2013 Opening Day Preview, Part 4.

#10: Alex Gordon

It sound weird to say this, given all the drama and agitas that accompanied Gordon’s first four years in the majors, but at this point, he seems to me to be one of the most reliable and consistent players on the entire roster.

Last year he hit .294/.368/.455, and there’s no reason why he can’t sustain that performance. His numbers were all down slightly from 2011, but the only real difference was that he turned nine home runs into a triple and six more doubles. If you just take out his 2009-2010 seasons, his career looks like a smooth progression from College Player of the Year to Minor League Player of the Year to decent rookie to promising sophomore to, finally, a true major league star. He’s 29 years old now, but given that he’s a fitness freak, given his skill set (both power and speed), and given the position he plays, he’s probably a better bet to age gracefully into his 30s than anyone else on the team.

For what it’s worth, he’s raking in spring training, against relatively high-caliber competition. (His “opposition quality” metric at baseball-reference, a new stat that weights playing time in spring training against the opposition you face – so that we can differentiate the player who’s performing well against guys who were in A-ball last year – is 9.4, which is almost major-league quality. Most players have a rating between 8 and 9.)

And it’s time to finally ask the question: is Alex Gordon the most underrated player in baseball?

As Exhibit A, the prosecution presents the following list, of the players with the most Wins Above Replacement over the last two years:

Player             bWAR

Justin Verlander   15.9

Ryan Braun         14.5

Miguel Cabrera     14.2

Ben Zobrist        14.0

Robinson Cano      13.4

Alex Gordon        13.3

Dustin Pedroia     12.5

Clayton Kershaw    12.5

Cliff Lee          12.5

Andrew McCutchen   12.3

Adrian Beltre      12.3

Over the last two years, Alex Gordon has been the sixth-best player in the major leagues. But if you were to ask the casual fan, I doubt he’d make the list of the six best players in the AL Central. And frankly, the writers aren’t much better. In 2011, Gordon got three 10th-place votes for AL MVP. Last year, he got none. In neither year did he make the All-Star team. Josh Hamilton was the starting left fielder for the AL both years. Aside from the fact that Hamilton played nearly as much center field as left field the last two years, Hamilton’s value over the last two years combined (6.9 bWAR) was less than Gordon’s value in 2011 alone (7.1 bWAR).

Go to your average fan and assert that Alex Gordon is a better ballplayer than Josh Hamilton. Wait for the laughter to die down. It may take a while.

In The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract, James writes this under the entry for Darrell Evans, who he ranked as the 10th-best third baseman of all time:

“Darrell Evans is, in my opinion, the most underrated player in baseball history, absolutely number one on the list. There are at least ten characteristics of an underrated player:

1. Specialists and players who do two or three things well are overrated; players who do several things well are underrated.

2. Batting average is overrated; secondary offensive skills, summarized in secondary average, are underrated.

3. Driving in runs is overrated; scoring runs is underrated.

4. Players who play for championship teams are often overrated; players who get stuck with bad teams are often underrated.

5. Players who play in New York and LA are sometimes overrated, while players who play in smaller and less glamorous cities are sometimes underrated, although this factor is not as significant as many people believe it to be.

6. Players who are glib and popular with the press are sometimes overrated, while players who are quiet are sometimes underrated, although, again, this factor is not as significant as many people think it is.

7. Players who play in parks which do not favor their skills are always underrated. Players who play in parks which favor them – hitters in Colorado, lefties in Yankee, pitchers in the Astrodome – are always overrated.

8. Hitters from big-hitting eras (the 1890s, the 1920s and 1930s) are overrated in history, and pitchers from the dead ball era and the 1960s are overrated. Pitchers from the big-hitting era and hitters from the 1960s are underrated.

9. Undocumented skills (leadership, defense, heads-up play) tend to be forgotten over time. Everything else deteriorates faster than the numbers.

10. Anything which “breaks up” a player’s career tends to cause him to be underrated. A player who has a good career with one team will be thought of more highly than a player who does the same things, but with three different teams. Switching positions causes a player to be underrated. A player who plays 1,000 games at third base and 1,000 games at second base may be underrated, because it’s harder to form a whole image of what he has done.”

Let’s go through the list one by one.

1. Gordon’s skill set is extremely diverse. He hits home runs but not a lot of home runs. He led the league in doubles last year. He draws walks. He hits for a high average. He plays great defense. He doesn’t ground into a lot of double plays. He doesn’t have one signature skill; his signature is that he has a lot of skills.

2. Gordon has actually hit for a good average the last two years, but had never hit above .260 before that; his career average is still just .269.

3. Gordon has been the leadoff hitter for most of the last two years, which of course means he’s going to score runs more than he’ll drive them in. He has 159 RBIs the last two years, but 194 runs scored.

4. Check.

5. Check.

6. Gordon is a very pleasant individual and certainly not combative with the media, but he’s a man of few words.

7. Kauffman Stadium is not a pitchers’ park overall, but it is a very tough park for power hitters, which cuts against Gordon’s primary skill when he reached the majors, and forced him to adjust his batting approach as a result.

8. Not really relevant, since we’re talking about a player who’s underrated in his own era.

9. A significant amount of Gordon’s value is in his defense – he’s won Gold Gloves the last two years, and deservedly so – and that’s a big reason why his overall value is not appreciated.

10. Gordon’s career has been broken up by his struggles in 2009 and 2010, which included a position switch and a remedial course in the minor leagues. I suspect a big part why he’s so underrated is simply that people have the Gordon of 2007-2010 in mind when they think of him. And because he was so highly touted, I think his failures hit people harder – he was already written off as a bust before he turned his career around.

In essence, Gordon is the best example of the Post-Hype Sleeper in baseball today.

So what we have is a player who’s a top-ten value in all of baseball even though no one thinks of him that way, and who ticks off pretty much every box on the How To Be Underrated At Baseball checklist. Does that mean Gordon’s the most underrated player in the game?

No, because of the guy two slots ahead of him on the list above. Ben Zobrist might have a lower Q rating than even Gordon, even though Zobrist has been a better player for a lot longer. Gordon, at least, was the #2 overall pick out of college and the best prospect in the game once upon a time. Zobrist was a sixth-round pick, and while he hit .318 in the minors, his career high in home runs was seven. In his first shot at the majors, he hit .224/.260/.311; the following year, in 97 at-bats he hit .155. (And in one of the worst moves of my fantasy career, I released him from my Stratomatic team after his sophomore season. Oops.)

Since then Zobrist has hit .267/.367/.462. He plays for Tampa Bay, so while he’s played for a perennial contender, he also plays in one of the worst markets in the game and in a ballpark which masks his excellence. Gordon has changed positions once in his career; Zobrist changes positions once or twice a week, and has legitimate Gold Glove talent in both right field and second base, which is an exceptionally rare skill set. Gordon makes around $10 million a year on his long-term contract; Zobrist makes $5.5 million this year, with club options for $7 million and $7.5 million for 2014 and 2015.

So no, Alex Gordon is not the most underrated player in baseball. He might be the second-most, though.

#9: Second Baseman

I am slightly disappointed but not the least bit surprised that the Royals have selected Chris Getz to start at second base over Johnny Giavotella. I think Giavotella is the better player, because he’s a career .331/.397/.477 hitter in Triple-A, and because he’s only played 99 games in the major leagues, and because he’s nearly four years than Chris Getz, who by the way still has never hit a home run in the three years and 254 games he’s played for the Royals.

Am I 100% certain this is the wrong decision? No. I can’t deny that in his 376 plate appearances in the majors, Giavotella has hit .242/.271/.340, which is even worse than Getz’s career line of .257/.314/.316. Getz does have some other inherent advantages. He bats left-handed, which provides some lineup balance, because of the other eight starters, five bat right-handed, and only Gordon, Hosmer, and Moustakas bat from the left side. Having six right-handed bats approaches the point of being a tactical disadvantage*.

Getz is also a better baserunner (probably 2-3 runs over the course of a season) and a better defender. The defensive advantage is probably overstated, not because Giavotella is great – he isn’t – but because Getz is only average at best himself. Baseball Info Solutions has Giavotella at 5 runs below average in his career (about 9 runs over a full season), but they also have Getz at 17 runs below average in his career, which is around 6 or 7 runs a year. He looks like Frank White when put next to Yuniesky Betancourt, which is why the perception in Kansas City is that he’s a well-above average defender.

*: I’ve mentioned this right/left balance problem before, and in writing this it occurred to me – this wouldn’t be such a problem if the Royals had a switch-hitter or two in their lineup, and it feels like they always used to have at least one.

So I checked, and…it’s true. Since Willie Wilson entered the lineup in 1978, the Royals had at least one switch-hitter play 95 or more games EVERY YEAR from 1978 to 2004. They weren’t always good – David Howard was the sole entry in 1995 – but there was always at least one. Wilson, UL Washington, Kurt Stillwell, Brian McRae, Felix Jose, Jose Offerman, and Carlos Beltran helped keep the lineup balanced. As recently as 1997, the Royals had three switch-hitters in their lineup – Offerman, Chili Davis, and Bip Roberts.

But since 2004, only two switch-hitters have played in 95 games: Alberto Callaspo in 2009, and Melky Cabrera in 2011. (Wilson Betemit came close.) I don’t know if the Royals just got lucky all those years, but they could really use a guy like that in their lineup. Just another reason to love Adalberto Mondesi.

Anyway, I think going with Getz is a mistake, but I’m not certain. What I’m certain about is that I shouldn’t have to be uncertain. Last year the Royals gave Yuniesky Betancourt 43 starts at second base, almost all of them while Giavotella languished in Omaha. Give that playing time to Giavotella, and either he would have hit (and wouldn’t have had to fight for a job this spring) or he wouldn’t (and we’d have more confidence that Getz is the right choice.) The bad decisions of years past continue to echo in 2013, when they might actually matter.

The good news is that whether Getz hits or not, the Royals are almost certain to get a better performance overall at second base than they did last year. Last year, Royals’ second basemen combined to hit .256/.289/.359, and that includes Irving Falu’s fluky 18-for-50 performance at the position. But even worse, they combined to be 15 runs below average on defense. Thanks go yet again to Yuni, who in barely a quarter season’s worth of playing time managed to be 10 runs below average by himself. It’s almost as if letting the worst defensive shortstop in the majors play second base on a bad ankle is a terrible idea.

If Getz doesn’t hit, they’ll give Giavotella another shot, and if they don’t because he’s not hitting or because he’s traded, they’ll give playing time to Falu, or Miguel Tejada, or Christian Colon. Regardless, it will be hard for them to get a worse performance from second base than they did in 2012. Even if it looks like they’re going to try.

#8: James Shields

I’ve explored every angle of Shields already, so there’s not much more to say. If he’s healthy he’ll be valuable. How valuable he is comes down to 1) whether he can avoid the extremely poor results on BABIP that he had in 2010 and 2) whether his significant home/road splits throughout his career in Tampa Bay are exaggerated.

He has a 3.89 career ERA, and I think expecting 200 innings and an ERA around 3.9 is realistic. That makes him a valuable pitcher, and probably the best one on the Royals. It doesn’t make him an ace, or a game-changer, or worth a top-five prospect in all of baseball. If he can get that ERA down to 3.15, his mark over the last two years, then we’re talking.

#7: Mike Moustakas

There’s a limit to how valuable you can be when you play a corner position and have an OBP south of .300. To his credit, Moustakas approached that limit, contributing in other ways – 34 doubles, 20 homers, and stellar defense which may have been the most shocking (in a good way) development of the season.

There’s almost certain to be some improvement going forward. Moustakas is just 24 – he turns 25 in September – and the vast majority of players who establish themselves as an everyday player in the majors by the time they’re 23 will improve over the next 3-4 years. How much improvement is the question. Moustakas was worth nearly 3 bWAR last year because of his defense, but between the fact that he’s never fielded that well before, and the fact that defensive skills erode earlier than offensive ones, we have to assume he won’t be quite that good with the glove going forward.

There is also the matter of a knee injury last season, which he quietly played through even though he hit just .201/.262/.316 from August 10th on. Prior to that point, he was hitting .260/.312/.455. His perseverance is admirable, but the fact is that you’re probably not helping your team much when you hit .201, even if you are playing great defense. If the Royals could get a .260/.312/.455 line from Moustakas over the entire season this year, they’d take that, with a hope of further improvement to come.

For all the attention Eric Hosmer gets as the key to the Royals’ future, it’s quite possible that Moustakas will have the better career owing to his position and defense. And while neither one is likely to sign a long-term deal that buys out free agency years, owing to the fact that Scott Boras is their agent, I’d place Moustakas’ odds of such a deal at “slim”, not “none”. He already turned down Boras’ advice once, agreeing to the Royals’ $4 million offer out of the draft at the last moment. He’s not giving the Royals the Salvador Perez treatment, but I wouldn’t be shocked if the Royals were able to buy out one year and get him signed through 2018 by next winter. I’m sure they’d like to, as otherwise they’re looking at the specter of losing both Moustakas and Hosmer in the same off-season.

#6: Lorenzo Cain

I feel like Cain is talked about less than anyone else in the lineup, even the second base mess. It’s understandable given that he couldn’t stay healthy last year; once you get that injury-prone label it’s hard to break. On the other hand, Cain played a full season in Omaha in 2011, and played 127 games at three different levels in 2010. Since turning pro, the only other season he didn’t play at least 125 games (remember, minor league seasons run only 140 games) was 2009. Hopefully, last year was a fluke.

It’s also worth remembering that in 110 career games in the majors, Cain has hit .281/.327/.412. He has some pop (21 doubles, 8 homers) and a lot of speed (17-for-18 in steal attempts). He has a very good defensive reputation, and the numbers suggest that “very good” is an understatement: he’s been worth 19 runs above average in basically two-thirds of a full season.

Put it this way: you know how much I/we rave about Salvador Perez? How the mind boggles at the fact that in 115 career games, Perez has been worth 4.2 bWAR, which is practically an MVP-caliber pace? Well, in 110 career games, Cain has been worth 4.0 bWAR.

No, I don’t think that’s sustainable, because I don’t think his defensive numbers are sustainable. But be honest: you didn’t know he had been that effective in his career. I sure didn’t, and I get not paid to know this stuff.

Cain turns 27 next month – the most common age for a career year. If he stays healthy, that Torii Hunter vibe he gives off at the plate may reflect itself on the stat sheet as well. If you’re looking for a reason to believe that the conventional wisdom on the 2013 Royals is wrong, look no further than a breakout season from The Painkiller.

Five For Friday: 3/22/13.

Sparksjay (@sparksjay): 2013 Royals Post-Mortem Headline on your blog?

Right now, my guess would be “Good. Not good enough.” I think this will be the Royals’ winningest season since 1989; I don’t think they will make the playoffs. For some people, the former will justify the James Shields trade. For me, the latter will justify my criticisms of it.

I’m sure I’ll make this point a few dozen more times as we go along, but to be clear: I hate the trade, but I’m still optimistic bout the Royals in 2013 – in large part because the costs of the trade won’t manifest themselves until 2014 and beyond. But in order for the trade to be a true win this year, the Royals have to go to the playoffs. It should be telling that I’m more optimistic about the 2013 Royals than virtually every other analyst out there – and even I don’t think they’ll make the playoffs.

Adam Pearce (@pearcead): What will you be looking for once the season starts (i.e. Hosmer’s ability to hit inside pitches) to believe the Royals have a chance?

What will I be looking for? Wins. Specifically, a winning April. It would have symbolic significance, given that the franchise has had just three winning Aprils in the last 23 years. But it would also have immense practical value, because here is the Royals schedule from April 30th until June 2nd:

vs. Tampa Bay (3)

vs. White Sox (3)

@ Baltimore (3)

vs. Yankees (3)

@ Angels (3)

@ Athletics (3)

@ Houston (3)

vs. Angels (3)

vs. St. Louis (2)

@ St. Louis (2)

@ Texas (3)

There’s a breather in there against the Astros, but aside from that, the easiest series of the bunch could be the one against the Yankees. Seriously. (Assuming Granderson and Teixeira aren’t back by that point.)

The Royals don’t have to come out of the gate like they did in 2003, but if they’re 10-14 when the Rays come to town, they could already be in selling mode by the time they leave Texas.

Bart Parry (@Bart41CPA): If Frenchy struggles, who are the likely trade candidates? Seems like real upgrade possibilities are scarce/costly (i.e. Stanton).

I’ll spare you my pie-in-the-sky trade ideas for Stanton until the Royals are actually in contention this summer. If the Royals do make a trade, it will likely be for a left-handed bat, which would allow them to use Francoeur in a platoon rather than give up on him completely.

I’m sure there are a number of left-handed bats in the major leagues who could fit the bill, but the name that stands out to me for obvious reasons is David DeJesus. DeJesus is only under contract for 2013, the money isn’t crazy, the Cubs are rebuilding…I’m sure they would be happy to trade him for a prospect of some worth. Since leaving the Royals he’s hit .252/.337/.390 the last two years, which comes out to an OPS+ of exactly 100. He has a fairly sizeable platoon split – for his career, he’s hit just .256/.325/.346 vs. LHP, but .292/.367/.449 vs. RHP. He doesn’t have a classic rightfielder’s arm, but he makes up for a lack of strength with impressive accuracy, and he played 86 games in right field for the Cubs last year.

Basically, DeJesus’ strengths and weaknesses makes him a perfect complement for Francoeur (or more precisely, makes Francoeur a perfect complement for him). He’d be an ideal candidate even if the Royals didn’t have a familiarity with him.

The only downside is that it requires Dayton Moore to make a trade with Theo and Jed. Well, nothing’s perfect.

Greg Brokaw (@gregbrokaw): Another “if contending…” question: What does your ideal September/playoff rotation look like?

That’s a good question, because on the one hand, it’s possible that some of the pitchers who will be in the minors or on the DL in April will be among the Royals’ five best starters by September. But on the other, if the Royals are actually contending in September, then things have likely gone well with the rotation that the Royals are opening the season with.

So the only two things I’m fairly certain about are that 1) barring injury, James Shields will be your Game 1 starter and 2) none of Mendoza, Chen, or Hochevar will be in the playoff rotation.

If I had to guess, Ervin Santana would start Game 2, if only because it’s hard to imagine the Royals going to the playoffs without Santana bouncing back to his 2011 form, and if he does, he’s a worthy starter. I’ll go with Danny Duffy in Game 3; a playoff berth from the Royals will likely include a big boost from his return in July. You could round out the rotation with a bunch of guys – Jeremy Guthrie, Wade Davis, Felipe Paulino, even Yordano Ventura or Kyle Zimmer.

Peter Radiel (@petercr1): Do you think the Royals can win the World Series with the current front office?

Yes.

There are two main reasons for my confidence. The first is that asking “can X win the World Series” is just a subset of the question “can X make the playoffs”. There’s no hard evidence that one particular type of playoff team is more likely to win a World Series than another. Teams that win more games in the regular season have a slight edge, but even that’s less than you would think. Anything can happen in a best-of-seven series, to say nothing of a best-of-five or the new Wild Card game (what my friend Joe Sheehan refers to as the Coin Flip game).

In the last 14 years, do you know how many times the team with the best regular-season record went on to win the World Series? Once. In 2009, the Yankees won 103 games and a world championship. (Okay, 1½. The Red Sox, who tied with the Indians for most regular-season victories, won the title in 2007.)

So if the Royals can reach the playoffs – or at least win the division, so they don’t have to play a fourth playoff round – they can win the World Series.

The other main reason is this: the San Francisco Giants have won two of the last three World Series. (They didn’t rank among the top 3 in regular-season wins either year.) Maybe Ned Colletti Brian Sabean isn’t as bad a general manager as I thought he was in the summer of 2010, when he was on my list of the five worst GMs in the game. But he is still the guy who:

1) Traded a living, breathing human being for Jose Guillen that summer.

2) Gave Barry Zito a 7-year, $126 million contract.

3) Refused to commit to Brandon Belt at first base for the better part of 2 years.

4) Signed Aaron Rowand to a 5-year, $60 million contract.

5) Signed Barry Zito. For seven years. And $126 million. No, really.

The secret to the Giants’ success? Draft Matt Cain. Draft Tim Lincecum. Draft Madison Bumgarner. Draft Buster Posey. Sign Pablo Sandoval out of Latin America. The rest is just details, honestly.

The Royals haven’t hit on their draft picks quite that well, but they’re still working on it. If Brian Sabean can win not one but two World Series, then yes, Dayton Moore & Company can win one.

2013 Opening Day Preview, Part 3.

#15: Luke Hochevar

Hochevar was going to be third on this list until he was moved to the bullpen, and I don’t have to tell you how much of a relief it is to move him down this far.

I already said plenty last time, but two points I didn’t get to:

- When Kyle Davies was stinking up the joint for the Royals year after year, I kept asking why they wouldn’t at least try him in the bullpen. The results he was getting didn’t correlate with his stuff, so he seemed like a prime candidate to see whether working in short stints might give him some more velocity on his fastball, which would in turn make his off-speed stuff play up.

The Royals never did give the bullpen a shot; Davies never pitched a game in relief for the Royals. And maybe it’s a moot point; Davies was released a season and a half ago, and hasn’t even thrown a pitch in the minors since. (So much for the Royals’ claim that if they let him go, 29 other teams would want him.)

I have to think that’s factored into the Royals’ decision with Hochevar a little. Hochevar’s problem is a little different – whereas Davies had good stuff but poor peripherals, Hochevar has good stuff and good peripherals – in particular, his walk rate is about 30% lower than Davies. Hochevar’s problem is that his ERA trails his peripherals by a historic degree. I don’t know whether that problem can be solved in the bullpen, but having advocated the same move for Davies, I’d be disingenuous if I said it wasn’t worth trying for Hochevar. I don’t like the price, but the experiment itself is fine.

- Of course, the reason Hochevar’s ERA is so much worse than his peripherals is because he can not pitch with men on base. That doesn’t seem like a problem that will naturally get fixed in the bullpen. At the very least, he’s not a reliever you want to bring into a game with ducks already on the pond. This may factor into the Royals wanting to try him as a short reliever – long relievers have to come in to clean up the starter’s mess, and there may be no one in the major leagues more ill-suited to the task. If Hochevar can start an inning clean and air it out for an inning or two, he might surprise us. But I’d keep him away from the high-leverage situations until he’s proven himself – many times over.

#14: Tim Collins

Speaking of Greg Holland and strikeout rates last time around, here’s a chart for you:

Highest Strikeout % by a Royal (min: 25 IP)

Year Pitcher        K%

2011 Greg Holland 31.76%

2012 Tim Collins  31.53%

2012 Greg Holland 31.49%

2009 Joakim Soria 31.08%

While strikeout rates have gone up significantly just in the last 5-7 years, that’s still an impressive testament to the current administration’s bullpen-building skills. That’s a Rule 5 pick, a 10th-rounder listed at 5’10”, and an undrafted 5’7” guy who was acquired for Rick Ankiel and Kyle Farnsworth. Not bad.

(Of course, the bullpen also will have two guys drafted in the top half of the first round. Neither Crow nor Hochevar was drafted to be a reliever, but it’s a good reminder that drafting relievers in the top half of the first round is almost always a mistake.)

Last winter I postulated that Collins’ control problems could improve quickly, because a higher-than-normal fraction of his walks as a rookie came on 3-2 pitches – in other words, he wasn’t walking guys because he couldn’t throw strikes, but because he was just nibbling too much. As it happens, Collins’ walk rate dropped significantly, particularly when you account for the fact that he intentionally walked eight batters last year (up from just two as a rookie). He faced exactly 295 batters in both 2011 and 2012, and his unintentional walks dropped from 46 to 26. His K/UIBB ratio jumped from 1.30 to 3.58. Partly this was because his command problem wasn’t as bad as it looked, and partly this was because of some changes Dave Eiland made to his delivery (detailed here by Baseball Prospectus).

Collins is just 23, and it’s unusual for a left-handed reliever to establish himself in the majors at such a young age. Collins has made 140 relief appearances in the majors, and just three other lefties in major league history have relieved 100 or more times by the end of their age 22 season: Terry Forster (201), Billy McCool (174), and Mitch Williams (164).

Mind you, Collins is already notable for being the shortest successful pitcher the majors has seen in a half-century. Collins already has more Wins Above Replacement than any pitcher listed at 5’7” or shorter since Bobby Shantz retired in 1964. Seabiscuit is among the most unique players the Royals have ever employed, a bundle of contradictions. He’s the shortest pitcher ever to suit up for the team, but throws harder than all but a few left-handers in the organization’s history. At age 17 he wasn’t considered good enough to be drafted, but by the age of 21 was in the majors in a role usually reserved for much older players.

And he’s left-handed, but for the second straight year he was more successful against right-handed hitters. As I wrote last year, that’s not a fluke – the combination of his delivery (over-the-top) and repertoire (reliant on a 12-to-6 curveball) is typically associated with reverse platoon splits. Right-handed batters hit just .196/.293/.333 against Collins last year – but left-handers hit .239/.333/.436.

While I think the Royals are aware of this to the point where they don’t use him as a lefty specialist, I also think Ned Yost doesn’t appreciate that Collins is legitimately better against right-handed hitters. Last year, 135 of the 295 batters Collins faced were left-handed. The first batter he faced was typically left-handed, and not surprisingly, the first batter of each appearance hit .237/.361/.492 against him. It’s unconventional, but the Royals would be better off calling on Herrera against left-handed hitters and Collins against right-handed hitters, at least until Donnie Joseph or someone else establishes themselves as a legitimate lefty specialist.

However he’s used, Collins is a joy to watch and a bear to hit. The novelty of his height wore off a long ago; what we’re left with is a hell of a reliever.

(Although he also makes a hell of a leprechaun.)

#13: Billy Butler

Again, these rankings account for a player’s consistency – Butler ranks this low not because he’s not important, but because even in a down year he rakes. He hit .291/.361/.461 in 2011, and all three rate stats were his worst numbers of the last four years. The legends say that hitting .300 is the mark of a good hitter. Billy Butler’s career batting average is .30006. That’s who he is: Billy Butler, Professional Hitter.

I’d like to say that I buy into his power surge last year – hitting 29 home runs after never hitting more than 21 before – but I suspect it will turn out to be an outlier. A true power surge would have resulted in more extra-base hits overall, but Butler hit just 32 doubles after hitting 44 or more in each of the previous three years. His extra-base-hit totals the last four years read: 73, 60, 63, 62.

In essence, about a dozen balls that bounced on the warning track in years past just cleared the fence. He didn’t hit more fly balls than in years past. He didn’t show better plate discipline – actually, he had the fewest walks (54) and the most strikeouts (111) of the last four years, suggesting he might have been selling out for power a little bit at the plate. Those are not the signs of a player who took a legitimate step forward with his power.

Not that he needs to; Butler has been one of the best DHs in the league for four years running, and doesn’t even turn 27 for another month. While I wouldn’t bet on a player with his physique to age particularly gracefully, he’s still years away from a likely decline. He is also a graduate of the Prince Fielder School Of Surprisingly Durable Fat Guys – Butler has only missed 11 games in the last four years, and at least a couple were probably interleague games where he couldn’t start and wasn’t need as a pinch-hitter.

It certainly wouldn’t be a surprise if Butler did take a real step forward this year – this is his age 27 season, and 27 is still the most common peak age for a hitter. But the Royals don’t need Butler to take a step forward. They just need him to be himself. That’s plenty good enough.

#12: Jeremy Guthrie

It’s hard to evaluate a pitching coach after just one season, but between his work with Collins and with Guthrie, Eiland certainly earned his keep last year. Guthrie was broken when the Royals got him last year. Eiland said it would take a couple of starts to work out the problems with his delivery, and sure enough, he got rocked in his first two starts with the Royals. From that point on, he had a 2.34 ERA in 81 innings.

Of the four starters the Royals are really counting on, Guthrie strikes me as the guy with the smallest difference between his floor and his ceiling in terms of his skill set. Last year was screwed up by his Colorado Experience, but from 2007 to 2011, his xFIPs read 4.18, 4.48, 5.13, 4.60, and 4.47. He’s a low-walk, low-strikeout pitcher, which limits his downside and his upside.

But it also makes him more dependent on his defense than the average pitcher, because more balls are going to be put in play against him. He has maintained below-average BABIPs throughout his career; his career mark is .278, and excepting his time with the Rockies, since 2007 he’s never had a mark above .286. After 1200 innings, it’s reasonable to suggest that his below-average BABIPs are a real skill. At the same time, if he has anomalous year where his BABIP is .320, he gives up so much contact that he could get slaughtered. So while his skill set is stable, the end results may not be.

I continue to think that Bronson Arroyo is a really good comp for Guthrie. Since 2005, Arroyo has a 15.2% strikeout rate, to Guthrie’s 14.2%, but Arroyo has spent almost all that time facing pitchers in the NL. Their walk rates are similar (5.9% for Arroyo, 6.7% for Guthrie), as are their home run rates (1.29 HR/9 for Arroyo, 1.26 HR/9 for Guthrie), their groundball rates (40.2% for Arroyo, 40.6% for Guthrie), and their BABIPs (.283 for Arroyo, .278 for Guthrie). And the end results are about the same (4.14 ERA for Arroyo, 4.28 for Guthrie). One big difference: Arroyo’s fastball has averaged between 87 and 89 mph for most of his career. Guthrie’s fastball has been 92-93 mph his entire career, and showed no hint of a decline last year, coming in at 92.6.

Neither pitcher is going to excite a fan base, but they both have value because they provide league-average innings in bulk. Arroyo has made 32+ starts for eight years running, and Guthrie has averaged 30 starts a season over the past six years – his own streak of 32+ starts was snapped only because he was shell-shocked by Coors Field.

After the 2010 season, the off-season before he turned 34, Arroyo signed a 3-year deal with the Reds for $35 million (but with a lot of deferred money). This winter, at the same age, Guthrie got 3 years/$25 million. If you believe that last year’s carnage was entirely explained by the altitude, then Guthrie’s not overpaid. Though looking at the way the market shook out, they probably didn’t need to guarantee him that third year.

In the first year of his deal, Arroyo pitched about as well as he usually does – except he surrendered a whopping 46 home runs in 199 innings, leading the NL in runs allowed with a 5.07 ERA. But last year he bounced back as if nothing had happened, throwing 202 innings, walking just 35 batters, with a very solid 3.74 ERA. If Guthrie follows the same path, I think we can expect him to be durable and to maintain his skill set for the bulk of his contract – but the vagaries of the batted ball means at least one of his three years is going to be a stinker.

#11: Alcides Escobar

One of the reasons why I am reasonably optimistic about the Royals’ performance this season – certainly more optimistic than the consensus – is that there just aren’t a lot of guys on the roster who are likely to be significantly worse than they were last year. On the offensive side of things, Escobar is the most likely to decline, and even in his case I expect the decline to be modest.

Escobar’s batting average has gone from .235 to .254 to .293 over the last three years, despite no real change in his home run or strikeout rates (last year his strikeout rate actually jumped along with his batting average). The difference stems from his BABIP, which has climbed from .264 to .285 to .344. Now, here’s the thing: hitters have much more control on BABIP than pitchers do, so we can’t simply chalk up an 80-point jump in his BABIP to randomness.

But if it’s not randomness, than what is responsible for the jump? And which number is most reflective of Escobar’s abilities? To answer those questions, I searched for a formula that would project Escobar’s BABIP based on his inherent skills – most notably his rate of hitting line drives (which turn into hits 75% of the time) and pop-ups (which turn into outs 95% of the time). I unfortunately wasn’t savvy enough to figure out how to use the most sophisticated xBABIP calculators, but I was able to use this quick-and-dirty one, which projected these BABIPs for Escobar:

2010: .315

2011: .333

2012: .348

First off, Escobar has legitimately improved his ability to turn balls in play into hits. In 2011 he cut his pop-up rate in half, and in 2012 he increased his line-drive rate by 5%. That’s enough to move the needle a little. He also gets a bonus for his speed – his stolen bases climbed from 10 to 26 to 35, and the formula assumes that more stolen bases means more speed, which means beating out more infield singles. On the one hand, I’m not sure Escobar got faster so much as he learned how to use his speed better; on the other hand, he’s also become more proficient at bunting for a base hit:

2010: 3-for-10 (.300)

2011: 7-for-32 (.219)

2012: 11-for-27 (.408)

So some improvement should be expected. But the big take-home point is that last year’s BABIP was not the anomaly – his BABIPs in 2010 and 2011 were. If that’s the case, his .293 average may not be quite the outlier I thought it was. I still think he’s more of a .270-.280 hitter, unless he’s able to cut back on the strikeouts, but that’s still plenty good enough. (And let’s not forget: after Kevin Seitzer fixed his swing in 2011, Escobar hit .286/.323/.411 from June 7th onward. So he’s basically been a .290 hitter for his last 250 games.)

His offensive breakthrough last year allowed his defensive decline to fly under the radar. To the naked (non-scouting) eye, Escobar looked like a perfectly average shortstop last year, but not the defensive marvel he was in 2011 (particularly the first half). The defensive metrics are not that kind. Almost all metrics were in agreement that he was one of the best shortstops in the AL in 2011, but in 2012, their evaluations range from slightly below-average to well below-average.

The truth, as it usually is, is somewhere in between. He was a good shortstop; he just wasn’t the shortstop he was in 2011. He was only 25 and it might be a fluke, but analysis shows that defensively, players peak in their early 20s, which is to say they start declining in the field almost from the moment they reach the major leagues.

Regardless, Escobar was a more valuable player on the whole. He’s 26 years old and he’s under club control for the next five years at a total cost of under $21 million. He’s not Salvador Perez, but he’s a highly underrated asset.

Five For Friday: 3/15/13.

Eric Loes (@loeseric): How would you rank those in competition for the 5th spot as of right now? (Chen, Mendoza, Smith, Ventura)

I still think it’s a two-man race for the fifth starter’s spot, with Chen perhaps having a slight advantage. On the one hand, I think Mendoza is better suited for the long relief role; on the other hand, if Chen starts, Tim Collins might be the only left-hander in the pen. On a third hand, even if Chen relieves, that would leave the Royals without a left-handed pitcher who actually gets left-handed hitters out – both Chen and Collins have been more effective against right-handers in their careers.

I know Ned Yost mentioned Ventura’s name as one of the candidates for the job, but I have to think this is just a case of positive reinforcement for the kid, telling him that if he keeps doing his job that he’s on the fast track to the majors. I love Ventura, but he’s made six starts above A-ball in his career, and Allard Baird isn’t the GM anymore. He doesn’t even turn 22 until June. To start his service time clock would be foolish even in a case of extreme need, and the Royals don’t have an extreme need.

That leaves Will Smith, and let’s be frank…giving Will Smith the job because of a terrific spring training would be a thoroughly Royals move. He’s been fantastic in Arizona this year – in a grand total of seven innings. Smith has allowed more than a hit an inning at every stop since he got out of A-ball. Giving him the #5 spot would mean that the Royals would enter the year with Chen, Mendoza, and Hochevar all in their bullpen. That would be weird.

So barring a trade or an injury, my guess is that Chen’s the fifth starter, Mendoza’s the long man, Hochevar will be the short man in the middle innings (with a chance to move into a later role if he pitches well), and the seventh reliever is J.C. Gutierrez, who’s out of options. But I wouldn’t sleep on Donnie Joseph, who’s been fantastic this spring and would be the perfect compliment to Collins, as Joseph is death on left-handed hitters.

I give the Royals a lot of crap, but that’s actually a pretty damn nice pitching staff.

Jeff Crawford (@jdcraw82): Hosmer looks awful in the WBC. Please tell me not to be concerned.

I’m not going to tell you not to be concerned, because you have plenty of reason to be concerned. But the reason to be concerned is because Eric Hosmer hit .232/.304/.359 last year. Hosmer was below replacement-level last year – THAT’S why you should be concerned.

But concerned because he’s 4-for-21 in the WBC? Nah. Not any more than I’d be excited that he was 9-for-23 in spring training before he got an emergency phone call to report to Team USA the next morning.

Marshall Miller (@iammarshall913): If Royals are in contention near the trade deadline, do you think GMDM completely leverages the farm in another “win now” trade?

Not only do I think that Dayton Moore might completely leverage the farm at the trading deadline, I think that in the right circumstances, and for the right player, he absolutely should make another win-now trade.

I don’t have anything against trading prospects for established major league players. I had a very serious problem with the specifics of the James Shields trade, but the concept is sound, in the right situation.

As to what that situation is, well, I have some ideas that I may explore once the season gets underway. Let’s just say that if the Royals are in contention, and their right fielder isn’t hitting very well, there’s a player down in Miami that I’d be willing to move the sun and moon for. You know that Dave Dombrowski would love to get his hands on Giancarlo Stanton, and the Tigers and Marlins have a long history of making trades together. This is where the Royals could leverage their superior farm system to hand the Tigers the first of what we hope will be many defeats.

LM (@LDMalm): Is the front office allowing Kyle Zimmer to long toss?

Two years ago the Royals had developed a very strong reputation as one of the teams most resistant to the growing trend of extreme long-tossing (300 feet and up) among high school and college pitchers. This reputation had a lot to do with Mike Montgomery, who chafed at the restrictions the Royals had placed on his throwing.

But since then, a couple things have happened:

1) The Royals, from what I’ve been told and what has been reported publicly, have become much less resistant to the concept of long-tossing.

There’s a story of the Royals meeting with high school sensation Dylan Bundy a month before the draft in 2011. Here’s Albert Chen reporting in Sports Illustrated:

"They did not like Dylan throwing long toss," says Denver. "They were discussing the way he throws, how he shouldn't throw on a long arc. Dylan and I were sitting there, just listening. And then, at some point, Dylan just took over. He took over the whole conversation, talking about specific muscle groups, why he does what he does. Before the session was over, he was teaching them about how the shoulder really works. They were in awe."

The story makes it appear that the Royals are these unfrozen caveman lawyers who are frightened and confused by our modern pitching methods. But here’s the thing: the Royals were planning – hoping – to draft Bundy, to the point where they had a financial deal in place had he slipped to #5. That wouldn’t be the case if they hadn’t agreed to accommodate Bundy’s pitching regimen.

2) The Royals let Montgomery have his way and allowed him considerably more autonomy on his throwing program after he got off to a poor start in 2011. This did not, unfortunately, fix whatever it was that was ailing Montgomery.

The night before Chen’s column ran, I spoke for over two hours with Alan Jaeger, a pitching coach in California who is widely considered to be the guru and driving force of the long-toss movement. While criticizing the Royals for not agreeing with his methods in the past, he was also complimentary of the fact that the organization had become more open minded over the past year.

So while I haven’t heard anything specific about Kyle Zimmer this spring, I believe that the Royals are as accommodating of long-toss programs as any other team. They want to make sure their pitchers aren’t overdoing it, obviously. But I no longer have concerns that the Royals are behind the curve on this subject.

Greg Brokaw (@gregbrokaw): If no major injuries surface and the team is in contention in September, how worried are you that Ned will hold us back?

It’s a good question, because Yost’s tactical errors were a big part of his undoing in Milwaukee, and it takes a special kind of panic to fire your manager in September when you’re in a pennant race. Joe Sheehan has been riding me on this point all winter, telling me that even if the Royals are a contender this year that their manager is going to cost them wins with his tactical moves.

It’s certainly a concern of mine, but I do think Yost won’t hurt the Royals too much if only because the team he’s being handed is kind of a push-button roster. The Royals have four closer-caliber relievers in their bullpen, so even if Yost screws up by bring in the right-hander when he should bring in the left-hander, at least he’s bringing in a quality pitcher.

The biggest potential mistakes are these:

- Failing to recognize that Collins gets right-handers out better than left-handers, and using him as a LOOGY.

- Failing to recognize that Crow is quite vulnerable to left-handers, and leaving him in to pitch against them in crucial spots.

- Letting Hochevar pitch in important situations and/or with men on base before he’s proven he can be effective in relief.

- Riding Salvador Perez’s knees into the ground by starting him 145+ times behind the plate.

Beyond that…I mean, sure, he’ll probably let Francoeur bat when he shouldn’t, and he might bunt too much with Alcides Escobar, and he’ll pinch-run for Billy Butler and then lose Butler’s bat in extra innings. But those are the kinds of moves that every manager in baseball makes. If Yost can just avoid the big mistakes and be a perfectly mediocre game manager, the Royals can win with him.

It remains to be seen whether he can rise to the level of mediocrity.

Hochevar: It's A Relief.

Sorry for my absence last week; I was working on my big article for Grantland – hey, any time you get the chance to write that the Yankees are doomed, you have to take it – and then I had to prepare for my Stratomatic draft. Priorities, people.

It may be a little light over the next 2-3 weeks, as I’m due to take my Dermatology re-certification exam later this month. Fortunately, I only have to take the exam every 10 years; if I’m still writing on this blog the next time I have to take the exam, something’s probably gone wrong.

Anyway…so, Luke Hochevar.

Let’s get the negative out of the way first. Luke Hochevar, who has a 5.39 career ERA, who in five seasons as a starter has never had an ERA below 4.68 – something unprecedented in major league history – was tendered a contract by the Royals, on the expectation that he would be in their rotation this season.

They gave up the ghost on March 13th.

I know many of you think I’m an insufferably arrogant human being, possibly because I can be insufferably arrogant at times. And I know many of you think that all I do is bitch about the Royals, even though this blog started with 23 Reasons Why I’m Optimistic About The Royals, and I’ve been complimentary of such moves as signing Juan Cruz and signing Jeff Francoeur and trading for Jonathan Sanchez.

But tell me, guys, how would you react if for the past 20+ years, this was the story of your life?

Me: “I can’t believe the Royals did X. That makes no sense.”

Royals: “We know what we’re doing.”

Me: “No you don’t. Here are seven reasons why doing X hurts the team.”

Royals: “Trust us. We’re the professionals.”

Me: “Then why does a rank amateur like myself know that you’ve made a mistake?”

A few months pass.

Royals: “We have elected to reverse decision X. It’s no one’s fault. Sometimes things don’t work out in baseball.”

Me: “And sometimes things don’t work out because they were bad ideas to begin with.”

Royals: “Trust us. We’re the professionals.”

I’ve been having these conversations – admittedly one-sided, and in the early years, entirely in my head – with the Royals since 1989, when I was 14 years old. Here’s just a short list of the decisions the Royals have made which were clearly, unequivocally bad from the moment they were made, and whose badness was only made clear and more unequivocal by the passage of time.

1989: Signed Storm Davis

1992: Left Jeff Conine exposed in the Expansion Draft; protected David Howard and Bill Sampen

1993: Traded Gregg Jefferies for Felix Jose

1995: Traded David Cone for three magic beans

1997 & 1999: Rode Jose Rosado’s arm into the ground

2000: Traded Jeremy Giambi for Brett Laxton

2001: Traded Johnny Damon in order to get proven closer Roberto Hernandez

2002: Hired Tony Pena as manager instead of Buck Showalter

2002: Traded Jermaine Dye for Neifi Perez

2005: Left Jose Lima in the rotation all year (and paid him incentive bonuses of $1 million) to finish with a 6.99 ERA in 32 starts

2005: Hired Buddy Bell as manager instead of anyone else in the whole world

2007: Signed Jose Guillen to a 3-year deal so he could poison the clubhouse, apparently

2009: Traded for Yuniesky Betancourt

2009: Destroyed Gil Meche’s arm

2009: Declined Miguel Olivo’s option and released John Buck so they could sign Jason Kendall to a two-year deal for more money than Olivo and Buck combined

2011: Brought back Kyle Davies for $3.2 million even though he wasn’t good at his job

2012: Thought so much of the Yuniesky Betancourt Experience that they signed up for it again

This isn’t a listing of the Royals’ worst mistakes, mind you; only a listing of the ones that were inexplicable to anyone with common sense. I’m not including the Mark Davis signing, or the many, many, many draft mistakes they’ve made over the years.

Now, you’ll notice that most of these occurred under a different administration, and it’s not fair to blame Dayton Moore for something Herk Robinson did. On the other hand, the pace of these unforced errors doesn’t appear to have slowed down at all. I think Moore has done more things right than his two predecessors, particularly in the player development department, which is why the Royals are poised to have their best season since John Schuerholz left town. But he’s also good for a doozy at least once a year.

And now we have one more. In December, the Royals tendered Hochevar a contract for more money than he would possibly have gotten on the free agent market. They didn’t even try to play hardball with him, the way they did with their two other arbitration-eligible players, Felipe Paulino and Chris Getz, both of whom signed before the tender deadline for less money than they might have earned in arbitration, out of fear that they might get cut.

But in Hochevar’s case, the Royals not only had no intention of cutting him, they were very explicit to the media that they had no intention of cutting him, which of course destroyed all of their leverage.

Three months later, he was moved to the bullpen.

Yes, you can argue that at the time Hochevar was tendered, the Royals hadn’t yet traded for James Shields and Wade Davis. But that’s a diversion. The fact remains that for the money they’re paying Hochevar, the Royals could have found better starting pitchers on the free agent market. The fact remains that in the last five years, 108 pitchers have made 90 or more starts in the majors, and Hochevar ranks dead last among them with a 5.45 ERA. No one else is higher than 5.06.

(This is kind of an aside, but it’s too funny not to mention: if you lower the minimum to 70 starts, here are the three worst ERAs from 2008 to 2012: Brian Bannister (5.58), Luke Hochevar (5.45), and Kyle Davies (5.20). Royals Baseball!)

The Royals are saying all sorts of nice things about how this will free Hochevar to air it out for an inning or two, and how they don’t see him as a long reliever but as a genuine power arm that could pitch the seventh and eighth innings alongside Crow and Collins and Herrera. That’s, um, debatable. What’s not debatable is that a small-market team that has an incredibly deep pool of young, cheap relievers is paying Luke Hochevar $4.56 million to pitch middle relief.

What’s not debatable is that, assuming Bruce Chen wins the fifth starter’s role, Hochevar will be paid more in 2013 ($4.56 million) than the other six relievers in the bullpen combined (about $3.8 million).

And sometimes things don’t work out because they were bad ideas to begin with.

---

OK, we’ve dispensed with the negativity. Which is good, because I would much rather dwell on the positives of this decision, which are plenty. It may sound snarky to say that upon hearing the news, I felt a lot better about the Royals’ chances to make the playoffs this year – but it’s absolutely true.

Because look, as silly as it was for the Royals to bring Hochevar back as a starting pitcher this season, it would be MUCH MUCH MUCH more silly for them to backtrack on their decision in May or June, after he’s already put up a 7-spot in the box score a couple of times, than to do so in March. Moving Hochevar to the bullpen now puts egg on their faces, but it doesn’t put any losses in the standings.

In past years, the Royals would stubbornly send a starting pitcher out there every fifth day in the hopes that he would turn it around, whether it was Jose Lima in 2005 or Kyle Davies in 2011. But in past years, the Royals weren’t really playing for anything; there weren’t really any consequences. That was what made Hochevar’s return so frustrating: a team that was going all-in on 2013, that had gambled so many prospects on that proposition, was prepared to undo all of that just to prove a stubborn point about Luke.

The Royals are still putting a brave face up about him, as they should, publicly. But by making this move, they are in effect acknowledging that if they’re serious about winning this year, they have to stop sacrificing potential wins to prove a point. As a fan, it was easy to say “why I should take the Royals’ chances of winning seriously when the organization itself doesn’t?” By making this move, the organization is finally saying: we do.

So I give them credit for doing it. I didn’t think they had the guts to – I mean, in my very last column less than two weeks ago, I said that Hochevar almost certainly wouldn’t lose his job. “And if they cut bait with him now, they’d be admitting they made a mistake without even giving him the chance to prove it. The embarrassment that would cause makes it highly unlikely that they would do such a thing.”

Instead, they sucked it up and accepted the embarrassment. They knew that when they made this decision, they’d be mocked the way I mocked them in the first half of this column. It’s that fear of embarrassment that causes organizations – not just in baseball but all of sports – to double-down on bad decisions long after they’ve been proven wrong. (Matt Cassel, anyone?)

Every year in spring training, the Royals say that the better player will win the job, even though the winner appears to be a foregone conclusion. It’s not just the Royals – every team puts on the illusion of competition even though they’ve already made up their mind. And I (and lots of other people) honestly thought that was the situation here.

That’s why this decision is so potentially significant. The Royals have made it very clear that when they say the best pitcher will be named the fifth starter, they mean it. That gives them the credibility to say that whoever wins the job at second base, or backup catcher’s spot, or the last spot in the bullpen, really did win the job because they were perceived to be the best player for it, and not just because the organization had already made up its mind and was too stubborn to change it.

Having said all that, the Royals haven’t gone far enough. Sparing us Hochevar’s 5+ ERA in the rotation is an enormous relief, but there’s no real evidence that he will pitch better in the bullpen, or at least better than Donnie Joseph or JC Gutierrez or Louis Coleman or whoever else would take that spot. Even when you apply the natural bump that pitchers get when they move to the bullpen, Hochevar’s looking at an ERA in the mid-4s. That probably deserves to be in a major league bullpen somewhere, just not for the money they’re paying him.

So yeah, you could argue that the best move for the Royals would be to just release him outright. And I’m not 100% convinced that they won’t. While the initial deadline to release a player and pay him just one-sixth his salary has passed, the final deadline is still two weeks away. If the Royals cut Hochevar by March 27th, they’ll owe him just under a quarter of his salary, about $1.1 million. By moving him to the bullpen now, they have two weeks to evaluate what they see. While I’m sure they’re not intending to cut him, if he handles the transition poorly, they have that option in their back pocket.

The other option is that they could trade him. I don’t think he has any trade value at his full salary, but I do think that if the Royals pick up a significant amount of his contract, he could be moved. Since they owe him $1.1 million anyway, let’s say they’re willing to pick up $2 million of his contract in a trade. Now another team might look at Hochevar and see a pitcher who, if nothing else, has made over 30 starts each of the last two years, a pitcher who is just 29 years old, who has the stuff and peripheral numbers of a #3 starter. The opportunity to acquire that pitcher for one year and $2.5 million dollars – along with the option to bring him back for one more year if he figures things out – might appeal to some teams.

No, not every team. Not most teams, honestly. But, say, the Colorado Rockies? Just maybe.

The Rockies have already been linked to Luke Hochevar this winter, although the reported rumor is that the Royals called them, not the other way around. But right now, the Rockies’ projected rotation is Jorge de la Rosa, Jhoulys Chacin, Drew Pomeranz, Juan Nicasio, and Jeff Francis. There aren’t a lot of rotations that Hochevar might improve, but that’s one of them. Then factor in that the Rockies…how do I put this nicely…don’t seem to know what they’re doing right now. Their front office is in disarray; I’m not even entirely sure who’s in charge. The Royals have already taken advantage of the Rockies’ poor decision making by acquiring Felipe Paulino for nothing and Jeremy Guthrie for less-than-nothing.

To you and me, it looks like no team could possibly have interest in Hochevar. But Hochevar’s trade value looks like Clayton Kershaw compared to where Jonathan Sanchez’s stock was last July, and the Royals were able to convince the Rockies to take a flyer on him.

There’s an added bonus to sending Hochevar to Colorado if you’re the Royals: it seems to me (and a lot of people) that the Royals don’t want to give up on him because they’re deathly afraid that they’ll let him go and he’ll figure it out somewhere else, and not only will they miss out, but they’ll like idiots for not fixing him themselves. Not to be cruel, but if you wanted to put a pitcher in a position where he was least likely to succeed and make you look foolish, um, wouldn’t you pick Colorado? Between the ballpark and the organization, Hochevar could have the best year of his career and still have a 5 ERA.

And if they’re able to convince the Rockies to take Hochevar and half his contract, and maybe even surrender a modest prospect in return, their decision to tender him that contract may yet be redeemed. After all, for all the inexplicable decisions the Royals have made over the last 20 years, few seemed as self-defeating as the decision to keep sending Sanchez out there last year to walk the ballpark and get pulled in the third inning every five days. I was adamant that he was never going to turn it around, and I was right. But the Royals found a way to be right as well, by finding a team even more oblivious to his suckitude than they were. If they can do it again with Hochevar, their decision to tender him will be explicable after all.

Even if they don’t, and they keep him around to pitch low-leverage innings, the worst he can do is turn a 6-3 game into a 10-3 laugher. Sure, I don’t want the Royals to throw away money. But I’d much rather that than to see them throw away games.

Five For Friday: 03/01/13.

Ca$h-Money. Maddog (@MadDogKiller): How bad of a spring does Hochevar have to have to get cut?

A really bad, no-good, awful, terrible spring. Mind you, it could happen. The Royals really don’t have a significant financial commitment with Hochevar – his salary isn’t guaranteed, and if he’s released before March 15th, he’s owed just one-sixth of his salary, less than $800,000. If he’s released after March 15th but before Opening Day, he’s owed a quarter of his salary, less than $1.2 million.

But the psychological commitment…that’s different. Contrary to how it seems sometimes, the Royals are quite aware of what people think about Hochevar. They are also aware that almost everyone thinks they’ve made a big mistake by retaining him at such a high salary – and by “everyone”, I don’t just mean fans, I mean most front offices. They know they’re bucking conventional wisdom here.

And if they cut bait with him now, they’d be admitting they made a mistake without even giving him the chance to prove it. The embarrassment that would cause makes it highly unlikely that they would do such a thing. The only scenario I could see that would earn him his release is if Hochevar’s stuff is qualitatively down this year – his velocity is gone, or he can’t throw strikes, something like that. Basically, the Royals would need an excuse – an excuse above and beyond the fact that he’s been a lousy pitcher for five years.

Once the season starts, things change. A bad first six weeks in the rotation might be enough to move him to the bullpen, if not off the team. The problem, of course, is that by that point his entire salary is guaranteed.

Sparksjay (@sparksjay): Anything about the Royals’ Spring Training start that has you adjusting the 86+/72- hopes for the season?

Is anyone seriously hurt? No? Then we’re still on course.

Seriously, there is very little that can happen in spring training that should adjust your expectations for an entire team, and most of what can happen is bad. Last year the Royals lost Joakim Soria for the entire season, and Salvador Perez for half the season, so we’re already ahead of the game there.

Every now and then a young player will show up to camp and impress the living daylights out of everyone. The problem is that for every Albert Pujols, there are ten Gary Scotts. Last year Danny Duffy showed some of the best stuff of any left-hander in baseball in March – and got me unduly excited – but that didn’t prevent him from blowing out his arm in May. (Although I still think it bodes well for him upon his return.)

So far, the only blip on this year’s radar screen is left-handed reliever Donnie Joseph, who has faced six batters and struck them all out. He has a chance to be an impact guy in the pen, but probably not until mid-season, and anyway you’re not going to change your projection for the team based on a middle reliever.

And as for the Royals’ 6-0-1 start…two years ago the Royals led all of baseball with a 20-11 record in spring training. They lost 91 games. In 1999 they led all of baseball with a 22-9 record in March. They lost 97 games.

Michael Buchanan (@ExtremeSquirrel): Does Adalberto Mondesi have the potential to become a top 10 MLB prospect?

Man, I could answer Adalberto Mondesi questions all day.

The short answer is: yes. Baseball Prospectus’ Jason Parks, who is admittedly Mondesi’s biggest fan among the prospect guru ranks, already has Mondesi ranked #58 overall. Remember: Mondesi 1) has played in 50 professional games and 2) is 17 years old. (He was the youngest player on BP’s Top 100 list.)

You might recall that when I wrote about Mondesi, I compared him to where Jurickson Profar was two years ago…and then had J.J. Picollo basically do the same thing. Well, on Twitter recently, Parks was asked what minor league player had the best chance of being the next Profar, and his answer was – Mondesi. So by those standards, Mondesi doesn’t have Top 10 potential – he has Top 1 potential.

He probably won’t get there, but he’s still a magnificent prospect, really unlike any prospect I’ve ever seen in the Royals’ system. He will probably open this season in Lexington, which would make him (to the best of my knowledge) the youngest Royal ever to play in a full-season league. If he makes it to Wilmington before the season ends, he will be the youngest Royal ever to reach that level. If he gets to Double-A before July of 2014, he would be the first 18-year-old Royal ever to reach that level. And so on.

Of course, he might struggle this year and get sent back down to short-season ball. He might have to repeat low-A ball next year, and not reach Wilmington until 2015.

In which case, he’ll still be 19 years old. Holy crap.

Nate Freiberg (@NateFreiberg): With the Royals thin at the corners, any chance Nady makes the team with that in mind? And does Endy have any shot over Dyson for 4th OF?

Barring injury, I would be shocked if either player makes the Opening Day roster. Nady is probably finished as a hitter, and Chavez is basically Jarrod Dyson in seven years. But I imagine that the Royals are hoping both players (and Willy Taveras, probably) are willing to accept a minor-league assignment when the season starts. Because as I mentioned in my last column, if any of the Royals’ corner players get hurt, they’re really down to Elliot Johnson as a replacement. If Nady goes to Omaha and rakes, he would actually be a viable call-up option if, say, Billy Butler goes on the DL and the Royals are desperate for DH at-bats.

This should terrify you, by the way.

David Hovey (@davidmhovey): I am a big Will Smith fan. Based on your past age discussions, would the Royals be wise to give him the #5 spot based on potential for improvement?

No. There is a very important distinction to be made here, which is that while age is an extremely important variable to consider for hitters, it is much less important for pitchers. A 20-year-old position player who is capable of being a league-average player in the major leagues is almost certain to improve significantly over time, and will probably become a star. For pitchers, that’s not the case. Just look at Rick Porcello.

Porcello is actually a good example of what is the most important variable for a pitcher’s longevity, which is his strikeout rate. As a rookie, Porcello had a very solid 3.96 ERA. But he struck out just 89 batters in 171 innings (or, if you prefer, a 12.4% strikeout rate), which is terrible. His strikeout rate has veeeerrrry slowly crept up – it was all the way to 13.7% last year – and he has yet to have a season as good as his first one.

Bill James put it this way many years ago (I’m paraphrasing): if you have to choose between a 37-year-old pitcher striking out 10 batters per nine innings, or a 27-year-old pitcher striking out 7 batters per nine innings, the 37-year-old will probably still be pitching in the majors when the 27-year-old has been forced into retirement. (The 37-year-old he was referring to was Nolan Ryan, so James was right.)

Compare Porcello to Ruben Tejada, who came up the year after and was mostly overmatched as a hitter – Tejada hit .213/.305/.282 as a 20-year-old middle infielder. Tejada wasn’t a dominant hitter in the minor leagues, mostly because he was so young for his level, and never made Baseball America’s Top 100 Prospect List (Porcello was #21 twice, the first time before he ever threw a professional pitch). Few people thought Tejada was going to amount to much (my Stratomatic opponents will vouch for the fact that I was one of the few). But as a 21-year-old sophomore, Tejada hit .284/.360/.335; last year he took over for Jose Reyes and hit .289/.333/.351 as the Mets’ starting shortstop. If he doesn’t improve any further, he’s a league-average shortstop, and at 23 he’s probably going to improve further.

All of this is my typically long-winded way of saying: no, Will Smith’s age doesn’t make me think that he’s going to improve significantly. If he starts striking out a batter an inning in Omaha this year, then we’ll talk.

Brent Saindon (@basaindon): Just curious: any plans to resume “The Baseball Show”?

I included this bonus question just because it’s an easy way for me to announce: The Baseball Show With Rany & Joe should make its triumphant return next week. With the unfortunate demise of Up And In: The Baseball Prospectus Podcast with Kevin Goldstein and Jason Parks, and ESPN’s Baseball Today with Eric Karabell, Keith Law, David Schoenfield, et al, we know many hard-core baseball fans are looking for their fix of sophisticated baseball discussion. So if you haven’t listened to what Will Leitch calls “my personal favorite baseball podcast”, I hope you give us a try next week.

2013 Opening Day Preview, Part 2.

Continuing our breakdown of the Opening Day roster…

#20: Elliot Johnson

I already broke down Johnson’s game here, so I won’t rehash it. While I don’t think Johnson’s performance is going to make or break the season, I think it’s fair to say that how much playing time he gets will be a pretty good gauge of how successful the Royals are this year. I imagine that the plan is that he’ll start once a week at various positions, maybe twice a week on occasion. That’s 30-40 starts, maybe 150 plate appearances. Maybe he gets 20-30 plate appearances as a pinch-hitter, or as a late-inning replacement, but really, he should max out at around 180 plate appearances. (With the Rays in 2011, he got 181.)

If Johnson gets more than that, most likely one of three things happened:

1) Alcides Escobar gets hurt, and the Royals elect not to bring up Christian Colon to fill in;

2) Another starter gets hurt, and the Royals have so little depth to fill in anywhere that Johnson is forced into duty;

3) The winner of the second base job tanked, the loser doesn’t impress anyone in Omaha, and they turn to Johnson out of desperation.

None of these scenarios are appealing. (2) is the most likely by far; if any Gordon or Francoeur or Moustakas or Hosmer or Butler get hurt, Johnson is going to see a lot of at-bats.

Now, that won’t necessarily happen. All five players are in their 20s, they all have a history of durability, and none of them went on the DL last year. But – and this is no knock against Johnson – if you told me right now that he winds up with less than 200 plate appearances this season, I’d feel a lot better about the possibility that the offense takes a big step forward.

Unless, you know, Johnson himself gets hurt, and we’re treated to a heaping dose of Miguel Tejada instead.

#19: Kelvin Herrera

As you know, I am overly fond of comps for young players, and many of these comps make no sense whatsoever in retrospect. But all last winter I said Kelvin Herrera was the new Rafael Betancourt, and – with one important caveat – you could drop Herrera’s rookie stat line into Betancourt’s career and no one could pick it out.

While their end results are the same, they get there in different ways. Both pitchers rely heavily on a fastball that they throw with pinpoint command, which is why they issue very few walks. (They both give out a fair number of intentional walks, but strip those aside, and Herrera walked 15 in 84 innings – 1.60 per nine – and Betancourt has walked 107 in 618 career innings – 1.56 per nine.) They both combine their control with strikeout stuff – Betancourt’s career rate is slightly higher than Herrera’s.

Both also have fairly large platoon splits; for his career, Betancourt has a .205/.230/.336 line against RHP, but .260/.323/.410 line against LHP. As a rookie, Herrera was .235/.268/.311 against RHP, and .275/.351/.392 against LHP. In Betancourt’s case, his susceptibility to left-handers kept him in a set-up role for most of his career, although he finally earned the closer’s role with the Rockies last year, at age 37, and did just fine.

While the results look the same, their repertoires are different. Betancourt’s main secondary pitch is a slider, and he tosses the occasional changeup. Herrera’s main off-speed pitch is his changeup, and he throws the occasional curveball. This is important because slider-centric pitchers tend to have big platoon splits; changeup- and curveball-centric pitchers tend to have small splits, if any split at all. One season is not nearly enough of a sample size to judge Herrera, so despite his relative struggles last year, there’s good reason to think that he will be able to get left-handers out going forward. Particularly since his changeup is nasty.

The one important caveat, and the reason why Herrera has potential above and beyond what Betancourt has accomplished, is that his fastball is qualitatively better than Betancourt’s. It’s much faster, for one; while Betancourt’s heater has registered in the 91-93 range throughout his career, Herrera averaged 97.4 mph on his fastball according to Pitch f/x, higher than any pitcher in baseball other than Aroldis Chapman last year.

And the other difference is that Herrera’s fastball sinks as much as Betancourt’s rises. Betancourt’s groundball percentage for his career is 30%, and was as low as 23% in 2006; both numbers are insanely low. Herrera, by contrast, was at 55.5% last year, which is Trevor Cahill/Tim Hudson sinker territory, only with a pitch coming in at 97 mph.

For his career, Betancourt has surrendered 65 homers in 618 innings; that’s not a bad ratio per se, but it’s the biggest weakness in his game. Herrera, by contrast, gave up only four home runs in 84 innings last year, and that’s not really a fluke. More impressively, he gave up all four home runs by April 21st. In his first 10.1 career innings, Herrera gave up five homers. Since then, he’s working on a streak of 76 innings without allowing one.

Despite his flyball tendencies, Betancourt’s command has made him a consistently effective, if not dominant reliever. He had one transcendent season, in which he was arguably the best reliever in baseball, in 2007 (79 innings, 51 hits, 6 UIBB, 1.47 ERA). He followed that with his only bad season in 2008 (5.07 ERA, thanks to 11 HR in 71 innings). Every other season of his career has been almost indistinguishable.

I think that bodes well for the consistency of Herrera’s skill set, only at a potentially higher level than Betancourt. The only real concern with Herrera is simply health; he missed almost all of 2009 and 2010 before the Royals made him a reliever, and making 76 appearances last season approached, if not crossed, the line of danger last season.

But if he’s healthy, he’s almost certain to be effective. Given the variability inherent to the role, that’s a rare trait for a reliever.

#18: Aaron Crow

Well, I guess Crow is a reliever for good now. If the Royals had known they were using the #12 pick in the draft – and giving a major-league contract to – a reliever, I wonder if they would have still taken him. (In fairness, I wanted Grant Green, who’s turned into the A’s version of Christian Colon, a perfectly useful bench guy who’s going to be stretched as an everyday player. Point, Dayton Moore.)

At least Crow’s a good reliever; he’s basically a slightly worse version of Herrera. Herrera averages 97.4 on the gun; Crow averages 94.7. Herrera’s groundball rate is 55.5%; Crow’s career rate is 52.5%. Herrera has substantially better command, possibly because Crow tries to get hitters to chase his slider, which does lead to more strikeouts.

That slider is the difference between the two. He threw it 39% of the time last year, which is an astonishing number for a breaking ball. As he’s gotten settled in the relief role, he’s become exclusively a two-pitch pitcher – he threw curveballs about 5% of the time, and exactly two changeups all of last year. Unlike Herrera, he’s earned his platoon split honestly – for his career, Crow’s line against RHP is .218/.298/.287, while against LHP it’s .257/.333/.424.

Having two right-handed set-up men with varying repertoires is an asset if Ned Yost knows how to use them. Despite last year’s splits, Crow is the guy to use when predominantly right-handed hitters are due up, while Herrera’s the guy to turn to when it’s mostly left-handers or switch-hitters coming.

If this is Crow’s permanent role now, it would be nice if the Royals take the bubble wrap off of him a bit. He threw just 62 innings as a rookie – he was battling a sore shoulder late in the year – and last year, despite pitching in 73 games, threw just 65 innings. Crow is five inches taller than Herrera, he’s three years older, and he’s trained as a starter – he should be the guy throwing 80-90 innings a season. Particularly with the improvements the Royals made to their rotation, increasing Crow’s workload would help insure that their big four relievers are the only ones who ever need to pitch in meaningful late inning situations.

#17: Luis Mendoza

If he was projected to pitch in any kind of meaningful role, Mendoza would rank a lot higher than this, because let’s be honest: we still don’t know what he is. Is he the journeyman AAAA pitcher who, through 2010, had pitched 84 innings in the majors and allowed 92 runs? Is he the pitcher who, in his last 17 starts of last season, averaged over 6 innings a start and had a 3.82 ERA with a pretty K/BB ratio of 74 to 28? And where does the 2011 Mendoza, who led the PCL in ERA but struck out just 81 batters in 144 innings, fit in the equation?

I don’t know. I do know that Mendoza’s impressive second-half performance coincided with learning a new cutter from Dave Eiland in late June, adding credence to the theory that his improvement was not simply random variation.

(Advanced data doesn’t really help here. Pitch f/x doesn’t even recognize his new pitch as a cutter – it lists it as a two-seam fastball. Mendoza threw his four-seam fastball over 70% of the time every year of his career until last season – last year, he threw it just 28% of the time, his “two-seamer” 40% of the time, and his slider, which he threw less than 10% of the time previously, was thrown 22% of the time. My guess is that his cutter is confusing their algorithms, and is getting classified as a two-seamer sometimes and as a slider other times.)

I also know that Mendoza is still only 29 – he’s six weeks younger than Luke Hochevar – and that he’s not even arbitration-eligible yet, and won’t be a free agent for four years. So I know that the Royals should have a lot of motivation to find out who he is.

But as it stands, right now he’s the team’s seventh starter, and is more than likely to spend the year in long relief. A year ago that made sense, because his OPS rose dramatically after his first time through the lineup – but his difficulty the second and third times through the lineup disappeared around the time he learned the cutter.

If it were me, Mendoza would start the year in the rotation, and get a month or two to prove whether he really can be a cheap league-average innings eater. If he lost the job to Bruce Chen, I’d argue that’s a defensible decision, and I’d credit the Royals for having enough depth that they didn’t need Mendoza in their rotation.

Instead, he’s going to lose his job to Hochevar. If the Royals are right, more power to them. If they’re wrong, they can’t claim that they didn’t have any better options.

#16: Greg Holland

I really don’t think enough has been made about how unlikely Greg Holland’s emergence as a dominant reliever was. Two years ago, he was a short right-hander with okay stuff and command issues, a former 10th-round pick who in five minor-league stops never had an ERA under five. I don’t have my 2011 copy of the Baseball America Prospect Handbook on me, but I’m pretty sure he didn’t even rank among the Royals’ top 30 prospects. He started 2011 in Omaha and didn’t get called up until mid-May.

He then pitched 60 innings, allowed 37 hits, walked 16 batters and struck out 74. He became the second Royal ever – after Robinson Tejada in 2009 – to have twice as many strikeouts as hits allowed.

It was one of the best middle-relief seasons in franchise history, but given his history we wanted to see him do it again. And when he got cuffed around in April, losing two games and allowing 13 hits and 8 runs in 6.1 innings, it looked like 2011 might have just been a wonderful outlier. But it turned out he was pitching through a strained ribcage muscle; he missed three weeks to let it heal, and when he came back was almost the same guy he was the year before.

2011, all season: 60 IP, 37 H, 16 UIBB, 74 K, 3 HR, 1.80 ERA

2012, May 12th-: 61 IP, 45 H, 26 UIBB, 81 K, 2 HR, 2.08 ERA

His command was not quite as sharp, but he still missed tons of bats. (While Holland’s K/9 ratio was a full point higher in 2012 than 2011, he actually struck out a slightly lower percentage of batters overall – 31.5% instead of 31.8%. But because he faced more batters per inning, he had more opportunities for strikeouts. This is one example of why I’m trying to switch over to strikeout percentage instead of strikeouts per inning.)

I didn’t see Holland pitch in the minor leagues, so I don’t know if he’s a fundamentally different pitcher now than then. He threw hard in the minors, but I wasn’t expecting an average fastball of 95.6 mph, which he’s maintained throughout his career. He has used a nasty splitter as an out pitch, although that can’t alone explain his success, as he throws it only about 5% of the time. (I’m approximating – Pitch f/x doesn’t recognize his splitter at all. I’m thinking the Pitch f/x people still need to tighten up their algorithms a little.)

It’s tough to reconcile the pitcher we’ve seen the last two years with the pitcher we were told about in the minor leagues. But the Greg Holland we’ve seen has legitimate closer stuff, and he’s done it two years in a row now, and at this point we can stop worrying about whether it was a fluke. Like Joakim Soria, Holland was an unexpected gift for the Royals’ bullpen.

The difference is that Soria was unexpected because no one had seen him pitch in so long, and it is to the Royals’ credit that they scouted him and thought he could jump straight from A-ball and the Mexican League to the majors. But in Holland’s case, everyone had seen him pitch, and no one was particularly impressed.

But this is where relievers come from. They come from humble beginnings, they come from the Northern League (Jeff Zimmerman) and from underneath (Dan Quisenberry) and they master a new pitch (Bruce Sutter) and they’re 28th-round picks who learn the perfect slider (Sergio Romo). Greg Holland’s transformation is small potatoes compared to, say, Jonny Venters. Relievers are comets that arrive unexpectedly, and disappear just as fast. Which is why, when you’ve got a superfluous one, you need to trade him right away.

The Royals never traded Soria because they never understood that when you’re losing 95 games a year, a great reliever is superfluous even when you don’t have a replacement. And they don’t seem at all eager to turn trade from their current depth of relievers. But they really should. A team that likely can’t find room for Donnie Joseph or Louis Coleman is a team that can afford to trade relievers for help elsewhere.