Tuesday, December 14, 2010

Kansas City Chiefs' Playoff Odds, Week 14.

The odds that we’ve already seen Zack Greinke’s last start in a Royals uniform, which were already better than 50/50, have gone up significantly in the wake of Cliff Lee’s decision to sign with the Mystery Team™, a possibility that was all but mocked until just hours before it was announced.

Lee signing with the Phillies has to be considered a positive for the Royals on the whole; the Phillies were never considered serious candidates for Greinke, while the Rangers and Yankees both were. Everyone expected the bridesmaid to turn their interest on Greinke; no one expected there to be two bridesmaids instead of one.

I am about 95% certain that the Royals will get a credible offer for Greinke in the coming days. I am much less than 95% certain that the Royals will actually pull the trigger on one. Moore has made it very clear that he isn’t simply looking for the most talent in a trade, but for the most talent that fits the needs of the organization going forward.

“There’s only a few organizations in baseball that match up with what we want if we were to trade a player like Zack Greinke,” Moore said. “It depends on what the club has in their system, and what matches up with what we need.”

“We now have a very realistic view of the timeline for many of our (young) players,” Moore said. “So, if we are to make a deal with any of our major-league talent, we know exactly what we need to try to get in return.”

My first reaction to reading this – and the first reaction for many of you, I’m sure – was, “Oh, no, here we go again.” Six years ago, Allard Baird made it clear that he prioritized getting a third baseman and a catcher for Carlos Beltran. He managed to fill the positions he wanted, landing Mark Teahen and John Buck, but he did so in the place of getting the most talent that was offered him. (There is strong circumstantial evidence that the Yankees offered Robinson Cano, for instance.)

At first glance, this smacks of the same thing: Moore feels like he needs specific positions filled (this time around, it’s up-the-middle talent), and will trade Greinke for the best package of talent that fits his presumed needs, rather than the best package of talent overall.

But it’s not quite that simple. For one thing, there actually is something to the notion that a team in the Royals’ position is better off focusing on specific needs rather than simply getting the best overall player. As Bill James wrote a quarter-century ago, there are two stages to any rebuilding project. Stage 1 is to get the most talent into the organization possible. Stage 2 is to arrange that talent into the framework of a major-league roster.

In 2004, the Royals were clearly still in Stage 1, which made Baird’s insistence on getting players to fill specific positions that much more maddening. The best thing you can say about the Moore administration is that, unlike their predecessors, they have completed Stage 1. They have the best farm system in baseball. As such, they have to start thinking about Stage 2 – if they want to compete in 2012, they have to actually put together a complete roster that can win. Acquiring another first baseman who can mash just isn’t going to help the team right now, not with Billy Butler and Kila Ka’aihue and Eric Hosmer. To a lesser extent, I don’t think the Royals need to target a top-tier left-handed starter. All things equal, I’d much rather the Royals acquire a shortstop or centerfielder than a first baseman.

But things are rarely equal, and in general, the Royals should always be looking for the most talent available. For one thing, there is a mechanism that teams can use to shape their roster when they have an excess of talent at one position and a dearth of talent at another. It’s called a trade. I’ve been writing for at least the past year that at some point, Moore is going to need to package some of expendable players to fill in the holes elsewhere. The most likely target would be Kila Ka’aihue, if he hits well next season and Eric Hosmer is ready, but the Royals also have a few extra second baseman they can afford to part with. If the Royals are blown away by an offer, they need to take it no matter what positions they fill, and work out the details later.

But the main reason I’m not that concerned about Moore’s comments – yet – is that unlike with Beltran, the Royals’ options aren’t simply to accept Trade Offer A or Trade Offer B. They have the option of simply keeping Greinke, which is an infinitely preferable choice than accepting a lowball offer.

So I read Moore’s comments to say, in order for the Royals to trade Greinke, they have to get a ton of talent AND that talent has to fit the mold of the team. If either requirement is not met, then they’ll simply hold onto him for now. They have a default option, and it’s a good one. Which is why, while I’m sure the Royals are willing to trade him, and would even prefer to trade him, I’m far from sure that they actually will.

- Moving to the other side of the Truman Sports Complex…for as badly as the Chiefs played on Sunday, they’re fortunate that their playoff situation looks as strong as it does. The Raiders’ loss to the Jaguars keeps Oakland on the fringes of the playoff picture, and the Jets loss at home to Miami makes some unlikely second-chance scenarios a little more likely.

The Chiefs’ playoff odds would have looked a lot better if the Ravens had not outlasted the Texans in overtime. A loss by the Ravens would have put them at 8-5, meaning that if they lost just two of their last three games (and their next two games are at home against the Saints, and on the road against Cleveland), they’d finish 9-7 and that would open up a wild-card spot for the Chiefs at 10-6.

But even so, the Chiefs’ wild-card aspirations are still alive should they not win the division. But it’s not a path I’d advise them to take.

The simple rules:

1) If the Chiefs win their last three games, they win the AFC West.

Pretty cut-and-dried. They’re still 8-5, thanks to the rule that says you’re only awarded one loss no matter how badly you get beaten. Win their last three, and the Chiefs are 11-5; the best the Chargers can finish is 10-6.

2) If the Chiefs win their next two games, then Oakland is eliminated from the division title.

The Raiders can not finish better than 9-7, so the moment the Chiefs get their tenth win, they eliminate the Raiders from winning the division. This may be important in that the Raiders may have nothing to play for in the season finale – other than the satisfaction of knocking their bitter rivals out of the playoffs, which ought to be motivation enough.

3) If the Chiefs win their next two games, their Magic Number for San Diego is 1.

By that, I mean that if the Chiefs beat St. Louis and Tennessee in the next two weeks, then if San Diego loses either of their next two games, then the Chiefs will have clinched the division before they play in Week 17. It’s important to remember that while everyone thinks the Chargers are in the driver’s seat because of their schedule – and they are, given that they host the 49ers next week, then finish on the road in Cincinnati and Denver – the Chargers can’t afford to slip up even once.

4) If the Chiefs win two of their last three games, the Chargers win the division if they win out.

In this case, both teams finish 10-6, and there is no scenario in which the Chiefs could win the tiebreaker between the teams. They each won one game head-to-head, and both teams will have a 3-3 in-division record (unless KC’s loss comes against Oakland, in which case they’ll be just 2-4 in the division).

The third tie-breaker is record in common games. The Chargers and Chiefs play very similar schedules; they have 14 of 16 games in common. The difference is that the Chiefs play Cleveland and Buffalo, while San Diego plays New England and Cincinnati. Owing to the fact that the Chiefs beat both the Browns and Bills, while the Chargers lost to the Patriots, then if both teams finish 10-6, the Chiefs will be 8-6 in common games, the Chargers 9-5, and the Chargers will be awarded the division.

5) If the Chiefs finish 10-6 and do not win the division, they may still qualify for the wild card IF EITHER the Jets or Ravens lose their last three games.

This might sound unlikely, but it’s considerably likelier than it was this time last week, owing to the Jets loss at home to the Dolphins. If the Jets or Ravens lose their last three games, they’ll finish 9-7, opening up a wild-card spot to a 10-6 team. (Remember, the Chiefs would also lose tiebreakers to both teams if they each finish 10-6.)

The odds that the Ravens lose their last three games – vs. New Orleans, at Cleveland, vs. Cincinnati – are pretty remote. But the Jets?

For one thing, the Jets aren’t that good to begin with. They’re 9-4 but have only outscored their opponents by 31 points; they had a three-game stretch where they beat the Lions and Browns in overtime, then scored the game-winning touchdown against a porous Texans defense with 10 seconds left. They just lost to Miami at home, and the week before that they were waxed 45-3 in New England.

Then there’s their schedule: at Pittsburgh, at Chicago, vs. Buffalo. Ignore the last game for a moment; the odds that they lose each of their next two games are very high. That would put the Jets, after starting 9-2, on a four-game losing streak and in danger of missing the playoffs. This is a team that just suspended a coach for the rest of the season for deliberately sticking his knee out to trip an opposing player. The danger is here for a complete team meltdown headed into their last game, against a Buffalo team that is a hell of a lot better than their 3-10 record suggests – particularly since Ryan Fitzpatrick took over at quarterback.

It’s still a pretty unlikely scenario. But after what happened in 2006, I’m committed to accounting for all possibilities.

However, even if the Jets or Ravens lose their last three games, the Chiefs are not guaranteed to make the playoffs with a 10-6 record. To clinch a playoff spot, they would also need:

a) EITHER the Jaguars or Colts to lose one of their last two games.

The Jags and Colts play this weekend. If Jacksonville wins, then the Chiefs have nothing to fear from this division; the Colts can finish no better than 9-7. However, IF Indianapolis wins, and IF both teams then win out, both the Jaguars and Colts will finish 10-6.

In that case, if the Colts win the division, then the Chiefs would win a tiebreaker with Jacksonville owing to their head-to-head record. If the Jaguars win the division, the Chiefs lose a tiebreaker for the same reason.

If I’m looking at my spreadsheet correctly, then it appears that the Colts would win the division based on a better record in common games. If that’s the case, then I’m 99% sure that the Chiefs have nothing to fear from the AFC South no matter what happens. I’m just putting this out there in case someone else is doing the math and thinks I’m wrong.

b) The Dolphins lose one of their last three games.

If the Dolphins win out, they will finish 10-6. If the Dolphins and Chiefs both finish 10-6, then the Dolphins will win the tiebreaker based on in-conference record unless the Chiefs’ one remaining loss occurs this weekend in St. Louis. In that case, we’d have to move to the fourth tiebreaker, Strength of Victory, and right now I’m sure you’re even less interested in learning who wins that tiebreaker than I am in figuring it out.

The Dolphins host Buffalo and Detroit the next two weeks, meaning they could easily go into their final game 9-6 – on the road against the Patriots, who will probably have wrapped up the #1 seed and have nothing to play for. The Dolphins, then, may be the team most poised to gain if the Jets collapse down the stretch.

So there you have it. If the Chiefs win their next three games, or if the Chargers slip up somewhere, the math is easy. But just in case, root like heck against the Jets, and maybe against the Dolphins too.

Francoeur's Folly.

Before I get to the Chiefs, I have to say a few words about the Greinke situation in light of Cliff Lee’s shocking decision to head to Philly.

But before I get to Greinke, I can’t let what happened yesterday pass unnoticed.

Jeff Francoeur was officially introduced as a member of the Kansas City Royals yesterday. Nothing unexpected happened at the press conference – everything was warm and fuzzy, Francoeur talked about how excited he was to be a part of the organization and how he wanted to stay long-term, and everything was rainbows and sunshine. Which is how it’s supposed to be.

But buried at the bottom of this article at MLB.com was an utterly mind-blowing quote from Francoeur:

“When you get there, it’s so much fun that you want to get back. I remember during the World Series hearing guys like Cal Ripken saying, ‘I never got to play in a World Series,’ and he played for 18 or 19 years…I was very humbled by the opportunity.”

I read this last night before going to bed, and my mind was officially blown. It took until this morning to recover. And now that I’m writing about it…the quote has disappeared from the article.

I was worried I dreamt it, and took to Twitter to see if anyone else had seen the same thing. Steven St. John at 810 WHB immediately responded to say that he had read the same quote, and then intrepid follower @ashleylat found an echo of the quote online, at Forbes.com of all places. You can find it here, assuming it hasn’t been scrubbed by the time you read this.

So I have no choice but to believe that Jeff Francoeur claims Cal Ripken told him that he (Ripken) never played in the World Series. Even though millions of people, Baseball Reference, and presumably Ripken himself remember that the Baltimore Orioles, with Ripken at shortstop, won the 1983 World Series.

I think we may have figured out what’s wrong with Francoeur. We have to at least entertain the possibility that he’s deaf. And based on his infamous “If on-base percentage is so important, then why don't they put it up on the scoreboard?” quote, we have to at least entertain the possibility that he’s blind as well.

Poor Kevin Seitzer. In order to fix Francoeur, he can’t simply be a miracle worker. Apparently, he has to be The Miracle Worker.

(Addendum: Just in case it's not clear, I'm just having a bit of fun at Francoeur's expense. If Francoeur misheard Ripken, that's hardly the worst sin in the world - the World Series is a zoo and I'm sure he talked to a lot of people. And as Craig Brown pointed out to me, it's not like Francoeur would have first-hand knowledge of this - he wasn't born until a few months after the World Series ended.)

Friday, December 10, 2010

Francoeur Comes Home.

I’m sorry, guys. This is all my fault.

I mean, who am I to criticize Dayton Moore for finally doing something that I agitated for 18 months ago? I thought Jeff Francoeur was a risk worth taking then; how can I fault Moore for taking that risk now?

In my defense, that was more than 800 plate appearances (and more than 550 outs) ago. When Francoeur was wearing out his welcome in Atlanta, he was a 25-year-old outfielder just two years removed from a .293/.338/.444, Gold Glove-winning season. When he takes the field next April, he’ll be 27, and his last non-awful season will be four years in the past.

You know what? I’m not taking the blame for this. Dayton Moore and Jeff Francoeur was an inevitability from Day One. A charismatic ex-Brave? Someone Moore had a good personal relationship with in Atlanta? Great tools? No plate discipline? Lots of RBIs? A low OBP? Pleeze. The wonder isn’t that Moore and Francoeur are reunited. The wonder is that it took this long. The only thing this union is missing to make it the quintessential Dayton Moore transaction is a mutual option. Wait, what’s that?

But while I’m certainly less optimistic about Francoeur’s potential upside today than I was in June, 2009, at the same time I think this signing is so easy to mock – Bad Major League GM Signs Bad Major League Outfielder (That He Once Signed Out Of High School) – that it’s getting a bad rap. Or at least, a worse rap than it deserves.

For one thing, it’s a one-year deal. One year, everyone, along with that ridiculous and generally meaningless mutual option that Moore loves. (As an aside: have the Royals actually kept a single player on one of those mutual options? Miguel Olivo, maybe?) Judging from the Royals’ blogosphere, fans were fully expecting Moore to give Francoeur two or even three guaranteed years, at five or seven million dollars per. Instead, Frenchy is guaranteed just $2.5 million.

Nonetheless, the blogosphere is in open revolt. Over at Royals Review, they had to start an overflow thread after the original post generated over 800 comments. People are not happy about this.

Nor should they be. But neither should they be going completely apesh*t over it either. For some people, this is the straw that broke the camel’s back. But it’s still a straw – it’s not an anvil.

The Cliff’s Notes on Francoeur, again: promoted to the majors in the middle of the 2005 season, at the age of 21, and was the phenom of phenoms – he was on the cover of Sports Illustrated inside of two months. He swung at everything, but no one cared, because he could hit for average, hit for power, catch everything, and had an arm like you wouldn’t believe.

In 2006 and 2007 he still suffered from a low OBP, but contributed in enough other ways – decent power, very good defense, didn’t miss a single game either year – that he was still a valuable player overall. In 2007 he drew 42 walks. He was still just 23. The following spring, Joe Sheehan and I wrote some fantasy baseball columns for Sports Illustrated, and working independently, we both listed Francoeur as one of our breakout candidates. (Trust me, Joe and I don’t agree on players all that often.)

And since then – complete meltdown. Beyond awful in 2008, to the point where he was sent to Double-A for a few games. Even worse in 2009 until the Braves dumped him on the Mets for Ryan Church. Francoeur had a nice, batting-average-assisted half-season with New York, then in 2010 went back to hitting .250 with no walks and mediocre power.

As Matt Klaassen cannily noted, over the past three seasons, Francoeur has been the fourth-worst everyday hitter in the major leagues. He will be just the third-worst hitter on the Royals, though, as two of the three players below him in the standings are Yuniesky Betancourt and Jason Kendall.

There’s no way to sugarcoat it – over the past three years, Francoeur has sucked. And as a rule of thumb, the simplest way to predict the future is to assume it will resemble the past.

But baseball is not simple. Players are not stat-generating robots; they improve and regress, break out and fall apart. The fact that Francoeur has hit .256/.301/.389 over the last three seasons does not mean that he’s going to hit .256/.301/.389 going forward, just as the fact that he hit .280/.319/.463 in his first three seasons (at the age of 21-23, mind you) didn’t guarantee that he would maintain that performance.

Maybe I’m giving Dayton Moore too much credit, but I feel quite confident in saying that if Moore knew for a fact that Francoeur would hit .256/.301/.389 with the Royals, he wouldn’t have signed him. This signing, then, is based on the expectation that Francoeur will improve. Which he might. He’s not Jose Guillen, signed to a long-term contract at 32, which anecdotally seems to be the most common age for good-not-great hitters to fall off a cliff. Francoeur will be just 27, which is the most common age for players to have the best season of their career.

And, again: it’s a one-year deal. The costs of any player acquisition can be divided into three parts: players, money, and opportunity. In terms of players, the Royals didn’t trade for Francoeur, and they don’t lose any draft picks by signing him. In terms of money, committing $2.5 million to Francoeur simply isn’t enough to inhibit the Royals from making any other move. Maybe I’m giving Moore too much credit, but I can’t foresee a situation in which the Royals find themselves unable to sign Player X, or offer Player Y a long-term contract, or trade for Player Z, because they spent $2.5 million on Jeff Francoeur. If that money wasn’t spent on Francoeur, it would have sat in a brokerage firm earning an annual Wal-Mart dividend.

In terms of opportunity: it’s a one-year deal. Francoeur is guaranteed a roster spot for 2011 – and as deep as the farm system is, the Royals don’t have any premier outfield prospects who might have a claim on that spot. This is nothing like the Mike Jacobs trade, when the Royals buried Kila Ka’aihue in Triple-A.

One of the complaints I’ve read about this deal is that it blocks David Lough from starting in the majors next season. As far as I’m concerned, that’s a good thing. I like Lough a lot, and think he has a chance to be an everyday outfielder in the majors. But Lough hit .280/.346/.437 in Omaha last year, hardly the numbers of someone who’s ready for a full-time job in the majors. (In 2008, Ka’aihue hit .314/.456/.628. Now that’s a player who was ready.)

The reason I’m so intrigued by Lough is that, after being an overly aggressive hitter throughout his minor league career, the light bulb suddenly went on in the middle of 2010. His career high in walks was 35, and in the first three months of 2010, he drew just 10 walks in 66 games. But from July 1st on, Lough drew 30 walks in just 54 games; after the All-Star Break he hit .316/.403/.462. If the improvement is real, he’s legit.

But the danger of letting him spend another half-season in Omaha to prove it was real is nothing compared to the danger of assuming it was real and starting him in right field on Opening Day. In general, I’m in full agreement with Moore’s philosophy that “it’s better to leave a player in the minor leagues for too long than to bring him up too early.” This philosophy was taken to an unhealthy extreme with Ka’aihue, but by and large it’s the right idea. You know who wasn’t left in the minor league for too long? Jeff Francoeur. Francoeur never played a day in Triple-A, and played just 102 games in Double-A when he was brought to Atlanta. He wasn’t exactly tearing the cover off the ball either – he was hitting .275/.322/.487 in Birmingham at the time.

If signing Francoeur accomplishes nothing else, it makes it easier for the Royals to avoid the temptation of bringing some of their players to the major leagues before they’re ready. There’s value in that. Maybe not $2.5 million worth of value, but it’s not negligible.

Then there’s the fact that, purely in terms of roster construction, Francoeur’s skill set fits the team pretty well. The Royals didn’t have a right-handed-hitting outfielder on their 40-man roster. (There’s also the fact that the outfield, as currently constructed, kinda sucks. In a rare moment of self-reflection, someone in the front office admitted as much. “Right now,” one club official said, “based on what our guys have accomplished, we might have the worst outfield in baseball. Now, I’m hoping those guys come through. They have potential, especially Gordon, but we don’t have much you can count on.”)

The only switch-hitter on the roster is Derrick Robinson, who’s not ready. So unless the Royals wanted to go with an all left-handed outfield, or bring up Robinson, or rush Paulo Orlando to the majors, or cross their fingers and hope Jordan Parraz doesn’t suck – they had to find a right-handed outfielder.

They could have traded for one – giving up some of their precious young talent for a stop-gap solution. Or they could sign one in free agency. The Royals wisely chose the latter.

As this article explains, the Royals were looking at no fewer than six options. One of them was Matt Diaz. I love Diaz, always have, and think that the decision to waive him after the 2005 season (the Braves swooped in and offered a nothing prospect to get him) might be the most underappreciated dumb move of Allard Baird’s career. But Diaz hit .250/.302/.438 last season. He turns 33 in March.

Diaz signed with the Pirates, for two years and $4.25 million. Given the opportunity cost – both years and dollars – I’d rather have Francoeur’s contract.

I’m not saying that Francoeur was their best option. (In particular, I’m curious to see what Austin Kearns signs for.) But the notion that signing Francoeur was some sort of calamity – sorry, guys, I’m not seeing it. Francoeur does, in fact, bring some skills to the table. He can hit lefties – he’s a lifetime .299/.343/.481 hitter against southpaws – and play defense. With the exception of 2008, he has graded out as an above-average right fielder; he has roughly average range, but still has one of the best throwing arms in the game. (He has thrown out at least 11 baserunners in every season of his career.)

The Royals, bless their heart, didn’t sign Francoeur to be a platoon player and defensive replacement. They signed Francoeur with the promise that he’ll get every opportunity to be an everyday player. Even for an outfield that their own front office admitted might be the worst in baseball, Francoeur might not be an improvement.

But he might be. He’s 27 years old. From the age of 21 to 23, he was an above-average outfielder. Is it really so ridiculous to suggest he might be able to bounce back? Is it really so ridiculous to give him a one-year contract to see if he can?

Frankly, I’m sort of fascinated to see what will happen. You all know what I think about Kevin Seitzer, and while it’s sort of a cliché to sign a bad hitter and say, “here, Kevin, you fix him,” I think it’s worth a gamble. Seitzer is criticized for emphasizing contact and line drives over power, but that misses the point, which is that what Seitzer also emphasizes is plate discipline. Two years ago, before Seitzer was hired, the Royals had one of the lowest walk totals by a major league team since World War II. Last season, with a bunch of retreads in the lineup for most of the year, the Royals finished a respectable 9th in the league in walks.

More than anything else, a lack of plate discipline has undermined Francoeur’s career. He’s being paired with a hitting coach that stresses plate discipline above almost all else. And he’s being paired with a hitting coach who isn’t afraid to make radical changes in a hitter’s approach. Many hitting coaches use a Hippocratic philosophy of “first, do no harm,” and only tinker with their hitters. One of the main criticisms of Seitzer is precisely because he’s not like that – he’s willing to take the chance of doing harm.

But in Francoeur’s case, there’s no risk of doing harm – he already sucks. Seitzer can hardly make Francoeur worse, but he might – just might – be able to make him better. Seitzer hasn’t had a real success story since Raul Ibanez, but then few players have been willing to surrender themselves to Seitzer’s approach the way Ibanez did.

Ibanez had nothing to lose – he was 29 years old, and his career numbers in the majors were .241/.295/.383. One off-season with Seitzer, and he hit .280/.353/.495 for the Royals in 2001 – his best numbers since he was playing in the California League. He’s been an above-average hitter ever since.

There’s a good chance that even after all his failures, Francoeur won’t surrender to the idea that his approach is broken and needs to be fixed. And even if he does, there’s a good chance that Seitzer won’t be able to fix him. But if he does and he does, well, the raw tools are there for Francoeur to return to being an above-average everyday player.

Which brings me to my main criticism of this contract, which is that while the downside for the Royals is limited, so is the upside. The mutual contract is silly; if Francoeur isn’t worth $4 million, the Royals will decline, and if he’s worth more than $4 million, Francoeur will. In the unlikely but very possible event that Francoeur can be fixed, and he hits .280/.340/.460 or something along those lines, with good defense, the Royals would have a very valuable commodity for 2012 – except that he won’t be under contract. This is a shame, and sort of defeats the purpose.

If Francoeur does rebound, then, the Royals will either have to pony up bigger bucks for an extension – and take the risk that he regresses once again – or let him go. One factor to consider is that if Francoeur rebounds even a little, he’s got a good chance at being a Type B free agent next winter. It’s important to know that the formula the Elias Bureau uses to rank free agents was 1) designed in the 1980s and 2) bears only a passing resemblance to reality. Some of the categories that go into ranking hitters include at-bats (or plate appearances), homers, and RBIs. So according to Elias, Francoeur didn’t have an awful season in 2010; he batted nearly 500 times, hit 13 homers, and drove in 65 runs. This quirk in the system may net the Royals a draft pick, or at least raise Frenchy’s trade value in July.

It’s pretty clear that the Royals have given up on 2011. They traded DeJesus, they’re shopping for stopgap options, and they’re increasingly certain to trade Greinke. As a fan, this hurts – mostly the trading Greinke part. But as an analyst, it absolutely makes sense. The wave of talent coming up through the minors has a chance to be historic, in Royals history if not in major-league history.

If the Royals get a major talent haul for Greinke, then the amount of young talent they bring to the majors in 2012 and 2013 figures to compare with the great youth movements of our generation, like the 2008 Rays, like the 1992-94 Indians, like the 1991-95 Braves. Even if it winds up being a lesser youth movement, like the 2001-02 Twins, that should be enough to set the Royals up for years of contention. If Greinke winds up being the final, spectacular offering to the angry baseball idol that cursed the franchise so many years ago, his sacrifice will not have been in vain.

The problem is that people are getting tired of hearing about 2012, and it’s tempting for the Royals to try to find a way to have their cake and eat it to. They tried that in 2009, signing a bunch of stopgap veterans, and for 29 games it worked. It hasn’t worked since, nor should we expect it to.

The Mission 2012 mantra reminds me of the lightning scene in “Poltergeist”, where the kids count the time between seeing the lightning in a rain storm and hearing the thunder. At first they can count to five, indicating the lightning is still off in the distance – and then they can count to four, then three, and pretty soon their house is under attack. At first Mission 2012 was so far off in the distance that we didn’t even know when it would arrive – and then Moustakas and Hosmer started hitting, and then the Sinister Six all made it to Double-A, and suddenly you could see Mission 2012 in the distance. It’s still in the distance, and I know it feels like it’s never going to get here, but it’s getting closer. I promise.

And the Royals are acting accordingly. Two off-seasons ago, not seeing any young talent on the immediate horizon, Dayton Moore threw his money around like they were beads at Mardi Gras. Two years to Kyle Farnsworth here; two years for Willie Bloomquist there. Trade a reliever for Coco Crisp here; trade a reliever for Mike Jacobs there.

Last year, Moore let Miguel Olivo and John Buck out of their contracts, then signed Jason Kendall for two years – simultaneously hurting the team in 2010 and committing way too much money and playing time to a washed-up catcher in 2011.

This winter, Moore has again committed way too much money and playing time for a player in 2011 – but only 2011. He didn’t give out a two-year deal to Francoeur, and I strongly suspect he won’t be giving out a two-year deal to anyone else. It’s almost like he understands that he’s got all these prospects that are going to deserve a spot on the roster in 2012.

That’s the strangest criticism I’ve heard about Moore in all this – that signing Francoeur just proves that he’s so addicted to veteran players that he’s going to block the progress of all of the Royals’ top prospects when they’re ready. Maybe I’m giving Moore too much credit, but…come…on. Dayton Moore made his bones in drafting and developing players. He’s spent the last four-plus years drafting and developing players – his players. It’s one thing for him to not show faith in the prospects he inherited, like Ka’aihue and Mike Aviles. But does anyone really think that he’s going to make excuses not to bring up Moustakas when he’s ready? That he’s going to bury Eric Hosmer? That he’ll trade away Mike Montgomery for a shiny object?

In the same week where the Rockies signed Ty Wigginton to a two-year deal for $8 million, and the Pirates gave Kevin Correia a two-year deal for $8 million, and the White Sox gave A.J. Pierzynski a two-year for $8 million, getting angry over a 1-year, $2.5 million contract for anybody is sort of silly. The Mariners just signed Miguel Olivo for two years and $7 million, which is especially ridiculous given that they could have bought his option from the Rockies (as the Blue Jays did), exercised the option, and only had to commit $3 million for one year.

But the Royals’ signing of Francoeur gets more derision than any of those moves, because it’s Jeff Freaking Francoeur, and because it’s Dayton Freaking Moore.

Maybe I’m giving Moore too much credit. Maybe, as Sheehan tweeted, I have Stockholm Syndrome. But from where I sit, this move isn’t remotely as bad as most Royals fans think. Even if, thanks to the lack of a true option, it’s not nearly as good as Dayton Moore thinks.

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Copy and paste everything above, and you can skip what I’m about to write regarding Melky Cabrera. The Royals have signed Cabrera to a one-year, $1.25 million contract with incentives. Cabrera, like Francoeur, was never able to build on his early promise. As a 21-year-old rookie for the Yankees in 2006, Cabrera hit .280/.360/.391. At the end of that season, given his age, defensive versatility, and on-base ability, he was quietly one of the more valuable young commodities around.

It never came together for him; he regressed over the next two seasons, although in 2009 he rebounded to hit a respectable .274/.336/.416. He was the starting centerfielder on a world championship team, and was just 24 years old. But the Yankees being the Yankees, they could do better, and they did – they traded for Curtis Granderson, and sent Cabrera packing as part of the Javier Vazquez trade with Atlanta.

The only part of the last paragraph that matters, apparently, is the last word. Cabrera, like Francoeur, and like so many others before him, is an EX-BRAVE! So naturally this is just Moore being Moore, and so it must be an awful move. Never mind that Moore tried to trade for Cabrera four years ago, and succeeded – the Yankees were willing to trade him for Reggie Sanders before Sanders received his Injury-of-the-Month Club selection in the mail.

I guess it doesn’t matter that Cabrera is still just 26 years old. He might take playing time away from Mitch Maier! Never mind that Cabrera is MORE THAN TWO YEARS YOUNGER than Maier. And never mind that his career line (.267/.328/.379) – IS BETTER THAN MAIER’S (.256/.330/.347). And never mind that Cabrera is a switch-hitter who can play all three outfield positions, and seems to be a roughly average fielder wherever he plays. And never mind that he’s making just $1.25 million.

Cabrera is an ex-Brave. And he was awful in 2010. So signing him is just proof that Dayton Moore has taken a step down from incompetence and has now entered the realm of parody. If you don’t believe me, click this.

I understand the temptation to rip Moore for everything he does. I may have even succumbed to this temptation a time or two myself. But come on, guys. The Royals just signed an incredibly versatile outfielder – hits both ways, plays all three outfield spots – who’s in his mid-20s, who’s been a slightly below-average hitter for most of his career – for $1.25 million. I don’t just like this move – I really like this move. It’s a small transaction, but the Royals just signed a good fourth outfielder for peanuts. And as with Francoeur, there is the small but real possibility that Cabrera re-discovers some of his early promise again.

It would be one thing if the Royals signed Cabrera with the intent of having him eat into Alex Gordon’s playing time. But it appears the Royals want to give Cabrera the chance to complete for the starting job in centerfield. This would cut into the chances that Jarrod Dyson starts in the majors – a very good thing, because even if you think that Dyson can be an everyday player in the majors, you can’t deny that he needs to show he can actually hit in Triple-A first. This might mean that Maier and Gregor Blanco will have to fight for a roster spot – and as I’ve argued since the Royals traded for Blanco, the two players have remarkably similar skill sets, so keeping both is kind of redundant anyway.

I like this signing a lot more than the Francoeur signing, both because Cabrera is only guaranteed half as much money, but also because Cabrera, by virtue of only having 4+ years of service time, is not a free agent at the end of 2011. If he does have a bounce-back year, the Royals can keep him for 2012 at a reasonable cost; if he doesn’t, they can cut him.

Combined, the Royals have guaranteed Francoeur and Cabrera $3.75 million in 2011. By coincidence, they’re paying Jason Kendall $3.75 million in 2011 by himself. They paid Jose Guillen more money than that after he was waived at the end of July. Barry Zito makes more money than that every seven starts or so. Kyle Farnsworth made more than that in each season of his two-year deal.

This isn’t the apocalypse, everyone. This is just the Royals taking a couple of one-year flyers on a couple of hitters who showed promise in their early 20s, and are still in their mid-20s. This is a chance to see what Seitzer, after years of being asked to reinvent a bunch of thirty-something hitters who weren’t that good in the first place, can get through to a couple of players who are old enough to have been humbled, but young enough to make adjustments.

Maybe I’m giving Moore too much credit. But if these are the two worst moves he makes this off-season, he’s had a hell of an off-season. I said before the Winter Meetings began that the best move the Royals could make was to do nothing at all. They didn’t do nothing, but they also didn’t do anything to disrupt the team beyond 2011. Mission 2012 is still on course.

Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Kansas City Chiefs' Playoff Odds, Week 13


Before we get into Chiefs mode, a few housekeeping items:

- For those of you who missed it, I wrote a guest column for my friend John Sickels at minorleagueball.com here. If you’re a die-hard Royals fan, you probably won’t learn anything new from this – but any time I’m offered the chance to gloat in front of a national audience, I’m inclined to take it.

- I’m glad I got my Carl Crawford column up on Saturday, because if it had gone up on Sunday, it would have been obsolete the moment it hit the web. The Jayson Werth contract was just that ridiculous. If Werth is worth 7 years at $18 million a year, it would be hard for anyone to argue if Crawford claims he’s worth 8 years at $22 million a year, or even more.

Of course, what Crawford is truly worth is simply what the market will bear, and the fact that the Nationals lost their mind for Werth doesn’t mean the same will happen with Crawford. But if this is indicative of what the free-agent market will be this winter, the Royals might be better off sitting it out. Sure, they’ll have money to burn in a year or two, but if they don’t like what’s available in free agency at that point, there’s a good chance they can simply trade a token prospect to a team that’s having buyer’s remorse, and get a useful but overpriced player with the old team footing some of the bill.

- As Matt Klaasen pointed out on Twitter, the Jayson Werth signing makes the timing of the David DeJesus trade even more suspect. For one, if the price of an everyday outfielder just went up, then the $6 million that DeJesus is owed for 2011 looks even more appealing today. And secondly, since none of the usual suspects signed Werth, that means one more team that would have been in the running for DeJesus’ services.

For instance, the Red Sox. Going into the winter, Boston looked like clear favorites to sign either Werth or Carl Crawford. But now, Werth is off the market, and they’re unlikely to chase the rising cost of Crawford (especially now that they’re trying to work out a long-term deal for Adrian Gonzalez.) We know that the Red Sox had interest in DeJesus last July. You don’t think that right now, if the Royals had held on to DeJesus, the Red Sox would be showing considerably more interest than they had a month ago?

There’s nothing wrong with a GM being decisive; Kenny Williams has made a living like that. But there is something wrong with a GM being decisive when he doesn’t have to be. There was nothing to be gained by trading DeJesus in November instead of in December or January. There was considerable opportunity to be lost. The Royals have Vinny Mazzaro and Justin Marks; they also have to wonder if they could have gotten more, if they had just shown some patience.

- When I appeared on the Baseball Prospectus Podcast to talk about the Royals 2 weeks ago – you can find that here – Kevin Goldstein asked me if I thought the Royals would trade Zack Greinke this winter. I put the odds at the time at around 20%, because I felt like the Royals had all the leverage in the situation, and they would only move him if they got him an overwhelming offer.

Today, I’d put those odds much higher, for two reasons. The first is that with the money that’s flying around this month, Greinke’s contract - $27 million for 2 years – looks even more enticing than ever. Depending on where Cliff Lee ends up, you’ll have at least one and possibly two of the Rangers/Yankees who will be looking for a fallback option, and Greinke for $27/2 looks considerably more appetizing after you’ve just offered Lee $120/5 and been turned down.

The second is that the number of media rumors hinting that Greinke wants out of Kansas City continues to go up. I don’t trust these rumors 100% - Greinke is a tough person to read, and he’s very private, and unless these rumors are coming straight from his mouth (which I doubt) then I’m inclined to take them with a huge grain of salt. The Royals would know better than anyone spreading these rumors whether their relationship with Greinke is salvageable or not. But there’s certainly a chance that it’s not, in which case he’s likely to go. I’d put the odds that he gets traded by Opening Day at 50/50, maybe a little higher depending on where Lee ends up and just how desperate the bridesmaids get.

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Sunday was a heck of a day for the Chiefs. They won, which wasn’t surprising; the Chargers lost; which was. And then Josh McDaniels was relieved of his duties in Denver, and given how many teams respond to their coach being fired with sudden, if short-lived, improvement (look at the Vikings post-Childress and the Cowboys post-Phillips), we can only hope that the Broncos respond the same way – given that they host the Raiders in two weeks and go to San Diego for the season finale.

As it stands, the Chiefs are 8-4, and hold a 1.5 game lead on the division with four games to go. Here’s what this means:

1) No matter what happens against the Chargers next week, the Chiefs control their own destiny.

That’s the most important thing to take away from this. If San Diego had won against Oakland, then a scenario was very much in play that had the Chiefs losing in San Diego, finishing their season with three wins and an 11-5 record – and missing the playoffs when the Chargers also finished 11-5 and had the tiebreaker in hand.

The Chargers’ loss eliminates the possibility of an 11-5 team missing the playoffs, at least in the AFC. Which no doubt makes Matt Cassel happy, seeing as how only one NFL team in history has missed the playoffs with an 11-5 record – and he was the quarterback of that team.

(In the NFC, though, all bets are off. The NFC West is so putrid that in each of the other three divisions, there are two teams that are 8-4 or better. One of those teams is guaranteed to miss the playoffs.)

If the Chiefs lose in San Diego, but win their final three games, they are guaranteed to win the division, and in fact are guaranteed to be at least the #3 seed. (They would be guaranteed to have a better record than the AFC South champion – the Jaguars, who lead the division, already have 5 losses, and they lost to the Chiefs head-to-head.)

2) The odds that the Chiefs qualify for the playoffs as a wild-card team, which were already tiny, are now infinitesimal.

Before, there was a chance that the Chiefs might finish 11-5 and lose the division, which would bring the wild-card into play. But now, for the Chiefs to not finish in first place in the AFC West, they would have to finish no better than 10-6. This could happen if they lose to the Chargers and then stumble against the Rams or Titans, while San Diego wins their last three.

In that case, the Chiefs have to hope that either the Ravens or the Jets finish no better than 9-7. Remember, the Chiefs lose almost all tiebreakers outside the division, because of their inferior in-conference record. (There are some scenarios in which, if the Chiefs lose to the Rams, they might win a tiebreaker against the Jets or Ravens, but those permutations are a little too complicated to get into right now.)

For the Ravens to finish 9-7, they’d have to lose three of their last four games, which include home games against New Orleans and Cincinnati, and play Houston and Cleveland on the road. None of those games are gimmes, but I expect them to at least split.

The Jets would have to lose their last four games in order to finish 9-7. Maybe their 45-3 ass-kicking on the foot of New England is fresh in my mind, but I actually wonder if this could happen. The Jets host Miami this week, then play the Steelers and Bears on the road. If they lose to the Dolphins, the chance of a major freefall is there – and then they finish at home against a feisty Buffalo team that is a hell of a lot better than their 2-10 record would indicate.

If the games break right next week, we can revisit these scenarios in more detail. For now, I’d focus on the division if I were you.

There’s two ways this can go. If the Chiefs beat San Diego, then it literally does not matter what happens against St. Louis in Tennessee. Even if the Chiefs lose to BOTH the Rams and Titans, if they beat the Raiders in the season finale, they will be 10-6, and both the Raiders and Chargers will have at least seven losses each.

Now if, like me, the memory of the home loss to the Raiders to close out the 1999 season, costing the Chiefs a playoff berth – because Pete Stoyanovich missed the game-winning field goal as time ran out, then Jon Baker started overtime by kicking out of bounds (his third time that day!) – you’d rather it didn’t have to come down to the final game. But if the Chiefs beat the Chargers, there’s a good chance that it won’t.

If the Chiefs win next week, then their Magic Number is 2 – any combination of Chiefs wins (vs. the Rams or Titans) or Raiders losses (vs. Jacksonville, Denver, and Indianapolis) that equals 2 or more, and the Chiefs will have clinched the AFC West before they kick off against Oakland. They might be playing for seeding, but they won’t be playing for their lives.

If the Chiefs lose to San Diego, they really need to run the table to be safe. If they beat Oakland, then a win against either St. Louis or Tennessee eliminates the Raiders. However, a loss against either team opens up the door for San Diego to win the division if they win their last three games. After playing the Chiefs, the Chargers host the 49ers, then finish on the road against the Bengals and Broncos – all very winnable games for them.

If the Chiefs lose to San Diego and Oakland, then they have to beat St. Louis and Tennessee, for starters. Then they have to hope that both Oakland and San Diego lose at least one of their other three games along the way. Which is certainly possible. We might, in fact, see a scenario in which the Chiefs lose in San Diego, take care of business against the Rams and Titans, and – if both the Chargers and Raiders lose one more game – the Chiefs will still have clinched the division before they take the field against Oakland.

In summary: beat San Diego and the division is yours for the taking. Lose to San Diego and the division is still yours for the taking; you just can’t afford any more screw-ups. That’s what a 1.5-game lead with four games to go does for you.


Saturday, December 4, 2010

My Winter Meetings Dream.


Granted that it’s a feeling not supported by any evidence at the moment, I have a feeling this is going to be one of the busier Winter Meetings we’ve seen in a while. MLB’s savvy decision to move up the various arbitration/non-tender deadlines means that teams have already made preliminary roster decisions, cleared the dead space on their roster, and dumped a bunch of players into the free-agent pool.

On top of that, it seems like a lot of teams have a ton of money burning a hole in their pocket. (Unemployment is still 10%, but the rich seem to be doing awfully well for themselves these days.) That’s a recipe for some big contracts, and hopefully some big trades as well. We’ve already seen some of the former (Victor Martinez, Adam Dunn), and today we saw one of the latter (Adrian Gonzalez).

The Royals enter the meetings with everyone’s favorite trade chit in Zack Greinke, and – particularly if they trade Greinke – a surprising amount of payroll space they can fill. Consider that the only major-league player under contract for 2012 is Joakim Soria, on a very team-friendly deal. (Noel Arguelles and Aaron Crow both have guaranteed contracts in 2012.) So there’s no particular reason why the Royals can’t be one of the most active teams in baseball this week.

I don’t think they will; I’m still not buying the national consensus that the Royals have to trade Greinke, or even that they will. I think that the Royals hold all the leverage here – if they don’t trade Greinke today, they still have the opportunity to trade him in July, 2011, or January, 2012, or even July, 2012 under the right circumstances.

Maybe I’m giving Dayton Moore too much credit here, but I only see the Royals trading Greinke for a monstrous package – one MLB-ready player with star potential, and at least two Grade A-/B+ caliber prospects. Could that happen? Given the dynamic of this year’s market, I think it could, particularly since both the Rangers and the Yankees have the prospects to make it happen, so whoever loses the Cliff Lee sweepstakes will have both the motivation and the talent to make it happen. But I still think the odds are 50/50 at best.

Nevertheless, I think the Royals should rock the baseball world and make the biggest transaction of the Winter Meetings. And I’m not referring to a Greinke trade.

I think the Royals should do whatever it takes – up to and including a seven-year, $140 million contract offer – to sign Carl Crawford.

Hear me out here. In the next 4000 words, I hope to convince you:

- That Carl Crawford is worth an enormous contract in general;
- That Crawford fits the Royals’ needs particularly well;
- That the Royals can afford him.

I probably won’t succeed. But it’s worth a try.

1) Carl Crawford is worth an enormous contract.

- A seven-year contract is a risk for any player, but Carl Crawford mitigates that risk more than any free agent on the market.

First, let’s point out the obvious: Carl Crawford is a hell of a player. His career line is .296/.337/.444, which includes his formative years from ages 20 to 22. Over the last six seasons, his line is .302/.347/.463. In five of the last six seasons, he has had an OPS+ of over 110. Last year was the best season of his career, as he hit .307/.356/.495 into the teeth of a league-wide offensive turndown.

His triple slash numbers are good, but they’re not $20-million-a-year good. However, they understate his value significantly, because they don’t incorporate his speed and defense, both of which are top of the line.

He has led the AL in steals four times in his career; he’s probably not as fast as he once was, but just two years ago he stole a career-high 60 bases, finishing second in the league to Jacoby Ellsbury. His 82% career success rate is outstanding.

Crawford is perhaps the best defensive left fielder in baseball. He won a Gold Glove this year, which is virtually unheard of for a left fielder – the Gold Gloves almost always go to center fielders. Gold Gloves mean almost nothing – but STATS’ Fielding Bible Awards do mean something, in that they’re voted on by people who actually pay attention to defense. Crawford finished second to Brett Gardner this year, which was an upset, given that Crawford had won three consecutive Fielding Bible Awards for left field – and only one Fielding Bible Award is given out to both leagues combined.

The fielding stats can’t agree as to whether Crawford’s defense is excellent (worth 10 runs a season) or spectacular (20 runs). Personally, I’m fine with either assessment.

Crawford is durable – he’s been on the DL just once in his career, I believe. He’s consistent – he’s had just one off-season (2008) in his career.

Add it all up, and he’s one of the best players in baseball. Per baseball-reference.com, Crawford was worth 4.8 Wins Above Replacement last year, and has averaged 3.7 WAR over the last seven years. Per Fangraphs, he was worth 6.9 WAR last year, and has averaged 4.6 WAR over the last seven years. (Fangraphs really, really likes his defense.)

Using the industry rule of thumb that one win is worth around $4.5 million, then depending on who you trust, Crawford was worth somewhere between $21 million and $27 million this past season. Even if he declines a little going forward, and even if we don’t see any salary inflation over the next few years, Crawford figures to be worth in the range of $18-20 million a season.

Most free agents decline, of course; that’s the curse of signing free agents. But then, most free agents are on the wrong side of 30, and as Royals fans know, there are few things more futile than hoping that the 31- or 32-year old outfielder your team just signed isn’t about to slow down. Jose Guillen might be the archetype of this phenomenon, but ask the Mets how they feel about Jason Bay. Ask the Rangers (or the Royals, or the Indians) how they feel about Juan Gonzalez. (And maybe, just maybe, ask the team that signs Jayson Werth how they feel in two or three years.)

Crawford, on the other hand, is just 29 years old, which isn’t terribly young for a free agent, but young enough that he should have at least a few years before his decline phase sets in.

Also, Crawford has the skill set of someone who should age very, very well. It’s an accepted bit of sabermetric wisdom that players with “old player’s skills” – hitters with low batting averages, but lots of walks and power – tend to age very quickly. (The seminal example of this was Alvin Davis; more recently, think Ben Grieve or Brad Wilkerson.) When the ability to lay off bad pitches and hit cripple pitches for power constitutes a player’s entire skill set, then even a slight loss of bat speed can be devastating. To a lesser extent, pure speed players – think Luis Polonia or Alex Cole – also do not age well, because once their legs go, so does their value.

The players who are most likely to maintain their value well into their 30s are players who mix both power and speed. Generally, as these players get older, they lose their speed, but compensate by developing their ability to pull pitches in their happy zone. The classic example of this would be Barry Bonds, but we’ll ignore him for obvious reasons.

Think Bobby Abreu, who had a long peak from ages 25 to 30 and then has gone through a very gentle decline since – last year, at age 36, he still managed a 119 OPS+. Or think Derek Jeter, who may be in decline now but had one of the best seasons of his career at age 35. Or think Eric Davis, one of the most electrifying power/speed players of my lifetime. Sadly, while Davis may have had 80 power and 80 speed, he had 90 fragility, to the point where he had to retire at age 32. But after two years away from the game, he came back at the age of 34 and was an absolute monster for three years.

Crawford is in a subclass of power/speed players, with true world-class speed but just average power. Besides Crawford, just 10 players in history have amassed 300+ steals and 100+ homers by the end of their age 30 season. I’ve divided them into two groups:

Group A

Roberto Alomar, Barry Bonds, Bobby Bonds, Rickey Henderson, Joe Morgan

Group B

Lou Brock, Cesar Cedeno, Marquis Grissom, Jimmy Rollins, Juan Samuel

The players are separated by their walk rate; the players in Group A walked more than 10% of the time, Group B walked less than 10% of the time. Group A, as you can see, has three Hall of Famers – likely to be four in a month – and Bobby Bonds. If you have an elite combination of power and speed and you walk a lot, well, you’re a superstar.

Group B consists of five guys who had power and speed, but who didn’t walk a lot, and consequently were never as good as they were perceived to be – and perhaps never as good as they could have been. Crawford happens to fall into Group B. But let’s look a little deeper.

Cedeno is a special case; he was one of the greatest young players of all time, but was always dogged by accusations that he didn’t give maximum effort, and suffered a severe injury mid-career – I want to say he broke his ankle – and was never the same player afterwards.

Samuel was a power/speed dynamo in his early years, but also swung at damn near everything – he led the NL in strikeouts each of his first four years. He had his last good season at age 26, although he was a great bench player into his mid-30s.

Marquis Grissom was never a great player – his power numbers benefited from coming up in the mid-90s – but he aged very well. At the age of 37, he was the everyday centerfielder for the Giants and hit .279/.323/.450, which is pretty much what he was doing in his mid-20s.

It’s too early to evaluate Jimmy Rollins yet; since he won the MVP award in 2007 he’s been in steady decline, but he’s also battled various injuries; it wouldn’t surprise me at all if he bounced back in 2011.

And that leaves Lou Brock, who I think is the most illuminating comparison to Crawford. Brock was an All-Star caliber player starting in 1964, when he was 25, but he didn’t walk very much in his 20s. In 1967, at the age of 28, Brock walked just 24 times all year despite leading the NL in at-bats.

But in 1969, at age 30, he set a then-career high with 50 walks. (The redefined strike zone no doubt helped.) And his walk totals continued to increase, to 60 the next year, and 76 the year after that. He maintained most of his newfound discipline through his mid-30s.

And Brock aged spectacularly well. His power disappeared in his 30s, but from 1971 to 1976, when he was 32 to 37 years old, Brock hit .306/.364/.399 – in the low-offense 1970s, remember – and averaged 71 steals a year. He posted an OPS+ of 107 or better each season.

The reason this is germane to Crawford is that, over the last two years, Crawford has quietly begun to add a dash of plate discipline to his game. Through 2008, his career high in walks was 37; the last two seasons he has walked 51 and 46 times. Whereas someone like Samuel had already allowed his free-swinging ways to undermine his career by his late 20s, Crawford has learned to control his aggression, and is a better player than ever.

In addition to his improving walk totals, there are other reasons to think Crawford will follow the Lou Brock career path instead of the path of the other guys in this group. Unlike Cedeno, he’s very durable; in eight full seasons in the majors, he’s played 150 games six times, and 143 games in a seventh season; only in 2008 (when he played 109 games) did he miss significant time. Unlike Grissom and Samuel and even Rollins, Crawford is a legitimately good hitter. Crawford has had an OPS+ of 110 or better five times in his career. Samuel and Rollins did that just once by age 30, Grissom twice.

Crawford is getting better – his OPS+ of 134 last season was a career high. And the kicker – this group consists of players with 300 SB and 100 HR after their age 30 season. But Crawford just finished his age 28 season. Only two other players in history – Rickey Henderson and Cesar Cedeno – had reached both plateaus by that age.

After all that, the player in recent history who I think is most comparable to Crawford is a player who just missed our cutoff (he had 263 steals and 120 homers by age 30.) It’s our old friend, Johnny Damon.

Damon was in the majors at age 21, Crawford at age 20. Both are very, very durable. Both are high-average, high-speed, moderate-power players. Crawford has been a better hitter – a lot more steals, a few more homers – than Damon in his 20s. Damon led the league in triples once; Crawford has done it four times. Damon struck out less. But really, they’re very similar players.

At least at the plate, Damon hasn’t surrendered anything to age. His speed has slowly evaporated, but his power has solidified, and he’s taking a few more walks in his old age. From the age of 29 to the age of 35 – the timeframe of a seven-year deal for Crawford – Damon hit .291/.363/.450 with an OPS+ of 110, and averaged 144 games a year. Factor in that Crawford is a slightly but clearly better player than Damon was at the same age, and those numbers look pretty good.

Seven years is a long time, and there’s a very real risk that Crawford will suffer a serious injury in Year One and whoever signs him will be stuck with one of The Worst Contracts Of All Time. But excepting the apocalyptic scenario, Crawford seems to be almost a certainty to contribute an above-average bat, and game-changing speed and defense, for the bulk of his contract.

Everything above makes Crawford a great signing for the Royals, but also makes him a great signing for any team.

2) Crawford fits the Royals’ needs particularly well.

For one thing, he fits the ballpark to a T.

Kauffman Stadium may no longer have the Astroturf of its heyday, but the ballpark plays very similar to the way it did in the 1970s – it’s a great park for speed, a lousy park for power, and neutral to offense overall. According to the Bill James Handbook, over the last three years Kauffman Stadium has reduced home runs by 19%, but increased batting average by 12 points, and increased triples by 36%.

Carl Crawford is a Kauffman Stadium kind of player. He might not hit 19 homers again like he did last year, but he’ll hit .300 every year, and ought to be good for double digits in triples. (And he’ll be the Royals most dangerous inside-the-park-homer threat since Willie Wilson.) The larger outfield in Kauffman Stadium also makes defense more important, and a huge amount of Crawford’s value is in his glove.

Among other weaknesses, the Royals in recent years haven’t taken advantage of their ballpark, probably due to their lack of speed. Over at Baseball Prospectus, Matt Swartz ranked the 30 major-league teams by the degree of their home-field advantage over the last three years, and the Royals had the fifth-smallest home-field advantage in the game. Crawford would help the Royals win anywhere; he would help them win even more at home.

And then there’s the fact that going forward, the Royals need defense more than offense.

The Royals have been a truly awful defensive team for most of the past decade, and as promising as their future looks overall, even if the rebuilding project pans out, defense is still going to be the team’s Achilles’ heel.

The ideal roster construction in 2013 would have, I suppose, an infield of Moustakas, Colon, Giavotella, and Hosmer, an outfield of Lough/Derrick Robinson/Brett Eibner, and Wil Myers catching. Or if you want good defense, you could move Myers to the outfield, replace Lough, and put Salvador Perez behind the plate.

With the exception of Hosmer, none of those infielders grade out as better than average. The outfield has more potential, but it’s very much a work in progress – Robinson is a second-tier prospect, and Eibner has yet to bat as a pro. If Jarrod Dyson turns into the second coming of Gary Pettis, it might not matter – but that’s still wishful thinking.

The Royals badly need a true plus defender somewhere in the field. Crawford is simply the best defensive left fielder in the game. With so much young pitching coming up, the Royals need to back them up with a defense they have confidence in. And remember: most of that young pitching is left-handed. That means most of the batters they’ll be facing are right-handed. Batters tend to pull the ball. That means a preponderance of balls headed to left field. Where Carl Crawford can catch them. The circle is complete.

Assuming Alex Gordon can adapt to right field – and physically there’s no reason he can’t – a Crawford/Blanco/Gordon outfield would be above-average. Or the Royals could go balls-out for defense, start Jarrod Dyson in center, and have one of the best defensive outfields in baseball.

3) The Royals can afford him.

Ah, yes. Cost. Can the Royals afford to pay one player – any player – close to a quarter of their entire payroll?

I say yes, and here’s why: if Mission 2012 is successful, the Royals are going to have somewhere between 16 and 20 players on their roster who are 0-3 guys – players who are not yet arbitration-eligible, and therefore making somewhere between $400,000 and $700,000 a year. Let’s split the difference – on Opening Day, 2013, the Royals will have 18 guys on their roster making somewhere around $10 million – combined.

That leaves only seven other spots to fill on their roster. The Royals had a $75 million payroll last year, so there’s no reason to think they can’t afford at least a $75 million payroll in 2013, if not more.

So let’s say the payroll is $75 million. That means the Royals will have $65 million to pay the other seven players. One of those players will probably be Joakim Soria, at $8 million. So that’s six roster spots to fill, and $57 million to play with. (Let’s make it $55 million to account for Crow’s and Arguelles’ contracts.)

In other words, the Royals are rapidly facing a situation where they almost have to spend big money on free agents, because if they miss the playoffs in 2013 by five games with a payroll of $25 million, there will be hell to pay. The advantage of having so many young players – so many cheap players – is that you have money to spend. But you have to spend the money. And if you’re going to spend it, spend it on an elite player. And there is perhaps no more elite player on the market this winter than Carl Crawford.

Put it this way: even if the Royals give Crawford $19 million a year, that still leaves them $36 million for the other five guys, an average of $7.2 million per player. The Royals absolutely can afford one elite, $15-million-plus player on their roster going forward.

And if the Royals are going to sign an elite free agent, they should probably target an outfielder. Pitchers are simply too unpredictable and too risky; even if you hit on them early, the odds that they get hurt at some point in a long-term contract is huge. (See Meche, Gil.)

And if they’re going to sign a hitter, it makes sense if they avoid signing a player at a position where they already have an elite prospect who’s expected to man that position in a year or two. So no elite third baseman (Moustakas) or first baseman/DH (Butler/Hosmer/Ka’aihue). The Royals have a lot of options at second base, between Aviles and Giavotella and possibly Christian Colon (if he moves) or Jeff Bianchi (if he’s healthy).

That leaves shortstop, catcher, and the outfield. The best catcher on the market this winter has already signed (Victor Martinez), and so has the second-best catcher (John Buck – yes, John Buck.) The best shortstop available is…Derek Jeter? Juan Uribe? Miguel Tejada? Edgar Renteria? It ain’t pretty, folks.

And then there’s the outfield, where you have Crawford, then Jayson Werth, then a big gap.

So Crawford is clearly the best free-agent hitter on the market at a position where the Royals need a long-term solution. But not only that…Crawford is a better hitter at a position of need than anyone on the free-agent market next year.

When the Royals nabbed Gil Meche for an extra year and an extra million per, one of the stated reasons Dayton Moore gave for the deal was that while the Royals might not have been in a position to contend in 2007, they felt that it was better to sign Meche a year earlier than they might have needed him, because they liked him better than any of the pitchers who were expected to be free agents the following year. You can argue with their assessment, but the thought process is sound – better to sign the right guy today than have to sift through a barrel of lesser options tomorrow.

Right now, 2012 is shaping up as a good year for free agents overall – but keep in mind that every year people complain that the following year’s crop of free agents look better than the current one – because over the ensuing 12 months, a bunch of those players will sign extensions with their current teams.

Even so, at those positions (C, SS, OF), here are the best players who might be free agents next winter according to Cot’s Contracts:

Jorge Posada
Jose Reyes
Jimmy Rollins
Jason Bartlett
Michael Cuddyer
Jason Kubel
Carlos Beltran
J.D. Drew

Remember, those are the best free agents out there – assuming none of them sign an extension with their current team. Every one of these guys is either not nearly as good a player as Crawford, much older, or both. The only guy who might compare with Crawford going forward is Jose Reyes, who is still just 27 and is a very similar hitter. But Reyes has an ugly injury history, and anyway I’d be surprised if he didn’t sign an extension with the Mets between now and next winter.

So if the Royals pass on Crawford now, hoping to spend their money next winter instead, they’ll quickly find that there’s no one remotely as appealing as Crawford is today. There ought to be some elite starting pitchers available, but 1) pitchers are much, much riskier as long-term signings; 2) the strength of the farm system is in their starting pitchers; 3) if they really want an elite starting pitcher, they should just hold on to Zack Greinke.

If the Royals want to sign an elite free agent for 2012, their best bet is to sign the elite free agent of 2011.

Can they afford to pay Carl Crawford up to $20 million a year? Well, they just paid a combined $24 million to Gil Meche and Jose Guillen this year. I think they can afford to pay less money to a single player who actually helps the team.

Can they afford to pay Carl Crawford a quarter of their payroll? Conventional Wisdom in baseball states that teams should never put more than 20% of their payroll on one player. But then, Conventional Wisdom can’t account for a team that can put a minimum-wage top prospect at virtually every position on the diamond. The Royals find themselves in a unique situation; they can afford to take a unique approach to the market.

So while everyone expects the Royals to move Zack Greinke this week, I say, zig when everyone’s zagging. Sign Crawford, and suddenly you have a no-lose decision to make.

On the one hand, if you can convince David Glass to take a payroll hit just this one time, you can go into next season with both Crawford and Greinke on your roster. Shedding the team of Guillen’s $12 million and DeJesus’ $6 million almost pays for Crawford’s salary right there, although the payroll will have to go up because Greinke gets a big raise, Soria a smaller one, and some players are due salary increases in arbitration. But you’ll get a big chunk of that money back in 2012 when Meche’s contract comes off the books.

Best of all, you’ll go into 2011 with a legitimate shot at .500, if not better, and you can go to Greinke and say “Look, we just signed the best free-agent hitter on the market. We’re committed to spending the money to win. Oh, and if you haven’t heard, we’ve got the best farm system in baseball. Here’s a pen.”

If Greinke declines, you can always trade him later. If he accepts, then by 2013 you’re paying close to $40 million for two players – an elite all-around hitter and one of the best pitchers in the game, who by that point will be surrounded by talented players making the league minimum. Keep this in mind – any prospect the Royals bring up after June 15th or thereabouts won’t be arbitration-eligible until 2015. By 2015, Crawford would be in the fifth year of his contract. Maybe the Royals will find themselves in a payroll crunch in 2015, but frankly, if the Royals haven’t won something by 2015, Dayton Moore will have bigger things to worry about than a payroll crunch.

On the other hand, if Glass isn’t willing to stomach a payroll north of $85 million, then you can trade Greinke this winter, and lap the field for the best farm system in the game – seriously, the Royals would rank both first and last, and the Baseball America Prospect Handbook would just list the Royals’ Top 60 Prospects while cutting the Astros or White Sox out of the book entirely.

You’d save $13.5 million in 2011, and when Meche’s contract comes off the books next winter, that’s $25.5 million in savings – more than enough to pay Crawford, with enough money to sign a mid-tier free agent next winter if the opportunity presents itself.

The bottom line is this: from 2012 to 2014, the Royals ought to have as much minimum-wage talent on their roster as any team in baseball. But you can’t win with minimum-wage players alone. You have to spend your money somewhere, and if you’re going to spend it, you might as well spend it on the best talent available. Every good team is built on a foundation of star players, and Carl Crawford is a star.

Go ahead and argue that I’m being silly, that the Royals have no chance at signing Crawford, that Crawford would never go to a small-market loser like the Royals, and never mind that Gil Meche did just that when the Royals offered him the highest salary for the most years. You wanna know how you do it? Here’s how, if the Angels offer Crawford 6 years at $18 million per, the Royals offer him 7 years at $19 million per. If the Angels pull a knife, the Royals pull a gun. He sends one of yours to the hospital, you send one of his to the morgue. That's the Kansas City way, and that's how you get Crawford! Now do you want to do that? Are you ready to do that?

Sorry, got a little excited there.

Anyway, maybe the Royals don’t have a chance. Maybe their offer is DOA. But they’ll never know unless they make one. Sure, Crawford’s a risk. But so is passing him by and then waiting for another free agent of his caliber to come along in the future. It’s a risk either way. If you’re going to take a risk, personally, I’d rather take Crawford as well.

Sunday, November 28, 2010

Kansas City Chiefs' Playoff Odds, Week 12


The Chiefs?

Yes, the Chiefs. If you’re not a Chiefs fan, you’ll probably want to skip this post.

What the hell do you know about the Chiefs?

Relative to what I know about the Royals, not much. I’m a fan of football; I’m a student of baseball. I could probably name all 40 members of the Royals’ 40-man roster; I doubt I could name 40 members of the Chiefs’ 53-man roster.

But I am a Chiefs fan, and have been since I became a football fan in the late 80s, which not coincidentally happened to be the first time in my lifetime that the Chiefs were a competitive squad. I have watched essentially every meaningful game in the last 20 years, and since moving to Chicago and signing up for DirecTV in 2003, I’ve watched somewhere around 80-90% of all their regular-season games.

I never played football, and I lack the ability to watch the game the way someone who has played the game can – I can’t identify any but the most obvious defensive formations, and I couldn’t tell you what, say, the free safety’s exact responsibilities are on a specific play. (Speaking of which, if anyone out there knows a good football primer out there, that might teach a devoted fan how to watch football in a more intelligent fashion, don’t be afraid to mention it in the comments.) But I’m competent enough in my fandom that I can usually identify penalties as they happen.

Have you ever written about the Chiefs before?

On just a few occasions. Most notably, I wrote a pair of Chiefs season previews for Deadspin back in 2006 and 2007. (This was back in the early, more innocent days for Deadspin, when Will Leitch made people like Carl Monday and phrases like “You’re With Me Leather” famous to a small but rabid audience. I barely recognize, and have long since stopped patronizing, the Deadspin that exists today.)

In 2006, I summarized the torture that Chiefs fans had endured over the previous fifteen years; in 2007, I flipped the coin over and recounted, in my typically overdone fashion, the Week 17 miracle that sent a 9-7 Chiefs team into the playoffs on the previous New Year’s Eve. You can read those pieces here and here.

Other than that, I’ve saved most of my Chiefs comments for Twitter, where I spend Sunday afternoons complaining about the team when they’re doing something wrong, and rarely giving credit when they’re doing something right. Like I said: I’m a fan.

Why do you want to write about the Chiefs now?

While I have very little to say about the Chiefs themselves, I have a lot to say about figuring out their odds of making the postseason. Given that the NFL season is only 16 games and a complex set of tiebreaker rules are used to differentiate between identical records, sorting through all the playoff permutations for an NFL team is about as complicated and tedious as solving one of the “Logic Games” problems on the LSAT.

Unlike most people, I find Logic Games sort of fun. I’m weird like that. Figuring out all the different ways the Chiefs can make the playoffs is even more fun.

Several years ago, back when the Chiefs were a competitive team and went into December with a legitimate shot at the playoffs, I would write weekly reports about the Chiefs’ playoff hopes and email them to people I knew in the Kansas City media – people I knew or people whose email addresses I had managed to find. We’re talking about maybe seven people. Needless to say, I didn’t get much feedback.

But I enjoyed it nonetheless, particularly in 2007, when the Chiefs needed four different games to break their way on the final day of the season and every one of them did.

Now, for the first time in four years, the Chiefs are competitive again, only this time I have a blog, and I can share my thoughts with all of you. Or at least those of you who care about my thoughts on the Chiefs. We’re talking about maybe seven people.

If you’re one of those seven, enjoy.

Alright, we get it. So what are the odds that the Chiefs make the playoffs?

There are two ways to make the postseason: by winning your division, or by securing a wild-card spot. When I’ve done this breakdown in years past, the Chiefs were in the running for both possibilities, which made the math difficult. This year, it’s actually pretty easy: win the division or go home.

Winning the division is a lot harder than it might look from a cursory glance at the standings. After winning convincingly in Seattle, the Chiefs are 7-4, with a one-game lead in the standings and just five games to go. In the main, any team with an outright lead in the standings with five games to go should be favored to hold on.

In this case, it’s not, and if I’m an oddsmaker, I’d probably list the Chiefs as an underdog to win the division. That’s because the Chiefs are almost certain to lose any tiebreaker to the Raiders or Chargers. The reason for this is that while the first tiebreaker the NFL uses to settle a tie for the division crown is head-to-head record, the second tiebreaker is overall division record.

How can you calculate the head-to-head tiebreaker when the Chiefs have only played each team once yet?

Well, the Chiefs have already lost to the Raiders once; if they lose the season finale to the Raiders, they’ll automatically lose the tiebreaker as well. But even if they beat Oakland, they’re almost certain to lose the second tiebreaker, because the Chiefs have already lost two AFC West games, in Oakland and in Denver.

The Raiders are currently undefeated in divisional games. Assuming the Chiefs beat Oakland when they rematch in KC to end the season, the Raiders would still have a better divisional record than the Chiefs unless they lose to San Diego next week (as they probably will).

Realistically, though, as long as the Chiefs beat Oakland in the season finale, it’s very unlikely that the Raiders will somehow squeak past the Chiefs into first place. The Raiders have six losses already; a loss to the Chiefs would leave them at 9-7 even if they run the table. A win against Oakland would give the Chiefs at least 8 wins; all they would need to do is win two of their other four games to clinch a 10-6 record.

Which is a long-winded way of saying that despite the fact that the Chiefs will probably lose a tiebreaker to Oakland, as long as the Chiefs take care of business, the Raiders are unlikely to be a threat to them.

What about the Chargers?

Thanks to the Colts crapping the bed tonight, the Chargers are a completely different story. The Chargers are only one game back, and of course they still have a home game left against the Chiefs.

If the Chargers win that game, not only do they make up the difference in the standings, they would take the lead in tiebreakers. The teams would finish even head-to-head, but a loss to the Chargers would mean that the best record the Chiefs could finish with in-division is 3-3.

The Chargers would have two wins in the division, meaning they’d only need to beat either Oakland or Denver to win the tiebreaker. That’s because, even if the Chiefs and Chargers both finish with the same in-divison record, the Chargers will almost certainly win the third tiebreaker, which is a team’s record in common games.

The Chiefs and Chargers share 14 of the 16 games on their schedule; the only two games which are not shared are Buffalo and Cleveland (for the Chiefs) and New England and Cincinnati (for the Chargers). The Chiefs were 2-0 in non-common games; the Chargers lost to New England already and haven’t played the Bengals yet. If both teams finish, say, 10-6 overall, then the Chiefs would be 8-6 in common games; the Chargers would be at least 9-5, and would win the division.

The implications of all this:

1) There’s no way to over-state the importance of the Chiefs-Chargers game in San Diego in two weeks. For the Chargers, it’s really a must-win game – if they lose that game, they’ll be two games back and lose a tiebreaker. If the Chiefs win that game, they are guaranteed to finish ahead of San Diego in the standings if they finish 10-6. If the Chiefs beat San Diego, not only are they guaranteed to win the division if they finish 11-5, but their guaranteed to win the division if they finish 10-6 unless Oakland wins their last five games.

If the Chiefs lose to San Diego, they lose control of their destiny. If they lose to the Chargers, then even if the Chiefs win their other four games, they have to hope San Diego loses somewhere else along the way.

In short: the Chiefs are more likely to win the division with a 10-6 record and a victory in San Diego, than with an 11-5 record and a loss in San Diego.

2) Chiefs fans should absolutely, positively be rooting for Oakland next week when the Raiders and Chargers play. A Raiders win does open up the possibility that Oakland could win the division with a 10-6 record. However, their path to a 10-6 record runs through Kansas City in Week 17.

Put it this way: if Oakland beats San Diego next week, then even if the Chiefs lose to San Diego the following week, the Chiefs control their own destiny: beat Denver next week, and finish with wins against Tennessee, St. Louis, and Oakland, and the Chiefs are guaranteed to win the division.

3) If the Chiefs do lose to the Chargers, there’s a very good chance that they’ll need help from an outside source – namely, the Broncos. Denver plays both Oakland in Week 15, and more importantly, they host the Chargers in the season finale.

Here’s a likely scenario for you: San Diego beats Oakland next week, while the Chiefs get their revenge on the Broncos, and the Chargers beat Kansas City in two weeks. Chiefs and Chargers both win in Weeks 15 and 16.

Going into the final game of the season, the Chiefs would need to beat Oakland to advance – and they would need Denver to beat the Chargers.

You should have shaken his hand, Todd. When the Broncos come to Arrowhead next week, make sure to tell Josh he’s your BFF.

Okay, so what about the Chiefs’ wild-card odds?

The answer to that is pretty easy, if unfortunate: there aren’t any. Almost.

Thanks to the Buffalo Bills’ continuing quest to be the best 2-14 team in NFL history, this time coughing up a win when Stevie Johnson got a sudden case of the Bowes*, the Steelers escaped with a win on Sunday. (Not that Chiefs fans should complain about the Bills’ ability to blow winnable games this year.) That means there are two AFC North teams (Pittsburgh and Baltimore) that are 8-3, and two AFC East teams (New England and New York Jets) that are 9-2.

*The Bowes: When an elite wide receiver drops a routine throw that would have iced a victory for his team.

There are only two wild-card teams in the conference, so for the Chiefs to qualify as a wild-card team they would have to surpass one of those four teams in the coming weeks.

That isn’t unlikely. What’s unlikely is that the Chiefs would surpass one of those four teams without winning the division. I mean, if the Chiefs win their remaining five games and finish 12-4, they’ll probably finish ahead of one of those teams – but it won’t matter, because they’ll be the AFC West champs.

If the Chiefs finish 11-5, they’re the AFC West champs unless their one loss is to the Chargers, and the Chargers go undefeated the rest of the way.

If the Chiefs finish 10-6, they would need either the Ravens or Steelers to go 2-3 the rest of the way, or they would need the Jets or Patriots to totally collapse and finish 1-4.

The most likely scenario for the Chiefs to win a wild-card spot, then, is if they finish 11-5 but lose the division title to the Chargers. In that case, then if either Baltimore or Pittsburgh lose two games the rest of the way, they would finish in a tie for the final wild-card spot.

Unfortunately, once again, the tiebreakers don’t fall the Chiefs way. When teams from different divisions finish tied for a wild-card spot, the first tiebreaker is head-to-head record. Since the Chiefs don’t play any of these teams this year, the second tiebreaker is conference record.

All four of the Chiefs’ losses have been to AFC teams, and if they lose to San Diego they can finish no better than 7-5 against the AFC. Both the Ravens and Steelers have lost a game to an NFC team, meaning if they finish 11-5, their conference record would be no worse than 8-4, and they would advance.

So if they don’t win the division, the Chiefs best – maybe only – shot at a wild-card spot is to finish 11-5, and hope that either the Steelers or Ravens lose three of their last five games. That’s not an impossibility; the Steelers play in Baltimore next week, so one of these teams is going to lose. The Steelers host the Jets later in the year, the Ravens host the Saints, and both teams have to travel to Cleveland to play a surprisingly feisty Browns squad.

Stranger things have happened. Like, say, on New Year’s Eve, 2006.

Are you really planning to write one of these up every week the rest of the season?

So long as the Chiefs keep up their end of the bargain, I’ll try to keep up mine. So give it about two weeks.