 15; at the age of 17 he was married, and then set off with his father on the pilgrimage to Mecca, a journey that would take two years to complete. This journey would include stops in Damascus and Baghdad, where “word spread of the amazing knowledge and intellectual agility of this young Maghrebin who could politely hold his own with the leading scholars of the city.” Abd el-Kader returned to his home village of Mascara in 1828, and likely would have spent the rest of his life there had events not interceded.

But they did. In 1830, King Charles of France saw an imperial campaign as a great way to counter unpopularity at home, and used a minor diplomatic incident as an excuse to invade Algeria. Algiers surrendered to the French quickly and fairly bloodlessly, although it was not enough to save the King; Charles abdicated later that year and transferred the crown to his cousin, Louis-Phillipe.

Had the French been more magnanimous in victory, the war might have been over quickly. The ruling Turks were hardly beloved by the local population, so if it was just a matter of paying taxes to a different leader, most of the citizens would have gone along with minimal protest.

But like so many foreign conquerors, the French soon turned the local populace against them by being unnecessarily harsh, by being completely tone-deaf to the local culture, and by kicking out the Turks, the only group of people who could have served as intermediaries. As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1837, “Once the Turkish government was destroyed with no substitute to replace it, the country fell into appalling anarchy.”

The political vacuum cried out for leadership, which by default fell onto the religious leaders of the various tribes outside the city. The brutality of the French occupation forced these tribal religious leaders to unite against their oppressor. In 1832, the various tribes came together to nominate Abd el-Kader’s father Muhi al-Din to be their sultan.

Muhi al-Din agreed on one condition: that immediately after he accepted the position, he would abdicate in favor of his son. This was met with immediate approval; Abd el-Kader’s religious knowledge, strength, and courage were already famous throughout the region. At the age of 24, Abd el-Kader became the leader of his people in a war against foreign occupation. He would soon earn his title of “Emir al-Mumineen” – the Commander of the Faithful.

In retrospect, Abd el-Kader’s task was hopeless from the start. No amount of military brilliance could have made up for the difference in manpower and technology between the French army and the ragtag bunch of Algerian Bedouins. But man, did he try.

For 15 years, Abd el-Kader led his people in resistance against the French. He led his soldiers by example, staying in the saddle day and night, stopping only to pray, sometimes covering as much as 150 miles in a day to engage the enemy in battle. The French were astonished, and then impressed, at the military prowess of their young enemy.

Abd el-Kader wasn’t simply fighting a war against the French; he was also fighting to establish a nation among his own people. He commissioned a free-standing army. He established and collected taxes necessary to keep his army supplied. He created a cabinet of advisers, including a Jewish merchant who served as his ambassador to the French.

He had to battle not only the French, but the leaders of his own people, many of whom were not averse to working with the enemy or rebelling in other ways if it suited them.

By 1834, Abd el-Kader’s forces had achieved such success that the French general in charge with subduing them sued for a cease-fire, which was granted. Some extremists in his own community labeled him a heretic for negotiating with the French, forcing Abd el-Kader to wage another battle to defeat them.

A year later, though, another general in the French army used a flimsy pretext to break the cease-fire and marched upon Abd el-Kader’s forces. The French forces were ambushed and suffered a humiliating defeat, which burnished Abd el-Kader’s reputation, both with his own people and around the world.

This only made the French mad, though, and they returned in 1836 with more forces and more determination to exterminate their annoying adversary. Abd el-Kader learned quickly that he could not defeat the French army in a pitched battle, and resorted to lightning attacks, his cavalry emerging out of the desert to overwhelm a surprised French unit, then disappearing into the sand just as quickly.

Meanwhile, the exploits of this undermanned, underfunded guerrilla leader, standing up to the mighty French, began to draw the interest of the British and the Americans – the British because of their long-standing rivalry of the French, the Americans because of their own experience with fighting off British imperialization only a few decades before.

Abd el-Kader’s exploits were recounted in America in popular digests like Littell’s Living Age, and one reader was sufficiently taken by el-Kader to name a town after him. Timothy Davis, a lawyer who had settled in Dubuque in 1836 (Iowa had not yet become a state; it was still part of the Louisiana Territory), had acquired property on the Turkey River nearby which seemed ideal for a flour mill, and sketched out a new town to be built around the mill. “So Timothy Davis, a pioneer spirit, respected lawyer and distant admirer of this resilient underdog, named the new settlement after Abd el-Kader, wisely shortened for American tongues to Elkader.”

Elkader, Iowa was founded in 1846. It remains today as the seat of Clayton County, with a population of around 1500. It is the only city in America named after an Arab.

In 1837, General Thomas Bugeaud was put in charge of the French operations in Algeria. His initial assignment was to secure another peace treaty with Abd el-Kader, which he did. This treaty acknowledged France’s sovereignty over the coastal cities of Algiers and Oran, while conceding the interior desert regions to Abd el-Kader. Once again, the French government was not pleased with the terms of the treaty once the details became known. Furthermore, the text of the treaty in Arabic was slightly, but crucially, different than the text in French. In 1839, the French took advantage of the ambiguity by marching their army through a region of the country that was forbidden to them in the Arabic version. The war began anew.

By 1841, the French had become fed up with the resistance of Abd el-Kader and his small army. It was clear that their conventional war tactics were not working. General Bugeaud gave his recommendation to the French Parliament. “We need a leader who will be implacable and wage unlimited war.” He was referring to himself.

For the next six years, the French waged Total War. Over 100,000 soldiers – one-third of the entire French army – was stationed in Algeria, and they were not constrained by the ordinary rules of warfare. Houses were burned, livestock was shot, crops were destroyed. If Abd el-Kader was Robert E. Lee, then Bugeaud was William T. Sherman.

In the words of one of Bugeaud’s most trusted officers, “I shall leave not a single tree standing in their orchards, not a head on the shoulders of these wretched Arabs…I shall burn everything, kill everyone.” The same officer was responsible for suffocating hundreds of men, women, and children who had taken refuge inside a series of caves. In the English press, Bugeaud became known as “The Butcher of the Bedouins.”

By contrast, Abd el-Kader conducted war in as civilized a manner as possible. He devised a series of rules for the treatment of prisoners which were, in some ways, a forerunner to the official rules codified in the Geneva Convention in 1949. In one instance, he released a group of French captive soldiers because he did not have enough food to feed them. Some prisoners were so impressed with Abd el-Kader’s treatment of them that they formally defected to the other side, and served as foreign advisors to the emir.

Through intermediaries, Abd el-Kader set up a correspondence with the Bishop of Algiers, and agreed to release French prisoners of war in exchange for the bishop’s promise to press the French military to release Arab prisoners – which he did, with only limited success. If the French soldiers knew that they would not be slaughtered by the enemy if taken prisoner, they might not fight quite so passionately. As a French Colonel wrote, “We are obliged to try as hard as we can to hide these things [the treatment accorded French prisoners by the Emir] from our soldiers. For if they so much as suspected such things, they would not hasten with such fury against Abd el-Kader.”

Prisoners who were brought to Abd el-Kader were questioned to make sure they had been treated well on their journey; if they weren’t, the Algerian soldier responsible for their care was flogged. Female captives were turned over to the care of the one person in the world that Abd el-Kader trusted most: his own mother.

But the French were too strong, and Abd el-Kader’s Algerians were too disunited. By 1847 he wasn’t fighting a war so much as he was evading capture. His lieutenants were starting to surrender to the French. Abd el-Kader took his family to Morocco, seeking refuge there, but were refused by the Sultan, who did not want to anger the French. Many of his remaining loyal followers wanted to launch one last attack, to go out in a blaze of glory. Abd el-Kader refused.

“If I thought there were still a possibility to defeat France, I would continue. Further resistance will only create vain suffering. We must accept the judgment of God who has not given us victory and who in His infinite wisdom now wants this land to belong to Christians. Are we going to oppose His will?”

In December, 1847, Abd el-Kader sent word to General Lamoriciére, now leading the battle against him, that he was prepared to discuss the terms of his surrender. An agreement was reached, and signed by the King’s own son, that Abd el-Kader and his men would surrender, ending the 15-year war, in exchange for safe passage to Alexandria or Acre in Egypt, where Abd el-Kader planned to live out the rest of his days.

And once again, Abd el-Kader was betrayed when an agreement he reached with one Frenchman did not go over well with the rest of them. The French had more important things on their mind than what to do with Abd el-Kader – the monarchy of King Louis-Philippe was collapsing, and in February of 1848 he abdicated before he could be overthrown. The new government refused to ratify the agreement. Abd el-Kader and his family were instead forcibly moved to France, where they were held prisoner – in fairly luxurious surroundings – for over four years.

The French betrayal of Abd el-Kader only made him a more heroic figure in the eyes of the world. In 1850, a horse named Abd el-Kader (nicknamed “Little Ab”) was entered into the Grand National Steeple Chase in England. The horse, a 33-1 longshot, won. And won the same race the following year. The British author William Thackeray wrote an elegy to Abd el-Kader entitled “The Caged Hawk.” De Tocqueville himself called Abd el-Kader “a Muslim Cromwell.”

And within France, Abd el-Kader became a sort of celebrity. “A cult of sorts began to form around the personality of the emir. People streamed from all over France to visit him.” It was, I imagine, sort of the 19th-century version of going to see the Pope at Yankee Stadium. At one point Abd el-Kader was assigned a new French guard who had requested to be transferred; “he wanted the honor of guarding the emir to repay the consideration with which he had been treated as a former prisoner.” As a nun who cared for Abd el-Kader’s family wrote to her superior, “Allowing for certain exceptions of a theological nature, there is no Christian virtue that Abd el-Kader does not practice to the highest degree.”

In 1849, citizens of Bordeaux put Abd el-Kader’s name on the ballot as a candidate in the presidential elections. By 1852, French public opinion had turned in favor of their fallen enemy, and the elected President, Louis Napoleon (soon to be Emperor Napoleon III), announced that Abd el-Kader was to be freed. After a triumphant parade through Paris, Abd el-Kader and his family were sent to Bursa, a Turkish city not far from Istanbul. Bursa did not agree with the emir, though, and in 1855 – after obtaining approval from Napoleon – Abd el-Kader moved to Damascus.

On the way to Damascus, Abd el-Kader met and befriended the British military attaché in Lebanon, Colonel Charles Henry Churchill – distant cousin of Winston. Churchill would eventually write the definitive biography of Abd el-Kader of his time. When Abd el-Kader arrived in Damascus, as Churchill wrote, “Not since the days of Saladin had anyone received such a triumphal welcome.”

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And so it was that in 1860, Abd el-Kader, the tragic hero of the Arab world, found himself in the epicenter of the maelstrom of mayhem. Abd el-Kader had retired from political life, but he still wielded a substantial amount of symbolic power, should he need it. He would.

Connected as he was to the elites of Damascus, Abd el-Kader had heard rumors that certain elements of Damascene society were planning to take advantage of the violence in nearby Lebanon to launch an attack on the local Christians. He was sufficiently concerned to inform the French Consul, and together they went to see the governor, Ahmed Pasha, not realizing that the conspiracy went all the way to the top. Pasha reassured them that there was nothing to the rumors.

Nonetheless, the rumors were so persistent that the Consul was persuaded to do something extraordinary: under the tightest of secrecy, he authorized the expenditure of French money to arm Abd el-Kader and a thousand of his Algerian men.

On July 8th, Abd el-Kader had learned the details of the plot between the Druze and the Turks, and had rode out of the city to confront the Druze cavalry before they attacked. He – and his small army – succeeding in, ahem, convincing the Druze to call off their attack. Meanwhile, though, he was oblivious to the fact that there was a mob already sweeping through Damascus.

He returned to the city on July 10th, and found chaos before him. “Abd el-Kader soon learned that the Turkish troops assigned to protect the populace had been ordered into the citadel or were lackadaisically watching as rioters were running amok, burning homes and slaughtering Christians.”

And at that moment, Abd el-Kader, the man who had led his Muslim people in a war against Christian invaders for 15 years, knew what he had to do. And that he had to do it quickly.

First he and his men hurried to the French consulate to offer safe harbor; the French were immediately joined by Russian, American, Dutch, and Greek diplomats looking to flee the scene. And then:

All afternoon of July 10, Abd el-Kader plunged into the chaos of the Christian quarter with his two sons shouting: “Christians, come with me! I am Abd el-Kader, son of Muhi al-Din, the Algerian…Trust me. I will protect you.” For several hours his Algerians led hesitant Christians to his fortresslike home in the Nekib Allée, whose two-story interior and large courtyards would become a refuge for the desperate victims.

“As night advanced fresh hordes of marauders – Kurds, Arabs, Druzes – entered the quarter and swelled the furious mob, who, glutted with spoil, began to cry for blood. Men and boys of all ages were forced to apostatize and were then circumcised on the spot…Women were raped or hurried away to distant parts of the country where they were put in harems or married instantly to Mohammedans,” wrote Churchill of the events. “To say that the Turks took no means to stay this huge deluge of massacre and fire would be superfluous. They connived at it, they instigated it, they shared in it. Abd el-Kader alone stood between the living and the dead.”

Abd el-Kader returned with his men, and every Christian they could pull away to safety, to his estate.

News spread among the rioters that the emir was protecting the Christians. The next day an angry crowd gathered at his door to protest. They were prepared to tolerate his harboring diplomats, but demanded that he hand over the local Christians under his protection. As the mob got larger and more unruly, the emir came to the door.

“Give us the Christians,” the crowd shouted after he had quieted it by his silent presence.

“My brothers, your behavior violates the law of God. What makes you think you have a right to go around killing innocent people? Have you sunk so low that you are slaughtering women and children? Didn’t God say in our holy book, Whoever kills a man who has never committed murder or created disorder in the land will be regarded as a murderer of all humanity?

“Give us the Christians! We want the Christians!”

“Didn’t God say there should be no constraint in religion?” the emir vainly replied.

“Oh holy warrior,” cried out one of the leaders in the mob. “We don’t want your advice. Why do you stick your nose in our business?”

“You have killed Christians yourself,” shouted another. “How can you oppose us for avenging their insults. You are like the infidels yourself – hand over those you are protecting in your home, or you will be punished the same as those you are hiding.”

“You are fools! The Christians I killed were invaders and occupiers who were ravaging our country. If acting against God’s law doesn’t frighten you, then think about the punishment you will receive from men…It will be terrible, I promise. If you will not listen to me, then God didn’t provide you with reason – you are like animals who are aroused only by the sight of grass and water.”

“You can keep the diplomats. Give us the Christians!” shouted the mob, sounding more and more like Romans in the Coloseum.

“As long as one of my soldiers is still standing, you will not touch them. They are my guests. Murderers of women and children, you sons of sin, try to take one of these Christians and you will learn how well my soldiers fight.” The emir turned to Kara Mohammed. “Get my weapons, my horse. We will fight for a just cause, just as the one we fought for before.”

“God is great,” his men shouted, brandishing their guns and swords. Faced with the emir’s battle-hardened veterans, the crowd melted away bravely hurling insults.

Well over a thousand Christian refugees were housed inside Abd el-Kader’s home, making it so crowded that people could not sit or lie down, let alone use the facilities. So Abd el-Kader arranged for small groups of his Algerian men to accompany the Christians, in groups of 100, to the citadel outside the city – the same citadel that the Druze had originally planned to use to slaughter them.

The residence was finally emptied out and cleaned. Abd el-Kader then circulated word that a reward of fifty piasters would be paid for each Christian brought to his home. For five days, the emir rarely slept, and when he did, it was on a straw mat in the foyer of his residence where he dispensed reward money from a sack he kept by his side. As soon as 100 refugees were collected, his Algerians escorted them to the citadel.

The worst of the rioting ended on July 13th, 1860 – one hundred and fifty years ago today. At least 3,000 Christians were killed before it was all over. Abd el-Kader was credited with saving upwards of 10,000 Christians, including the entire European diplomatic corps.

Word reached France a week later – both the horrifying news of the massacre, and the incredible news of Abd el-Kader’s pivotal role in stopping it. The French were in equal parts ecstatic and dumbfounded. Editorials praising his actions were printed in newspapers throughout the country. Le Gazette de France wrote:

“The emir Abd el-Kader has immortalized himself by the courageous protection he has given the Syrian Christians. One of the most beautiful pages of the history of the 19th century will be devoted to him.” Another paper wrote: “When the carnage was at its worst, the emir appeared in the streets, as if sent by God.”

Word traveled across the Atlantic in due course. On October 20th, the New York Times published its own editorial:

“For Abd-El-Kader this is indeed a chapter of glory, and of the truest glory, too. It is no light thing for history to record, that the most uncompromising soldier of Mohammedan independence, when that independence kept the mountains, sword in band, became the most intrepid guardian of Christian lives and Christian honor in the days of his political downfall, and in the decline alike of his people and of his faith. The defeats which surrendered Algiers to the Frank have been strangely and nobly avenged…To-day the Christian world unites to honor in the dethroned Prince of Islam, the most unselfish of knightly warriors, risking limb and life to rescue his ancient foes, his conquerors and the conquerors of his race and his religion, from outrage and from death.”

(Amazingly, the New York Times has archives that date back to 1851. You can read the full editorial here.)

Abd el-Kader was not the only Muslim who strove to defend the Christians of Damascus from the raging mob. In particular, in the area of Damascus known as Maydan, which (then and now) was home to the most devoutly religious Muslims in the city, Muslims hid and protected their Christian neighbors from the violence. But Abd el-Kader became the face of those Muslims who had stood up to defend the Christian community, and as such, honors and accolades descended upon him from all over the world.

The French immediately bestowed upon Abd el-Kader, who barely a decade before had been their greatest enemy, the French Legion of Honor. (This would be like America, in 1987, awarding the Congressional Medal of Honor to Ho Chi Minh.) Russia, Spain, Prussia, Great Britain, and the Pope all awarded various distinctions on Abd el-Kader. And from the United States came a gift of a pair of finely wrought colt pistols – one source claims they were made of gold – delivered in a maple box which bore the inscription: “From the President of the United States, to his Excellency, Lord Abdelkader, 1860.”

(Two of my sources claim the gift was sent by President Lincoln, not President Buchanan. While this would make the story even better – one of our best presidents rather than one of our worst – Lincoln did not take office until March, 1861.)

Abd el-Kader was characteristically modest about his role. In a letter to the Bishop of Algiers, he wrote,

“…That which we did for the Christians, we did to be faithful to Islamic law and out of respect for human rights. All creatures are part of God’s family and those most loved by God are those who do the most good for his family. All the religions of the book rest on two principles – to praise God and to have compassion for his creatures…The law of Mohammed places the greatest importance on compassion and mercy, and on all that which preserves social cohesion and protects us from division. But those who belong to the religion of Mohammed have corrupted it, which is why they are now like lost sheep. Thank you for your prayers and good will toward me…”

The impact of the massacre was significant. As soon as word reached France, an army was dispatched to Lebanon. The Turkish sultan, looking to deprive the French of a reason to invade, dispatched his own army to Damascus to identify and prosecute the perpetrators. In the end, over 300 men were found guilty, half of whom were exiled from the empire. The others were sentenced to death, including the governor, Ahmed Pasha, who was shot. But the lingering question of who was the true instigator of the unrest – whether it was the Turks who wanted revenge, or whether it was even the British or French who were looking for an excuse to occupy Syria – remains unsolved to this day.

Meanwhile, the French and British both still had designs on the area, and as a bridge until the day came when they could officially colonize the region, the idea was floated of installing Abd el-Kader as the ruler of Damascus. The only problem was that Abd el-Kader had no interest. As he told a visiting French journalist, “My career in politics is over. I have no ambition for worldly glory. From now on, I want only the sweet pleasures of family, prayer, and peace.”

He was true to his word. Abd el-Kader lived out the rest of his days in Damascus, and his residence was on the must-visit list of any European who came to the city. In 1869, Abd el-Kader was influential in convincing the Arabs of the worthiness of a project to build a canal to link the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, which helped to make the Suez Canal a reality.

Otherwise, Abd el-Kader lived a life of simple spirituality, spending much of his time writing a commentary on the works of Ibn Arabi, the famous 13th-century Muslim scholar. He died of renal failure on May 25th, 1883, and was buried next to Ibn Arabi’s tomb in Damascus. The New York Times ran an obituary a few months before his death, which read in part:

“One of the ablest rulers and most brilliant captains of the century, if the estimates made of him by his enemies is correct, is now, in all probability approaching the end of his stormy career…The nobility of his character, no less than the brilliancy of his exploits in the field, long ago won him the admiration of the world…Great men are not so abundant that we can afford to lose them without a word. If to be an ardent patriot, a soldier whose genius is unquestioned, whose honor is stainless; a statesman who could weld the wild tribes of Africa into a formidable enemy, a hero who could accept defeat and disaster without a murmur – if all these constitutes a great man, Abd-El-Kader deserves to be ranked among the foremost of the few great men of the century.”

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One of the youngest people to accompany Abd el-Kader on his journey into exile, first to France and later to Damascus, was Muhammad Yunus, who was just seven years old when he left Algeria. When the mob invaded Damascus. Muhammad Yunus Al-Jaza’iri (Al-Jaza’iri is Arabic for “The Algerian”) was in his early 20s, but he had already earned a position as a trusted confidant to Abd el-Kader and occupied a high place in the emir’s army, and he played a pivotal role in rescuing the Christians from the mob. Which isn’t surprising, as Muhammad Yunus’ own father, Muhammad Sha’aban, had been one of Abd el-Kader’s most trusted lieutenants during the war in Algeria. Also, Abd el-Kader was his uncle.

While Abd el-Kader’s fame made him untouchable, those around him were not so lucky. Muhammad Yunus was poisoned and died suddenly in 1880. The Druze were suspected, but nothing was ever proved.

When Muhammad Yunus died, Abd el-Kader himself was the executor of his estate, and until he passed away Abd el-Kader served as the guardian to Muhammad Yunus’ young son, Mahmoud, my great-grandfather.

Muhammad Yunus was my great-great-grandfather.

Abd el-Kader, as best as we can discern from the genealogy records, was my great-great-great-great uncle.

I’ve been writing professionally for 15 years, and particularly since 9/11 I have tried, when circumstances allow, to make this an underlying theme in my work: that Muslims and Christians can live together, that there is more that unites us than divides us, that it is only the extremists on both sides who want to see a Clash of Civilizations, and not co-existence, rule the day.

Just know that greater men have tread this way before. My efforts to do so are a speck of dust on top of a mighty mountain of tolerance my ancestors built in 1860. I am honored to play whatever miniscule part I can in echoing the message that Abd el-Kader spread so eloquently, and with such impact, 150 years ago today.

(All italicized words above are quoted directly from John W. Kiser’s wonderful book, Commander of the Faithful: The Life and Times of Emir Abd el-Kader, without which this article could not have been written.)

Enjoy the All-Star Break, everyone. There will be a baseball post here soon enough.

Friday, July 9, 2010

Burlington.

If Wilmington is the minor-league hottie that the Royals are constantly trying to please, then Burlington is the slightly overweight girl with self-esteem issues that’s just happy the Royals called, and never mind where they’ve been the last few days.

The Royals have sampled much of the Midwest League over the last quarter-century. Their low A-ball affiliate has moved from Appleton, Wisconsin in 1987, to Rockford, Illinois in 1993, to Springfield, Illinois in 1995, to Lansing, Michigan in 1996, to a two-year sabbatical in the South Atlantic League in Charleston, West Virginia in 1999, and finally to Burlington, Iowa in 2001.

The fact that I had to include the state along with the name of each city tells you what you need to know: none of these teams play in large cities, and none of them –with the exception of the Lansing Lugnuts – are a particularly desirable location for a minor league affiliate. In particular, the Midwest League teams have to deal with, well, Midwest weather. The Royals can afford a state-of-the-art drainage system at Kauffman Stadium, and can have the players back on the field just as soon as the Tornado Warning expires. The Burlington Bees can’t. Just by way of example, the Bees were rained out this Tuesday, and Wednesday the game was suspended in the seventh inning due to rain. That’s pretty typical. It could be worse; at least the Mississippi hasn’t flooded this year.

The Royals have stuck with Burlington for the last decade nonetheless, probably because it’s close by, and because the Bees put up with teams that are as consistently wretched as the Blue Rocks are consistently great. The Charleston Alley Cats were 61-80 and 53-80 in 1999 and 2000, and since moving to Burlington, the team has eight losing seasons in nine years, and finished at least five full games under .500 seven times.

The exception was 2008, when after a 30-39 first half, the Bees went 46-29 in the second half to clinch a playoff spot, then blew through three rounds of playoffs to win the Midwest League championship. And you guys all thought Mike Moustakas wasn’t a leader.

The Bees are on pace for their worst season yet in 2010, as even a doubleheader sweep on Thursday night only improved the team’s record to 30-52. Now, winning isn’t everything in the minors, and at this level of the minors winning isn’t much of anything. But this team is as weak in prospects as its win-loss record suggests.

The big exception to this is Wil Myers, and he alone makes the Bees worth watching. (Or he did, anyway.) Myers was drafted in the third round last year, but the Royals nearly took him with their first-round pick, and gave him mid-first-round money ($2 million) to sign. It’s been money well spent. As a 19-year-old in a tough hitters’ league, Myers started out slowly, hitting just .232 (but with good pop) in April. He heated up in May and June, and by the end of June his overall line was .289/.408/.500, with 10 homers, 19 doubles, and 48 walks.

Those numbers are ridiculous for a teenager in the Midwest League. Two years earlier, at the same age, Moustakas hit .272/.337/.468, with 22 homers and 25 doubles in a full season, and everyone was duly impressed. Myers’ performance for Burlington was very similar – except that Myers had more walks by the end of June than Moustakas had (43) all season long.

It’s so hard to evaluate the batting eye of a high school hitter, because they face so much inferior competition that sometimes they’re forced to expand their strike zone for the good of the team. Reports before the draft were that Myers had a good batting eye, but no one expected this level of patience.

Myers is clearly on a faster track than Moustakas was, because he was promoted to Wilmington at the start of this month. He’s only getting hotter; in eight games with the Blue Rocks, Myers has hits in seven of them, and last night he went 4-for-5 to raise his average with Wilmington to .438 (14-for-32). He only has two doubles and one walk in those eight games; we’ll cut him some slack.

Did I mention Myers is a catcher? No, I guess not. He is, you know. A 19-year-old catcher who has hit his way to high-A ball, where he’s batting right behind Eric Hosmer. Hosmer, who is one of the organization’s best prospects, is a year older than Myers and plays first base.

Wil Myers, the catcher, might well be the best prospect in the entire organization.

The problem is that it’s less than 50/50 that Wil Myers really is a catcher. The tools are there – he’s thrown out a solid 34% of attempted basestealers this year, and made just 4 errors – but he also has allowed 18 passed balls in just 51 games behind the plate.

Myers wasn’t a full-time catcher in high school, so he has barely a year of full-time backstopping to his credit at this point. I think the impact of blocking balls behind the plate is overrated. The Royals survived a couple of seasons of Miguel Olivo just fine; they can survive Wil Myers. Myers’ offensive skills, solid arm, and weaknesses with the nuances of catching remind me of Jorge Posada, who to this day drives the Yankees crazy with his defensive deficiencies. (Hey, it’s hard to catch with so many rings on your fingers.)

The greatest impediment to Myers’ glove might be his bat. If he keeps hitting like this, he’s going to force himself to the majors before his glove is ready, and the Royals will be tempted to move him to the outfield. In their defense, that might even be the correct move. Myers’ body type – a lanky 6’3”, 190 – lends itself more to running around an outfield than squatting behind the plate. His offense will definitely play in a corner, and he has the speed (10 steals this year) and arm to make himself into a quality right fielder in short order. And while catchers are always in demand, the Royals have less depth in the outfield than they do at almost any other position.

Still, you hate to give up on the potential to have a catcher who hits like Myers does. For now, the Royals don’t have to make that decision. If Myers keeps hitting the way he has, though, he might be ready for the majors by the time he’s 21, and then a decision will have to be made. It’s a dilemma other teams would love to have.

Picollo on Myers: Very good hands, good athleticism, but footwork is not good. Pop times to second base are 1.8-1.9 seconds, which is good…footwork is an issue partly because he’s tall and lanky…if he doesn’t smooth out his actions behind the plate there are some worries about his long-term health if he stays at catcher…his defense isn’t helped by the fact that A-ball pitchers are much more erratic than in the majors…has heard from scouts that Posada [he brought up Posada’s name on his own] looked much the same way in A-ball – some nights he looked awful, some nights he looked good.

With Myers gone, the cupboard is almost bare. The second-best hitter on the team, outfielder Carlo Testa, is hitting a modest .255/.331/.450, and is 23 years old. There isn’t another hitter anywhere on the roster who strikes me as more than a long-shot prospect.

On the mound things are equally bleak. The pitching staff includes some notable names, but they’re not notable for their performances this season. One’s notable for being an early-round bust (Sam Runion), another for struggling to return from Tommy John surgery (Matt Mitchell), and another for being talented but with a perpetually sore arm (Kelvin Herrera).

Keaton Hayenga was a late-round pick in 2007, even though he had torn his labrum on a bad slide during his senior year of high school. The Royals were enamored enough with his arm that they gave him $300,000 to sign, then waited patiently for 2 years for him to return to the mound last season. This year, the wrapper was finally taken off, and the Royals were excited to see the return on their investment.

What they’ve received is a pitcher with an 8.23 ERA, and just 17 strikeouts in 43 innings. When you gamble on prospects, sometimes you’re going to crap out.

Bryan Paukovits, who was a junior college draft-and-follow from 2006, has been the Bees’ best pitcher this season. In 62 innings, he’s allowed just 43 hits and 16 walks, with 65 strikeouts. The problem is that he just turned 23; he’s a few levels below where a prospect his age should be. The Royals have promoted him to Wilmington, and he gave up nine runs in his first start, although he’s pitched better since then. He’s a prospect, but a marginal one.

With all that said, there’s at least one pitcher on the Bees’ staff who has true All-Star potential. That would be Tyler Sample, who was the Royals’ third-round pick in 2008 out of a Colorado high school. Sample was considered quite raw – and had already had Tommy John surgery in high school – but he threw very hard and had a very promising knuckle-curve. He was very much a project, and in his pro debut he walked more than a batter per inning, but last season he walked just 22 batters in 55 innings.

He made his full-season debut this year, and his control issues resurfaced, as he walked 27 batters in his first 30 innings. His control has slowly but dramatically improved since; in his last ten starts, he has walked just 28 batters in 49 innings, and in his last two starts he has just two walks (against 14 strikeouts) in 12 innings.

He’s still a long ways from the majors, and he just turned 21. But his stuff is undeniable, as he’s allowed just 59 hits in 79 innings while striking out 71. He’s a monster at 6’7”, 245, and sometimes it just takes tall pitchers a while to straighten out their mechanics and repeat them on every pitch. If there’s one pitcher in the organization that I’d bet on to jump up the prospect rankings in the next 12 months, it’s Sample. If the light bulb goes on, he could move very, very quickly.

But that’s it for Burlington. One top prospect, one sleeper prospect, and a whole lot of chaff. That’s a pretty standard fare for a minor-league team. It’s a tribute to the organization that “pretty standard fare” makes Burlington easily the weakest full-season team in the system.

I’ll be back next week with a brief overview of the short-season leagues, and then try to tie it all together with my unscientific rankings of the organization’s top 30 prospects.

Wednesday, July 7, 2010

Deadline Decisions.

As most of you have noticed, this season has been rather therapeutic for me as a fan of the Kansas City Royals. By the end of the 2009 season, my relationship with the team had become, frankly, toxic. I’m in a much better place now, to the point where I think that many of my fellow Royals bloggers are needlessly pessimistic about the future of the franchise. I like a good Dayton Moore joke as much as anyone, but I almost wonder if there’s some sort of time warp going on here, where people continue to judge Moore as if the last six months never happened.

Moore gets hammered, and deservedly so, for moves like the Betancourt trade and the Kendall signing – but is only grudgingly given his due, if at all, for the fact that the farm system overfloweth. As Kevin Goldstein rhetorically asked after Chris Dwyer’s last start for Wilmington – 6 innings, no runs, 9 strikeouts, and a promotion to Double-A after the game: “Seriously, is any system having as good a year as the Royals? Is there anyone even close?”

So I’ve climbed back on the Moore train, and plan to stay on board until we see what happens with the most impressive collection of minor league talent the organization has had in at least 15 years. That doesn’t mean that my criticisms of Moore will suddenly abate. In a way, the evaluation of Moore only really starts now.

This month, in fact, may be the most important month of Moore’s tenure to date. This is the month when we’ll find out whether Moore is truly serious about trusting the future of the Royals to the kids, or whether he’s going to continue to follow the safe, CYA route of employing proven veterans until they’re pried from his cold, dead hands.

In Moore’s first July as a GM, he was a trading dervish. He got the proceedings off to an early start, moving J.P. Howell to Tampa Bay for Joey Gathright on June 20th. He then moved Ruben Gotay for Jeff Keppinger (July 19th), Mike MacDougal for Daniel Cortes and Tyler Lumsden (July 24th), Elmer Dessens for Odalis Perez, Blake Johnson, and Julio Pimental (July 25th), Tony Graffanino for Jorge de la Rosa (July 25th), and on deadline day he traded Matt Stairs for Joselo Diaz, and Jeremy Affeldt and Denny Bautista for Ryan Shealy.

Not all these trades worked out – actually, in aggregate the Royals probably lost more talent than they acquired – but the point was that Moore saw an opportunity to overhaul his roster, and took it. We can only hope he’ll be similarly active this season.

Moore hasn’t been active at the deadline since. In 2007, his only July trades were to acquire the infamous Roman Colon for a minor leaguer, and to trade Octavio Dotel (a no-brainer) for Kyle Davies. In 2008, the Royals did not make a single July trade, although they did pass Horacio Ramirez through waivers in August and then traded him to the White Sox for Paulo Orlando. (And they plucked Robinson Tejeda off waivers from the Rangers in June.) And last year, the only trade Moore made in July was…the acquisition of Betancourt. But hey, he also paid cash to acquire Ryan Freel and Josh Anderson, so it’s all good.

The Royals can’t afford that kind of passivity this season. Not when their window of opportunity looks like it might open a crack next season, and then be thrown completely open in 2012. Not when they’ve got at least a half-dozen players who will attract some kind of interest on the trade market. And not when they’ve got replacements ready to step in, all of whom figure to be better than the guy they’re replacing in a year or two, and some of whom are better than the guy they’ll be replacing right now.

This last point is crucial, because the unfortunate by-product of the Royals’ current 8-3 stretch is that some people are actually suggesting that the Royals are still in contention this season. Me, I prefer for my team to be playing better than .452 baseball before I think about contending. I’m a purist like that.

It’s one thing for Ned Yost to argue that the Royals aren’t out of it. He’s the manager; if he can’t make the case that his team isn’t out of it, he’s not doing his job. It’s another thing when our old friend Jeff Flanagan argues that the Royals can’t afford to trade Jose Guillen because they’re in the race. Come on, Jeff. You’re better than this.

“Try and visualize the lineup right now without Guillen – replace him with Mitch Maier or Willie Bloomquist. Seriously, how does that look?”

As a courtesy to Flanagan, I won’t make a list of the six different reasons why this is a ridiculous argument.

As I write this, the argument for what to do with Guillen may have become a moot point, as in his last at-bat against the Mariners last night he pulled up lame while running to first base. We’ve been told that it was a quadriceps injury, and that he’s “day-to-day” – which, given Guillen’s history, seems incredibly optimistic.

This significantly impacts the Royals’ ability to trade him, obviously. But even if Guillen is out for an extended period of time, it’s unlikely to have a huge impact on the Royals in the long term. The Royals were never going to get more than a marginal prospect for him. The main value of trading Guillen was always to open up the lineup spot to a younger, more deserving player – if he’s on the DL for a while, that spot will open up anyway.

(Okay, the main value of trading him was simply to unload his salary – he’s owed nearly $6 million the rest of the season, which is to say, more than the Royals are likely to shell out for all of their draft picks this year. But I’m not sure the Royals would have been able to get another team to pick up a large fraction of his salary.)

The injury to Guillen, though, only hammers home the point that it’s better to move these guys a few weeks early than one day late. So let’s look at all the players the Royals might be tempted to trade this month – which is over half the roster – and see what they can get.

Player: Kyle Farnsworth

Outstanding salary: $2.25 million* + $500,000 buyout.

*: The season is at roughly the halfway point, so I’m simply dividing each player’s salary by two.

Odds that the Royals will trade him: 80%.

Quick – who leads the Royals in ERA? Here’s a clue – it’s the same guy who leads the team in WHIP. Here’s another clue: it’s the last guy you would have guessed before the season began.

Farnsworth’s 2.04 ERA and 1.047 WHIP in 35 innings don’t justify his two-year, $9 million contract, but they do explain why the Royals thought he’d be worth the money. The dude still throws in the upper 90s, after all. There are always teams looking for bullpen help at the trading deadline, and Farnsworth’s contract situation is very favorable.

Farnsworth has allowed just three runs in his last 26 innings, and just as impressive as his performance is the fact that he’s maintained it even as the Royals have slowly ramped up his responsibilities. He started the season pitching the same garbage relief that he was relegated to last season. He then started pitching in games where the Royals had a large lead, then games where the Royals only trailed by a run, and now he’s pitching in tie games in the ninth inning, as he did Monday night. The old Farnsworth would have given up the walk-off homer on his second pitch – as he did last year. The new Farnsworth pitched a tidy one-two-three inning and got the win. Evidently Farnsworth is relying more on a two-seamer and a changeup this year. This makes some sense - as hard as he throws, his four-seamer never had much movement, and his two-seamer is still plenty fast.

It’s hard to believe that the Royals would keep Farnsworth, given that he’s gone after the season, and that he’s likely to have multiple suitors. Stranger things have happened, but the odds are pretty good that he’ll be moved soon.

Possible suitors: The Angels are still in the race, and have a pretty dreadful bullpen, a rarity under Mike Scioscia. The Red Sox are also pretty thin behind Jonathan Papelbon and Daniel Bard. And the Reds are clinging to first place despite a bullpen without a single reliable right-handed reliever.

What the Royals should expect in return: Let’s not lose our heads here: he’s still Kyle Farnsworth. A single B-grade prospect would be a steal. More likely, the Royals are likely to get a guy who grades out as a future utility-player/good fourth-outfielder/bullpen arm.

Who replaces him: The Royals have a ton of relief prospects, but they could all still benefit from a little more development. If and when Hochevar or Meche returns, they’ll slip into the rotation and either Bruce Chen or Anthony Lerew will take Farnsworth’s role. Otherwise we might see another audition for Brian Bullington or Philip Humber.

Player: Scott Podsednik

Outstanding salary: $825,000

Odds that the Royals will trade him: 65%

If you want to be charitable towards the Royals, you can make the case that they signed Podsednik with the intention of dealing him at the deadline all along. If that’s the case, then mission accomplished: Podsednik is having a classic Podsednik season, batting .301/.348/.370. It’s a completely singles-driven profile; Pods has hit FIVE doubles all season, which is ridiculous for someone who has the speed to make a double out of a single once a month. Still, he’s hitting for average, and stealing bases (24 of 34 so far), and his defense in left field hasn’t been a complete disaster.

Best of all, he’s doing this in a season in which offense is suddenly down all around baseball, making otherwise-rational teams think that they now need an infusion of speed and little ball to win in this brave new world. I see no need to disabuse these teams of this notion. Podsednik’s low salary might make him particularly appealing to teams with financial constraints.

Possible suitors: Left fielders for the San Diego Padres are hitting a combined .193/.289/.279. Throw in the fact that Podsednik is a perfect fit for that ballpark, and I’m a little disappointed that we haven’t seen a trade already. Melky Cabrera has been so disappointing in Atlanta that they’ve been forced to play Eric Hinske out there.

What the Royals should expect in return: Again, we (and the Royals) need to keep our expectations in check. As an everyday player, Pods is likely to fetch more than Farnsworth, but only a little more. I’d be happy with someone who would rank as the 15th-best prospect in the organization – which, given the state of the farm system, would actually be a half-decent prospect.

Who replaces him: Alex Gordon, assuming he’s eligible for parole.

Player: David DeJesus

Outstanding salary: $2.3 million this year, $6 million next year or $500,000 buyout.

Odds that the Royals will trade him: 55%

The big fish in the Royals’ pond, DeJesus is having the best season of his underrated career. He’s hitting .329/.397/.466, adapted to his third outfield position in the last three years flawlessly, is under a very reasonable contract, and has a very enticing option for next season. He’s also almost a certainty to be a Type B free agent, and possibly a Type A free agent, either this year or next.

The draft pick compensation is a huge part of his trade value. Twenty years ago, teams would give up impending free agents without any recognition of the value those players would have in terms of draft picks. Things are different today. Three years ago, the Red Sox gave up three players for a half-season of Eric Gagne, in large part because they valued the draft pick that Gagne was expected to give them. (Gagne then pitched so badly for the Sox that he dropped out of the Type B rankings completely.)

DeJesus’ situation is interesting because there’s a good chance he’ll be a Type A free agent this winter – but if his option is picked up, he’ll probably be a Type A free agent next winter as well. The Elias rankings are based on a player’s performance over the past two seasons, so DeJesus’ numbers this year will count towards his free agent status both times. Basically, as long as DeJesus hits as well in 2011 as he did in 2009, he’ll have the same Free Agent status both times.

The Royals have three options with DeJesus:

1) Trade him.

2) Decline his option, offer arbitration, then collect two draft picks when he signs elsewhere this winter.

3) Exercise his option, then decide between 1) and 2) against next year.

From where I sit, declining DeJesus’ option would be foolish – a player of his caliber is a bargain on a one-year, $6 million deal. The only downside is the risk that he gets hurt or somehow plays so poorly in 2011 that the draft picks you would have gotten this winter dry up.

The Royals might justifiably say that they’d rather have the draft picks in hand, given that they’re odds of contending in 2011 aren’t that great even with DeJesus. But for a team that’s in a win-now mode, DeJesus’ option is awfully enticing. Which is to say, DeJesus probably has more valuable to another team than he does with the Royals.

So the incentive is there for a deal to be made. The question is whether a contender is willing to give up the talent it will take to get DeJesus and the two draft picks.

Possible suitors: Since DeJesus can play all three outfield positions competently, any team with an outfield need is a potential destination. The same teams that would want Podsednik would want DeJesus even more; the Braves, in particular, have the farm system talent to get a deal done. The Red Sox don’t know what they can expect from Jacoby Ellsbury or Mike Cameron, and J.D. Drew hasn’t even had his annual injury yet. If the Rays are as fed up with B.J. Upton as they appear, then Tampa becomes an option. A sleeper team might be the Giants, if they decide to go all-in for this season.

What the Royals should expect in return: A lot. A lot, or they shouldn’t do the deal. Let’s put it this way: I wouldn’t trade DeJesus for the package that the Phillies got for Cliff Lee (J.C. Ramirez, Phillippe Aumont, and Tyson Gillies). Granted, that’s more a reflection of Ruben Amaro’s incompetence than anything else. But DeJesus should be able to command the standard three-prospect package of a Grade B+, a Grade B-, and a Grade C prospect. Think of this as a do-over on the Carlos Beltran trade.

(Going on a tangent for a moment, but I think we can add Ruben Amaro to that list of General Managers who I’d rank behind Dayton Moore. Amaro gave Raul Ibanez that three-year deal that looked like a steal for one month, and an albatross ever since. He was given a huge gift when Roy Halladay agreed to a contract extension before trading for him, and then screwed everything up by giving away Lee for pennies. He gave Ryan Howard a ridiculous contract extension at the exact moment before his value went south. And the Phillies are barely over .500, in third place, and in danger of squandering the final peak years of some Hall of Fame-caliber players.)

Who replaces him: Gordon, but if the Royals manage to trade DeJesus and Podsednik, they have some decisions to make in at least one corner outfield spot. They could audition Jordan Parraz or David Lough out there. There’s also a good chance that DeJesus’ replacement in right field will be one of the players coming back in a trade.

Player: Willie Bloomquist

Outstanding salary: $850,000.

Odds that the Royals will trade him: 40%

A year after Bloomquist had a career-high 434 at-bats, the Royals have found a way to minimize his contributions – he has only 74 at-bats in half a season. The prescription for Bloomquist always said that for best results, take him in small doses. For as much flak as his signing received, our issue was was always more about what he represented than Bloomquist himself.

Since joining the Royals, Bloomquist has 508 at-bats and 167 games, basically a full season’s worth, and has hit .262/.305/.360, along with 30 steals in 39 attempts. That’s not a starting player, but as a utility player those numbers are perfectly acceptable. His salary of $1.4 million last year, $1.7 million this year is not ridiculous. What was ridiculous was that he was practically a full-time player last year. This year, his opportunities to hurt the ballclub have been limited.

One of the reasons why Bloomquist’s playing time has been curtailed of late has been the surprise performance from Wilson Betemit, who is hitting a frankly ridiculous .386/.438/.773 since he was called up. In 44 at-bats, he has hit four homers, which 1) ranks sixth on the team, and 2) is as many homers as Jason Kendall has hit since the start of the 2008 season.

Betemit isn’t anywhere near this kind of hitter, but there’s every reason to think that he can be a significant contributor to the Royals going forward. Betemit, like another ex-Braves retread in Bruce Chen, was a top prospect once upon a time. Betemit was signed by the Braves when he was 14 years old – no, seriously, 14. When his real age came to light years later, the Braves were disciplined – I believe they were banned from signing international players for six months – and they got off easy. Betemit is one of the few guys in baseball today who debuted in the majors as a teenager, in 2001. That off-season, Betemit was ranked the #9 prospect in all of baseball by Baseball America. As a 19-year-old, he had just hit .355/.394/.514 in a six-week stint in Double-A.

He didn’t stick in the majors until 2005, when he was 23, but hit a very respectable .305/.359/.435 as a rookie. He never developed after that point, and was traded in 2006, 2007, and 2008. He signed as a minor-league free agent with the Royals this winter.

The thing is, while he never developed into a star, Betemit really hasn’t played all that badly either. His career line in the majors is .263/.328/.445, and aside from a 45 at-bat audition with the White Sox last year, he’s always been at least adequate in the majors. He’s only 28 years old, and much like the player who essentially replaced him in Atlanta, Omar Infante (that would be All-Star Omar Infante to you, buddy), while Betemit’s dream of being an everyday player may be over, he should have a long and successful career as a super-utility player ahead.

Betemit can do most of the things Bloomquist does, but Bloomquist can do only some of things Betemit does. Both of them can play multiple positions, but Betemit also has the advantage of being a switch-hitter. Bloomquist’s biggest advantage in the field is that he can play all three outfield positions, whereas Betemit has never started a game in the outfield. On the other hand, given his bat, Bloomquist’s ability to play the outfield may actually be a detriment, because it tempts teams into playing him out there.

Betemit has made at least 16 starts at all four infield positions, and started at both shortstop and second base for the Yankees in 2008. He’s not the most graceful defender in the middle infielder, but then he more than makes up for it with the bat. Offensively, it’s no comparison. Bloomquist has a massive edge in speed; Betemit has a massive edge in plate discipline and power.

The problem with Betemit is that he doesn’t have the look of a utility infielder. Utility infielders are supposed to be scrappy, scrawny, speedy guys who don’t hit much – they’re supposed to look like Willie Bloomquist. Betemit doesn’t. But given our manager and general manager’s background with Atlanta, the fact that the Braves are thriving with Infante in that utility role lends hope that the Royals may feel comfortable doing the same with Betemit. Which makes Bloomquist, whose Swiss Army Knife package is appealing to some contenders, expendable.

Possible Suitors: The Red Sox, who are missing something like a third of their roster – including Dustin Pedroia – are rumored to have interest. You would expect almost every National League contender to at least kick the tires on Bloomquist.

What the Royals should expect in return: A lottery ticket. Some 19-year-old kid who throws strikes and has maybe a 10% chance of seeing his velocity suddenly bump into the low 90s.

Who replaces him: Betemit takes over his role; the Royals have a half-dozen options for who takes over his roster spot. If they want a backup outfielder, they could go with Jordan Parraz. If they want Willie Bloomquist Lite, they can go with Irving Falu or Ed Lucas.

Player: Brian Bannister

Outstanding salary: $1.15 million. Bannister is also under club control for 2 more seasons.

Odds that the Royals will trade him: 30%.

You know I love Bannister, and I can’t say that I want to see him go. If nothing else, keeping him around is worth it to have a perpetual foil to Dayton Moore in the clubhouse.

But if the Royals decide it’s time to move on, well, I can’t blame them. Bannister has a career 4.88 ERA, and over the last three years that number goes 5.76, 4.73, and 5.44. I think he’s a better pitcher than that, and for significant periods of time he has been a better pitcher than that. But twice in his career he’s run out of steam in August, and this year his numbers are destroyed by the 11 runs he gave up in Cincinnati when he became dehydrated.

Let’s face it: with his upper-80s fastball, there’s simply a limit to how good Bannister can be in the superior league. He’s the quintessential National League pitcher; against inferior hitters, without having to face the DH, and in a big ballpark – hello, NL West! – he could be a revelation. Plus, he’s an excellent hitter for a pitcher. At least, this is the pitch the Royals should be making.

The Royals don’t have to trade him, and they shouldn’t trade him just get rid of him. But in the long run, the Royals are looking at a situation where they should have five starting pitchers better than Bannister as soon as next summer. There’s nothing wrong with making a proactive trade now, rather than trading him for whatever you can get next season.

A month ago Bannister had a 4.50 ERA and his trade value was presumably a lot higher. Then came the disaster in Cincinnati, a bad start in Atlanta where he admitted to being gun-shy, six shutout innings to beat Stephen Strasburg, and then two consecutive outings where he’s allowed four runs. Basically, the Royals need Bannister to show some consistency over the next three weeks to convince suitors that his struggles were just a speed bump and not something to be alarmed by.

It’s no surprise, then, that with the All-Star Break coming up, the Royals are bumping Anthony Lerew from his start on Saturday in favor of Bannister. The Royals say they’re doing this because Bannister’s the better pitcher, and he probably is, but don’t be fooled: they’re showcasing him. If Bannister aces his next few auditions, we may have to find someone new to carry the torch of sabermetrics in the Royals’ clubhouse.

Possible suitors: The Padres would be an ideal location for him, and while San Diego has four starters with an ERA of 3.24 or less (!), their fifth starter, Kevin Correia, has a 5.05 ERA. The Dodgers have been struggling to find a fifth starter all season. The nasty divorce between the McCourts has basically frozen the Dodgers’ payroll, but if the Royals are willing to pick up Bannister’s modest salary the rest of the season, they could steal something here. Remember, the Indians’ willingness to pay the remainder of Casey Blake’s salary netted them Carlos Freaking Santana for a two-month rental.

But given that all three divisional races in the NL are close, there are a lot of teams that could use him. Maybe Omar Minaya wants to erase his mistake and bring Bannister back? The Reds? The Cardinals? There are a lot of landing places for Bannister if the Royals are serious about moving him.

What the Royals should expect in return: If the Royals trade him, it has to be with the knowledge that they’re giving up 2.5 seasons of a league-average pitcher. That’s not beanbag. It’s not worth trading him if they don’t get at least a Top-15 prospect in return.

Who replaces him: Meche or Hochevar in the short term. Michael Montgomery or Aaron Crow or Chris Dwyer or John Lamb by this time next year.

Player: Mike Aviles

Outstanding salary: Aviles is not arbitration-eligible yet, so his salary is basically the league minimum. Also, he won’t be a free agent until after the 2014 season.

Odds that the Royals will trade him: 25%.

Aviles is the most surprising player whose name has come up in trade rumors. On some level, it makes sense. Second base is an easy position to fill, because you’re basically drawing on the pool of second baseman and the pool of failed shortstops. The Royals want to see what Chris Getz can do, and if Getz fails, then they have Johnny Giavotella getting ready off-stage.

And let’s face it: the Royals have never been entirely comfortable with Aviles. He never had a good defensive reputation, even in the minors, then shocked everyone by playing the hell out of shortstop as a rookie. This year, he’s played mostly second base, and frankly hasn’t looked all that sharp. The ideal solution would be to admit that Betancourt was a mistake and move Aviles back across the keystone, but the Royals probably look at how Aviles has played at second base and figure that it would only look uglier at shortstop.

If the Royals do trade him, this won’t be your standard deadline deal. Aviles is under contract for 4.5 more seasons. His career batting average is .300 on the nose, and that includes the .183 disaster last season when he played hurt. This would be a substantial trade of a cheap everyday player under contract for the long term, and the return would have to be in kind.

Possible suitors: Aviles’ name has come up in trade rumors because the Red Sox are reportedly interested in him; with Pedroia out in the short-term, and Adrian Beltre a free agent after the season, the Red Sox might see Aviles as a guy who can fill a lot of holes in different spots both now and in the future. But “a guy who can fill a lot of holes” is a lot different than “an everyday middle infielder”, which is why I’m skeptical that the Royals will be able to trade him for what he’s worth. What worries me is that they might be able to trade him for what they think he’s worth.

What the Royals should expect in return: Aviles isn’t the player that DeJesus is. On the other hand, he’s millions of dollars cheaper, and he’s under contract for three additional seasons. I don’t think it’s unreasonable to expect a DeJesus-caliber haul for him.

Others of note:

Player: Rick Ankiel

Outstanding salary: $1.625 million, plus $500,000 buyout.

Odds that the Royals will trade him: 15%.

First he has to get healthy. Then he needs to hit. And even then, some team has to be suitably confident that Ankiel will stay healthy, and keep hitting. It’s a tall order. As with Guillen, the Royals can be reasonably confident that Ankiel will pass through waivers, effectively moving his trade deadline to August 31st.

Player: Kyle Davies

Outstanding salary: $900,000, plus he’s under club control in 2011.

Odds that the Royals will trade him: 10%.

Like Bannister, Davies has shown stretches of effectiveness, but whereas Bannister has been a league-average starter for months at a time, Davies has problems going more than a few starts at a time. Davies is cheap, but in the last five seasons he has just one year with an ERA lower than 5.27. In his last six starts, he’s walked 20 batters and struck out 13. I still think the Royals should try him in the bullpen for the next three months and see if they catch lightning. Otherwise, he’s a non-tender candidate this winter.

Player: Alberto Callaspo

Outstanding salary: Basically league minimum, and under club control through 2013.

Odds that the Royals will trade him: 10%.

There isn’t even a whisper of a Callaspo trade rumor, but you have to think the Royals are trying to figure out his future with Mike Moustakas on his way. Callaspo isn’t hitting nearly as well as he did last season; he hit .300/.356/.457 last year, and just .277/.310/.417 at the moment. But I actually think his trade value may be higher. For one, most of his dip at the plate can be explained by a drop in his batting average, which is somewhat fluky – the power he showed for the first time in his career last season has stayed. But more importantly, whereas last season he was a second baseman with terrible defense, he’s now a third baseman with at least adequate defense. Remember, the Royals were actively trying to trade him this winter, and the only substantial rumor we heard was from the Dodgers for Triple-A catcher A.J. Ellis.

I don’t think the Royals will trade him now, and I don’t think they should trade him now, because Callaspo’s value is not as a one-year rental, but as a long-term solution at the hot corner. Teams are more amenable to making major roster changes in the off-season. The Royals will likely hold on to Callaspo for now, hope that his batting average rebounds in the second half, and try their luck on the market again this winter.

Conclusion: Without even knowing what the Royals get in return, we can almost tell whether this will be a successful month for Moore simply by how many players get traded. With the exception of DeJesus and Aviles, it’s hard to imagine the Royals making a trade that doesn’t improve the team in the long term.

If you add up the percentages that each player gets traded, you wind up with an average of 3.3 players traded, and that doesn’t include Guillen, whose trade status is up in the air at the moment. That may be giving Moore too much credit, but I don’t think it’s unreasonable to expect that at least three guys get moved off the roster this month.

Basically, as along as Farnsworth and Podsednik find new homes, and as long as the Royals don’t give DeJesus or Aviles away, this will be a successful month. Anything less than that, and Moore’s ability to understand his team’s position on the success cycle – and his ability to avoid thinking that two good weeks from his team suddenly means they should be a buyer instead of a seller – will be called into question.