I keep waiting for the Royals to do something noteworthy
enough to justify writing a column about it, and they keep not obliging. After
six weeks, I finally blinked. So let’s find some things to talk about.
- The biggest transaction the Royals have made in the last
six weeks was trading David Lough for Danny Valencia. On a pure
talent-for-talent basis, the Royals lost the trade. But as the Royals have now
moved out of the “acquire talent” stage of franchise construction, and into the
“arrange that talent into the framework of a winning team” stage, it’s a
defensible move.
By making the trade, the Royals have made it clear that they
don’t entirely buy into Lough’s performance in 2013, either offensively or
defensively. On the whole, I agree with them. Lough hit .286 as a rookie; this
is good. He walked 10 times in 335 plate appearances; this is bad. He was 27
years old; this is terrible, at least from the standpoint of whether you expect
Lough to improve or even maintain his performance going forward.
Defensively, Lough was worth 15 runs above average
defensively in not even a half-season in the field; this is good. Defensive
numbers are notoriously unreliable, and Lough wasn’t reputed to be the second
coming of Garry Maddox in the outfield; this is bad.
The last two paragraphs explain how Lough can 1) lead all AL
rookies – yes, even Saint Wil – in Wins Above Replacement according to
baseball-reference.com, and 2) still be worth trading for a platoon third
baseman.
In the expansion era (since 1961), only eight 27-year-old
rookies had as many bWAR than Lough, and one of them was Ichiro Suzuki. Here
are the other seven, and you’ll laugh when you see who’s number one:
Player Year bWAR
Mike Aviles 2008
4.7
Lew Ford 2004 4.4
Randy Milligan 1989
3.7
Scott Podsednik 2003 3.6
Freddy Sanchez 2005 3.3
Ron Theobald 1971 2.9
David Lough 2013 2.7
Andy Stankiewicz 1992 2.7
Aviles, like Lough, came out of nowhere to have a remarkable
rookie season that was elevated by 1) a very good batting average despite poor
plate discipline and 2) terrific defensive numbers that were completely
unexpected. (Aviles was +14 runs at shortstop as a rookie per Baseball Info
Solutions.) He’s been a useful utility guy, but hasn’t had a season with even
half as many bWAR since.
Ford hit .299/.381/.446 as a rookie, after hitting
.329/.402/.575 in a 34-game cup of coffee the year before. In his sophomore
year he hit .264/.338/.377; the following year he hit .226/.287/.312 and was
out of baseball before long. Podsednik hit .314/.379/.443 for the Brewers in
2003, slumped to .244/.313/.364 in 2004 (but led the NL in steals) and was
traded to the White Sox, where he hit a respectable .290/.351/.349, and then,
after not hitting a homer all season, hit two in the playoffs as the White Sox
won the World Series. He would be a useful player for years to come, but never
had an above-average OPS+ after his rookie year.
Randy Milligan hit .268/.394/.458 for the 1989 Orioles, a
big part of their turnaround from a 54-107 record the year before to within two
games of the AL East title. He hit .265/.408/.492 in 1990 and was a useful
player through 1993, when he hit .299/.423/.434, but age hit him with a right
hook; he batted 98 times in 1994, at age 32, and never played again. Milligan
was a Ken Phelps All-Star through and through, a guy who never should have had
to wait until he was 27 to stick in the majors, but came up in an era when no
one cared what your OBP was. He had a career .408 OBP in the minors. In 1987,
at age 25, he hit .326/.438/.595 with 29 homers and 103 RBIs in Triple-A. That
got him two at-bats in September and a trade to Pittsburgh; a year later the
Pirates traded him to the Orioles for Pete Blohm, a graduate of Johns Hopkins
and the pitching coach for the college team during the off-season when I tried
out for the squad my sophomore year in 1992, which is why I went on this
tangent and this paragraph is so damn long.
Freddy Sanchez is the one old rookie who really built on his
success; after hitting .291/.336/.400 as a rookie, he led the NL in batting
average (.344) and doubles (53) the following year, and played regularly for
five more years before getting hurt in 2011 and he hasn’t played since. It’s
worth noting that even as a rookie, Sanchez had tremendous contact skills – he
struck out just 36 times in 492 plate appearances – which boded well for his
ability to continue to hit for average.
Ron Theobold hit .276/.342/.325 as a rookie, hit
.220/.342/.256 as a sophomore and never played in the majors again. Andy
Stankiewicz hit .268/.338/.348 as a rookie, which so impressed the Yankees that
he got 9 at-bats the following year; he never got more than 150 at-bats in a
season again, hitting .216/.291/.286 after his rookie year.
Milligan and Sanchez went on to productive careers, but both
players had given reason to believe in them after their rookie years – Sanchez
because of his very low strikeout rate, Milligan because he had mashed in the
minors. None of the other guys on this list ever had a single 2.5 bWAR season
again.
So while I think Lough might be a useful fourth outfielder
and may end up with 2000 at-bats in the major leagues, I think it’s unlikely
the Royals will truly miss him. With Gordon, Cain, and Aoki the starters, the
Royals had to move one of Lough, Jarrod Dyson, and Justin Maxwell. They had to
keep Dyson for Cain insurance, and because his speed was such a weapon off the
bench, and they had to keep Maxwell because he crushes lefties. Lough doesn’t
really do any one thing that well, so it was hard to see a reason for him to
get much playing time barring injury.
Valencia, on the other hand, does one thing well and only one thing well: hit lefties. Last
year he hit .304/.335/.553 in 170 plate appearances overall, which sounds
great, but breaks down to .371/.392/.639 vs. LHP, .203/.250/.422 vs. RHP.
That’s par for the course for Valencia; his career numbers are .329/.367/.513
vs. LHP, .229/.269/.360 vs. RHP. He’s a third baseman but not a particularly
good one, and mostly DH’ed last year, although in fairness it’s not like he was
going to play over Manny Machado.
So it would appear that the Royals traded an outfielder they
had no room on the roster for, in exchange for a third baseman who will platoon
with Mike Moustakas and make the 2014 team a few runs better. This makes
perfect sense, but it’s not that simple, because I don’t think the Royals are
prepared to make Moustakas a platoon player at this point in his career.
And I’m not sure they should. As bad as Moose was in 2013, a
year ago he was coming off a season where he hit .242/.296/.412 and played out
of his mind at third base, and was worth 3.2 bWAR. That’s not great, but that’s
something you can build on for a 24-year-old third baseman. Yes, he declined
both offensively and defensively last year, but I think writing him off as an
everyday player, or even a future star, is premature. According to
Baseball-Reference, his list of 10 most similar players through age 24 includes
Ken McMullen (1583 career games, 34 bWAR), Don Money (four-time All-Star),
Howard Johnson (three times finished in top 10 of MVP vote), Gary Gaetti (2507
career games, 42 bWAR), and yes, Alex Gordon. More than half of his comps went
on to have really good careers.
A guy who doesn’t show up on his comps list, but who I’ve
used as a comparison, is Pedro Alvarez. Alvarez, like Moustakas, was the #2
overall pick in the draft (although Pedro was drafted out of college), reputed
to have tremendous power but not a great hitter for average. Like Moose,
Alvarez hit well at age 23 (.256/.326/.461), but at age 24 was even worse than
Moustakas (.191/.272/.289), to the point where the Pirates had to send him back
to the minors. But they didn’t give up on him, and the last two years Alvarez
has hit .244/.317/.467 with 30 homers, and .233/.296/.473 with a league-leading
36 homers. He’s still a flawed player, but on the balance a pretty good one.
So I don’t think the Royals can give up on Moustakas yet.
The problem is, it would be a crime to keep Valencia on the bench against
lefties, but there’s nowhere else he’s going to play. You’re not benching
Butler against lefties; you’re not playing Valencia over Hosmer at first base.
In left field, Gordon just had a historically good season for a left-handed hitter
against left-handed pitching, and in right field, if Aoki is going to platoon
with anyone, it’s Maxwell.
So I don’t know where Valencia fits right now, other than to
give the Royals enough of a threat hanging over Moustakas that it lights a fire
in his ass and gets him to report to camp in tremendous physical and mental
shape. I’m not discounting that; Sam Mellinger just tweeted that Moustakas is
in Arizona and he hears that Moose is in great physical shape. Remember, two
years ago he showed up in great shape after working out at Boras’ institute all
winter, and had his best year; last year he didn’t and he didn’t. If Valencia’s
presence spurs Moustakas to get back on the Gary Gaetti track, the trade is
worth it. But better still if he can step in against left-handers every once in
a while.
With Maxwell, Dyson, the backup catcher, and Emilio
Bonifacio, I don’t even see where Valencia fits on the roster unless the Royals
go to an 11-man pitching staff. I would support such a move – the Royals don’t
need seven relievers – but of course, they have so many good relievers that it
will be hard for them to get down to seven, let alone six. So I expect another
move at some point, possibly late in spring training after Moustakas has
already earned himself back in the Royals good graces. I expect Valencia or
Maxwell to be on the move. But I’ll confess that the Royals rarely do what I
expect.
- It’s the end of January and Brett Hayes is still the
Royals’ backup catcher, and I guess it’s time to acknowledge that yes, he
really is going to be the Royals’ backup catcher.
I’ve given the Royals a lot of grief over letting George
Kottaras go, and I stand by the fact that he was a cheap and ideal complement
to Salvador Perez’s skill set. But I have to be fair here: when the Royals got
Kottaras in the first place, they did so because he was waived by the Oakland
A’s. I didn’t excoriate the A’s for waiving him even as I was praising the
Royals for claiming him, even after the A’s had replaced Kottaras with a
slightly better version of himself – John Jaso – surrendering a very nice
prospect named A.J. Cole for the privilege.
And the A’s had just acquired him at the trading deadline in
2012 from the Brewers for a marginal prospect. I guess what I’m saying is that
when three different teams have given up a player with very useful skills for
next-to-nothing in the span of 16 months, it’s possible that the problem isn’t
with the teams, but with the player. Now, I don’t know what that problem might
be. Maybe Kottaras is such a bad game-caller that pitchers simply don’t want to
throw to him. Maybe he’s a clubhouse lawyer. Maybe he’s Patient Zero in some
heretofore undisclosed Ebola virus epidemic in major league clubhouses. Maybe
he’s Wiccan. But there’s something about him which makes him look like a much
better player from a distance than up close.
I think he’s a great acquisition for the Cubs, who have the
luxury of taking a gamble on a guy who could run into 20 bombs and walk 80
times if he had to play everyday. But I do wonder if the Royals might know
something we don’t here.
None of this excuses the decision to go to war with Brett
Hayes, a career .220/.266/.374 hitter in the majors. The Royals will tell you
it doesn’t matter because Perez is going to catch 140 times anyway, and they
might be right. But I’ll tell you that if anything
happens to Perez, you can kiss the Royals’ playoff hopes goodbye. Perez may or
may not be as valuable to the Royals as he was last year. But he’s definitely
more irreplaceable this year.
- Payroll update: thanks to Jeremy Guthrie kindly agreeing
to move some of his 2014 salary into a buyout of his new 2016 option, the
Royals’ payroll is at a tick above $89 million pending the resolution of
arbitration cases for Greg Holland and Aaron Crow.
That’s not a terrible
payroll – it would be the highest in team history – but it’s only slightly
higher than last year’s. And this year, the Royals get an additional $25
million* in TV revenue. Given where the Royals are on the win curve, in a place
where a few additional wins could be the difference between making the playoffs
and not – there’s really no defense for not upping the payroll another $10
million or so. I’d say the Royals should re-sign Ervin Santana, but 1) I’m
skeptical that Santana will be able to replicate his 2013 season, and 2) if the
Royals wanted to add another starter, they could have afforded Matt Garza’s new
contract, with the upshot that they’d still get the extra draft pick when
Santana signed elsewhere.
*: I’ve seen it
reported that the $25 million is only about $15 million after taxes. This is
ridiculous, ownership propaganda. Yes, owners pay taxes on their profit – but
expenses are taken out before taxes.
Put another way, payroll spent on players is tax-deductible. It’s important to
be economically literate, because if you’re not, you’ll be taken advantage of
by rich people with an agenda.
I know there are still a bunch of fans hoping and expecting
that the apparent collapse of the starting pitching market – as illustrated by
Garza only getting 4 years and $50 million – gives the Royals a real shot at
Santana. I don’t see it. Garza may well be an aberration; his contract is so
small that it makes me wonder if his medical reports are terrible, as it’s the
only thing that explains the deal. (Keith Law certainly subscribes to that
theory, and he would know better than I.) Also, there’s this notion that unlike
every other team, the Royals wouldn’t have to give up a draft pick to sign him.
Which is silly, because of course they’d have to give up a
draft pick – they’d give up the draft pick they’re expecting to get when he
signs elsewhere. That will be a supplemental first rounder, maybe around pick
#35 or so. That’s a less valuable pick to lose than a true first rounder, which
some teams would have to give up – but it’s more valuable a pick than the
second-round pick the Blue Jays – whose first-round picks are protected – or
the Yankees – who have already surrendered their first-round pick – would give
up.
So let it go. Santana will sign elsewhere, the Royals will
get a nice draft pick for their troubles, and they’ll have money to spend
elsewhere.
That is, if David Glass will spend it. What bothers me the
most about ownership spending this winter is that if they don’t spend the savings they got from Guthrie’s reworking of his
deal (or if they’ve, in essence, already spent it), then his restructured deal
benefits neither the team nor the fans, but only Glass’s pocketbook. Because in
two years, the Royals will count the $3.2 million that they now owe Guthrie in
2016 as part of the team’s payroll, and factor it in when they say they can’t
spend any more money. But today, when they’re reaping the savings from the
restructured deal, they’re keeping quiet.
I think David Glass wants to win. But I think he wants to
make money more. Which is kind of sad, because he has plenty of the latter and
precious little of the former.
- Luke Hochevar settled before his arbitration hearing.
That’s not newsworthy. What’s newsworthy is that his $5.21 million contract
contains an additional $400,000 in possible incentives based on games
finished…and games started. If Hochevar is starting games for the Royals this
season, the extra money they’ll be paying him will be the least of their costs.
- It’s late January, which means it’s Top 100 Prospect time.
MLB.com’s list went up last Thursday, and Baseball Prospectus’ list went up
today; Baseball America’s and Keith Law’s list go up later this week.
MLB.com has only four Royals in their Top 100, but three of
them (Kyle Zimmer, Yordano Ventura, and Raul Adalberto Mondesi*) are in their
top 40; by “prospect points” they have the Royals with the 6th-best farm system
in the game. BP’s list is even more favorable to the Royals; they have seven
Royals in their top 100, with Ventura all the way up at #12 (and Jason Parks’
pick for 2014 AL Rookie of the Year), and Miguel Almonte in the top 50.
*: We need a
definitive name for Raul, son of Raul, younger brother of Raul, now that he
wants to be known as Raul. RAM? RMIII?
I’ll have more to say about each prospect later, but the
Royals pretty clearly still have a very deep farm system. For all my criticisms
of the front office, as long as they keep churning out talent, the era of
90-loss seasons should be over for the foreseeable future. But it takes more
than just good player development to begin an era of 90-win seasons.
- Speaking of wins and losses, it’s also projection season.
Clay Davenport, my long-time colleague and co-founder of Baseball Prospectus,
raised some hackles over the weekend with his projections, that have the Royals
at 77-85 and in fourth place – behind the White Sox, which would be astonishing
if true. Needless to say, that would be disappointing. Frankly, for some people
it would be employment-terminating.
On the other hand, if you look at the Royals’ Fangraphs
page, you will see projected WAR totals for all 30 teams on the right-hand
side, and by this measurement the Royals rank as the 7th-best team in baseball,
and would win the second Wild Card spot in the AL. They have the Royals so high
in part because, while the Royals don’t have any superstars in their lineup (no
position is expected to exceed 4.0 WAR), by signing Infante and Aoki they’ve
also eliminated any holes. Shortstop is projected at 1.5 WAR; every other
position is between 2 and 4. That’s not sexy, but it’s enough to get a team to
85 wins.
The problem is that 85 wins sounds great in pre-season
projections, because projections by their nature compress teams around the
mean. Clay’s projections, for instance, have no team winning more than 91
games. But of course some team will,
and most likely at least 5 teams in the AL will win more than the 85 games that
Fangraphs’ numbers would suggest for the Royals.
If the Royals want to be one of those five teams, some
players are going to have exceed their projections, perhaps wildly. Someone
from the Duffy/Ventura/Zimmer triumvirate will have to step up, and someone
among Gordon, Butler, Hosmer, and Moustakas is going to have to post a 900 OPS
and garner some MVP votes.
Which could happen. If it doesn’t, 77-85 is closer than
you’d think. There’s a whole range of outcomes that are possible for the
Royals. That’s not new. What’s new is that there’s a whole passel of
consequences that come with them.
18 comments:
All that to say: Clay Davenport's work is completely meaningless and worthy of being thoroughly ignored.
Since I was the last to post on your last thread I will be the first on this one. Enjoyed the insight and agree that there is little to say at this juncture. One question though. Will the Royals begin the season with the roster that they have now or, in your opinion, add someone (hopefully a pitcher).
I'm wondering if having Valencia on the bench would help keep opposing managers honest with their bullpens.
Like if Moose is due to face a righty in a late-inning, high leverage situation. Perhaps the other team opts to let Moose have the platoon advantage rather than see Valencia vs a lefty..
Maybe that's lot logical, but I know a .340 batting split can sure scare away quite a bit of logic.
Any team in baseball can go 77-85 given the right set of circumstances. Heck, I can easily construct a scenario where even the Astros or Red Sox end up with that record. But I think the Royals' talent level is quite a bit better than a range that centers on only 77 wins.
Last year the Royals won 86. Let's compare.
Likely to be worse this year:
1. Bullpen: last year was amazing; this year will likely be just very good
2. Starting pitching: Vargas will be okay but not as good as 2013 Santana; Guthrie '14 will be less lucky than Guthrie '13. Likely Ventura/Duffy/Zimmer combo will be better than Chen/Davis, but only a little.
3. Health: Royals are likely to see more DL time this year
4. Defense: still excellent, but last year will be hard to match
Better
1. 2nd base (duh)
2. 3rd base: Moose will improve, Valencia will help a bit
3. Butler (a little)
4. Hos (a little)
5. RF
So, pitching and luck a little worse, hitting a bit better. Looks like 82-79 to me. If Hosmer and someone else of the Butler/ Moose/Gordon/Aoki/Infante group have big years, and Royals are lucky again on injuries, playoffs are likely; if not and Salvy spends significant time on DL, 77 wins sounds about right.
They did sign Ramon Hernandez to a minor league deal and he's expected to challenge Hayes for the backup job. I'm not sure that's any better but its something.
Call me silly, but I disagree. Until Santana signs with someone there is no pick to lose.
You can't lose something you never had.
I'm still holding out hope that the Royals resign Santana. I think bringing him back really makes a playoff appearance a real possibility. A rotation of Shields, Santana, Guthrie, Vargas, and Duffy/Ventura/Zimmer/ Hochevar is pretty damn solid and has plenty of depth. The offensive additions of Infante and Aoki, along with growth from the younger guys and a bounce back year from Billy, make that a solid group too. The bullpen is spectacular. Adding Santana back to the mix takes away any obvious holes on the roster. The only possible hole is if there is no improvement or a repeat horrible performance from Moustakas.
The Royals are going to throw this season away by putting Wade Davis back in the rotation because of the option years on his contract. I wish they would find a way to trade him before that happens but I had to watch Hochevar make 128 starts and Kyle Davies make 99 for the Royals so I am pretty sure I have at least one more season of Wade to watch.
Wow, I didn't think you'd go so far as using a religion in the same way you did a super ebola virus.
I'm not wiccan, or affiliated with any other religious group, but that speaks a bit to your sensitivity towards groups different from yours. Bravo. Lost a reader.
Rany, nice to hear from you again. The previous poster needs to realize the concept of "sarcasm"...I am scared to death of our starting pitching beyond Shields. Guthrie's peripherals are scary, and Vargas' are not much better. Unless Duffy 2.0 and Ventura are the next Koufax/P. Martinez (I know, strange comps), we might need an 8-man bullpen...
Mick
Good to hear from you again, Rany.
I'm with Davenport. The signing of Vargas was a killer. Had GMDM waited until now he might have had the money to bid for Santana. I'd still love tohear an explanation of why Vargas when you could of had Chen?? Other than age is there a real difference that favors Vargas. And Wade Davis needs to be sent someone where far away.
Gordon's offense has slid for two straight years. Butler had a modest off year. If that continues then Hos, Moose, and Perez are going to have to really step it up to cover for them.
Raul Mondesi: Team RamRod.
I love Rany, find this column interesting, and find the Royals to be a very interesting team.
But as smart as Rany is, his point about the $25 million being tax deductivle if spent on player salary makes no sense in assessing the value of the $25 million to the owners. If the owners spend the $25 million on payroll, then the money is worth zero to ownership profits. It is a wash - they receive $25 million more in revenue and they have $25 million more in expenses. The owners are correct in saying if the team keeps the $25 million as addition profits, it is worth only about $15 million after taxes.
It is odd for Rany to make such an obvious mistake on a number issue.
@Kansas City
You are correct that Glass could pocket the money and still be $15M ahead.
However, the team has said repeatedly that they are not making a profit and that payroll is as high as it could be and have the team merely break even.
In this context, Rany is correct. A $25M windfall would allow a team to raise their tax-deductible expenses (such as payroll) by $25M and maintain a balanace.
You may be correct about what Randy was trying to say. It depends on what he was referring to as "being reported." If it was reported that the $25 million only provides $15 million to possibly spend on payroll, then that is wrong and what Rany said is correct. However, if it was reported that the $25 million does not increase profits by $25 million and would only result in $15 million in profits afer taxes, then that is correct. In any event, without more context, I think Rany's criticism of "propaganda" is too strong.
Putting the tex issue to one side, the stat comparisons to prior players always seems persuasive, but how acccurate is it realy as a predictive tool?
I don't think that comps are that great as predictive tools, but they can help suggest a potential range going forward.
It also helps as a narrative device. Rany can post vallencia's splits vs lhp and rhp. Those numbers might not mean much to a lot of readers. Or rany can say he has been peak billy butler vs lhp and tony pena jr against rhp. That paints a more vivid picture.
Post a Comment