Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Kansas City Chiefs' Playoff Odds, Week 13


Before we get into Chiefs mode, a few housekeeping items:

- For those of you who missed it, I wrote a guest column for my friend John Sickels at minorleagueball.com here. If you’re a die-hard Royals fan, you probably won’t learn anything new from this – but any time I’m offered the chance to gloat in front of a national audience, I’m inclined to take it.

- I’m glad I got my Carl Crawford column up on Saturday, because if it had gone up on Sunday, it would have been obsolete the moment it hit the web. The Jayson Werth contract was just that ridiculous. If Werth is worth 7 years at $18 million a year, it would be hard for anyone to argue if Crawford claims he’s worth 8 years at $22 million a year, or even more.

Of course, what Crawford is truly worth is simply what the market will bear, and the fact that the Nationals lost their mind for Werth doesn’t mean the same will happen with Crawford. But if this is indicative of what the free-agent market will be this winter, the Royals might be better off sitting it out. Sure, they’ll have money to burn in a year or two, but if they don’t like what’s available in free agency at that point, there’s a good chance they can simply trade a token prospect to a team that’s having buyer’s remorse, and get a useful but overpriced player with the old team footing some of the bill.

- As Matt Klaasen pointed out on Twitter, the Jayson Werth signing makes the timing of the David DeJesus trade even more suspect. For one, if the price of an everyday outfielder just went up, then the $6 million that DeJesus is owed for 2011 looks even more appealing today. And secondly, since none of the usual suspects signed Werth, that means one more team that would have been in the running for DeJesus’ services.

For instance, the Red Sox. Going into the winter, Boston looked like clear favorites to sign either Werth or Carl Crawford. But now, Werth is off the market, and they’re unlikely to chase the rising cost of Crawford (especially now that they’re trying to work out a long-term deal for Adrian Gonzalez.) We know that the Red Sox had interest in DeJesus last July. You don’t think that right now, if the Royals had held on to DeJesus, the Red Sox would be showing considerably more interest than they had a month ago?

There’s nothing wrong with a GM being decisive; Kenny Williams has made a living like that. But there is something wrong with a GM being decisive when he doesn’t have to be. There was nothing to be gained by trading DeJesus in November instead of in December or January. There was considerable opportunity to be lost. The Royals have Vinny Mazzaro and Justin Marks; they also have to wonder if they could have gotten more, if they had just shown some patience.

- When I appeared on the Baseball Prospectus Podcast to talk about the Royals 2 weeks ago – you can find that here – Kevin Goldstein asked me if I thought the Royals would trade Zack Greinke this winter. I put the odds at the time at around 20%, because I felt like the Royals had all the leverage in the situation, and they would only move him if they got him an overwhelming offer.

Today, I’d put those odds much higher, for two reasons. The first is that with the money that’s flying around this month, Greinke’s contract - $27 million for 2 years – looks even more enticing than ever. Depending on where Cliff Lee ends up, you’ll have at least one and possibly two of the Rangers/Yankees who will be looking for a fallback option, and Greinke for $27/2 looks considerably more appetizing after you’ve just offered Lee $120/5 and been turned down.

The second is that the number of media rumors hinting that Greinke wants out of Kansas City continues to go up. I don’t trust these rumors 100% - Greinke is a tough person to read, and he’s very private, and unless these rumors are coming straight from his mouth (which I doubt) then I’m inclined to take them with a huge grain of salt. The Royals would know better than anyone spreading these rumors whether their relationship with Greinke is salvageable or not. But there’s certainly a chance that it’s not, in which case he’s likely to go. I’d put the odds that he gets traded by Opening Day at 50/50, maybe a little higher depending on where Lee ends up and just how desperate the bridesmaids get.

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Sunday was a heck of a day for the Chiefs. They won, which wasn’t surprising; the Chargers lost; which was. And then Josh McDaniels was relieved of his duties in Denver, and given how many teams respond to their coach being fired with sudden, if short-lived, improvement (look at the Vikings post-Childress and the Cowboys post-Phillips), we can only hope that the Broncos respond the same way – given that they host the Raiders in two weeks and go to San Diego for the season finale.

As it stands, the Chiefs are 8-4, and hold a 1.5 game lead on the division with four games to go. Here’s what this means:

1) No matter what happens against the Chargers next week, the Chiefs control their own destiny.

That’s the most important thing to take away from this. If San Diego had won against Oakland, then a scenario was very much in play that had the Chiefs losing in San Diego, finishing their season with three wins and an 11-5 record – and missing the playoffs when the Chargers also finished 11-5 and had the tiebreaker in hand.

The Chargers’ loss eliminates the possibility of an 11-5 team missing the playoffs, at least in the AFC. Which no doubt makes Matt Cassel happy, seeing as how only one NFL team in history has missed the playoffs with an 11-5 record – and he was the quarterback of that team.

(In the NFC, though, all bets are off. The NFC West is so putrid that in each of the other three divisions, there are two teams that are 8-4 or better. One of those teams is guaranteed to miss the playoffs.)

If the Chiefs lose in San Diego, but win their final three games, they are guaranteed to win the division, and in fact are guaranteed to be at least the #3 seed. (They would be guaranteed to have a better record than the AFC South champion – the Jaguars, who lead the division, already have 5 losses, and they lost to the Chiefs head-to-head.)

2) The odds that the Chiefs qualify for the playoffs as a wild-card team, which were already tiny, are now infinitesimal.

Before, there was a chance that the Chiefs might finish 11-5 and lose the division, which would bring the wild-card into play. But now, for the Chiefs to not finish in first place in the AFC West, they would have to finish no better than 10-6. This could happen if they lose to the Chargers and then stumble against the Rams or Titans, while San Diego wins their last three.

In that case, the Chiefs have to hope that either the Ravens or the Jets finish no better than 9-7. Remember, the Chiefs lose almost all tiebreakers outside the division, because of their inferior in-conference record. (There are some scenarios in which, if the Chiefs lose to the Rams, they might win a tiebreaker against the Jets or Ravens, but those permutations are a little too complicated to get into right now.)

For the Ravens to finish 9-7, they’d have to lose three of their last four games, which include home games against New Orleans and Cincinnati, and play Houston and Cleveland on the road. None of those games are gimmes, but I expect them to at least split.

The Jets would have to lose their last four games in order to finish 9-7. Maybe their 45-3 ass-kicking on the foot of New England is fresh in my mind, but I actually wonder if this could happen. The Jets host Miami this week, then play the Steelers and Bears on the road. If they lose to the Dolphins, the chance of a major freefall is there – and then they finish at home against a feisty Buffalo team that is a hell of a lot better than their 2-10 record would indicate.

If the games break right next week, we can revisit these scenarios in more detail. For now, I’d focus on the division if I were you.

There’s two ways this can go. If the Chiefs beat San Diego, then it literally does not matter what happens against St. Louis in Tennessee. Even if the Chiefs lose to BOTH the Rams and Titans, if they beat the Raiders in the season finale, they will be 10-6, and both the Raiders and Chargers will have at least seven losses each.

Now if, like me, the memory of the home loss to the Raiders to close out the 1999 season, costing the Chiefs a playoff berth – because Pete Stoyanovich missed the game-winning field goal as time ran out, then Jon Baker started overtime by kicking out of bounds (his third time that day!) – you’d rather it didn’t have to come down to the final game. But if the Chiefs beat the Chargers, there’s a good chance that it won’t.

If the Chiefs win next week, then their Magic Number is 2 – any combination of Chiefs wins (vs. the Rams or Titans) or Raiders losses (vs. Jacksonville, Denver, and Indianapolis) that equals 2 or more, and the Chiefs will have clinched the AFC West before they kick off against Oakland. They might be playing for seeding, but they won’t be playing for their lives.

If the Chiefs lose to San Diego, they really need to run the table to be safe. If they beat Oakland, then a win against either St. Louis or Tennessee eliminates the Raiders. However, a loss against either team opens up the door for San Diego to win the division if they win their last three games. After playing the Chiefs, the Chargers host the 49ers, then finish on the road against the Bengals and Broncos – all very winnable games for them.

If the Chiefs lose to San Diego and Oakland, then they have to beat St. Louis and Tennessee, for starters. Then they have to hope that both Oakland and San Diego lose at least one of their other three games along the way. Which is certainly possible. We might, in fact, see a scenario in which the Chiefs lose in San Diego, take care of business against the Rams and Titans, and – if both the Chargers and Raiders lose one more game – the Chiefs will still have clinched the division before they take the field against Oakland.

In summary: beat San Diego and the division is yours for the taking. Lose to San Diego and the division is still yours for the taking; you just can’t afford any more screw-ups. That’s what a 1.5-game lead with four games to go does for you.


Saturday, December 4, 2010

My Winter Meetings Dream.


Granted that it’s a feeling not supported by any evidence at the moment, I have a feeling this is going to be one of the busier Winter Meetings we’ve seen in a while. MLB’s savvy decision to move up the various arbitration/non-tender deadlines means that teams have already made preliminary roster decisions, cleared the dead space on their roster, and dumped a bunch of players into the free-agent pool.

On top of that, it seems like a lot of teams have a ton of money burning a hole in their pocket. (Unemployment is still 10%, but the rich seem to be doing awfully well for themselves these days.) That’s a recipe for some big contracts, and hopefully some big trades as well. We’ve already seen some of the former (Victor Martinez, Adam Dunn), and today we saw one of the latter (Adrian Gonzalez).

The Royals enter the meetings with everyone’s favorite trade chit in Zack Greinke, and – particularly if they trade Greinke – a surprising amount of payroll space they can fill. Consider that the only major-league player under contract for 2012 is Joakim Soria, on a very team-friendly deal. (Noel Arguelles and Aaron Crow both have guaranteed contracts in 2012.) So there’s no particular reason why the Royals can’t be one of the most active teams in baseball this week.

I don’t think they will; I’m still not buying the national consensus that the Royals have to trade Greinke, or even that they will. I think that the Royals hold all the leverage here – if they don’t trade Greinke today, they still have the opportunity to trade him in July, 2011, or January, 2012, or even July, 2012 under the right circumstances.

Maybe I’m giving Dayton Moore too much credit here, but I only see the Royals trading Greinke for a monstrous package – one MLB-ready player with star potential, and at least two Grade A-/B+ caliber prospects. Could that happen? Given the dynamic of this year’s market, I think it could, particularly since both the Rangers and the Yankees have the prospects to make it happen, so whoever loses the Cliff Lee sweepstakes will have both the motivation and the talent to make it happen. But I still think the odds are 50/50 at best.

Nevertheless, I think the Royals should rock the baseball world and make the biggest transaction of the Winter Meetings. And I’m not referring to a Greinke trade.

I think the Royals should do whatever it takes – up to and including a seven-year, $140 million contract offer – to sign Carl Crawford.

Hear me out here. In the next 4000 words, I hope to convince you:

- That Carl Crawford is worth an enormous contract in general;
- That Crawford fits the Royals’ needs particularly well;
- That the Royals can afford him.

I probably won’t succeed. But it’s worth a try.

1) Carl Crawford is worth an enormous contract.

- A seven-year contract is a risk for any player, but Carl Crawford mitigates that risk more than any free agent on the market.

First, let’s point out the obvious: Carl Crawford is a hell of a player. His career line is .296/.337/.444, which includes his formative years from ages 20 to 22. Over the last six seasons, his line is .302/.347/.463. In five of the last six seasons, he has had an OPS+ of over 110. Last year was the best season of his career, as he hit .307/.356/.495 into the teeth of a league-wide offensive turndown.

His triple slash numbers are good, but they’re not $20-million-a-year good. However, they understate his value significantly, because they don’t incorporate his speed and defense, both of which are top of the line.

He has led the AL in steals four times in his career; he’s probably not as fast as he once was, but just two years ago he stole a career-high 60 bases, finishing second in the league to Jacoby Ellsbury. His 82% career success rate is outstanding.

Crawford is perhaps the best defensive left fielder in baseball. He won a Gold Glove this year, which is virtually unheard of for a left fielder – the Gold Gloves almost always go to center fielders. Gold Gloves mean almost nothing – but STATS’ Fielding Bible Awards do mean something, in that they’re voted on by people who actually pay attention to defense. Crawford finished second to Brett Gardner this year, which was an upset, given that Crawford had won three consecutive Fielding Bible Awards for left field – and only one Fielding Bible Award is given out to both leagues combined.

The fielding stats can’t agree as to whether Crawford’s defense is excellent (worth 10 runs a season) or spectacular (20 runs). Personally, I’m fine with either assessment.

Crawford is durable – he’s been on the DL just once in his career, I believe. He’s consistent – he’s had just one off-season (2008) in his career.

Add it all up, and he’s one of the best players in baseball. Per baseball-reference.com, Crawford was worth 4.8 Wins Above Replacement last year, and has averaged 3.7 WAR over the last seven years. Per Fangraphs, he was worth 6.9 WAR last year, and has averaged 4.6 WAR over the last seven years. (Fangraphs really, really likes his defense.)

Using the industry rule of thumb that one win is worth around $4.5 million, then depending on who you trust, Crawford was worth somewhere between $21 million and $27 million this past season. Even if he declines a little going forward, and even if we don’t see any salary inflation over the next few years, Crawford figures to be worth in the range of $18-20 million a season.

Most free agents decline, of course; that’s the curse of signing free agents. But then, most free agents are on the wrong side of 30, and as Royals fans know, there are few things more futile than hoping that the 31- or 32-year old outfielder your team just signed isn’t about to slow down. Jose Guillen might be the archetype of this phenomenon, but ask the Mets how they feel about Jason Bay. Ask the Rangers (or the Royals, or the Indians) how they feel about Juan Gonzalez. (And maybe, just maybe, ask the team that signs Jayson Werth how they feel in two or three years.)

Crawford, on the other hand, is just 29 years old, which isn’t terribly young for a free agent, but young enough that he should have at least a few years before his decline phase sets in.

Also, Crawford has the skill set of someone who should age very, very well. It’s an accepted bit of sabermetric wisdom that players with “old player’s skills” – hitters with low batting averages, but lots of walks and power – tend to age very quickly. (The seminal example of this was Alvin Davis; more recently, think Ben Grieve or Brad Wilkerson.) When the ability to lay off bad pitches and hit cripple pitches for power constitutes a player’s entire skill set, then even a slight loss of bat speed can be devastating. To a lesser extent, pure speed players – think Luis Polonia or Alex Cole – also do not age well, because once their legs go, so does their value.

The players who are most likely to maintain their value well into their 30s are players who mix both power and speed. Generally, as these players get older, they lose their speed, but compensate by developing their ability to pull pitches in their happy zone. The classic example of this would be Barry Bonds, but we’ll ignore him for obvious reasons.

Think Bobby Abreu, who had a long peak from ages 25 to 30 and then has gone through a very gentle decline since – last year, at age 36, he still managed a 119 OPS+. Or think Derek Jeter, who may be in decline now but had one of the best seasons of his career at age 35. Or think Eric Davis, one of the most electrifying power/speed players of my lifetime. Sadly, while Davis may have had 80 power and 80 speed, he had 90 fragility, to the point where he had to retire at age 32. But after two years away from the game, he came back at the age of 34 and was an absolute monster for three years.

Crawford is in a subclass of power/speed players, with true world-class speed but just average power. Besides Crawford, just 10 players in history have amassed 300+ steals and 100+ homers by the end of their age 30 season. I’ve divided them into two groups:

Group A

Roberto Alomar, Barry Bonds, Bobby Bonds, Rickey Henderson, Joe Morgan

Group B

Lou Brock, Cesar Cedeno, Marquis Grissom, Jimmy Rollins, Juan Samuel

The players are separated by their walk rate; the players in Group A walked more than 10% of the time, Group B walked less than 10% of the time. Group A, as you can see, has three Hall of Famers – likely to be four in a month – and Bobby Bonds. If you have an elite combination of power and speed and you walk a lot, well, you’re a superstar.

Group B consists of five guys who had power and speed, but who didn’t walk a lot, and consequently were never as good as they were perceived to be – and perhaps never as good as they could have been. Crawford happens to fall into Group B. But let’s look a little deeper.

Cedeno is a special case; he was one of the greatest young players of all time, but was always dogged by accusations that he didn’t give maximum effort, and suffered a severe injury mid-career – I want to say he broke his ankle – and was never the same player afterwards.

Samuel was a power/speed dynamo in his early years, but also swung at damn near everything – he led the NL in strikeouts each of his first four years. He had his last good season at age 26, although he was a great bench player into his mid-30s.

Marquis Grissom was never a great player – his power numbers benefited from coming up in the mid-90s – but he aged very well. At the age of 37, he was the everyday centerfielder for the Giants and hit .279/.323/.450, which is pretty much what he was doing in his mid-20s.

It’s too early to evaluate Jimmy Rollins yet; since he won the MVP award in 2007 he’s been in steady decline, but he’s also battled various injuries; it wouldn’t surprise me at all if he bounced back in 2011.

And that leaves Lou Brock, who I think is the most illuminating comparison to Crawford. Brock was an All-Star caliber player starting in 1964, when he was 25, but he didn’t walk very much in his 20s. In 1967, at the age of 28, Brock walked just 24 times all year despite leading the NL in at-bats.

But in 1969, at age 30, he set a then-career high with 50 walks. (The redefined strike zone no doubt helped.) And his walk totals continued to increase, to 60 the next year, and 76 the year after that. He maintained most of his newfound discipline through his mid-30s.

And Brock aged spectacularly well. His power disappeared in his 30s, but from 1971 to 1976, when he was 32 to 37 years old, Brock hit .306/.364/.399 – in the low-offense 1970s, remember – and averaged 71 steals a year. He posted an OPS+ of 107 or better each season.

The reason this is germane to Crawford is that, over the last two years, Crawford has quietly begun to add a dash of plate discipline to his game. Through 2008, his career high in walks was 37; the last two seasons he has walked 51 and 46 times. Whereas someone like Samuel had already allowed his free-swinging ways to undermine his career by his late 20s, Crawford has learned to control his aggression, and is a better player than ever.

In addition to his improving walk totals, there are other reasons to think Crawford will follow the Lou Brock career path instead of the path of the other guys in this group. Unlike Cedeno, he’s very durable; in eight full seasons in the majors, he’s played 150 games six times, and 143 games in a seventh season; only in 2008 (when he played 109 games) did he miss significant time. Unlike Grissom and Samuel and even Rollins, Crawford is a legitimately good hitter. Crawford has had an OPS+ of 110 or better five times in his career. Samuel and Rollins did that just once by age 30, Grissom twice.

Crawford is getting better – his OPS+ of 134 last season was a career high. And the kicker – this group consists of players with 300 SB and 100 HR after their age 30 season. But Crawford just finished his age 28 season. Only two other players in history – Rickey Henderson and Cesar Cedeno – had reached both plateaus by that age.

After all that, the player in recent history who I think is most comparable to Crawford is a player who just missed our cutoff (he had 263 steals and 120 homers by age 30.) It’s our old friend, Johnny Damon.

Damon was in the majors at age 21, Crawford at age 20. Both are very, very durable. Both are high-average, high-speed, moderate-power players. Crawford has been a better hitter – a lot more steals, a few more homers – than Damon in his 20s. Damon led the league in triples once; Crawford has done it four times. Damon struck out less. But really, they’re very similar players.

At least at the plate, Damon hasn’t surrendered anything to age. His speed has slowly evaporated, but his power has solidified, and he’s taking a few more walks in his old age. From the age of 29 to the age of 35 – the timeframe of a seven-year deal for Crawford – Damon hit .291/.363/.450 with an OPS+ of 110, and averaged 144 games a year. Factor in that Crawford is a slightly but clearly better player than Damon was at the same age, and those numbers look pretty good.

Seven years is a long time, and there’s a very real risk that Crawford will suffer a serious injury in Year One and whoever signs him will be stuck with one of The Worst Contracts Of All Time. But excepting the apocalyptic scenario, Crawford seems to be almost a certainty to contribute an above-average bat, and game-changing speed and defense, for the bulk of his contract.

Everything above makes Crawford a great signing for the Royals, but also makes him a great signing for any team.

2) Crawford fits the Royals’ needs particularly well.

For one thing, he fits the ballpark to a T.

Kauffman Stadium may no longer have the Astroturf of its heyday, but the ballpark plays very similar to the way it did in the 1970s – it’s a great park for speed, a lousy park for power, and neutral to offense overall. According to the Bill James Handbook, over the last three years Kauffman Stadium has reduced home runs by 19%, but increased batting average by 12 points, and increased triples by 36%.

Carl Crawford is a Kauffman Stadium kind of player. He might not hit 19 homers again like he did last year, but he’ll hit .300 every year, and ought to be good for double digits in triples. (And he’ll be the Royals most dangerous inside-the-park-homer threat since Willie Wilson.) The larger outfield in Kauffman Stadium also makes defense more important, and a huge amount of Crawford’s value is in his glove.

Among other weaknesses, the Royals in recent years haven’t taken advantage of their ballpark, probably due to their lack of speed. Over at Baseball Prospectus, Matt Swartz ranked the 30 major-league teams by the degree of their home-field advantage over the last three years, and the Royals had the fifth-smallest home-field advantage in the game. Crawford would help the Royals win anywhere; he would help them win even more at home.

And then there’s the fact that going forward, the Royals need defense more than offense.

The Royals have been a truly awful defensive team for most of the past decade, and as promising as their future looks overall, even if the rebuilding project pans out, defense is still going to be the team’s Achilles’ heel.

The ideal roster construction in 2013 would have, I suppose, an infield of Moustakas, Colon, Giavotella, and Hosmer, an outfield of Lough/Derrick Robinson/Brett Eibner, and Wil Myers catching. Or if you want good defense, you could move Myers to the outfield, replace Lough, and put Salvador Perez behind the plate.

With the exception of Hosmer, none of those infielders grade out as better than average. The outfield has more potential, but it’s very much a work in progress – Robinson is a second-tier prospect, and Eibner has yet to bat as a pro. If Jarrod Dyson turns into the second coming of Gary Pettis, it might not matter – but that’s still wishful thinking.

The Royals badly need a true plus defender somewhere in the field. Crawford is simply the best defensive left fielder in the game. With so much young pitching coming up, the Royals need to back them up with a defense they have confidence in. And remember: most of that young pitching is left-handed. That means most of the batters they’ll be facing are right-handed. Batters tend to pull the ball. That means a preponderance of balls headed to left field. Where Carl Crawford can catch them. The circle is complete.

Assuming Alex Gordon can adapt to right field – and physically there’s no reason he can’t – a Crawford/Blanco/Gordon outfield would be above-average. Or the Royals could go balls-out for defense, start Jarrod Dyson in center, and have one of the best defensive outfields in baseball.

3) The Royals can afford him.

Ah, yes. Cost. Can the Royals afford to pay one player – any player – close to a quarter of their entire payroll?

I say yes, and here’s why: if Mission 2012 is successful, the Royals are going to have somewhere between 16 and 20 players on their roster who are 0-3 guys – players who are not yet arbitration-eligible, and therefore making somewhere between $400,000 and $700,000 a year. Let’s split the difference – on Opening Day, 2013, the Royals will have 18 guys on their roster making somewhere around $10 million – combined.

That leaves only seven other spots to fill on their roster. The Royals had a $75 million payroll last year, so there’s no reason to think they can’t afford at least a $75 million payroll in 2013, if not more.

So let’s say the payroll is $75 million. That means the Royals will have $65 million to pay the other seven players. One of those players will probably be Joakim Soria, at $8 million. So that’s six roster spots to fill, and $57 million to play with. (Let’s make it $55 million to account for Crow’s and Arguelles’ contracts.)

In other words, the Royals are rapidly facing a situation where they almost have to spend big money on free agents, because if they miss the playoffs in 2013 by five games with a payroll of $25 million, there will be hell to pay. The advantage of having so many young players – so many cheap players – is that you have money to spend. But you have to spend the money. And if you’re going to spend it, spend it on an elite player. And there is perhaps no more elite player on the market this winter than Carl Crawford.

Put it this way: even if the Royals give Crawford $19 million a year, that still leaves them $36 million for the other five guys, an average of $7.2 million per player. The Royals absolutely can afford one elite, $15-million-plus player on their roster going forward.

And if the Royals are going to sign an elite free agent, they should probably target an outfielder. Pitchers are simply too unpredictable and too risky; even if you hit on them early, the odds that they get hurt at some point in a long-term contract is huge. (See Meche, Gil.)

And if they’re going to sign a hitter, it makes sense if they avoid signing a player at a position where they already have an elite prospect who’s expected to man that position in a year or two. So no elite third baseman (Moustakas) or first baseman/DH (Butler/Hosmer/Ka’aihue). The Royals have a lot of options at second base, between Aviles and Giavotella and possibly Christian Colon (if he moves) or Jeff Bianchi (if he’s healthy).

That leaves shortstop, catcher, and the outfield. The best catcher on the market this winter has already signed (Victor Martinez), and so has the second-best catcher (John Buck – yes, John Buck.) The best shortstop available is…Derek Jeter? Juan Uribe? Miguel Tejada? Edgar Renteria? It ain’t pretty, folks.

And then there’s the outfield, where you have Crawford, then Jayson Werth, then a big gap.

So Crawford is clearly the best free-agent hitter on the market at a position where the Royals need a long-term solution. But not only that…Crawford is a better hitter at a position of need than anyone on the free-agent market next year.

When the Royals nabbed Gil Meche for an extra year and an extra million per, one of the stated reasons Dayton Moore gave for the deal was that while the Royals might not have been in a position to contend in 2007, they felt that it was better to sign Meche a year earlier than they might have needed him, because they liked him better than any of the pitchers who were expected to be free agents the following year. You can argue with their assessment, but the thought process is sound – better to sign the right guy today than have to sift through a barrel of lesser options tomorrow.

Right now, 2012 is shaping up as a good year for free agents overall – but keep in mind that every year people complain that the following year’s crop of free agents look better than the current one – because over the ensuing 12 months, a bunch of those players will sign extensions with their current teams.

Even so, at those positions (C, SS, OF), here are the best players who might be free agents next winter according to Cot’s Contracts:

Jorge Posada
Jose Reyes
Jimmy Rollins
Jason Bartlett
Michael Cuddyer
Jason Kubel
Carlos Beltran
J.D. Drew

Remember, those are the best free agents out there – assuming none of them sign an extension with their current team. Every one of these guys is either not nearly as good a player as Crawford, much older, or both. The only guy who might compare with Crawford going forward is Jose Reyes, who is still just 27 and is a very similar hitter. But Reyes has an ugly injury history, and anyway I’d be surprised if he didn’t sign an extension with the Mets between now and next winter.

So if the Royals pass on Crawford now, hoping to spend their money next winter instead, they’ll quickly find that there’s no one remotely as appealing as Crawford is today. There ought to be some elite starting pitchers available, but 1) pitchers are much, much riskier as long-term signings; 2) the strength of the farm system is in their starting pitchers; 3) if they really want an elite starting pitcher, they should just hold on to Zack Greinke.

If the Royals want to sign an elite free agent for 2012, their best bet is to sign the elite free agent of 2011.

Can they afford to pay Carl Crawford up to $20 million a year? Well, they just paid a combined $24 million to Gil Meche and Jose Guillen this year. I think they can afford to pay less money to a single player who actually helps the team.

Can they afford to pay Carl Crawford a quarter of their payroll? Conventional Wisdom in baseball states that teams should never put more than 20% of their payroll on one player. But then, Conventional Wisdom can’t account for a team that can put a minimum-wage top prospect at virtually every position on the diamond. The Royals find themselves in a unique situation; they can afford to take a unique approach to the market.

So while everyone expects the Royals to move Zack Greinke this week, I say, zig when everyone’s zagging. Sign Crawford, and suddenly you have a no-lose decision to make.

On the one hand, if you can convince David Glass to take a payroll hit just this one time, you can go into next season with both Crawford and Greinke on your roster. Shedding the team of Guillen’s $12 million and DeJesus’ $6 million almost pays for Crawford’s salary right there, although the payroll will have to go up because Greinke gets a big raise, Soria a smaller one, and some players are due salary increases in arbitration. But you’ll get a big chunk of that money back in 2012 when Meche’s contract comes off the books.

Best of all, you’ll go into 2011 with a legitimate shot at .500, if not better, and you can go to Greinke and say “Look, we just signed the best free-agent hitter on the market. We’re committed to spending the money to win. Oh, and if you haven’t heard, we’ve got the best farm system in baseball. Here’s a pen.”

If Greinke declines, you can always trade him later. If he accepts, then by 2013 you’re paying close to $40 million for two players – an elite all-around hitter and one of the best pitchers in the game, who by that point will be surrounded by talented players making the league minimum. Keep this in mind – any prospect the Royals bring up after June 15th or thereabouts won’t be arbitration-eligible until 2015. By 2015, Crawford would be in the fifth year of his contract. Maybe the Royals will find themselves in a payroll crunch in 2015, but frankly, if the Royals haven’t won something by 2015, Dayton Moore will have bigger things to worry about than a payroll crunch.

On the other hand, if Glass isn’t willing to stomach a payroll north of $85 million, then you can trade Greinke this winter, and lap the field for the best farm system in the game – seriously, the Royals would rank both first and last, and the Baseball America Prospect Handbook would just list the Royals’ Top 60 Prospects while cutting the Astros or White Sox out of the book entirely.

You’d save $13.5 million in 2011, and when Meche’s contract comes off the books next winter, that’s $25.5 million in savings – more than enough to pay Crawford, with enough money to sign a mid-tier free agent next winter if the opportunity presents itself.

The bottom line is this: from 2012 to 2014, the Royals ought to have as much minimum-wage talent on their roster as any team in baseball. But you can’t win with minimum-wage players alone. You have to spend your money somewhere, and if you’re going to spend it, you might as well spend it on the best talent available. Every good team is built on a foundation of star players, and Carl Crawford is a star.

Go ahead and argue that I’m being silly, that the Royals have no chance at signing Crawford, that Crawford would never go to a small-market loser like the Royals, and never mind that Gil Meche did just that when the Royals offered him the highest salary for the most years. You wanna know how you do it? Here’s how, if the Angels offer Crawford 6 years at $18 million per, the Royals offer him 7 years at $19 million per. If the Angels pull a knife, the Royals pull a gun. He sends one of yours to the hospital, you send one of his to the morgue. That's the Kansas City way, and that's how you get Crawford! Now do you want to do that? Are you ready to do that?

Sorry, got a little excited there.

Anyway, maybe the Royals don’t have a chance. Maybe their offer is DOA. But they’ll never know unless they make one. Sure, Crawford’s a risk. But so is passing him by and then waiting for another free agent of his caliber to come along in the future. It’s a risk either way. If you’re going to take a risk, personally, I’d rather take Crawford as well.

Sunday, November 28, 2010

Kansas City Chiefs' Playoff Odds, Week 12


The Chiefs?

Yes, the Chiefs. If you’re not a Chiefs fan, you’ll probably want to skip this post.

What the hell do you know about the Chiefs?

Relative to what I know about the Royals, not much. I’m a fan of football; I’m a student of baseball. I could probably name all 40 members of the Royals’ 40-man roster; I doubt I could name 40 members of the Chiefs’ 53-man roster.

But I am a Chiefs fan, and have been since I became a football fan in the late 80s, which not coincidentally happened to be the first time in my lifetime that the Chiefs were a competitive squad. I have watched essentially every meaningful game in the last 20 years, and since moving to Chicago and signing up for DirecTV in 2003, I’ve watched somewhere around 80-90% of all their regular-season games.

I never played football, and I lack the ability to watch the game the way someone who has played the game can – I can’t identify any but the most obvious defensive formations, and I couldn’t tell you what, say, the free safety’s exact responsibilities are on a specific play. (Speaking of which, if anyone out there knows a good football primer out there, that might teach a devoted fan how to watch football in a more intelligent fashion, don’t be afraid to mention it in the comments.) But I’m competent enough in my fandom that I can usually identify penalties as they happen.

Have you ever written about the Chiefs before?

On just a few occasions. Most notably, I wrote a pair of Chiefs season previews for Deadspin back in 2006 and 2007. (This was back in the early, more innocent days for Deadspin, when Will Leitch made people like Carl Monday and phrases like “You’re With Me Leather” famous to a small but rabid audience. I barely recognize, and have long since stopped patronizing, the Deadspin that exists today.)

In 2006, I summarized the torture that Chiefs fans had endured over the previous fifteen years; in 2007, I flipped the coin over and recounted, in my typically overdone fashion, the Week 17 miracle that sent a 9-7 Chiefs team into the playoffs on the previous New Year’s Eve. You can read those pieces here and here.

Other than that, I’ve saved most of my Chiefs comments for Twitter, where I spend Sunday afternoons complaining about the team when they’re doing something wrong, and rarely giving credit when they’re doing something right. Like I said: I’m a fan.

Why do you want to write about the Chiefs now?

While I have very little to say about the Chiefs themselves, I have a lot to say about figuring out their odds of making the postseason. Given that the NFL season is only 16 games and a complex set of tiebreaker rules are used to differentiate between identical records, sorting through all the playoff permutations for an NFL team is about as complicated and tedious as solving one of the “Logic Games” problems on the LSAT.

Unlike most people, I find Logic Games sort of fun. I’m weird like that. Figuring out all the different ways the Chiefs can make the playoffs is even more fun.

Several years ago, back when the Chiefs were a competitive team and went into December with a legitimate shot at the playoffs, I would write weekly reports about the Chiefs’ playoff hopes and email them to people I knew in the Kansas City media – people I knew or people whose email addresses I had managed to find. We’re talking about maybe seven people. Needless to say, I didn’t get much feedback.

But I enjoyed it nonetheless, particularly in 2007, when the Chiefs needed four different games to break their way on the final day of the season and every one of them did.

Now, for the first time in four years, the Chiefs are competitive again, only this time I have a blog, and I can share my thoughts with all of you. Or at least those of you who care about my thoughts on the Chiefs. We’re talking about maybe seven people.

If you’re one of those seven, enjoy.

Alright, we get it. So what are the odds that the Chiefs make the playoffs?

There are two ways to make the postseason: by winning your division, or by securing a wild-card spot. When I’ve done this breakdown in years past, the Chiefs were in the running for both possibilities, which made the math difficult. This year, it’s actually pretty easy: win the division or go home.

Winning the division is a lot harder than it might look from a cursory glance at the standings. After winning convincingly in Seattle, the Chiefs are 7-4, with a one-game lead in the standings and just five games to go. In the main, any team with an outright lead in the standings with five games to go should be favored to hold on.

In this case, it’s not, and if I’m an oddsmaker, I’d probably list the Chiefs as an underdog to win the division. That’s because the Chiefs are almost certain to lose any tiebreaker to the Raiders or Chargers. The reason for this is that while the first tiebreaker the NFL uses to settle a tie for the division crown is head-to-head record, the second tiebreaker is overall division record.

How can you calculate the head-to-head tiebreaker when the Chiefs have only played each team once yet?

Well, the Chiefs have already lost to the Raiders once; if they lose the season finale to the Raiders, they’ll automatically lose the tiebreaker as well. But even if they beat Oakland, they’re almost certain to lose the second tiebreaker, because the Chiefs have already lost two AFC West games, in Oakland and in Denver.

The Raiders are currently undefeated in divisional games. Assuming the Chiefs beat Oakland when they rematch in KC to end the season, the Raiders would still have a better divisional record than the Chiefs unless they lose to San Diego next week (as they probably will).

Realistically, though, as long as the Chiefs beat Oakland in the season finale, it’s very unlikely that the Raiders will somehow squeak past the Chiefs into first place. The Raiders have six losses already; a loss to the Chiefs would leave them at 9-7 even if they run the table. A win against Oakland would give the Chiefs at least 8 wins; all they would need to do is win two of their other four games to clinch a 10-6 record.

Which is a long-winded way of saying that despite the fact that the Chiefs will probably lose a tiebreaker to Oakland, as long as the Chiefs take care of business, the Raiders are unlikely to be a threat to them.

What about the Chargers?

Thanks to the Colts crapping the bed tonight, the Chargers are a completely different story. The Chargers are only one game back, and of course they still have a home game left against the Chiefs.

If the Chargers win that game, not only do they make up the difference in the standings, they would take the lead in tiebreakers. The teams would finish even head-to-head, but a loss to the Chargers would mean that the best record the Chiefs could finish with in-division is 3-3.

The Chargers would have two wins in the division, meaning they’d only need to beat either Oakland or Denver to win the tiebreaker. That’s because, even if the Chiefs and Chargers both finish with the same in-divison record, the Chargers will almost certainly win the third tiebreaker, which is a team’s record in common games.

The Chiefs and Chargers share 14 of the 16 games on their schedule; the only two games which are not shared are Buffalo and Cleveland (for the Chiefs) and New England and Cincinnati (for the Chargers). The Chiefs were 2-0 in non-common games; the Chargers lost to New England already and haven’t played the Bengals yet. If both teams finish, say, 10-6 overall, then the Chiefs would be 8-6 in common games; the Chargers would be at least 9-5, and would win the division.

The implications of all this:

1) There’s no way to over-state the importance of the Chiefs-Chargers game in San Diego in two weeks. For the Chargers, it’s really a must-win game – if they lose that game, they’ll be two games back and lose a tiebreaker. If the Chiefs win that game, they are guaranteed to finish ahead of San Diego in the standings if they finish 10-6. If the Chiefs beat San Diego, not only are they guaranteed to win the division if they finish 11-5, but their guaranteed to win the division if they finish 10-6 unless Oakland wins their last five games.

If the Chiefs lose to San Diego, they lose control of their destiny. If they lose to the Chargers, then even if the Chiefs win their other four games, they have to hope San Diego loses somewhere else along the way.

In short: the Chiefs are more likely to win the division with a 10-6 record and a victory in San Diego, than with an 11-5 record and a loss in San Diego.

2) Chiefs fans should absolutely, positively be rooting for Oakland next week when the Raiders and Chargers play. A Raiders win does open up the possibility that Oakland could win the division with a 10-6 record. However, their path to a 10-6 record runs through Kansas City in Week 17.

Put it this way: if Oakland beats San Diego next week, then even if the Chiefs lose to San Diego the following week, the Chiefs control their own destiny: beat Denver next week, and finish with wins against Tennessee, St. Louis, and Oakland, and the Chiefs are guaranteed to win the division.

3) If the Chiefs do lose to the Chargers, there’s a very good chance that they’ll need help from an outside source – namely, the Broncos. Denver plays both Oakland in Week 15, and more importantly, they host the Chargers in the season finale.

Here’s a likely scenario for you: San Diego beats Oakland next week, while the Chiefs get their revenge on the Broncos, and the Chargers beat Kansas City in two weeks. Chiefs and Chargers both win in Weeks 15 and 16.

Going into the final game of the season, the Chiefs would need to beat Oakland to advance – and they would need Denver to beat the Chargers.

You should have shaken his hand, Todd. When the Broncos come to Arrowhead next week, make sure to tell Josh he’s your BFF.

Okay, so what about the Chiefs’ wild-card odds?

The answer to that is pretty easy, if unfortunate: there aren’t any. Almost.

Thanks to the Buffalo Bills’ continuing quest to be the best 2-14 team in NFL history, this time coughing up a win when Stevie Johnson got a sudden case of the Bowes*, the Steelers escaped with a win on Sunday. (Not that Chiefs fans should complain about the Bills’ ability to blow winnable games this year.) That means there are two AFC North teams (Pittsburgh and Baltimore) that are 8-3, and two AFC East teams (New England and New York Jets) that are 9-2.

*The Bowes: When an elite wide receiver drops a routine throw that would have iced a victory for his team.

There are only two wild-card teams in the conference, so for the Chiefs to qualify as a wild-card team they would have to surpass one of those four teams in the coming weeks.

That isn’t unlikely. What’s unlikely is that the Chiefs would surpass one of those four teams without winning the division. I mean, if the Chiefs win their remaining five games and finish 12-4, they’ll probably finish ahead of one of those teams – but it won’t matter, because they’ll be the AFC West champs.

If the Chiefs finish 11-5, they’re the AFC West champs unless their one loss is to the Chargers, and the Chargers go undefeated the rest of the way.

If the Chiefs finish 10-6, they would need either the Ravens or Steelers to go 2-3 the rest of the way, or they would need the Jets or Patriots to totally collapse and finish 1-4.

The most likely scenario for the Chiefs to win a wild-card spot, then, is if they finish 11-5 but lose the division title to the Chargers. In that case, then if either Baltimore or Pittsburgh lose two games the rest of the way, they would finish in a tie for the final wild-card spot.

Unfortunately, once again, the tiebreakers don’t fall the Chiefs way. When teams from different divisions finish tied for a wild-card spot, the first tiebreaker is head-to-head record. Since the Chiefs don’t play any of these teams this year, the second tiebreaker is conference record.

All four of the Chiefs’ losses have been to AFC teams, and if they lose to San Diego they can finish no better than 7-5 against the AFC. Both the Ravens and Steelers have lost a game to an NFC team, meaning if they finish 11-5, their conference record would be no worse than 8-4, and they would advance.

So if they don’t win the division, the Chiefs best – maybe only – shot at a wild-card spot is to finish 11-5, and hope that either the Steelers or Ravens lose three of their last five games. That’s not an impossibility; the Steelers play in Baltimore next week, so one of these teams is going to lose. The Steelers host the Jets later in the year, the Ravens host the Saints, and both teams have to travel to Cleveland to play a surprisingly feisty Browns squad.

Stranger things have happened. Like, say, on New Year’s Eve, 2006.

Are you really planning to write one of these up every week the rest of the season?

So long as the Chiefs keep up their end of the bargain, I’ll try to keep up mine. So give it about two weeks.

Thursday, November 18, 2010

Royals Report Card, 2010: Part Five.


Finishing up our report card with non-player personnel:

J.J. Picollo – Expectations: Moderate to High; Grade: A

I’m using “J.J. Picollo” as a proxy for the team’s entire player development staff, so this grade isn’t Picollo’s alone; some of the glory should reflect downward on people like Lonnie Goldberg (now the official Scouting Director) and Scott Sharp and Jin Wong, and upward on Dayton Moore and even the Glass family.

I’ve probably written 100,000 words on the farm system over the past 8 months, so there’s no point in expanding on those words much further. I might have been tempted to give the Royals an A+ if they had taken my advice and drafted Grant Green instead of Aaron Crow. There’s still time for Crow to get things together; a year ago we were cursing the Royals decisions to take Moustakas and Hosmer over guys like Rick Porcello and Matt Wieters and Gordon Beckham, and now it’s not so clear.

The Royals have done an outstanding job of drafting and developing players from multiple avenues. They’ve done well with top-of-the-first-round players (Moustakas and Hosmer), with over-slot players (Wil Myers, Chris Dwyer), with projectable arms (Mike Montgomery, Danny Duffy), and with at least one mid-round pick coming off an injury (John Lamb).

The two areas where we haven’t seen outstanding results yet are in Latin American talent, and in late-round picks. The jury is still out on the team’s Latin American operation; those players are typically signed at 16 or 17, and it’s simply too soon to see tangible results. The two original bonus babies, Yowill Espinal and Geulin Beltre,  have yet to reach full-season ball, but they’re only turning 20 this off-season. Salvador Perez looks like a legitimate candidate to play every day in the majors, and Cheslor Cuthbert held his own in the Pioneer League at the age of 17.

We’re still waiting for the Royals to find a starting pitcher or everyday hitter in the late rounds of the draft. Looking at the World Series teams, the Rangers found Ian Kinsler out of Mizzou in the 17th round, while the Giants drafted Jonathan Sanchez in the 27th round. While the Royals have found some decent relievers late, like Blaine Hardy in the 22nd round and Patrick Keating in the 25th, the closest they’ve come to a late-round steal is David Lough, who was an 11th-round pick and could be a worthy successor to David DeJesus’ role as the jack-of-all-trades outfielder. I suppose Jarrod Dyson (50th-round pick in 2006) could be that guy.

But that’s nitpicking. At the beginning of the season, I said that for the Royals to have a successful season in the minors, they needed to finish the season with one of the five best farm systems in baseball, if not top three. Well, they’re in the top one. Hard to find fault with that.


Kevin Seitzer – Expectations: Low to Moderate; Grade: B+

In Seitzer’s case, the “Expectations” were not so much for him as they were for the hitters the Royals had saddled him with. It might be hard to remember, but going into the season the Royals’ offense looked almost certain to be among the worst in baseball. It wasn’t just bad, it was bad without the upside of youth. I mean, look at the Opening Day lineup:

RF: David DeJesus
LF: Scott Podsednik
1B: Billy Butler
CF: Rick Ankiel
DH: Jose Guillen
3B: Willie Bloomquist
SS: Yuniesky Betancourt
C: Jason Kendall
2B: Chris Getz

My God. I mean, My God. Granted that Bloomquist was just a one-day replacement for Alberto Callaspo, the Royals had basically two major-league hitters in their Opening Day lineup.

And yet somehow, the Royals led the majors in batting average for most of the season, and finished the year second with a  .274 team average, behind only the Rangers’ (who benefit from their home park) mark of .276.

Batting average, of course, is a lousy predictor of run scoring, and hitting for average was pretty much all the Royals did well on offense. They finished tied for ninth in the AL in walks*, so their .331 OBP ranked just 8th in the league. They finished 12th in the league in homers, ahead of only Oakland and Seattle, so their .399 SLG ranked just 9th in the AL. Not surprisingly, they finished just 10th in the league in the only team offensive stat that really matters – runs scored.

*: The fact that the Royals ranked ninth in walks is itself a miracle, considering that two years ago – before Seitzer was hired – they walked just 392 times all season, which was not only the lowest total in baseball, but one of the five lowest totals by any major-league team in the last 50 years. The Royals had not ranked as high as ninth in the league in walks since 2003.

Still, if you had told me the Royals would finish ahead of four other AL teams in runs scored at the start of the season, I would have been thrilled. Given an entire bushel of lemons in March, Seitzer fashioned a decent lemonade.

Podsednik, who had hit .270 just once in the previous four seasons, hit .310/.353/.400 with the Royals. After he was traded to the Dodgers, he hit .262/.313/.336.

Guillen, who was left for dead over the winter, hit a perfectly respectable .255/.314/.429 for the Royals. He slugged just .375 for the Giants, despite the fact that, like Podsednik, he was traded to the inferior league.

Wilson Betemit, who hadn’t hit worth a damn in three years and was hitting .265/.358/.407 in Omaha when he was called up, hit .297/.378/.511 for the Royals.

DeJesus was having the best season of his career before he broke his thumb and missed the last two months.

Billy Butler was superficially disappointing because his home run total dropped from 21 to 15, but in reality, by virtue of striking out less and walking more, his OBP jumped 26 points, and given that offense in the AL was markedly down from 2009, Butler was substantially better relative to the league in 2010 than he was the year before (his OPS+ increased from 125 to 134.)

Yuniesky Betancourt wasn’t terrible.

Jason Kendall actually had a .335 OBP through the end of July, before he tried to play with just one shoulder. His final OPS+ of 71 was identical to his performance in 2009, which has to be considered a win given that Kendall was 36 years old.

The one key hitter on the Royals who regressed, Alberto Callaspo, hit even worse after he was traded to the Angels, suggesting that whatever his problem was, it wasn’t his hitting coach.

Seitzer isn’t perfect by any means. For one thing, perhaps his most important pupil, Alex Gordon, took a major step backwards. And I’ve heard criticism from some quarters that Seitzer tries to tailor one approach to all of his players, an approach which emphasizes a line-drive swing over power even in players who would be better served swinging for the fences.

The critics have some evidence in their corner, such as Butler’s astounding 32 double plays. Mike Aviles was hitting an empty .300 for the Royals all season, when in September – by his own admission – he changed his approach to “just swing hard”, and in his last 20 games he slugged .648 with 12 extra-base hits. I don’t know if he went against Seitzer’s orders or not, but he certainly used an unSeitzerish approach. (Then again, it was amazing he was hitting as well as he was so soon after Tommy John surgery.)

It will be interesting to see how Seitzer handles guys like Moustakas and Hosmer and Myers as they arrive in the majors. Moose, in particular, is the polar opposite of Seitzer as a hitter – a left-handed hitter with immense power and excellent ability to put the bat on the ball early in the count – and Seitzer needs to be careful not to force a square peg into a round hole.

But given that Seitzer coaxed an almost-mediocre performance out of a collection of nearly washed-up hitters, I’m certainly excited to see what he can do with elite talent.


Nick Kenney – Expectations: Moderate; Grade: B+

After all the crap I gave the departed Nick Swartz last season, it’s only fair that I take a look at how his successor did. It’s hard to judge a trainer’s effectiveness from afar, even after two decades – that’s why the Royals were so mad at me in the first place. After just one season, it’s nearly impossible. But we’ll try.

Take a look at the injuries on the 2010 Royals:

- Jason Kendall tried to play through a torn rotator cuff for a month. That’s bad, but that’s on Kendall and his medieval baseball code of never admitting to an injury more than on the training staff, I think.

- Alex Gordon broke his thumb sliding into second base. Traumatic injuries are not preventable, and he returned to active duty on schedule.

- Mike Aviles returned from Tommy John surgery well ahead of schedule, and despite his early return was an effective hitter all season, although he did heat up in September. Defensively is a different story, but again – he came back in 9 months. That’s a hell of an accomplishment for everyone involved in his rehab.

- David DeJesus broke his hand banging into a wall. It happens.

- Chris Getz missed two weeks with a strained oblique, but came back as soon as he was eligible; he missed September with a concussion. No fault of the trainers there.

- Rick Ankiel missed two months with a quad injury, then spent almost another month rehabbing in Omaha. If there’s one injury you can point to on the 2010 Royals as taking a lot longer to heal than it should, it’s this one. But there have been whispers in the press that Ankiel was in no rush to re-join a losing Royals squad, and that it wasn’t a coincidence he returned just in time to get traded.

- Josh Fields had major hip surgery in spring training and was originally expected to miss the whole season. He returned in time to rehab in Double-A in August, and hit well for the Royals in September.

- Luke Hochevar strained his elbow in early June – apparently while taking batting practice – and missed nearly three months. He appeared to be at 100% when he returned.

- Brian Bannister, who was shut down in 2009 with shoulder soreness, was never right in 2010, and was all but shut down for the final two months of the season – he made just two appearances after August 2nd.

- Kanekoa Texeira, after allowing ten runs in five appearances, admitted to pain in his elbow, and was shut down for the rest of the year.

Even more impressive might be how Kenney and Assistant Trainer Kyle Turner managed to keep players with nagging injuries in the lineup. Jose Guillen missed only two games all year before he was let go, which is a miracle. Frankly, he should have missed more games, and playing every day was probably detrimental to his production, as he sucked after a hot April. But that’s on Guillen and his manager more than on the trainer.

Billy Butler played with a bruised hand for most of the second half of the season. He missed only three games in the second half, and his production was almost unaffected; after hitting .322/.389/.483 before the Break, Butler hit .312/.386/.451 afterwards.

And Gil Meche, who was damaged goods before they ever showed up on the scene, was predictably awful in the rotation, then was scheduled to undergo surgery that would have kept him out for 18 months – and then had a change of heart, tried to pitch out of the bullpen instead, and against all expectations was actually reasonably effective as a reliever in September.

I haven’t catalogued every injury, but the ones I missed were either minor or were pre-existing conditions (e.g. John Parrish). In their first season with the Royals, Kenney and Turner had a pretty strong track record. Really, the only player on the entire team who suffered a “setback” or took longer to recover from an injury than expected was Rick Ankiel. Most of the guys who went on the DL, even those with significant injuries, came back with no loss of effectiveness.

It’s just one year. But I certainly feel a lot more comfortable entrusting the health of the Royals players to their new training staff than I did the old. Which was sort of the point of my tirade in the first place.


Dayton Moore – Expectations: Low to Moderate; Grade: B-

One of the hardest grades to give out, both because of the nature of his job and because of the schizophrenic manner in which he does it. And really, the grade depends heavily on the timeframe in which you’re looking at.

If you look back over the past year (since the end of the 2009 season), which is what I have done, then there’s an enormous penalty you have to apply for the atrocity that Moore committed to his catching position, when he got rid of Miguel Olivo and John Buck, then signed Jason Kendall for more years and more money than either Olivo or Buck would have received had they been retained (and more than they wound up signing for).

A year later, the outcome of this bizarre swap has been exactly as I (and everyone outside the organization) had predicted. Kendall sucked rocks; Buck had his best season ever, while Olivo had a solid if altitude-enhanced season; both Buck and Olivo are Type B free agents that will earn the Blue Jays (who smartly traded for Olivo’s option just for this purpose) a supplemental first-round draft pick. You know, the same type of draft pick that the Royals would love to get their hands on and have used rather successfully in the past.

(Buck has apparently signed an astonishing 3-year, $18 million contract with the Marlins, to which I can only say: good for him. Better that Buck gets overpaid than for that cretin Jeffrey Loria to pad his bank account. And as ridiculous as that contract is, at least for 2011 I’d rather have Buck at $6 million than Kendall at $3.75 million.)

Then there were the signings of guys like Scott Podsednik and Rick Ankiel, which weren’t necessarily bad signings as much as they were sort of pointless. Brian Anderson was a complete waste, but I find it hard to get worked up over a $700,000 contract.

But over the last eight months…let’s say, hypothetically speaking, that the Royals had fired Dayton Moore in February, and hired someone from outside the organization, let’s say Pat Gillick. And let’s say that Gillick, rather than Moore, was responsible for every transaction that’s been made since February.

Here’s a list of every significant move the new GM would have made:

- Axed Juan Cruz just three weeks and five innings into the season. Bullpen immediately turned around.
- Picked up Jai Miller off waivers.
- Traded Carlos Rosa for Rey Navarro.
- Released Roman Colon.
- Fired Trey Hillman after just six weeks.
- Promoted Bruce Chen to the majors.
- Picked Kanekoa Texeira off waivers.
- Promoted Wilson Betemit to the majors.
- Traded Alberto Callaspo for Sean O’Sullivan and Will Smith. Replaced Callaspo with Betemit.
- Traded Scott Podsednik for Elisaul Pimental and Lucas May. Replaced Podsednik with Alex Gordon.
- Traded Rick Ankiel and Kyle Farnsworth for Tim Collins, Gregor Blanco, and Jesse Chavez.
- DFA’ed Jose Guillen, then traded him for Kevin Pucetas. Gave Guillen’s playing time to Kila Ka’aihue.
- Traded Willie Bloomquist for nothing but the pleasure of trading Willie Bloomquist.

If Gillick – or anyone else – had put together this track record over the last eight months, we’d be speaking of him in the same reverential tones that Mariners fans were using to speak of Jack Zduriencik a year ago. Not every move worked out perfectly, but the new GM would have methodically removed most of the short-term highly-paid veteran talent on the squad for young prospects, without surrendering anyone who figured to be a part of the team’s future beyond 2011, and making at least one F**king-A! trade (Tim Collins) in the process.

That’s not the perception, of course, because the GM who removed so much dead weight from the Royals roster in 2010 is the same GM who added the dead weight in the first place. But it’s only fair to acknowledge that, at least since March or so, Dayton Moore has had a heck of a run. And last winter wasn’t a complete waste, as he did re-sign Chen to a minor league contract, and brought in Betemit on a minor league contract as well. (He also signed Noel Arguelles to a five-year deal, which looked savvy at the time, and may look savvy once again in the future.)

You can’t judge a GM based on eight months, of course. Ask Mariners fans what they think of Zduriencik now, and you’re likely to get some very disparate answers. If the Royals had one of those “Accident-Free For XXX Days” signs in the front office, right now that number would be up around 300, which would be a record under this administration. (Then again, some people would argue that the dial ought to have been reset after the DeJesus trade.)

The point isn’t that Dayton has suddenly become a good GM. The point is to simply acknowledge that he’s had a pretty good 2010, and we can only hope that he keeps his streak going. Depending on who the Royals fail to protect from the Rule 5 draft – rosters have to be set by tomorrow – that streak may end sooner rather than later.


Ned Yost – Expectations: Moderate; Grade: C+

I really don’t have much to say about Yost, which in itself is a victory, given the work that his predecessor did. Yost made some tactical moves which were indefensible – Jason Kendall batting second? – but looking at the strategic, big-picture moves, he was perfectly benign. He got Gordon back in the everyday lineup, he gave Ka’aihue a chance to play everyday (and stuck with him through a miserable August), he got the bullpen settled after they were on a historically bad pace in April.

The settling of the bullpen coincided with the return to form by Robinson Tejeda. On the day Yost was hired, Tejeda had a 5.57 ERA and had allowed 15 walks in 21 innings. Tejeda would give up just two runs over the next two months, and in 40 innings with Yost as his manager, Tejeda walked just 11 batters.

I doubt that the improvement can be credited entirely to Yost, but it was real improvement. And Tejeda’s improvement allowed Yost to pigeonhole Joakim Soria in ninth-inning save situations with little repercussion. You know how I feel about limiting closers to three outs in the ninth, but there’s another school of thought, subscribed to by none other than Bill James, which wonders whether the increase in utterly dominant seasons by closers over the last 15 years might have happened precisely because they’re limited to such a well-defined role.

Soria’s performance in 2010 is certainly a point in their favor. Under Hillman, Soria was brought in for a save situation in the eighth inning four times, and blew two of those saves. Under Yost, Soria pitched before the ninth inning only once all season, and that was to get some work in a blowout. He was used strictly as a three-out closer. He also was nearly perfect in that role, not blowing a save until the final game of the season.

I’m not arguing that Soria should be used as a ninth-inning guy only; if anything, Ron Washington’s bizarre usage of Neftali Feliz in the playoffs should only reinforce the need to use closers more liberally. But at least Yost had an eighth-inning guy who was worthy of the role, allowing him to use Soria in a more restrictive manner.

Yost was brought in to bring some calm and sanity to the manager’s chair, and he did. But that was the easy part of his job. The hard part starts next season, when he the greatest collection of minor-league talent in baseball starts rolling into his clubhouse, and he’ll be expected to turn that talent into a playoff team. Anything less will be a failure.


Bob McClure – Expectations: Moderate; Grade: D+

I’ve defended Bob McClure as a pitching coach for a long time – go back to this article here – and he’s certainly had his successes. But lately, his track record is more notable for the lack of successes. I think that, after five seasons as the Royals’ pitching coach – the longest tenure by a Royals pitching coach as far back as I can track, which is to the 1980s –it may be time for some fresh blood in that position. The Royals disagree with me, obviously, as they are bringing McClure back for another year.

Early in his tenure, McClure did some great work. Most notably, he claimed he could fix Gil Meche overnight, and he did – turning a career underachiever into a solid #2 starter for two-and-a-half seasons. Unfortunately, Meche’s run as a solid #2 starter was ended because he was allowed to pitch when he shouldn’t have been anywhere near a mound. Trey Hillman deservedly gets most of the blame for that, but McClure is far from innocent. As the pitching coach, either he missed the signs that Meche was pitching hurt, or he didn’t but was unable to convince his manager to take Meche out. Either way, that’s a black stain on McClure’s career.

McClure gently nurtured Zack Greinke back from the abyss, got Greinke to expand his repertoire, to max out his fastball more, and turned him into a Cy Young winner. Joakim Soria went from obscure Rule 5 pick to one of the best relievers in baseball overnight, and while most of the credit goes to the Mexicutioner, who arrived in the majors fully-formed*, McClure certainly did nothing to screw him up.

*: There’s really only one other major-leaguer I can think of who, like Soria, was an obscure minor-leaguer right up until the moment he made the Show out of spring training, and though we didn’t know it at the time, was already one of the best players in the majors. Is it fair to call Soria the Albert Pujols of closers?

The pitching staff McClure inherited in 2006 has to rank among the worst pitching staffs in major league history. The Royals’ Opening Day starter was SCOTT ELARTON. Thirteen pitchers started 3 or more games for the Royals that year, and none of them had an ERA lower than 5.12. The Royals allowed 971 runs that year – 72 more than any other team in the majors.

In 2007, the Royals allowed just 778 runs, ranking a respectable 8th in the AL. That’s a remarkable achievement, thanks to scouting (Soria), coaching (Meche), counseling (Greinke), and thinking (Bannister).

But since then, it’s been all downhill:

2007: 778 runs, 8th in AL.
2008: 781 runs, 10th in AL.
2009: 842 runs, 12th in AL.
2010: 845 runs, 14th (last) in AL.

Offense has steadily decreased around baseball over the last few years, but you’d never know that if all the baseball you watched consisted of the opponents’ half of Royals games. Perhaps the best argument you can make against Dayton Moore isn’t simply that, four years after he was hired, the Royals are just as bad as ever. It’s that since 2007, the Royals have actually gone backwards on the mound, even though pitching is the element of the game that Moore stresses the most.

Moore deserves the blame for not giving McClure better pitchers to work with, perhaps. But in 2010, at least:

- McClure failed once again to unlock the enigma that is Kyle Davies. Davies had a 5.34 ERA, the second-worst of any AL qualifer. Davies doesn’t have overwhelming stuff, but it’s far from the second-worst of any AL qualifier.

- Brian Bannister had the worst ERA of any major-league pitcher with 110 innings.

- Luke Hochevar made progress, but it was slow progress, as his 4.81 ERA attests.

- Zack Greinke regressed beyond our wildest fears.

- Sean O’Sullivan came in with modest expectations and failed to even reach those, with a 6.11 ERA.

The only starter who was a pleasant surprise in any way was Bruce Chen. One success and four failures is a poor batting average for anyone.

In the bullpen, Soria continued to pitch transcendently well, and McClure got Tejeda back on the right track after a terrible start. He probably did his best work with Kyle Farnsworth, getting the Goggled One to start throwing more off-speed stuff, and in turn getting him to resemble a major-league reliever long enough to foist him on another team.

But of the many relievers that revolved through the back door of the bullpen, none of them stepped up. Roman Colon was, once again, a joke. Victor Marte. Luis Mendoza. Josh Rupe. Brad Thompson. Jesse Chavez. Most ominously, the two hard-throwing rookies the Royals developed themselves, Blake Wood and Greg Holland, both had ERAs over five.

In isolation, the struggles of every pitcher above has a good explanation. In summary, the collective failures of the pitching staff are an indictment of McClure, and strongly suggest that a change is for the best.

The Royals chose to retain him for another year, and I can’t state with certainty that it’s a mistake. If McClure has another year like 2007 left in him, I’ll be singing his praises this time next year. And you can only assume that working with Tim Collins and Mike Montgomery and John Lamb and who-knows-who-else next season will make McClure look a lot smarter.

Given how much pitching talent the Royals have developed, and how crucial that talent is to their future playoff hopes, McClure better look like a freakin’ genius.


Trey Hillman – Expectations: Low; Grade: F

I only bring Hillman up because it really is rather remarkable how quickly the manager of Kansas City’s major league baseball team turned into a ghost. Hillman wasn’t persona non grata after he was fired; he was persona non exista. You can almost imagine the Royals taking down his portrait from the atrium of the front office and scrubbing the stadium of any evidence that he was ever employed there.

After he was fired I heard derisive comments referring to him as “The Genius”, and the first thing people would say when I asked about Yost was that, if nothing else, he acted like he was in charge – something they couldn’t say about his predecessor. In retrospect, it’s clear that Hillman was on far thinner ice with his GM at the start of the season than we had all anticipated. But in retrospect, it’s also a wonder that the Royals allowed him to hang on as long as he did.

Thursday, November 11, 2010

Somebody Messed With DeJesus.


What should I do?

Should I admit that the Royals have made mistakes?

Should I remind you that they’ve done this before?

Should I give you a history lesson?

What should I do?

…sorry. I feel like I’ve written this article – analyzing an underwhelming trade – so many times that I’ve run out of ledes.

The Royals traded David DeJesus to Oakland yesterday for Vinny Mazzaro and Justin Marks, and the reaction has been decidedly mixed. Fans hate it; some sabermetric types don’t like it, although others – notably Kevin Goldstein and Christina Kahrl – feel like it’s a good deal for both sides, as do most non-sabermetric journalists. Notably, almost no one thinks that the A’s got hosed here.

There’s a lot that people can disagree on about this trade, so let’s start by focusing on the undeniable facts of the deal:

- The trade almost certainly makes the Royals a worse team in 2011. Mazzaro could have a breakout season, or DeJesus could get hurt or suddenly lose effectiveness, but if those outcomes were likely, this trade wouldn’t have been made.

- The trade almost certainly makes the Royals a better – maybe only slightly better – team in 2012 and 2013. DeJesus will be a free agent after next season, and was unlikely to be re-signed. The Royals control Mazzaro’s contract through the end of 2015, and Marks might be ready for the majors in some role by mid-2012 as well. If DeJesus had walked, the Royals might have received one or two draft picks in return, but even if they hit on those picks, those players would be unlikely to surface in the majors before 2014.

- The trade saves the Royals about $5.5 million in 2011, the difference between DeJesus’ $6 million option and the roughly $500,000 that Mazzaro can expect to get. (Mazzaro is unlikely to be arbitration-eligible until 2013.) Saving money is a good thing – unless that money isn’t re-deployed elsewhere, in which case it’s a good thing for David Glass’s bank account only. Still, the money saved in this deal can’t be simply ignored.

- The trade denies the Royals the opportunity to get a draft pick or two when DeJesus walks next winter. For a team that has done a good job of using those high draft picks of late, this is hardly inconsequential. Remember, the Royals drafted Mike Montgomery with the pick they got as compensation when David Riske left as a free agent. Unfortunately, the pick the Royals used to draft Montgomery is the only supplemental pick they’ve had since 2004. It’s not for lack of trying – remember, Dayton Moore offered Mark Grudzielanek arbitration two years ago with the sole purpose of getting a draft pick, which failed when no one wanted to sign Mark.

- The trade relieves the pressure for the Royals to either 1) overspend on a free-agent pitcher to fill up the rotation this winter or 2) rush one of their young pitchers to the majors. Acquiring Mazzaro gives the Royals five major-league caliber starting pitchers – not necessarily good starting pitchers, but pitchers worthy of a roster spot – with three months still to go before spring training. The Opening Day rotation figures to go Greinke-Hochevar-Davies-Mazzaro-O’Sullivan. It’s a mediocre rotation at best, but it’s also a rotation where none of the starters are older than 27.

Of all the ways that Dayton Moore and Allard Baird differ as general managers, probably the most substantial difference is in their timetable for young players to reach the majors. Baird would bring up Leo Nunez or Ambiorix Burgos after two good weeks in Double-A; Moore wouldn’t bring Kila Ka’aihue up after two good years in the high minors. The handling of Ka’aihue was extreme, but in general I like Moore’s approach a lot better. If you keep a player in the minors too long, you might lose out on his performance when he’s ready to help you, but you’re not likely to ruin him. Keep a player in the minors for too short a period of time, and you might ruin him. Delaying his debut also keeps the service time clock from starting.

Given where the Royals are in the development cycle, and given that no one thinks they’ll be competitive until 2012, it makes no sense to bring any of their prospects north with the team on Opening Day next year. (I might make an exception for Tim Collins, who really does have nothing left to prove in the minors.) If trading for Mazzaro keeps the Royals from rushing someone like Danny Duffy into the rotation next spring, that’s a tangible side benefit of the trade.

So without knowing anything about the players involved in the trade, I think it’s important to acknowledge that whether or not we think the Royals made a good trade, we can at least understand why the Royals thought they made a good trade. This is not an awful trade along the lines of some that Dayton Moore has made. This isn’t trading two prospects for the rights to pick up most of Yuniesky Betancourt’s contract, which was a horrible trade from Day One because the Royals didn’t appreciate the desperation the Mariners had to make a trade. This isn’t trading a useful reliever for Mike Jacobs, which was a horrible trade from Day One because the Royals already had player (Ka’aihue) on their roster who could have done the job that they asked Jacobs to do better, and cheaper, and younger.

This was a trade in which the Royals gave up an established major-league player that had one year left on his contract, for an established major-league player that has five years left on his contract, and a minor-leaguer who hasn’t used up a day of service time yet. They traded present value for future value. They traded for two young pitchers, and under Moore the Royals have done a better job evaluating young talent than old, and done a better job evaluating pitchers than hitters. The concept was sound.

Now, about the execution…

We’ll skip over DeJesus for now, as I figure you’re all quite aware of his talents, and since one of his most obvious talents is consistency, we all sort of have an idea of his value.

Let’s talk about Vinny Mazzaro, who’s the key to the deal. Mazzaro was a third-round pick by the A’s in the 2005 draft, the year that they confused everybody who didn’t understand what “Moneyball” was all about by taking a bunch of high school pitchers early in the draft. Mazzaro was the third high-school pitcher the A’s took in the second or third round, and is the only one of the three to pan out so far, although Craig Italiano and Jared Lansford might both make it as middle relievers. (That’s right – the A’s took a guy named Vinny from New Jersey and a guy whose last name was Italiano.)

Mazzaro is a big-bodied right-hander (listed at 6’2”, 210) who throws a four-pitch repertoire, but is primarily known for having a good sinking fastball. He used this sinker to good effect in the minors, particularly in 2008, when – pitching for Midland, a good hitters’ park in the Texas League – he allowed just 3 homers in 137 innings. He reached the majors in June of 2009 – coincidentally, I happened to be in the stands for his major-league debut at U.S. Cellular Park – and has been a slightly-below-average pitcher to date, with a 4.72 ERA in 214 innings.

His biggest weakness to date has been his propensity for the home run, as he’s allowed 31 in those 214 innings. My original feeling when I looked at his stat line was that he had been awfully unlucky – groundball pitchers don’t typically give up a homer every seven innings – and that with normal luck he’s a good candidate for improvement.

But then I dug a little deeper at Fangraphs, and came upon a disturbing figure. Despite being labeled as a sinkerball pitcher from the time he was drafted, he hasn’t remotely been one in the major leagues. As a rookie, his groundball rate was just 39%, which marked him as a distinct flyball pitcher – by comparison, Bruce Chen’s GB% this season was 35%, and he’s one of the most extreme flyball pitchers in baseball. This year, Mazzaro coaxed a few more grounders, but his 43% GB rate was still a little below league average.

This is a problem. Mazzaro isn’t a power pitcher – he’s struck out just 5.8 batters per 9 innings in the majors, which is below-average. He’s not a control pitcher – he’s walked 3.7 batters per 9, also below-average. His entire claim to success rests on his ability to keep the ball on the ground. If his sinker doesn’t sink, then what is he?

The problem isn’t that his fastball literally doesn’t sink – according to Mike Fast, the guru of Pitch F/X data, the trajectory of his sinking fastball is actually quite in line with what a sinking fastball ought to do. The problem is that when the ball comes off the bat, it doesn’t behave like a sinker ought to behave – the groundball rate on Mazzaro’s sinker was 39%, compared to a league average of 52% for sinkers.

Now, with every crisis comes an opportunity, and it’s possible that the disconnect between Mazzaro’s repertoire and his results is an opportunity for the Royals to instantly improve his performance if they’ve identified something in Mazzaro’s delivery that explains the discrepancy. We all thought it was a little ridiculous when the Royals thought they could unlock the potential in Gil Meche, after all these years, simply by having him land on his toes instead of his heel – until it turned out they were right. If the Royals think they’ve pinpointed a similar issue with Mazzaro, well, they’ve earned the right to test that theory.

Unfortunately, my friend Nate Bukaty asked Dayton Moore this exact question on the radio this morning, and Moore’s answer, paraphrased, was that “Mazzaro just needs innings” to improve. If that’s really the Royals’ answer, that’s disappointing. Having said that, if I were the Royals, I wouldn’t admit that I could fix Mazzaro’s delivery until I’ve actually had a chance to work with him in spring training. Making that claim today would be a pretty empty boast, not to mention that Mazzaro might not appreciate hearing the news for the first time from a radio show.

Come spring training, though, that is one of the storylines to look for. And come the regular season, Mazzaro’s groundball/flyball ratio will be one of the most important stats to look at in the early going.

While Mazzaro was the main impetus for making the trade, Justin Marks is not simply a throw-in. Marks was also a third-round pick in the draft, albeit out of college as the ace of the University of Louisville staff last year. He’s a left-hander with a slightly above-average fastball, and throws three secondary pitches (curve/slider/changeup) that are all usable but not particularly distinguished.

I was amused to see so many people describe his first full pro season in 2010 as “disappointing”, because my first thought upon looking at his numbers was that he actually had a pretty good year. Of course, that’s because I was only looking at the right-hand side of his baseball-reference.com page, where I noticed that in 129 innings, he had struck out 136 batters and walked only 49, though he did give up 15 homers.

I guess the disappointment stems from the left-hand side of his page, where you’ll learn that he went 6-13 with a 4.87 ERA. Win-loss records mean less than nothing for minor leaguers, and frankly, ERA is about equally as meaningless. The component stats are all that matter, and Marks’ components show him to be a guy with pretty good stuff for a left-hander. Scouting opinions on him vary, but Baseball America’s Jim Callis tweeted yesterday that at least one scout thought he had a ceiling as a #3 starter in the majors. At worst, a number of people have said that his fastball/slider combination has a future as a lefty specialist in the majors.

With all that said, this makes Marks something like the eighth or ninth-best prospect in the Royals’ system just among left-handed pitchers. I keep saying that the Royals might actually be testing the theory that you can have too much pitching, and with each trade they make, they focus on acquiring more pitching. Going back to the Alberto Callaspo trade, by my count the Royals have traded for 10 players – two low-upside hitters (Lucas May and Gregor Blanco) and eight pitchers. Pitching may be the currency of baseball, but someone needs to tell Moore that by definition, currency is something that it can be used to buy and sell.

I’ve come around to the notion that the Royals received fair value, more or less, for DeJesus, and I think that the people who are calling this deal a disaster are thinking with their spinal cord – it’s an automatic reflex to call any trade between Billy Beane and the Royals’ GM (no matter who he is) a disaster. The best way to illustrate why I think it’s a fair deal is to compare it with the first trade Moore made this summer, when he moved Alberto Callaspo to the Angels in exchange for O’Sullivan and Will Smith.

The trades are eerily similar – in both cases, the Royals traded an everyday hitter in their lineup for a young right-handed starter who had already reached the majors, a starter who has decent but not great stuff, a starter who despite his youth is not projected to improve his stuff over time; and a left-handed starting pitching prospect who has above-average command of average stuff. The trades are thus easily comparable.

There’s no question in my mind that Mazzaro is a better pitcher/pitching prospect than O’Sullivan. Neither pitcher misses a lot of bats, but O’Sullivan’s strikeout rate is particularly bad – just 4.8 Ks per 9 innings. Both pitchers have roughly average control – O’Sullivan’s walk rate of 3.1 per 9 innings is slightly better than Mazzaro’s. And while both pitchers have given up a lot of homers in their career, Mazzaro at least holds the promise of reducing the taters with his sinker – O’Sullivan’s an unabashed flyball pitcher. O’Sullivan strikes me as a #5 starter, maybe #4 if everything breaks right – Mazzaro’s a #4, and a #3 if everything breaks right.

From everything I’ve gathered, I’d also say that Marks is a better prospect than Smith. Marks, I believe, throws a tick harder, and the consensus seems to be that he’ll succeed in the majors in some capacity – at the time the Royals acquired Smith, the consensus was that he was probably nothing more than a Quadruple-A guy.

So the Royals got better players for DeJesus than they did for Callaspo. That stands to reason, since DeJesus is the better player – but at the same time, the Royals had DeJesus under control for one more season at a slightly below-market value salary. Callaspo was under control for three-plus seasons, and was not even arbitration-eligible yet.

If you liked the Callaspo deal – and some of the same people who hate this trade were much more favorable to the Callaspo trade – I think you have to like the DeJesus deal. I was very ambivalent about the Callaspo deal, but at worst, I think that means I have to be deeply ambivalent about the DeJesus deal. Which I am.

And about DeJesus. When the Royals traded Callaspo, I was worried they were selling low, as he was hitting just .275/.308/.410 after his impressive .300/.356/.457 line in 2009. Instead of rebounding, though, Callaspo was awful for the Angels after the trade, batting .249/.291/.315. His power disappeared, and he wasn’t even hitting for average anymore. I have no doubt that the Royals wouldn’t be able to trade him for O’Sullivan and Smith today, or anything close to it.

DeJesus is a better player, but at the same time the Royals traded him at the absolute peak of his abilities. He hit .318/.384/.443 this season, setting career highs in average, OBP, and OPS. Now, by virtue of the fact that DeJesus’ game revolves around batting average – he doesn’t strike out much, but also doesn’t walk much or hit for a lot of power – his performance is heavily dependent on how many groundballs squirt through the infield and how many bloopers drop in no-man’s land.

He got the benefit of a lot of breaks in 2010, which is why he hit .318 instead of his career average of .289. But there’s no reason to think he was doing anything different in 2010 to explain his success, which is why it would be foolish to expect him to hit .318 again next year. He’s a .290 hitter, with some gap power, a few walks, good defense – that’s a good player, but hardly an irreplaceable one. If his luck goes the other way, like it did in 2007, and he hits .260 – well, he’s not even an average outfielder.

And he’s under contract for just one more season.

Frankly, the most valuable thing DeJesus brought to the Royals going forward was that compensatory draft pick. The Royals won’t get that – but they also won’t spend $6 million on DeJesus. People a lot smarter than I have tried to calculate the value of a draft pick, and the general consensus is somewhere around $4 million – double that if he’s a Type A free agent, of course. So between his salary and his draft pick compensation, it’s basically a wash.

So unless you think the Royals can compete in 2011, there’s no question that the Royals are much better off with Mazzaro and Marks than they were DeJesus.

I’m just not convinced that they’re better off than they would have been had they simply waited for a better offer. That’s my main beef with this trade: why now? Why not wait to see where Carl Crawford and Jayson Werth sign, knowing that for the teams that don’t sign either free agent, DeJesus may represent a better option for them than any free agent left on the market?

This again reminds me of the Callaspo deal, in that my main reservation with the trade was less about the talent the Royals received than about the nagging sense that they should have done better. You would think that some team would pony up more for a young, cheap everyday player. But if those offers weren’t there, what were the Royals to do?

In DeJesus’ case, we know that the offers were there. We don’t know what the offers were, but we know they were there – from the Red Sox in particular. It’s not a coincidence that the Red Sox and A’s were most interested, given that DeJesus’ defensive numbers have always been excellent, and those teams take those numbers seriously. But not every team does, and to a team like, say, the Cubs, what do they see when they look at DeJesus? A guy who can hit .300 but doesn’t hit for power, doesn’t have a lot of speed, and has to play a corner outfield spot. And who’s under contract for one year. And getting paid six million dollars.

So it’s quite possible that we, as fans, are overestimating the interest in DeJesus, and overestimating the offers that were made for him. Moore said on the radio today that this was “clearly” the best offer that any team had made for DeJesus, and what sucks is that I have no choice but to believe him. This is the uncertainty that makes my job difficult – without knowing what other offers were made, I can only speculate as to whether the Royals could have done better. All I know for certain is that trading DeJesus makes more sense than letting him go as a free agent next year. I have no way of knowing whether the Royals missed an opportunity to trade him for more.

If the Royals had asked me yesterday whether to take the deal or not, I would have said no. I would have said, wait for a better deal, and if you don’t get it, pencil DeJesus in as your right fielder and re-assess the situation in July. I would have told them that, while everyone seems to think the Royals are going to be awful in 2011, I actually think that the team could play close to .500, because Zack Greinke should be better, and Alex Gordon can’t be any worse, and Ka’aihue could be a stud, and Hochevar might take a step forward, and there aren’t a lot of players on the team (aside from maybe Yuni) who you’d expect to be significantly worse. If Gil Meche stays healthy in the bullpen, and Tim Collins does what we think he can do, the bullpen should be an asset. Mix in some second-half debuts from the Prospect Tsunami, and who knows what might happen?

I would have also told him that if you trade DeJesus, then you’re probably forfeiting your chances of signing Greinke to a contract extension. I might be in the minority here, but I still feel like if the Royals can simply put a .500 team on the field in 2011, that they have a real opportunity to convince Greinke to re-sign with the team. But if they suck in 2011, it won’t matter if they play well in 2012, because they’ll have no choice but to trade him by the trading deadline in 2011 before his trade value starts to evaporate.

The irony is that by trading DeJesus now, by keeping their vision focused on 2012 and beyond, Dayton Moore is being credited for looking at the big picture. But the way I see it, trading DeJesus for Mazzaro and Marks makes sense up close – the Royals will probably get more value for the two guys they traded for than the guy they sent packing – but it fails in the big picture, because it sets up a domino effect which almost forces the Royals to trade Greinke by the end of July.

Maybe that’s for the best. Maybe the Royals can get a Teixeira-like haul for Greinke, and maybe the players they get for him will be the coup de grace on a 2012 or 2013 Royals team which takes baseball by storm. Maybe Greinke will go down in history as the final sacrifice a long-suffering franchise had to make to end a quarter-century of misery.

That doesn’t mean I have to like it.

What should I do?

Should I throw a fit and say, once again, that Dayton Moore doesn’t know what the hell he’s doing? But if trading DeJesus, and likely Greinke after him, leads us to the promised land in two or three years, how can I complain now?

Should I Trust The Process? But if Moore trades off the two best Royals of the last seven years and doesn’t lead us to the promised land, how can I defer to his judgment now?

Or should I just wait and see?