Francoeur Forever.

We can argue the merits of the deal all day long. But I think we can all agree one thing: it was inevitable.

Having landed his white whale last winter, Dayton Moore wasn’t about to let Jeff Francoeur go. One year turned into three; after paying just $2.5 million (with some incentives) to secure Francoeur’s services for 2011, the Royals will be paying him $13.5 million to keep him in town for 2012 and 2013.

And like almost every move Moore makes, I’m deeply ambivalent about the signing. In the first 24 hours after the deal, I probably changed my position a half-dozen times. Ultimately, though, I have decided I am against the extension. I’m not vociferously against it, and I wouldn’t be surprised if it works out, but I think the odds are against it. But the reasons why I’m against the extension are probably not what you think.

There are two questions that have to be asked of the extension:

1) Is Jeff Francoeur worth $13.5 million over the next two years?

2) Is Jeff Francoeur a good fit for the Kansas City Royals over the next two years?

My answer to the first question is decidedly more neutral than most members of the sabermetric community. But then, I’ve been out of lock-step with the sabermetric community on Francoeur for over two years now, ever since I advocated that the Royals acquire him. Francoeur is a flashpoint in the still-simmering battle between scouts and stats. He is a player with undeniable skills – he was on the cover of Sports Illustrated at the age of 21 for a reason – and equally undeniable flaws.

From 2008 to 2010, from the ages of 24 to 26, Francoeur hit .256/.301/.389 and was one of the worst everyday players in baseball. His 2008 season, when he hit .239/.294/.359 with bad defense in right field, ranks (according to Baseball Reference) as one of the ten worst seasons by any hitter in the last 50 years. It was worse than Neifi Perez’s 2002 season, which seems hard to believe.

Nonetheless, Francoeur has been an everyday player for virtually his entire career, in part because teams still see his underlying tools, and in part because of his vivacious personality. Francoeur clearly got more opportunities than his performance has warranted – but just as clearly, the sabermetric establishment has tried to overcorrect for his reputation. I have no argument with the way analysts have consistently portrayed his performance over the last five years as beyond wretched – I agree with it.

But it’s one thing to say Francoeur is wretched – it’s another to say he is beyond redemption. Players aren’t static creatures, and they are capable of improvement, particularly when they are still in their mid-20s. Francoeur is no exception to that rule, but at times he has been treated that way, as when the Royals signed him this winter. Most – certainly not all – analysts thought it was a terrible move for the Royals, even though it was just a one-year commitment, and it wasn’t a lot of money, and the Royals had no better internal options.

Even when Francoeur got off to a great start this season, it was written off as typical Frenchy, always hitting well in his first month with his new team before reverting back to form. (Which is true, but in lieu of an actual explanation for why he would choose to suck after his first month, I failed to see why we should assume Francoeur was just baiting us.) And when Francoeur slumped in May and June, the conventional wisdom was that he was returning to his true talent level.

But since July 1st, Francoeur has disrupted the narrative. Here’s his monthly splits:

April: .314/.357/.569

May: .233/.287/.388

June: .235/.280/.367

July: .306/.377/.531

August: .306/.351/.458

For the season, he’s hitting .277/.330/.463, good for an OPS+ of 119, in a non-trivial sample size of 123 games. And I would submit that if someone named “Jeff Spainoeur” were a 27-year-old rightfielder with a cannon arm, and was hitting .277/.330/.463, and was an impending free agent, and his team signed him to a 2-year, $13.5 million extension…the reaction from most analysts wouldn’t be nearly so negative. It might, in fact, be positive.

That’s a red herring of sorts, because Jeff Spainoeur wasn’t one of the worst players in the game from 2008 to 2010, and Jeff Francoeur was, and past performance matters. By giving him a two-year extension, the Royals are basically gambling $13.5 million that, in this case, past performance doesn’t matter.

And that’s really the question here. If Francoeur plays as well in 2012 and 2013 as he has in 2011 – no better – he will justify this contract and then some. If he regresses even a little towards his performance the last three years, he’ll be an overpriced albatross.

So let’s break down his performance this year. What stands out to me is that – with the notable exception of his steals (he has 19 already, after having never stolen more than eight in any previous season) – Francoeur isn’t doing anything that out of character for him. He’s hitting .277; his career average is .269. He’s on pace for 19 homers, matching the number he hit as a 23-year-old in 2007; as a 22-year-old, he hit 29 homers. He’s hit 37 doubles and is on pace for about 45, which would be a career high; on the other hand, he’s hit over 30 doubles in three of the last four years.

He is on pace for 45 walks – breaking his career high of 42 – and 124 strikeouts, close to his career high of 132. He hasn’t struck out over 100 times in a season since 2008. If anything, it appears Francoeur made too much contact the last few years, or at least too much weak contact. His strikeout rate is back where it was from 2005 to 2007, when he was a decent player. Overall, he has the best strikeout-to-walk ratio of his career, but it’s not dramatically out of line with his past.

Aside from his steals, there’s nothing in Francoeur’s performance that seems unsustainable – and the Royals aren’t paying him $13.5 million because of his ability to steal bases. His improvements are subtle, but they’re across-the-board, and they’re made more impressive by the fact we’ve entered a low-offense era. Consider this:

2007: .293/.338/.444, 102 OPS+

2011: .277/.330/.463, 119 OPS+

In terms of raw offensive numbers, Francoeur is hitting almost exactly the same this year as he did four years ago – he’s traded eight points of OBP for 19 points of slugging. But the value of his performance is dramatically different – in 2007 he was essentially a league-average hitter, while in 2011 the same numbers are well above-average.

If you’re looking for numbers that will support the conclusion that he’s having a fluke season, your best bet is to look at his platoon splits. Most of the improvement Francoeur has shown this season has come against left-handed pitching – he is crushing them to the tune of .315/.378/.604. His OPS against southpaws this season is 141 points higher than his career numbers of .300/.347/.494. Against right-handed pitching, he’s only slightly better this season (.265/.314/.420) than his career line (.257/.299/.405).

On the other hand, hits against left-handed pitchers still count on the scoreboard. I’d be more concerned if his numbers this year were skewed by facing more left-handed pitchers than he normally does, but he’s actually faced left-handed pitching slightly less often (24% of the time) in 2011 than for his career (28%) as a whole. Basically, Francoeur is a league-average hitter against right-handed pitching, and an All-Star against left-handers.

Looking at Fangraphs’ pitch data, one thing stands out about Francoeur’s performance this season. While he swings at pitches outside the strike zone as much as always – he’s taken a hack at 40% of pitches outside the zone, a little higher than his career average of 38% – he has swung at pitches inside the strike zone at the lowest rate of his career. Francoeur has tried his luck against just 72% of pitches inside the zone, compared to a career average of 80%.

He’s still more aggressive than the average hitter – the typical batter swings at only 65% of pitches in the strike zone. But this fits with the theory that Francoeur isn’t succeeding by making more contact – he’s succeeding by making better contact, or more precisely, by not swinging at pitches that he can’t do anything with other than pop up or ground out weakly.

I don’t know if his performance is sustainable – but there is nothing about his performance that suggests it isn’t. And, again: he’s 27 years old. Alex Gordon is 27 years old, and he’s having a season that’s more out of character with his previous career than Francoeur is. (Last year, both Gordon and Francoeur had an OPS+ of 84 – but this year, Gordon’s OPS+ is 139.) Few people think Gordon’s improvement is a fluke. Sure, that’s because Gordon was a stud in the minor leagues – but it was just one season, and if we’re going to talk about just one season, then Francoeur was a stud in the major leagues at an age when Gordon was still a college junior. Gordon showed promise as a sophomore in the majors – but there’s hardly any difference between Gordon’s 2008 and Francoeur’s 2007.

The main reason people take Gordon’s performance more seriously than Francoeur’s is because Gordon knows the strike zone. That’s a valuable skill, but there are players who can succeed without plate discipline, and we shouldn’t discount Francoeur’s performance simply because he’s swing-happy. And the other reason why we take Gordon’s performance more seriously is that it’s coming on the heels of only two bad seasons, while Francoeur has had three in a row. But again: they’re both 27 years old. I don’t think it’s fair to penalize Francoeur because he was an above-average player in the majors at a younger age than Gordon was.

With all that said, I think the Royals overpaid a little. Francoeur’s having a good season at the plate, but he’s a rightfielder; most of them have. Of the 30 rightfielders in baseball who have played in 80 or more games, Francoeur ranks just 12th in OPS+. His defense is good but overrated – his arm, which is legitimately great, is not matched by his range, which is average or maybe a tick below.

He gets points for his durability; I don’t think Francoeur has ever been on the DL. Add it all up, though, and I thought Francoeur was likely to earn somewhere between $10 and $12 million over the next two years. He got $13.5 million instead. That’s not a huge overpay, but the Royals didn’t get any kind of Dayton Moore discount either. If Francoeur continues to play at the level he has sustained over the last four months, he’ll earn his money and more. But at this salary, I think the upside is limited. The downside, given Francoeur’s history, is considerable.

The downside is limited by one thing: it’s only a two-year deal. Francoeur will not have turned 30 by the time he’s a free agent. It’s nearly impossible to hand out a bad one-year deal, and even with a two-year contract it’s pretty difficult. The most overpriced part of any contract is the final year of the deal. I was worried that Moore would go three years or even longer in order to keep Francoeur in tow, particularly with Wil Myers struggling in Double-A. By signing Francoeur for just two years, Moore keeps the Royals from paying for his decline, and sets up a graceful transition to Wil Myers in late 2013 or at the beginning of 2014.

Add up all the pros and cons, and I come to the conclusion that it’s a fair deal for both sides. The Royals paid Francoeur his market value, more or less.

And with all that, I don’t like the deal.

The first reason for my skepticism is this: why now? Why hand out a multi-year deal in the middle of the season? This wouldn’t bother me so much if the Royals didn’t have an official policy of not negotiating contracts during the season. I mean, just last week we heard the happy news that the Royals had expressed to Alex Gordon their interest in discussing a long-term contract after the season, and he had expressed an interest to reciprocate. That’s terrific news – a long-term contract for Gordon should be the Royals’ #1 priority this off-season – but it raises the question: why did the Royals make Francoeur’s contract extension a higher priority than Gordon’s?

There are two possibilities. One is that Francoeur came to the Royals with an interest to sign a contract, which is the exception to the team’s policy, as they also did an in-season deal with Joakim Soria. But Soria’s contract, as everyone in baseball knows, was a very club-friendly deal. This contract isn’t. Francoeur got market value.

The other possibility is that the Royals were just so freaked out about Francoeur reaching free agency this winter that they were determined to sign him before he could test the market. If that’s the case – I mean, come on. Francoeur’s having a nice comeback season, but it’s not like he’s hitting like an All-Star. Factor in the possibility that he could go back to being the hitter that got chased out of Atlanta by a pitchfork-wielding mob, and a 2-year, $13.5 million contract was probably about as well as he could do.

This looks like a bit of a desperation move to me, in which the Royals decided to get a deal done just so they could cross it off their to-do list. What worries me is that the last time the Royals made a big transaction that appeared to be a bit premature, it was the David DeJesus trade. As they did last November, the Royals emphasized expediency over actually getting the best deal done.

If Francoeur continues to hit well the rest of the season, it won’t matter much. But by signing him in mid-August instead of after the season, the Royals are running the risk that he tanks over the last six weeks, in which case he’s signed to a contract that’s way overpriced before it even starts. If Francoeur hits like he did in May and June over the next two weeks, he’ll wind up with a line of .260/.310/.420, which is barely worth playing at all, let alone guaranteeing eight figures for. Even if you believe Francoeur’s performance is for real, given his history, wouldn’t you rather have six months of data to feel good about instead of four?

The Royals did this seven years ago, when Allard Baird was so impressed by Angel Berroa’s rookie season that he was committed to getting him signed to a long-term deal, and not even Berroa’s slump to begin 2004 could diminish Baird’s enthusiasm. The four-year deal was announced in mid-May, when Berroa was hitting around .200 with no secondary skills. He wound up batting .262/.308/.385, with noticeably worse defense than he showed as a rookie, and there were already second thoughts about his contract before it even went into effect. But the Royals had already committed to Berroa from 2005 through 2008; after a marginally bad 2005 season, Berroa was one of the worst players in baseball in 2006, and by 2007 the Royals had sent him and his bloated contract to Triple-A.

Francoeur’s contract only runs half as long. But as with Berroa’s rookie season, there is at least some reason to think Francoeur is having a fluky year, and I think the Royals should have waited as long as possible, and for as much data as possible, before committing to him past this year.

The second, and more significant, reason for my skepticism is that while Francoeur’s contract makes sense in the abstract, I don’t think he’s the best fit for the Royals going forward. This contract tells me that the Royals believe they can think about contending as soon as next season, a sentiment I share.

That requires a sea change in the way the organization builds its major league roster – winning trumps development, and tactical considerations trump strategic ones. That means that the Royals can’t just put a bunch of talented players on the field and hope. It means they need to do things like pinch-hit for their shortstop when the need arises, and not stick with a struggling starting pitcher when the game is on the line. It also means that they need to consider how the different parts of their lineup fit together.

Going into 2012, the Royals had three in-house candidates to fill two spots: center field and right field. (I will give them the benefit of the doubt that Alex Gordon’s place in left field is secure.) Those candidates were Francoeur, Melky Cabrera, and Lorenzo Cain.

Cain has the advantage of being the only one of the three who is a plus defender in center field. I’ve said this before, but it’s become enough of a problem that it needs to be repeated frequently: Melky Cabrera is a centerfielder in name only. The Royals rank 27th in the majors in Defensive Efficiency, and that’s despite the massive upgrade from Yuniesky Betancourt to Alcides Escobar at shortstop. With a young and inexperienced rotation likely for the next few years, more improvement is needed. Getting Cabrera out of center field is a top priority. That doesn’t mean trading him – he has been an adequate corner outfielder in the past, and probably will be again if the Royals move him to one.

Cabrera has the advantage of being the only one of the three who does not bat right-handed. I’ve written this before, but since no one else seems to be talking about it I’ll mention it again: the Royals are in danger of being a very right-handed-hitting team. Mike Moustakas, Eric Hosmer, and Alex Gordon all bat left-handed. But Billy Butler, Johnny Giavotella, Alcides Escobar, and Salvador Perez all bat right-handed. Not only that, but every top hitting prospect in the organization bats right-handed. The best prospects in the entire system that don’t bat right-handed are:

Triple-A: David Lough and Jarrod Dyson. (Yes, and Clint Robinson and Kila Ka’aihue, but they have no future in Kansas City.)

Double-A: Derrick Robinson and Paulo Orlando.

High-A: Rey Navarro, the one legitimate prospect on this list.

Low-A: No one.

Everyone from Wil Myers and Christian Colon to Brett Eibner and Cheslor Cuthbert bats right-handed. As does, I should point, Bubba Starling.

Cain and Francoeur both bat right-handed, while Cabrera is a switch-hitter. If the Royals commit to Cain in center field and trade Cabrera, the Royals will have six right-handed bats in the lineup almost every day next year, with little hope that the ratio will balance out in the near future. (Incidentally, this is one of the main reasons why I think the Royals would be foolish to let go of switch-hitting Brayan Pena as their backup catcher.)

Francoeur is the only one of the three who could neither play good defense in center field nor bat from the left side. The obvious solution for the Royals was to promote Cain, move Cabrera to right field (or possibly to left field, with Gordon switching corners), and to wave Francoeur good-bye. That would have upgraded their outfield defense while maintaining the platoon advantage in at least four spots in the lineup.

By re-signing Francoeur, the Royals put themselves in a difficult decision. Maybe they are able to trade Cain for a starting pitcher, in which case they’re stuck with a bad defender in a crucial up-the-middle position. Maybe they can turn Cabrera into prospects, in which case they’re going to be eaten alive by tough right-handed pitching. But the Royals have created a situation where, no matter which way they go, they’ve left the 2012 team with a significant tactical weakness.

Maybe the Royals get really creative here, and trade both Cain and Cabrera in order to open a spot for Jarrod Dyson (which honestly isn’t as crazy as it sounds). Or maybe they trade Butler and DH Cabrera (which is as crazy as it sounds, as I don’t think the Royals can get fair value for Butler). But as it stands now, bringing back Francoeur is the first domino in a chain reaction that, whichever way it goes, doesn’t end well for the Royals.

I hope I’m wrong. I hope that, between now and Opening Day, the Royals come up with an outfield arrangement which maximizes their chances of winning in 2012. The problem is that they already had such an arrangement at their fingertips, and let it go rather than relinquish their precious Francoeur. Re-signing Frenchy certainly isn’t a crippling move along the lines of the Jose Guillen contract; it doesn’t clearly make the Royals worse like the Mike Jacobs trade did. But the Royals spent a fair amount of money on a player who doesn’t have a long track record of success, and who the Royals didn’t really need in the first place.

There were better ways to spend that money. Love may be blind, but it ain’t cheap. If Dayton Moore’s love is requited, this contract won’t hurt the Royals. Unfortunately, “not hurting the Royals” is about the best we can hope for.

The Signing Deadline.

I know I owe you an article about how the additions of Johnny Giavotella and Salvador Perez have put the finishing touches on the most interesting Royals lineup in years, if not decades. But as you know, Monday was the signing deadline for the draft, and when the dust had settled, it turned out to be a far more interesting day for the Royals than I would have expected.

The interesting part of the day had little to do with Bubba Starling. There was no real danger that Starling wouldn’t sign, not when it was clear that his football skills didn’t match his baseball skills (run-first Nebraska quarterbacks are not exactly elite NFL prospects), not when it was clear how excited he was to be drafted by his hometown team, and not when – most importantly – the Royals have made it abundantly clear over the past four years that they will pay the market rate and then some to sign elite talents.

Starling did sign, as expected, and as expected, he signed so close to the deadline that the first confirmation on Twitter (from Scott Boras’ personal mouthpiece, Jon Heyman) didn’t arrive until about 4 minutes after the deadline had passed. Mildly surprising was that Starling signed for $7.5 million, which was less than what most people expected.

On Draft Day, I had predicted this exact amount, but as we got closer to the deadline, and rumors of $10 million offers swirled and the Boras Factor got magnified, I decided to inch my prediction upward, settling in at $8.25 million. They say you should never bet the under on a Boras contract. That may be true in general, and that’s almost always true for free-agent signings, but I think we may have reached our limit with amateur players, where the money being offered is so life-changing that teams feel comfortable sticking to their offer and daring the player to walk away. Even Scott Boras has his limits.

When Stephen Strasburg got a shade over $15 million guaranteed, everyone assumed Bryce Harper would get even more the following year; it’s a rare year that a Boras client doesn’t break the previous bonus record, after all. But Harper signed for just $9.9 million guaranteed. While Harper had uncommon leverage – he was just 17, after all, and could have gone back into the draft a year later – the Nationals quite reasonably didn’t want to guarantee as much for a player still years away from the majors as they did for a pitcher who could have been a #3 starter in the majors while he was still a college sophomore. And they didn’t have to, because 10 million dollars is an insane amount of money for a 17-year-old kid to walk away from. Scott Boras is many things; he’s not insane.

The rumors – and I must emphasize that everything I’m about to write is pure conjecture – were that the Royals offered $7.5 million to Starling immediately after he was drafted. Based on that rumor, and the fact that the two sides reportedly had no contact until just hours before the deadline, I will try to connect the dots here:

- The Royals drafted Bubba Starling, and immediately thereafter made a formal contract offer of $7.5 million, spread out over five years (taking advantage of the MLB provision that allows two-sport athletes to be paid over five years.)

- The Starling camp responded with a demand for $10 million.

- The two sides spoke rarely, if at all, between Draft Day and about 10:30 on Monday night.

- At 10:30, the Royals made the same offer they had in June, $7.5 million.

- The Boras camp made a counteroffer – perhaps the same $10 million, perhaps not. The Royals refused to budge.

- The minutes counted down, and the Boras camp tried to call the Royals’ bluff. They couldn’t, because it wasn’t a bluff. I’m reasonably certain that the Royals would have held their offer all the way to the deadline.

- The Starling camp realized in the final minutes that the Royals weren’t bluffing. At this point, my guess is that Boras tried to get a cosmetic concession, asking for the $7.5 million to be paid upfront. The Royals agreed to compromise on this request, which is why Starling’s bonus will be paid out over three years instead of five. (This is quite unusual – I’m not sure I’ve seen a signing bonus paid out over three years before. It’s almost always either a five-year spread or a lump sum.)

- With 51 seconds to the deadline, according to published reports, the Royals and Starling agreed to terms.

If my narrative is correct, than the Royals got Scott Boras – or his client – to blink. On the other hand, Boras got his client $7.5 million, the most guaranteed money the Royals have ever given to an amateur player here. The Royals were winners here, but there were no losers.

The part of the narrative I’m most certain about is that there was virtually no negotiating between Draft Day and August 15th, which was true for the majority of first-rounders – 23 of the 33 first-round picks had not agreed to terms going into Monday, and 22 of those 23 wound up signing. If we didn’t know it already, the two-month delay between the draft and the signing deadline is a complete waste of time. I’d rant more about this, but with a new Collective Bargaining Agreement being hammered out behind closed doors, I’m fairly confident that the signing deadline starting next year will be July 15th, if not sooner.

Anyway, Starling’s signing was a foregone conclusion; the intrigue came elsewhere in the draft. Whatever money the Royals saved by holding firm with Bubba, they spent and more. The Royals had already given second-round pick Cameron Gallagher $750,000 to sign – a little over the “recommended bonus” for his draft slot of $562,500. But on Monday, David Glass put on red tights and a fake white beard and stuffed a pillow under his shirt.

Fifth-round pick Patrick Leonard signed for $600,000. Slot money for his draft position was $161,100.

Fourth-round pick Kyle Smith signed for $695,000 – slot was $227,700.

Third-round pick Bryan Brickhouse, who before the draft was rumored to be demanding $1 million to sign, got his million – and an extra $500,000 to boot. Slot was $358,200.

Those signings were largely expected, although Brickhouse’s bonus was awfully surprising. But that wasn’t it. The Royals dispensed several other large bonuses to late picks who dropped in the draft because they were considered difficult signs.

Jack Lopez, the Royals’ 16th-round pick, was a Florida high school shortstop with the polish you’d expect from the son of the Reds’ bullpen coach. He got $750,000 to sign.

Jake Junis, an athletic two-way player from here in Illinois, had been drafted in the 29th round. The Royals signed him as a pitcher for $675,000.

In the 30th round, the Royals selected Mark Binford, a 6’7” right-hander whose high school career had been interrupted by Tommy John surgery, but has significant projection. They inked him for $575,000.

All told, according to Baseball America, the Royals spent a shade over $14 million in the draft. This smashed the previous all-time record – the Nationals had spent close to $12 million last year – but was only the third-richest draft haul this season, as the Nationals spent $15 million and the Pirates set the new record at just over $17 million.

The Nationals spent most of their bonus money on their first four picks, notably giving third-rounder Matt Purke, who came into the year as a projected Top 5 overall pick, $4 million and a major-league contract even though his arm may be damaged goods at this point. The Pirates spent $13 million of their $17 million on just two players – #1 overall pick Gerrit Cole, and their second-round pick Josh Bell, who was considered to be unsignable given his stated desire to go to college. By comparison, the Royals spread the wealth around a little more.

Look at it this way: the Royals, with just two picks in the first two rounds, spent more money in the draft than the Tampa Bay Rays, who had twelve picks in the first two rounds. That’s largely because the Royals had the chance to draft Starling, of course, who himself accounted for more than half the money the Royals spent. But consider this: the Royals handed out bonuses of $575,000 or more to as many players – eight – as the Rays did. That’s impressive.

Tempering my enthusiasm is that while the Royals gave out a lot of big bonuses, none of the guys they gave them to were elite, first-round-caliber talents that fell in the draft. There was no Wil Myers or Chris Dwyer or even Tim Melville in this draft – with the exception of Bubba, no one the Royals signed would have been a first-round pick in a world where signability wasn’t an issue. These were all second-to-fifth round talents. The Royals were willing to spend, but whether they get a return on their investment depends on their ability to scout.

It’s notable that the late-round signings – Lopez and Junis and Binford – were scouted throughout the summer, which allowed the Royals to get a better read on their abilities. Presumably, if they hadn’t liked what they saw, the Royals wouldn’t have been willing to cough up half a million dollars to sign them. A player’s stock can rise dramatically in the course of one summer – Albert Pujols famously showed a glimpse of what was to come between the time the Cardinals drafted him and when he signed. But all three late-round signings got the equivalent of second-round money – suggesting they are fine players, but not can’t-miss prospects by any means.

All eight players, it should be noted, are high school guys. The Braves’ philosophy has always been high school-heavy, and it’s usually worked for them. It’s worked for the Royals by and large since Dayton Moore was hired. But there’s added risk involved, and an added delay in seeing a return on their investment.

And let’s not forget: the Royals already gave $3 million to Elier Hernandez and $2 million to Adalberto Mondesi (Raul Mondesi’s son), both 16-year-olds out of the Dominican Republic. (Hernandez is an outfielder, Mondesi’s a shortstop.) They are the two largest bonuses ever given to an international amateur player by the Royals (Noel Arguelles aside; Cubans are always counted differently for some reason.) Both are 16 years old and have huge risk profiles. But with huge risk comes huge reward; the player who previously held the Royals’ record for the highest bonus given to a Latin American talent, Cheslor Cuthbert, is raking in the Midwest League at the age of 18 and is one of the best prospects in the system.

So counting the money spent in Latin America, the total outlay for amateur players by the Royals this summer checks in at around $20 million. (Thanks, Gil!) Amazingly enough, I’ve been told that’s not a record. What is almost certainly a record, though, is this: the Royals have spent more than half as much money ($20 million) on amateur players this year as they have on their entire major-league payroll ($36 million). I highly doubt any other team has ever done that.

Let me rephrase that: if my assumptions are correct, the Royals have devoted a larger share of their player budget to amateur talent than any other team in the history of baseball.

I fervently believe that the Royals can be competitive next year, and I fervently believe that they should be competitive in 2013. If they are not, heads deserve to roll.

But it’s worth remembering that, even if the worst-case scenario happens and Dayton Moore is shown the door in two years, he will have left the organization with a great deal of depth in the farm system. It took years to get the hamster wheel to start moving at full speed, but now that it is, it’s running of its own accord – the talent that’s making its way to the major-league roster is being replaced at the lowest rungs of the minor leagues just as fast.

Every player who has made his debut with the Royals since Opening Day is under contract through 2017. Maybe the Royals stumble next year, and maybe they stumble the year after that. But they’ve got six chances to get it right. With all the talent already on hand, and $20 million worth of ballplayers just now added, you have to figure they’re going to get it right at least once before time runs out.

Meanwhile, only two organizations spent less than $3 million in the draft: the Detroit Tigers and the Chicago White Sox. The Royals don’t have to focus on beating the Yankees and Red Sox – they simply have to beat the four other teams in the AL Central. And, at least when it comes to amateur talent, the Royals out-spent half of their divisional rivals this summer by the margin of nearly seven-to-one. If you’re looking for a reason to dream about the Royals not just winning, but dominating their division in a few years, well, stop looking.

Of Moose And Men.

Last night, Mike Moustakas played third base, as he has done in virtually every game since he was called up in early June, and batted 8th, as he has done in most every game since last Sunday – and, I’m guessing, never in his entire life before that.

He struck out in his first plate appearance against Jake Peavy. His second time up, he hit a liner right back to Peavy. His third time up, he jumped on a hanging breaking ball and lined it straight to the rightfielder. His final time at-bat, leading off the 9th against flamethrowing lefty Chris Sale with the Royals down a run, he grounded out weakly to the first baseman.

Four times up, four times made out, and it’s telling that having two hard-hit balls represents some kind of progress for Moustakas. Moustakas played in his 50th major-league game last night. After homering in his second career game, he hasn’t done so since. He endured a 2-for-49 stretch in mid-July, and after breaking out of that slump – if you can call going 7-for-27 a slumpbuster – he’s now 6-for-44 since. Since the 4th of July, Moustakas is 15-for-118, a .127 average, with just four extra-base hits (all doubles) and four walks. He’s 0-for-31 against the White Sox in his short career. He’s 4-for-47 against left-handed pitching. He’s 7-for-56 with runners in scoring position. From the 7th inning on, he’s 7-for-64. And so on.

Remember what a horrible hitter Alcides Escobar was before he suddenly caught fire in early June? After going 0-for-4 on June 6th, Escobar was hitting .203/.237/.236. In 212 at-bats, he had seven extra-base hits (all doubles) and nine walks.

In 183 at-bats, Moustakas is hitting .187/.241/.235 with seven extra-base hits (six doubles, one homer) and 13 walks. And he’s unlikely to contend for a Gold Glove at shortstop.

Prospects, even top prospects, have been known to struggle in their first exposure to major-league pitching. On some level, every rookie has endured the difficulties that Moustakas has dealt with. But very few rookies have endured this much difficulty.

How few? I decided to make a list of every third baseman who, in the year he debuted in the major leagues, batted 175 or more times with an OBP of under .250 and a slugging average of under .250.

Mike Moustakas is the first name on that list. He is also the last name on that list. No third baseman has ever debuted as poorly as Moustakas has in so many at-bats.

So I decided to expand the list to look at players at any position, with the same criteria as above – 175+ plate appearances, sub-.250 OBP and sub-.250 SLG. Seven other players met those criteria – but just one since 1972, and just three since World War II.

The only player of my lifetime with such a horrible debut was Brandon Inge, whose career is intertwined with Moustakas in an interesting way. Inge came up as a highly-touted catcher in 2001; he had been #67 on Baseball America’s Prospect List that spring. He hit .180/.215/.238 in 79 games. This being the early-21st-century Tigers, they had no better options other than to let him continue to play. In 2002 Inge inched forward to a line of .202/.266/.333; in 2003 he moved another millimeter to .203/.265/.339, and was still allowed to play in 104 games, doing his part as the Tigers lost 119 games that year.

Rather than giving up on Inge, the Tigers decided to move him to third base, where the offensive expectations were higher – and it worked beautifully, as from 2004 to 2006 Inge hit .265/.327/.443 and was a shockingly smooth defender. His stunning improvement mirrored that of the Tigers, as they rose to the AL pennant in 2006.

They won the pennant that year, but lost the division, blowing a big lead to the Twins and settling for the wild-card spot. They lost the division because they were swept in a season-ending series by the Royals. This was arguably more painful for the Royals than for the Tigers – by sweeping Detroit, the Royals wound up one game “ahead” of the Tampa Bay Devil Rays for the worst record in baseball – the Rays wound up with the first pick, the Royals with the second.

As I detailed here, on the season’s final day, had Brandon Inge simply managed to put the ball in play in the bottom of the 11th inning, the Tigers would have won the AL Central, and the Royals would have had the #1 overall pick instead. But he struck out. The Rays drafted #1, and took the clear #1 player in the draft, David Price. The Royals drafted #2, and they took…Mike Moustakas.

That eerie connection aside, most of the other players with horrible debuts never amounted to anything. The only other player to wind up with a career of note was Billy Rogell, who as an overmatched 20-year-old with the 1925 Red Sox hit .195/.244/.237. Rogell would eventually resurface five years later with Detroit, and from 1932 to 1938 was one of the better shortstops in the league, hitting .278/.366/.386 with above-average defense.

I don’t know what this means for Moustakas. His struggles notwithstanding, he’s not the second coming of Brandon Wood. Wood was done in by a historic amount of swing-and-miss – when the Angels released him earlier this year, he had a career strikeout-to-walk ratio of 153-to-13. Moustakas could stand to be more patient, but he has just 32 strikeouts in 187 at-bats, a pace of around 90-100 strikeouts over a full season. If anything, his problem is that he’s too afraid of not making contact – he’s putting the first decent pitch into play, leading to a lot of easy outs. His batting average on balls in play is just .219. That’s suggestive of a lot of weak contact, but also suggestive of some bad luck.

I’m not sure what ails Moustakas, but I do know that the standard prescription for his ailment is some remedial time in Omaha. The Royals have all but ruled that out, however. As Ned Yost said in today’s edition of the Kansas City Star:

“You don’t send him down for the same reason they didn’t send George Brett, Mike Schmidt or Robin Yount down after 250 at-bats and hitting .215.”

Except when Mike Schmidt was a rookie and hit .196, he also walked 52 times and hit 18 homers, for a respectable .324 OBP and .373 slugging average. When Brett had as many career plate appearances (205) as Moustakas has now, on June 27, 1973, his career line was .232/.272/.295 – poor numbers, but still substantially better than Moose’s. And Brett was just 20 years old at the time. Yount hit .250/.276/.346 as a rookie, and he was 18 years old.

“This is the same thing. This is nothing new. He’s not breaking any ground here.”

Unfortunately, he is. I’m not saying I know what the solution is. I’m just saying that Moustakas’ struggles so far are not the typical ones endured by a rookie. And so long as the Royals hand-wave his performance away as “not breaking any ground,” they’re unlikely to figure out the solution either.

Felipe and Ubaldo.

Last night, Felipe Paulino took the mound for the 12th time as a member of the Kansas City Royals, the 11th time as a starting pitcher. After allowing back-to-back triples to start the game, Paulino bore down; he worked into the seventh, and aside from a solo homer in the fifth inning, kept the Tigers off the board the rest of the way. For the fifth time in his last seven starts, he struck out at least seven batters. For his seventh start in a row, he walked no more than two batters. He pitched at least six innings for the seventh time in eight games.

And after watching Paulino once again make a quality start, and once again show glimpses of domination, the strangest question entered my head:

Who would you rather have right now: Felipe Paulino or Ubaldo Jimenez?

On the surface, this question is insane, and you’d have to suspect the same of anyone who poses it. Ten weeks ago, Paulino was waived by the Colorado Rockies with a 5.93 career ERA. Last year, Jimenez went 19-8 with a 2.88 ERA and finished 3rd in the Cy Young vote.

But this year, Jimenez is struggling a little – he allowed five runs in his Indians debut last night, raising his ERA in 2011 to 4.64. Since joining the Royals, Paulino has a 3.56 ERA.

Jimenez has pitched better than his ERA would suggest this year – in 128 innings, he has 125 strikeouts and walked just 49 batters unintentionally. He’s only allowed 11 homers, and that’s actually an uncharacteristically high number for him. (His career high is just 13, which is absolutely astonishing – he averaged 213 innings a year from 2008 to 2010 and pitched in Coors Field.) His xFIP this season is only 3.55.

Of course, Paulino has also pitched better than his ERA this year, as he has throughout his career. Since joining the Royals, he has 70 strikeouts and just 17 unintentional walks in 73 innings. He’s allowed just five home runs. While Jimenez has a history of being an extreme groundball pitcher, this year the two are indistinguishable: Jimenez has a 46.7% groundball percentage, Paulino is at 46.6%. Paulino’s xFIP this year – including 15 lousy innings with the Rockies – is 3.42. He hasn’t been lucky with the Royals – he simply hasn’t been extraordinarily unlucky like he was with the Astros. He’s also cut his walks and homers almost in half. The improvement in his home run rate is probably a little lucky, although it also has a lot to do with the ballpark. The improvement in his control looks like it’s for real.

Jimenez turns 28 in January. Paulino turns 28 in October.

Jimenez’s average fastball this year is 93.4 mph; one of the reasons to be concerned about him is that his velocity is down from years past, as his fastball averaged 96.1 mph in both 2010 and 2009. Paulino’s average fastball this year is 95.0 mph.

Jimenez’s slider averages 83.4, his curveball 76.7, his changeup 86.4. Paulino’s slider is 87.3, his curveball 78.2, his changeup 86.5. Both guys throw their curve about 8% of the time. Jimenez throws his fastball a little more and his changeup a lot more; Paulino relies much more heavily on his slider.

In addition to his effectiveness, one of the things that makes Jimenez so valuable is his durability – he has made at least 33 starts in each of the last three years, and has thrown 199, 218, and 222 innings. Paulino, of course, has no such record of durability. But break down his performance record more closely, and all the signs are there that, left to his own devices, he can be a durable starter.

Start with the fact that he’s thrown at least 104 pitches in seven straight starts, and threw at least 113 pitchers in the first four starts in that run, without any loss in effectiveness.

Then there’s the fact that he seems to be the rare pitcher who might actually be more effective as a starting pitcher than as a reliever. In his career he’s made 32 relief appearances and thrown only 39 innings in relief, but his ERA in that role is 9.15. (Throw out his first appearance with the Royals, when he stepped off a plane and retired 13 of 14 batters, and his relief ERA is 10.29.) In 45 career starts, his ERA is 4.76.

The reason Paulino pitches better in the rotation is twofold: 1) he tends to struggle early in his outings, and 2) he maintains his stuff deep into games. Consider that with the Royals this year, he has a 5.67 ERA in the first three innings of the game. From the fourth inning on, he’s allowed 8 runs in 40 innings – a 1.80 ERA.

While he hasn’t shown that extreme a pattern throughout his career, consider his career numbers when facing a batter for the first, second, and third times in a game:

First time through the lineup: .292/.357/.482

Second time through the lineup: .306/.359/.493

Third/fourth time through the lineup: .274/.371/.380

These numbers are a little misleading, in that a pitcher might not get to stick around long enough to face the lineup a third time if he isn’t pitching well – but even so, most pitchers do worse the third time through the lineup. (You don’t even want to know what Luke Hochevar’s splits are.) Paulino has not shown that tendency; if anything, he only get stronger.

Taking everything into consideration, the two pitchers are surprisingly even. The only area where Jimenez has a decided advantage is that he’s been doing it for four years instead of ten weeks.

That is, of course, an enormous advantage. But in Paulino’s corner is this: while Jimenez is only under contract through 2013, Paulino won’t be a free agent until after the 2015 season – four more years after this one. Jimenez is already signed to a ridiculously cheap contract – I believe the Indians owe him about $11 million between now and the end of the contract. Paulino is not signed; he will be eligible for arbitration for the second time this winter. Last winter, as a Super Two, he signed for $790,000. Even as well as he’s pitched this year, it’s unlikely he’ll make more than $1.5 million or so for 2012.

One thing that will keep his salary down is that, while Paulino has a fine ERA since joining the Royals, he’s only 1-4. (In Paulino’s 11 starts, the Royals have scored more than 3 runs just three times, and never more than 5.) He somehow lost four games in his short time with the Rockies, and last season he was 1-8 for the Astros. While win-loss records are almost meaningless, they probably have some impact in arbitration – and Paulino is 2-17 over the last two years. In 2009, he was 3-11. For his career, he’s 7-29. Right now, Paulino is tied with a pitcher named Ken Reynolds for the worst career winning percentage in major-league history for a pitcher with 35 or more decisions. I doubt that’s going to hold up, but in the meantime, that’s a hell of a stat to drop at an arbitration hearing.

If Paulino continues to pitch well in 2012, I could see him in line for a $5 million award in 2013 and escalating salaries after that. But better a pitcher with an escalating salary than a pitcher who’s a free agent.

So I ask you: after everything I’ve presented, if you’re the Royals, would you trade Felipe Paulino for Ubaldo Jimenez straight up? Do you trade a pitcher you picked up on waivers ten weeks ago, but who has pitched like a #2 starter since, for an established #2 starter who has shown flashes of being an ace? You gain security, predictability, and upside. But you also gain the concerns about Jimenez’s diminished velocity and the mystery of why the Rockies were so eager to trade him. And you lose club control of your pitcher in 2014 and 2015.

Who do you want: Felipe Paulino or Ubaldo Jimenez? This isn’t a loaded question. I honestly don’t know myself. But the mere fact that I can propose this question and not get completely laughed out of the room – well, my room, for all I know you’re ROTFLMAO right now – says something, doesn’t it?

The Cleveland Indians gave up their two best pitching prospects, a pair of Top-15 picks in Drew Pomeranz and Alex White, along with two lesser prospects, for the rights to Jimenez. And (at least in my opinion) they got the better end of the deal.

The Royals, meanwhile, picked up Felipe Paulino for the price of a waiver claim.

Eventually I’ll stop pimping Paulino. Eventually he’ll turn back into a pumpkin (although I don’t think he will), or I’ll get tired of singing his praises (doubtful), or people will wake up and recognize what the Royals have (bingo!)

But until that last thing happens, I’ll continue to say it: Felipe Paulino is not your typical free-talent find. The Royals, a team with a promising core of offense and a deep bullpen but utterly bereft of starting pitching, picked up a guy on waivers at the end of May, and at the beginning of August I’m undecided whether I’d trade that guy for Ubaldo Jimenez. He’s not simply one of the better moves of the Dayton Moore era.  The decision to sign Paulino might go down as one of the best moves in the history of the franchise.

Update: As a commenter astutely pointed out, Paulino is a free agent after 2014, not 2015; my apologies for the error. Given that Paulino is under club control for only one more season than Jimenez, the decision swings more clearly towards Jimenez. My general point stands, though.

Putting The "Dead" In The Deadline.

Well, that was kind of a dud.

In the week leading up to the trade deadline, no fewer than 26 trades were made, ranging from the irrelevant (Juan Rivera for a PTBNL) to the blockbuster (Ubaldo Jimenez for four Indians prospects) to the baffling (the three-way Edwin Jackson/Colby Rasmus trade). Somehow, the Royals were involved in only one of them, and the player involved was Mike Aviles. What happened?

The knee-jerk response is to blame Dayton Moore, to say that he erred by not trading any of his veterans, whether it was hitters Melky Cabrera and Jeff Francoeur or starting pitchers Jeff Francis and Bruce Chen. Even if the offers were insulting, better to get something for a guy like Francis than let him walk as a free agent. And in the case of Cabrera and Francoeur, trading one of them would open up an everyday job for Lorenzo Cain, which by itself would justify trading them, even for a less-than-ideal offer.

The knee-jerk response may be the right one. But let’s try to dig through what happened here, and what the Royals’ options might have been, before we dispense blame.

To review, here are the four Royals who were (presumably) on the market:

Melky Cabrera: 26 years old, hitting .304/.340/.466 (124 OPS+). Career OPS+ of 91. Below-average defender in CF; average-plus in a corner spot. Salary of $1.25 million. Under contract for 2012.

Jeff Francoeur: 27 years old, hitting .272/.326/.464 (120 OPS+). Career OPS+ of 94. Average range but outstanding arm in RF. Salary of $2.5 million. Mutual option for $4 million in 2012.

Jeff Francis: 30 years old, 4.38 ERA, 136 IP, 154 H, 24 UIBB, 70 K, 12 HR. Salary of $2 million plus incentives. Free agent after the season.

Bruce Chen: 34 years old, 4.29 ERA, 78 IP, 86 H, 25 UIBB, 47 K, 12 HR. Salary of $2 million plus incentives. Free agent after the season.

Cabrera clearly stands out from the other three players in terms of value, both because of his contract status (he’s the cheapest, and the only one under club control for next year) and in terms of performance. He’s the only one of the four that I gave better than even odds would be traded in my deadline preview.

And if the trade deadline had played out differently, he probably would have been traded. There were three contending teams that had made the acquisition of an outfielder a priority – San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. There was only one high-quality outfielder that was clearly on the market – the Mets’ Carlos Beltran. Cabrera was sort of Carlos Beltran Lite on the market – like Beltran, he’s a switch-hitter with power and speed, and the ability to fake center field or play either corner spot. So if the two runners-up for Beltran took a liking to Cabrera, there was a trade waiting to be made.

The problem was that one of the three teams – the Braves – would not have traded for Cabrera under any but the most dire circumstances, simply because 1) he sucked for them in 2010 and 2) they cut him after the season, only to see him revive his career with the Royals. For Frank Wren to have re-acquired Cabrera at the deadline would not only have been a PR nightmare – Cabrera was a piñata for Braves fans given his play and the fact that he was overweight and out-of-shape in Atlanta – but it would have been a tacit admission by Wren that he screwed up by letting Cabrera go in the first place. So that was out.

If the Braves had traded for Beltran – and they were certainly in the running – Lorenzo Cain might be our starting centerfielder today. But the Giants won the sweepstakes when they were willing to part with Zach Wheeler*, one of the top 25 prospects in baseball today, for Beltran.

*: This brings up an interesting question: did the Mets get more for Beltran, who is 34 years old and can no longer run or play centerfield, than the Royals got for Beltran when he was 27 years old and could do everything? The Royals got Mark Teahen, John Buck, and Mike Wood – the first two were borderline Top 100 prospects, but neither was a blue-chipper like Wheeler is. You could make the case either way, but when you consider that Beltran isn’t the player he used to be, and the fact that per his contract the Giants can’t offer him arbitration (so they won’t get any draft picks when he leaves), and either the Giants overpaid for him, or the Royals got jobbed. I’ll leave it as an exercise to the reader to determine which.

With the Giants out of play, that left Philadelphia as a possible destination for Cabrera. The Phillies had already indicated a preference for a right-handed hitting outfielder (which is why there were some rumors that they might be interested in Francoeur), and they decided to go that route, giving up a nice package of prospects for Hunter Pence.

We can argue whether they overpaid for Pence, or whether Pence is really a difference-maker worth trading four prospects for. Just compare the two:

Pence was hitting .308/.356/.471 – in a good hitter’s park in the NL.

Cabrera is hitting .304/.340/.466 – in a neutral park in the AL.

Pence is 28 years old; Cabrera turns 27 next week.

Pence is making $6.9 million this year; Cabrera is making $1.25 million.

Pence is under contract for two more years; Cabrera for one.

Pence is a slightly better player, and he has a much more consistent track record. But he’s also far more expensive, and while he’s under contract for one additional season, he might make eight figures in arbitration next season, while Cabrera will be lucky to make $5 million.

Ultimately it’s a moot point – the Phillies wanted Pence, and they were willing to pay for him. And at that point, there was no obvious destination for Cabrera to go. (Not that it mattered, but Atlanta solved their outfield problem brilliantly, getting Michael Bourn – who on the whole is probably a slightly better player than Pence – without giving up a single top prospect.)

As disappointed as I am that Cabrera wasn’t traded, I don’t see a trade opportunity that Dayton Moore missed. The only other outfielders to be traded to a contender were Ryan Ludwick (for a player to be named later) and Kosuke Fukudome, who was traded for a pair of marginal prospects named Abner Abreu and Carlton Smith. (You know they’re marginal because their names are “Abner” and “Carlton”.)

As outsiders, we can never fully analyze a GM’s decision-making, because we’ll never know the trade offers that were or weren’t made. But as best as I can tell, Moore didn’t make a mistake by holding on to Melky. The mistake would have been trading him for a marginal return. Cabrera is under contract for next season, he’ll be relatively inexpensive, and he’ll be 27 years old, and while it’s possible that his performance this year is a fluke, he’s young enough that it’s entirely possible it’s for real.

If you believe, as I do, that the Royals should go into 2012 looking to contend, and if you believe, as I do, that Melky Cabrera is clearly the second-best outfielder the Royals have under contact for 2012, then it would be stupid to move him just to move him. Standing pat wasn’t the sexy move here, but it was probably the right one.

With respect to Francoeur, there are two issues which I think are being confused:

1) Should the Royals have traded him?

2) Having decided not to trade him, will the Royals now give him a long-term deal?

Francoeur has the industry reputation of being a valuable role player, someone who can play defense and hit left-handed pitching, but not an everyday guy. As such, it’s likely that the market for him – if there was one at all – was comparable to what the Padres got for Ludwick (a PTBNL) or the Cubs got for Fukudome (a couple borderline guys). Remember, Francoeur was traded to a contender last year, and all the Rangers gave up to get him was Joaquin Arias – the same Arias that the Royals signed as a minor-league free agent after the Mets released him barely two months later.

The meager return that Francoeur was likely to bring was reason enough not to trade him. But on top of that, I think it’s time to admit that Jeff Francoeur isn’t the player he was as recently as last year. He’s a legitimate everyday rightfielder.

Look at his monthly splits:

April: .314/.357/.569

May: .233/.287/.388

June: .235/.280/.367

July: .306/.377/.531

Francoeur got off to a hot start (as he has with all three of his previous teams), then regressed back into being Jeff Francoeur for two months, inviting the usual snark from the usual places. Only with his hot July, he’s not only destroyed the narrative of “Jeff Francoeur: terrible ballplayer, except in his first month with a new team!”, he also has four months of evidence that he’s an improved ballplayer.

His overall line of .272/.326/.464 is easily his best since his half-season as a rookie in 2005. Remember, this isn’t the Home Run Era anymore. In 2007, Francoeur hit .293/.338/.444, roughly the same split line, but his OPS+ was just 102 – this year, it’s 120.

Maybe it’s a fluke, but if you want to make that case, there isn’t a whole lot of statistical evidence to back you up. Normally, fluky seasons are driven by a high batting average on balls in play, but Francoeur’s BABIP (.293) is actually lower than his career mark of .298. He is showing improved plate discipline – he’s on pace for a career high in walks, and his strikeout-to-unintentional-walk ratio is 2.61. That’s not very good, but for Francoeur it represents dramatic improvement – his previous career best is 3.26.

But the most stunning aspect of Francoeur’s season is that he has 18 steals; he had 23 career steals in six seasons before 2011. He also had been caught 18 times (56% success rate) before this season, but he’s been thrown out just five times this year (78% success rate).

However you break it down, it’s becoming increasingly clear that Francoeur has made real improvements on offense. Defensively, he remains a rightfielder with average range, but with a tremendous arm – both in terms of strength and accuracy. He’s thrown out 11 runners this season, the seventh year in a row he’s done that.

He’s still only 27 years old. Do I want to sign him to a long-term deal? Hell no. Would I be willing to bring him back on a one-year deal? Absolutely.

He’s got a mutual option for next season. That doesn’t guarantee that he’ll be back, and it doesn’t prevent the Royals from doing something dumb like giving him a four-year deal after the season. But there is a chance he’ll be back next season at a reasonable salary, and that possibility is a lot more valuable than cashing him in for another Joaquin Arias.

Last week, on the Border Patrol’s show on 810 WHB, Buster Olney said he was “99% sure” that the Rays would trade B.J. Upton. Upton did not, in fact, get traded. Upton, like Cabrera, is under contract for one more season, and the Rays are probably out of the race this year, and like the Royals they have a prospect waiting to take over the spot (Desmond Jennings, who’s currently playing left field.) I think the Rays, more than almost any team in baseball, have earned the benefit of the doubt when it comes to trades: if they didn’t trade a player, it’s probably because the offer wasn’t there. If the offer wasn’t there for Upton, I think the burden of proof lies with those who accuse the Royals of turning down a good offer for Cabrera and Francoeur.

I absolutely recognize that there is a danger that, with Francoeur still on the team, that Dayton Moore will finally succumb to his most primal urges and give Francoeur a long-term deal. But even if that happens, the mistake lies with the long-term deal, not with the decision to hold on to him right now. At this point, the Royals should finish the season with Francoeur, and then make a decision as to whether or not to bring him back on a one-year deal, whether it’s in the form of his mutual option or a similar contract.

If not, and Francoeur walks, there’s a good chance they’ll get a draft pick in return. MLB Trade Rumors put up their latest Elias Rankings yesterday, and if the season had ended then, Francoeur would be the highest-ranked outfielder not to achieve a Type B ranking. A strong finish by Francoeur might make him harder to retain, but it also makes it more likely that the Royals will get a draft pick when he does leave.

In the end, the clamoring from fans to move Cabrera and Francoeur has very little to do with their performance this year, or even the sustainability of that performance. It has almost everything to do with Lorenzo Cain. As I write this, the Painkiller is hitting .318/.389/.522 in Omaha, with a career-high 13 home runs. He continues to get good marks for his defensive ability, and would certainly be an upgrade over Cabrera in centerfield.

Granted, as Royals fans we don’t have much experience with this particular phenomenon, so it’s understandable if we don’t know how to react. But when a team has a player in Triple-A who is clearly ready for the majors, and his position is capably filled at the major-league level, sometimes you just have to wait. This isn’t Kila Ka’aihue being blocked by Mike Jacobs.

I had this discussion with Joe Sheehan on my radio show last Thursday, and he made some strong points:

1) Cain is going to be a capable centerfielder in the majors, but not a particularly good one. His .318/.389/.522 line against minor-league pitchers in a good hitter’s environment is not that much better than Cabrera’s .304/.340/.466 line for the Royals.

2) Cain is only 20 months younger than Cabrera. This isn’t a 22-year-old phenom we’re talking about here.

Based on that, if you’re the Royals, don’t you have to at least explore what Cain’s trade value is? He still has a prospecty sheen to him, and he hit over .300 in the majors last year, and he’s under club control for six seasons. If you can’t get a #3 starter in exchange for Cabrera or Francoeur, shouldn’t you find out if you can get one for Cain? We’ve reached the point in baseball’s economics where prospects are overvalued – just look at what the Indians gave up to get Ubaldo Jimenez* – and since Cain doesn’t project to be an impact player, the odds that the Royals would get burned badly by dealing him are small.

*: I’m surprised that the general reaction to the Jimenez trade is that the Rockies did well. Am I missing something? Jimenez almost won the Cy Young Award last season pitching in Coors Field. He has a 4.48 ERA this year, but 1) it’s the worst ERA of his career; 2) his peripherals suggest that his ERA should be much better; 3) he’s STILL an above-average starting pitcher. In exchange, the Indians gave up Drew Pomeranz, Alex White, and two nobodies. Pomeranz and White are both fine prospects – but if the Rockies are lucky, one of them will be as good as Jimenez one day. Meanwhile the Indians have Jimenez now, and for the next two years, at a ridiculously low salary. Pomeranz and White are comparable to Mike Montgomery and Aaron Crow. I love Montgomery and Crow, but if I could trade them for a guaranteed above-average starter with ace potential through 2013? I’d strongly consider that.

These things have a way of sorting themselves out. Maybe Francoeur opts out of his contract, or maybe the Royals find a buyer for Cabrera over the winter. But if not, trading Cain has to be considered as a fallback position.

As for Francis and Chen…they’re both serviceable starters, but “serviceable” isn’t going to get you much on the trade market. The same change in offensive levels that makes Francoeur better than he looks also makes Francis and Chen less impressive than you might think – an ERA in the low 4s just isn’t that special anymore. It doesn’t help that neither pitcher strikes out even 6 batters per 9 innings.

Aside from Jimenez, just three starting pitchers were acquired by a contender at the deadline. Doug Fister is a command-and-control pitcher who benefits from his ballpark and defense, sort of the right-handed version of Francis. But in addition to sporting a 3.33 ERA, he’s also under club control through 2014; this wasn’t a short-term rental by the Tigers. (And even then, I think they gave up too much.) Jason Marquis, as a 32-year-old in the final year of his contract, is more directly comparable to Francis and Chen. But his ERA and peripherals both point to him being a slightly better option. In exchange, the Diamondbacks traded Zach Walters, their ninth-round pick last season, and who’s having a pretty good season as a middle infielder in the Midwest League. He has maybe a 10% chance of turning into Mark Ellis or something.

The third guy is Erik Bedard, who the Red Sox got in a complicated three-way deal at the deadline. Bedard is an entirely different kettle of fish; going back to 2006, he has a 3.41 ERA and has struck out over a man an inning. The issue is that 2006 is also the last year in which he threw a pitch in September; the dude just can’t stay healthy. But for the Red Sox, they’d rather have a potential #2 starter than a guaranteed #4 starter; they already have a bunch of those.

And that’s it. No other contender made a trade for a starting pitcher. The Reds, who I thought might be a landing spot for Francis, had a terrible week going into the trading deadline and weren’t buyers at all. If you’re frustrated that the Royals didn’t move Chen and Francis, what about the fact that the Padres, with every incentive to move Heath Bell, couldn’t find a suitable market for him? If the offers aren’t there for a player, even one who is an impending free agent, it’s counterproductive to trade a guy just to say you did.

So as much as I’d like to muster up some outrage that Chen and Francis are still around, I really can’t. I didn’t see much of a market for them when I wrote my deadline preview two weeks ago, and the way the deadline went down doesn’t change my opinion any. If a contender develops a sudden need for a starting pitcher this month, it wouldn’t surprise me at all if either Francis or Chen still get traded after clearing waivers. But otherwise, I expect they’ll finish the season in Kansas City.

(It’s also worth pointing out that, amazing as this may sound, according to MLB Trade Rumors yesterday Bruce Chen would actually qualify as a Type B free agent – even after his 10-run debacle last week, he was the last Type B pitcher on the list. He’ll need to pitch well down the stretch, and he would need to sign a major-league contract with another team this off-season to prevent another Mark Grudzielanek situation, but the possibility of a draft pick is reason enough to turn down insulting offers for him.)

I should take the opportunity to break down the one trade the Royals did make. Just a week after recalling Mike Aviles from Triple-A, the Royals were able to spin him into Yamaico Navarro and Kendal Volz.

Navarro is a 23-year-old player who could be the guy that they wanted Mike Aviles to be – a true utility infielder capable of playing shortstop, second base, and third base well. Most utility infielders have the rough offensive profile of someone like Alcides Escobar – capable of hitting .250 but with nothing in the way of secondary skills like power or plate discipline. That’s not Navarro.

Twice he’s hit 11 homers in a minor-league season, and Baseball America wrote this offseason that he has “uncommon power for a middle infielder and the potential for 15-20 homers annually.” He also knows how to take a pitch – over the past two seasons, in 138 minor-league games (all in Double-A or Triple-A), he’s drawn 64 walks. Navarro hit .275/.356/.437 in the minors last season, and .258/.362/.469 this season. The Red Sox know how to develop middle infielders with secondary skills – look at Dustin Pedroia and Jed Lowrie – and while Navarro isn’t in their class, he’s not a punch-and-judy guy either. Along with Rey, Yamaico gives the Royals two Navarros who profile as excellent utility players in the majors at the very least.

By himself, Navarro – who was the #12 prospect in the Red Sox system before the season – would have justified the trade. Volz is a worthwhile gamble as well; he was the Sox’ ninth-round pick two years ago, but was a potential first-rounder before a disappointing junior season and got $550,000 to sign. In his first pro season last year, he was hittable but walked just 14 guys in 118 innings. Moved to the bullpen this year, he’s got 56 strikeouts and 12 walks in 51 innings. He’s probably a seventh-inning reliever in the end, but he’s more than just an organizational guy.

Last year, the Royals traded Scott Podsednik, Jose Guillen, Kyle Farnsworth, and Rick Ankiel for six players. Aside from Tim Collins, Navarro and Volz are both better than any of those guys. For Mike Aviles, that’s a nice haul.

Granted, Aviles ought to have some real value – he’s under club control for three more years after this one. But he’s already 30 years old; the fact that he’s under club control when he’s 33 probably isn’t worth all that much. Aviles has value on the bench, but his defense the last couple of years has been decidedly sub-par, and he has a .295 OBP since his rookie season. The Royals have moved on from him, and I fully expected them to release him this off-season if they couldn’t find a taker. Getting two legitimate prospects for him allows Moore to bring the Mike Aviles Era in for an easy landing.

Over the last year or so, I have developed a bit of a reputation as a Dayton Moore apologist, which I find hysterical – apparently it’s not good form to acknowledge that Moore has done some things well, or to acknowledge that Cabrera and Francoeur, two player acquisitions that were mocked mercilessly over the winter, have turned out to be two of the best free-agent signing any team made last off-season.

Actually, my reputation as an apologist might have started when I complimented Moore on the Cabrera signing at the time. I also refused to join in the whistles and catcalls when Francoeur was signed; while I was ambivalent about the deal, that was less because of Francoeur than because the fact that his 2012 option was a mutual one limited the Royals’ upside. (I think that observation has born out – if the Royals had a club option for $4 million next year, they would almost certainly exercise it, and that would obviate the need for a long-term deal.)

I’m sure my breakdown of the trade deadline will not change that perception. Am I disappointed by the lack of trades? Most certainly. But I’m disappointed at the market, not at the Royals’ decision-making.

The lack of movement at the deadline allows the Royals to kick the can down the road. Moore still has some decisions to make, and he still has the opportunity to screw things up badly – whether it’s signing Francoeur to a long-term deal, or failing to resolve the Lorenzo Cain situation. If and when that happens, I’ll voice my displeasure then. But criticizing Moore because his lack of moves opens up the possibility that he might screw up in the future – that strikes me as putting the cart before the horse. If that makes me an apologist, so be it.

P.S. For those of you who aren’t faithful listeners, “The Baseball Show With Rany & Joe” covered the trade deadline in two parts this weekend. So if you want my take on all the trades made around the game, please download the show from iTunes, or you can listen online with Part 1 here and Part 2 here.

Royals Today: 7/22/11.

Maybe it’s not The Most Wonderful Time of the Year, but trading season has to rank in the top five. The rumors, the intrigue, the possibility that some GM will lose his mind and trade Scott Kazmir for Victor Zambrano, or agree to pick up Matt Morris’ salary…if you’re a baseball fan, you have to love it. Say what you want about the NFL, but the almost complete lack of trades in that league is a big point in favor of major league baseball.

If you’re a Royals fan, you’re used to the drill – look over the roster, find the guys who are in the last year or two of their contract, and hope the Royals can trade each of them for anything of value. Some days you wind up with Tim Collins; most days you end up with Joselo Diaz or Blake Johnson.

Dayton Moore kicked off the season Wednesday by trading Wilson Betemit, who he evidently just realized was still on the roster. (Forgive him for not noticing – since Moustakas was called up on June 9th, Betemit had all of 23 at-bats in six weeks.) The Tigers were high on the list of teams looking to upgrade at third base, so it was a natural fit.

In return, the Royals got left-handed swingman Antonio Cruz, and catcher Julio Rodriguez. From Dayton Moore’s comments, you’d think Rodriguez was the more important player in the deal. He has a strong arm (he’s thrown out 36% of attempted basestealers in his career), and is hitting .283/.325/.354 in the Florida State League. He’s a prospect in the sense that he’ll probably make the majors, but his upside seems to be that of a defense-first backup catcher. He has no power – five home runs in 276 professional games – and swings at everything; his career high in walks is 14. If he were 20 years old – as the Royals mistakenly stated in their press release – I would be higher on him, but he’s actually 21, and turns 22 in a few weeks.

And as future backup catchers go, I don’t think Rodriguez profiles even as well as Manny Pina, who the Royals acquired in their trade of hard-throwing bad boy Danny Gutierrez two years ago. At the time, Pina was just a few months older than Rodriguez is now, and he was hitting .259/.313/.393 in Double-A. Pina has more power than Rodriguez, and was not quite as impatient at the plate. Pina has spent all of this season in Omaha, and has mysteriously started drawing walks at an unprecedented rate – he has 25 walks in just 160 at-bats, with a line of .238/.354/.381. (He’s sort of the Matt Treanor of Triple-A.)

Pina is already on the 40-man roster, and would be the obvious call-up if Treanor or Brayan Pena got hurt. He just turned 24. I don’t really see what Rodriguez brings to the table that the Royals can’t get from Pina, so I don’t see his acquisition as anything more than organizational depth.

Cruz is the more interesting player, if for no other reason than 1) he’s left-handed and 2) he’s 19. His numbers are nice but not spectacular; he’s got a 3.11 ERA in the Midwest League, with 68 hits, 28 walks, and 58 Ks in 75 innings. The scouting reports I’ve seen suggest that he typically throws 89-91, but can dial it up to 93-94 on occasion, and he has a developing curveball. He’s been a reliever for most of his (brief) pro career, and unless he adds velocity it’s unlikely he’ll be more than a reliever in the end. But he’s young enough that you can dream on him.

Neither player was listed among the Tigers’ Top 30 Prospects by Baseball America before the season, but I wouldn’t make too much of that. Young players, particularly Latin American players who don’t have a draft status to trumpet, can have their prospect status change quickly. Kelvin Herrera barely made the Royals’ Top 30 this winter, and now he’s clearly a Top 15 guy – granted, he was hurt most of the last two years, but no one expected him to be this dominant this quickly. Yordano Ventura wasn’t in the Royals Top 30 before the 2010 season; a year later he was in 12th in a loaded system. Rey Navarro wasn’t in the Royals’ Top 30 this past winter, and you could make a case for him in the Royals’ Top 10 today. I don’t think either Cruz or Rodriguez have made that kind of jump, but I’d expect Cruz at least to vie for a spot in the Royals’ Top 30.

It’s not a great haul, in all honesty. But having gone out of their way to destroy Betemit’s value by not trading him before Moustakas was called up, this was probably about the best the Royals could do. (I love this quote: As one club official noted: “His value wasn’t increasing here.” Really, Sherlock? It only took you six weeks to figure that out?) Despite sitting on the bench for the last six weeks, Betemit was just slightly underneath the bar for Type B free agent compensation, at least according to MLB Trade Rumors’ calculations. (Actually, MLB Trade Rumors just came out with their most updated numbers Tuesday, and Betemit somehow moved up the chart despite being on the bench, and is now projected to be a Type B player.)

If Betemit plays every day for Detroit and/or plays well, he’s almost certainly going to earn them a supplemental first-round pick after the season. If that’s the case, than Detroit wins the trade; I’d rather have the draft pick than the two guys the Royals picked up. Frankly, even if Betemit doesn’t, the Tigers should win the trade. Brandon Inge hit .177/.242/.242 for Detroit before he was designated for assignment (just four months into a two-year contract). Betemit should be a substantial upgrade if he hits like he did for the Royals this year. If he hits like he did for the Royals last year, it’s an enormous upgrade.

But there was no way Betemit was going to earn Type B status while picking splinters out of his butt. Better something than nothing, even if “something” isn’t all that great. As with the David DeJesus trade, though, the Royals didn’t even get the value of the compensatory draft pick in return for Betemit.

We can now close the book on the Wilson Betemit era in Kansas City: 141 games, a .290/.362/.468 line, and 16 homers and 35 doubles in just 479 at-bats. Betemit has the fifth-highest OPS+ (129) in Royals history among players with 500 or more plate appearances. Not bad for a minor-league invite who got paid less than $1 million total. But I can’t shake the feeling that he could have been a lot more valuable to the Royals if they had tried him in the outfield last season, and tried to sign him to a longer-term deal. And I can’t shake the feeling that he still has a lot of productive seasons left.

- Speaking of Betemit, his replacement hasn’t been faring so well of late. After a three-hit game on July 3rd, Mike Moustakas was hitting a very respectable .290/.372/.362. His power was a little shy, but with nine walks and 10 strikeouts in 19 games, his overall approach seemed, if anything, more advanced than expected.

Moustakas then went on an 0-for-21 slump that ended with a broken-bat single off Justin Verlander in the last game before the All-Star Break. In his first game back, Moose doubled in his second at-bat against Francisco Liriano. He is 0-for-22 since. He has two hits in his last 49 at-bats. Even Tony Pena Jr. is shaking his head.

Shocking as this might be to believe, I’ve seen worse. In fact, I’ve seen worse from another left-handed-hitting 22-year-old rookie third baseman. On April 18th, 1990, this player hit his first career home run – off Roger Clemens. It was the 23rd game of his career, and he finished it with a respectable line of .227/.349/.364. He would not get a hit again until May 11th. He went 0-for-41; someone correct me if I’m wrong, but I believe that is still the longest hitless stretch by a non-pitcher in the last 30 or 40 years.

He finally ended his slump with a bunt single off of Bret Saberhagen in the fifth inning. (In the eighth inning, with the Royals leading 4-1, he would homer off of Steve Farr, sparking a five-run rally. The more things change…) He would hit .268/.329/.333 the rest of the season, not great, but better than his overall line of .249/.324/.318.

The next season, Robin Ventura hit .284/.367/.442, with 23 homers and 100 RBIs, won a Gold Glove, and got some MVP votes. He was one of the best – and certainly most consistent – third basemen in baseball for the next decade.

The point is: rookies struggle. Even talented rookies struggle. I’m not happy that Moustakas couldn’t buy a hit right now if it was a vowel on “Wheel of Fortune”, but if he’s as talented as we think he is, he’ll get through it. He’s not being overmatched; in those 49 at-bats he’s only struck out 7 times, which is a good ratio even for someone hitting .300. He’s simply not making hard contact, and he’s probably pressing and swinging at pitches he shouldn’t in an effort to end his slump. (He doesn’t have a single walk in that span. Ventura, by comparison, walked 10 times during his 0-for-41 stretch.)

If this goes on much longer, a return trip to Omaha might be therapeutic. But I’d give him at least a few more days to see how he responds. Moustakas has responded well to failure in the past. He’s never failed to this degree before, and never on this big a stage. No one said the major leagues were easy.

- I have barely gone a column without writing about Felipe Paulino ever since he joined the team, but I can’t help it – I still think that the Royals’ fanbase and media have yet to fully appreciate the magnitude of how well he has pitched.

On Sunday against the Twins, Paulino made the mistake of hanging a slider to Jim Thome on a full count. (Side note: Jim Thome is my favorite non-Royals player of all time. He has also hit more home runs against the Royals than any player in history. Go figure.) That was virtually the only mistake Paulino made all day. He threw seven innings, struck out eight batters, and walked only one – and that walk was an intentional pass to Joe Mauer preceding the homer. (Ned Yost, everyone!)

In his previous start on July 5th, Paulino gave up nine hits and three runs in six innings, but walked just two batters and struck out nine.

On June 28th, Paulino struck out seven in seven innings, allowed only one walk (again intentional), but somehow gave up 11 hits and took the loss.

On June 23rd, Paulino pitched eight innings, struck out eight, and walked only one. But he did give up two homers, and five runs, and again took the loss.

In his last four starts, then, Paulino is 1-3 and has a 4.82 ERA, so it’s very easy to miss how well he’s pitched. In his last four starts, Paulino has whiffed 32 batters in 28 innings, and walked 3 batters unintentionally. He’s averaged 7 innings per start, and thrown at least 113 pitches in each start (but never more than 120).

Still not impressed? Paulino has struck out at least 7 batters, and walked no more than 2, in each of his last four starts. In the history of the Kansas City Royals, only two other pitchers have had four consecutive starts with 2 or fewer walks and 7 or more strikeouts. In 1996, Kevin Appier had four straight starts, and in 2009, after starting his season with six shutout innings (with three walks) in his first start, Zack Greinke rolled off five straight starts with 8+ Ks and no more than 2 walks, winning them all.

Since joining the Royals, Paulino has 53 strikeouts and 11 unintentional walks in 55 innings. Missing bats is nothing new for him; throwing strikes is. He has cut his walk rate nearly in half since joining the Royals.

His 3.60 ERA is not as impressive as his K/BB numbers, because he continues to give up hits at a higher rate than you’d expect – he’s allowed more than a hit an inning with Kansas City. His BABIP since joining the Royals is .340, and that’s actually an improvement on his career mark of .353. That’s both ridiculous and unsustainable. In the last 50 years, the highest career BABIP by a pitcher with 500 innings or more is .331, by Glendon Rusch. Paulino has spent almost his entire career with bad teams, pitching in front of bad defenses, and prior to joining the Royals pitched in two very good hitters’ parks. His performance on balls in play is a matter of luck. His ability to miss bats is very real, and his ability to throw strikes, while new, does not appear to be a fluke.

If Mike Montgomery had debuted on May 27th and had fashioned the stat line that you see from Paulino, Royals nation would be giddy with excitement over what’s to come. Montgomery has been a disappointment, but in his place the Royals have conjured Paulino out of thin air. He’s under contract through 2014, so we’ll have the chance to enjoy him for a while.

At the BP event, while talking about how the team uses statistical and scouting information together, Jin Wong mentioned Paulino as a guy who – going back to last winter – both sides agreed was someone worth gambling on. The scouts liked his fastball velocity and swing-and-miss slider; the stats guys liked his peripheral numbers. (They may also have liked the fact that in 2009, even while his ERA was over 6, Paulino induced batters to miss 27% of the pitches they swung at, compared to the major-league average of 20%.)

I thought this nugget of information was interesting, because the last time the Royals gambled on a player who the scouts and stats guys agreed on was a potential diamond in the rough, his name was Joakim Soria. Paulino may be Dayton Moore’s best free talent find since Soria. If he continues to pitch as well as he has, and stays in the rotation, he may wind up being even more valuable than Soria.

(Late update: Rustin Dodd has an excellent review of Paulino’s emergence in this morning’s edition of the Star.)

- This list, I think, explains a lot:

MOST PLATE APPEARANCES AS A KANSAS CITY ROYAL, NO HOME RUNS

Chris Getz: 592

Jason Kendall: 490

Carl Taylor: 363

Bobby Floyd: 356

Dick Drago: 327

The bottom three guys on this list all finished their Royals career by 1974 (and Drago, of course, was a pitcher.) After 35 years, apparently the Royals felt that extreme punch-and-judy hitters had come back into fashion.

Look, saying that I don’t think Chris Getz is a good ballplayer doesn’t mean that I don’t appreciate his talents. He’s a good basestealer, the best defensive second baseman on the roster (which isn’t the same as saying he’s a good defender), he’s got good bat control and is heady and gritty and all that.

And contrary to what Lee Judge might think, saying that I don’t think Getz is as good a player as Billy Butler doesn’t mean I have asthma* and eat pop-tarts and live with my mom. (Lee, let me present a friendly challenge: name me one well-known statistical analyst, or prominent Royals blogger, that remotely fits the stereotype you’ve presented. Just one. I’ll happily donate $100 to a charity of your choosing if you can.)

*: I don’t have asthma, but what if I did? Is it okay to make fun of people with asthma now?

If you want to know why I think Chris Getz isn’t a particularly good major-league player, look at that list above. Yes, the little things matter. But big things matter more; if they didn’t, they’d be the little things. And the biggest thing a position player can do on the field is hit a home run. Getz may do the little things well. But more than any other player in Royals history, he has shown a complete inability to do the big things.

Meanwhile, Johnny Giavotella is hitting .340/.394/.485 in Omaha. Moreover, as he did last year (when he hit over .370 after the All-Star Break in Double-A), Giavotella is getting better as the season goes along. Since June 1st, Giavotella is hitting .401 and slugging .615. Just in the month of June, Giavotella hit 14 doubles and four homers. In his entire Royals career, going back to the beginning of last season, Getz has 14 doubles and two triples.

I don’t know what the Royals are waiting for. They don’t need keep playing Getz just to justify the Mark Teahen trade – they’ve already won the trade, if for no other reason than that they weren’t the ones who then signed Teahen to a 3-year, $15 million deal. Getz isn’t the worst player in baseball – we’re not talking about Yuniesky Betancourt here. But the Royals have a better, younger player just waiting by the phone. It’s time to make it ring.