For Want Of A Pitcher: The Elite Free Agents.

Before we look at the available options on the free-agent pitching market, there are two key points to make. The first is that this is the year to be bold and aggressive if you want to corral a high-end free agent. With TV revenues – both local and national – booming throughout baseball, expect payrolls to follow. It wouldn’t surprise me at all if free agents who sign this winter get 15-20% more money than comparable players on the market last winter.

Dayton Moore has a history of making big transactions within days of the end of the World Series, but they tend to be trades, and they tend to be ill-advised, like trading the former Leo Nunez for Mike Jacobs (October 31st) or trading Mark Teahen for Chris Getz and Josh Fields (November 6th) or trading David DeJesus for Vinny Mazzaro and Justin Marks (November 10th) or trading Ramon Ramirez for Coco Crisp (November 19th). By contrast, his big free-agent signings (Jose Guillen and Gil Meche) were both in December, around the time of the Winter Meetings.

I think this might be the year to try to get the jump on the market, and make a pre-emptive offer to a top-tier pitcher in November, an offer that might look overpriced when it’s announced, but that looks like a bargain when the rest of the market has settled in January. It means offering a potential #2 starter, the kind of guy who got $12-13 million in the past, closer to $15 million a year. But that same pitcher might cost $16 million a year, or get a five-year deal instead of a four-year deal, a month or two later.

And that brings me to my second point, which is that no matter what the Royals say publicly, THEY CAN AFFORD IT, and don’t believe them if they say otherwise. This has been done elsewhere, but here’s a quick breakdown of the Royals’ payroll obligations for 2013:

Already Signed (6 players, $33 million)

Alex Gordon, $9 million

Billy Butler, $8 million

Jeff Francoeur, $7.5 million

Bruce Chen, $4.5 million

Alcides Escobar, $3 million

Salvador Perez, $1 million

Arbitration Eligible (3 players, $4.5 million)

Felipe Paulino, $2.7 million

Chris Getz, $1.2 million

Blake Wood, $600,000

The figures for the arbitration-eligible players are estimates which I took from MLB Trade Rumors here.

That’s $38 million going to nine players. Here’s the thing: the other 16 players on the Royals’ active roster would all be pre-arbitration eligible players, earning only slightly more than the major league minimum of $480,000 on average.

We’ll throw in some extra costs here; Aaron Crow will make at least $1 million next season, the result of the major-league contract he signed out of the draft. Joakim Soria is owed $750,000 in a buyout, and will probably re-sign a smaller incentive-laden deal. After his surgery I suggested something like $2.5 million guaranteed, so let’s run with that. That’s $41.5 million for 11 players. Let’s say the other 14 players average about $580,000 each – let’s say $8.12 million. Throw in Noel Arguelles and the $1.38 million he’ll make to spend another year in the minors, and that’s a grand total of $51 million.

(By the way, you’ll notice who’s missing from my list: Luke Hochevar, who would earn around $4.4 million in arbitration next year.)

The Royals’ payroll this season was over $63 million. Their payroll was close to $75 million in both 2009 and 2010. As I argued earlier, the Royals will be earning an additional $27 million in national TV revenue in 2014 – so if we take the Royals at their word that they were only breaking even in 2009-2010, that means their break-even point would be over $100 million by 2014.

Let’s be charitable and say the Royals should have a payroll of $85 million next season. That’s $34 million to play with.

Let me repeat that: THE ROYALS HAVE $34 MILLION TO PLAY WITH.

Let’s say they re-sign Jeremy Guthrie, and pay him $8 million in 2013. Let’s say the Royals spend another $2 million on low-end free agents, say a backup catcher, or even another reliever beyond Soria*.

*: Although why they’d do this is beyond me. Consider this: after the Royals traded Jonathan Broxton and waived Jose Mijares, EVERY SINGLE RELIEVER in their bullpen was pre-arbitration eligible. Not only that, but every one of them will still not be eligible for arbitration next year. A Soria/Holland/Herrera/Collins/Crow/Coleman bullpen would cost under $6 million next season, giving the Royals the leeway to spend their money elsewhere.

That still leaves $24 million. That means every single free agent is in play. Even if they go cheap and try to keep the payroll in the $75-80 million range, they can add an additional $14-19 million worth of contracts, which should include every free agent pitcher but one.

That one is Zack Greinke, of course, for whom the bidding will probably start at 5 years, $100 million – the contract he reportedly turned down from the Brewers before they traded him. After a rough early start with the Angels, that had people once again questioning his mental toughness, he finished strong: a 2.04 ERA in his last eight starts, allowing fewer than a baserunner per inning.

There is an assumption in certain circles that the Royals simply have no chance of signing Greinke, given the awkward way he left town. I don’t necessarily agree with that. I think the Royals have as much of a chance to sign Greinke as they would any pitcher who was clearly the prize of the free-agent market. Which is to say, exceedingly slim, but not zero. If anything, their chances might be slightly higher, simply because some free agents want to seek out the bright lights of the big cities, and would cross Kansas City off their list before even talking numbers. Greinke, it’s safe to say, does not want to play for the Yankees come hell or high water.

The two obstacles for the Royals are the same as always: their willingness to spend, and their ability to win. Regarding the first, I think that it’s going to take something in the range of 6 years and $130 million to sign Greinke. While the Royals can afford that, it would require them to put a substantial amount of their payoll into one player – a pitcher, no less. If Greinke gets hurt, you’ve just flushed a quarter of your payroll down the drain.

In Greinke’s defense, his combination of mechanics, low workload in his early 20s (thanks in part to his sabbatical), and injury history make him about as good a bet to stay healthy as any pitcher in the major leagues. My friend Will Carroll publishes his injury risk scores for every player during spring training, and two or three years ago, Greinke had the lowest score Carroll had ever given a pitcher. After he was called up in 2004, Greinke didn’t miss a start until he walked away from the team two years later; after he went back into the rotation for good in August, 2007, the only time he’s missed a start was when he broke some ribs playing basketball in the spring of 2011 and missed the month of April.

He’s as good a bet for 32 starts and 200 innings a year as anyone in baseball. He just turned 29 yesterday, so even a six-year deal would only take him through his age-34 season. I understand the risk of putting too many eggs in one basket. But this is one sturdy basket.

The other obstacle is simply that Greinke doesn’t want to play for a team that doesn’t have a chance of winning; that’s the reason he forced his way out of town in the first place. And let’s face it – the Royals didn’t exactly cover themselves in glory by going 72-90 this year. You’d like to think the Royals can sell Greinke on the young talent on the team – not just on the farm, but on the team – and the fact that the only thing that is keeping the Royals from a winning record is the same thing that his addition would correct.

But there’s another way the Royals can convince Greinke that they mean business about winning. Ten years ago, the Royals signed Mike Sweeney to a 5-year, $55 million contract that contained an unprecedented clause: if the Royals failed to finish at .500 in either 2003 or 2004, Sweeney would be able to void the last three years of the contract. The contract was actually held up briefly until MLB approved the language of the deal, because it was the first deal to contain a provision of this kind.

The Royals went 83-79 in the first year of the contract, rendering the clause moot, and then Sweeney started getting hurt so much that fans wished the Royals hadn’t finished above .500 so that Sweeney could have walked away. But that doesn’t change the fact that the clause was an inspired idea, making it possible for the Royals to sign one of their best players to a long-term deal while providing some guarantees to the player that he wouldn’t play for a loser forever.

If the Royals want to be serious about pursuing Greinke, they should offer him the same proviso – if the Royals don’t have a winning record in 2013 or 2014, he can walk away. If the Royals are as good as they think they are, there’s no risk in the guarantee. (And if you’re Dayton Moore, you know that if you’re not over .500 by 2014, you’re going to be out of a job anyway.) But from what we know of Greinke, that kind of reassurance might mean the difference between coming back to Kansas City and going elsewhere.

I doubt that he returns, because I doubt the Royals are serious about pursuing him. But they should be. He’s the only guaranteed game-changer on the market, and that’s worth the premium they’d have to pay.

But if they can’t land Greinke or don’t want to try, then they need to go all-in on Anibal Sanchez. Those of you who catch my radio spots have heard me talk up Sanchez as the ideal free-agent target for months now; he’s this year’s version of Edwin Jackson for me.

Sanchez was a highly-regarded prospect with the Red Sox when he was traded along with Hanley Ramirez for Josh Beckett after the 2005 season. He had a fine rookie season in 2006 (2.83 ERA in 114 innings) but tore his labrum in early 2007, and missed more than a year. He returned in 2008 and was not effective; in 2009 he regained his effectiveness, and in 2010 he added durability to his talents. He has thrown between 195 and 196 innings each of the last three years, with ERAs ranging from 3.55 to 3.86.

The injury history has to be somewhat concerning; labrum tears are no joke. But in a way he reminds me of Gil Meche, who missed over TWO years following labrum surgery, but had been healthy for years before the Royals signed him – and if the Royals hadn’t criminally neglected his shoulder pain in the third year of his contract, he might still be pitching today.

Sanchez was traded to the Tigers this summer, and in 12 starts gave them a 3.74 ERA. Even though it was only 12 starts, it is very reassuring that he proved he could handle AL competition. His performance did suffer a little – his strikeout rate dropped to 6.9 per 9 innings, which would be his lowest rate since returning from surgery. But that’s still an acceptable rate for a starting pitcher in the AL, particularly one with well above-average (and improving) command. Sanchez’s walk rate has dropped from 3.2 per 9 in 2010, to 2.9 per 9 in 2011, to 2.5 per 9 before he was traded, to 1.8 per 9 after he was traded. This is the progression you’d expect to see from a starting pitcher as he ages – his strikeout rate dips slowly, but his walk rate drops as well, allowing him to maintain his effectiveness.

Plus, Sanchez’s strikeout rate is starting from a high enough point that he could lose some of his stuff and remain effective. He struck out 202 batters in 196 innings just last season; the only qualifying starters with a higher strikeout rate were Greinke, Brandon Morrow, and Clayton Kershaw. I’d expect a small bounce upward in Sanchez’s strikeout rate next year, particularly since his fastball is not losing velocity – according to Pitch f/x, his average fastball velocity has been between 91.5 and 91.8 mph each of the last three years.

Sanchez isn’t an ace, but he’s perfectly capable of being a #2 starter. He has shown remarkable consistency over the last three seasons, has taken the ball every time out, and has the ability to miss bats. He’s had the opportunity to face AL competition and has passed the test so far. He’ll turn 29 next February, so he’s young enough to justify a long-term deal. And – like Greinke – because he was traded during the season, he won’t cost the Royals draft pick compensation. That’s a rule change in the new CBA; the Tigers won’t get a draft pick if he signs elsewhere, and the team that signs him won’t lose one.

Really, the only thing not to like about him is that he keeps pitching well for the Tigers in the postseason and jacking up his price. He threw 6.1 innings against the A’s in the ALDS, allowing only two runs, then threw seven shutout innings against the Yankees in the ALCS. Postseason performances attract attention; probably too much attention, given how small of a sample size they are.

The more I think about it, the more I like the Gil Meche comp – Sanchez can be a durable #2 starter for 3-4 years, and perhaps longer. The problem is that while only a few teams believed in Meche given his track record, there’s a much longer line of teams interested in Sanchez. Throw all the new TV money on the pile, and what was 5 years, $55 million for Meche is probably going to be 5 years, $70 million at the minimum for Sanchez. I could see 5/$75 or even 5/$80 as the asking price.

The thing is, I’d probably pay it. Assuming his health woes are behind him – and he’s pitching better than ever, so I’m thinking they are – he’s already an above-average starter, and there’s upside here that he could refine his command even more and be a 210 inning, 3.30 ERA pitcher for the next few years. And given that the Royals are unlikely to convince Greinke to sign quickly no matter what they throw at him, the single piece of advice I would give Dayton Moore is this: the moment teams are allowed to talk to free agents, get Sanchez’s agent on the phone, offer him 5 years and $70 million, and don’t let him hang up until you’ve got a deal done.

If the Royals are unable to get this year’s version of Edwin Jackson, they would be well-advised to get in touch with the real thing. They showed no interest in him last winter, so instead he signed a 1-year, $11 million deal with the Nationals, and then went out and did pretty much what you’d expect him to do: he made 31 starts (his sixth straight year with 31+ GS), threw 190 innings, and had a 4.03 ERA. His ERA was a little inflated by giving up eight earnies in 1.1 innings in his next-to-last start of the year; he actually set a career-high with a strikeout-to-walk ratio of 3.17.

Speaking of consistency, Jackson’s xFIP – my favorite single stat to evaluate a pitcher’s effectiveness, scaled to ERA – the last three years reads 3.71, 3.73, 3.79.

Oh, and the Nationals led the major leagues with 98 wins. That probably should count for something.

I’m actually not quite as high on Jackson as I was last winter. While he went out and had a season essentially identical to his performances the previous three years, part of my obsession with him was the small chance that he would have a breakout season and establish himself as an ace-level starter. That could still happen, but he’s a year older now and the odds are slightly less. Also, given that he spent the whole year in the NL for the first time in his career, I would have liked to see him take a step forward just because the quality of competition was worse.

But honestly, these are small quibbles. Jackson is still young enough to break out – he turned 29, making him one month older than Greinke and five months older than Sanchez. While his ERA drifted over to the wrong side of 4, what’s more important is that he set a career high in strikeouts per nine innings at 8.0 (helped no doubt by facing opposing pitchers at the plate). And while Sanchez has raised his price tag in October, Jackson’s lukewarm performance this month – he allowed four runs in five innings in his only start, then gave up a run in a relief inning when Davey Johnson got desperate for bullpen help in Game 5 – seems to have knocked his price down a peg.

Last year, I suggested that the Royals offer him 4 years, $50 million. He might not have accepted it at the time, but it’s noteworthy that he got rid of Scott Boras as his agent. The Pirates offered him a 3-year, $27 million contract that he rejected in favor of the one-year deal. While Boras was probably right to reject it – Jackson’s going to make more than $16 million over the next two years – Jackson’s decision to drop Boras suggests an unwillingness to play hardball.

Frankly, even though Jackson’s not quite as appealing as he was a year ago, the market inflation is so great that 4 and $50 sounds like a great deal right now. If Sanchez is worth $14 million a year for 5 years, then Jackson’s worth at least $13 million a year for 4, or $12 million a year for 5. If that sounds like way too much money, consider that after Jackson, the quality of starting pitchers available drops off a cliff.

The man standing at the edge of the precipice is Kyle Lohse. If I could give Dayton Moore a second piece of advice, it would be this: STAY AWAY FROM KYLE LOHSE.

Not that I expect Moore to listen to me. As Bob Dutton reported earlier this month, “there are indications the Royals have right-handers Anibal Sanchez and Kyle Lohse at the top of their list.” And if Dutton’s reporting it, you can take that to the bank.

So let’s compare the two, shall we?

- Sanchez turns 29 in February. Lohse turned 34 earlier this month.

- Sanchez has made 31+ starts each of the last three years. Lohse made just 18 starts in 2010, missing half the season following surgery to relieve compartment syndrome in his elbow.

- Sanchez has had ERAs ranging from 3.55 to 3.86 each of the last three years. Lohse had a 6.55 ERA in 2010.

- Sanchez’s ERAs the last three years are a fair representation of his performance – he has a 3.69 ERA, and a 3.63 xFIP. While Lohse has a 2.86 ERA this year, and a 3.39 ERA last year, his xFIP was 3.96 this year, 4.04 last year. The take-home conclusion: while Lohse has had better ERAs the last two seasons, he has actually pitched worse than Sanchez, but has been the beneficiary of good luck and good defense.

- On that subject, Sanchez’s BABIP the last three years have been eerily consistent - .310 this year, .310 last year, .305 in 2010. Lohse, on the other hand, had a .262 BABIP this year and a .269 BABIP last year. Those are not sustainable – his career BABIP is .297. (In his disastrous 2010, it was .364.) If you don’t like the fancy-pants numbers, just trust me on this: Lohse has been lucky for the last two years. Sanchez hasn’t. And since Kansas City is the place where luck goes to die, I’d rather have the pitcher whose success doesn’t depend on it.

- Sanchez misses bats. He struck out 7.7 batters per 9 this season, and his career rate is 7.6 per 9. Lohse does not. His strikeout rate was 6.1 batters per 9 this season, and that’s his highest rate in a full season since his rookie year in 2002.

- Sanchez at least spent half of this season in the AL. Lohse hasn’t pitched in the AL since the Twins traded him away in 2006. He has a career 4.88 ERA in the AL, vs. 4.07 in the NL. That’s not entirely fair to him – he’s a different pitcher now than he was in his 20s – but it’s fair to wonder whether he can make the adjustment back to the better league.

On the subject of Lohse being a different pitcher today, that’s one of the things that worries me most about him. He joined the Cardinals in 2008, a 29-year-old pitcher who had just come off a mediocre season for the Reds and Phillies – a 4.62 ERA in 193 innings. Of course, Dave Duncan’s specialty has always been, more or less, 29-year-old veteran starters with mediocre results, and sure enough in his first year with the Cardinals, Lohse had a 3.78 ERA in 200 innings, as he cut both his home runs and walks by about 20%.

That’s what Dave Duncan did – by preaching command of the sinker above all, he got pitchers to throw more strikes and give up fewer homers. In five seasons with the Cardinals, Lohse has walked 2.2 batters and allowed 0.9 homers per 9 innings. Everywhere else, he’s allowed 2.8 walks and 1.2 homers per 9 innings. Granted, Duncan retired after last season and Lohse was better than ever this year – but I’d be very worried that whatever made Lohse such an effective pitcher in St. Louis will stay in St. Louis when he leaves.

I made the point with Sanchez that as a pitcher ages, his strikeout rate tends to suffer, but because his walk rate drops in tandem, his overall effectiveness may not decline. The problem for Lohse is that his walk rate is so low that there’s not much more he can improve in that regard.

Lohse reminds me of no one so much as Joel Pineiro, who washed ashore in St. Louis after the Mariners and Red Sox gave up on him. Duncan got him to cut his walk rate in half, and in 2009 he threw 214 innings, walked 27 batters (the lowest walk rate in the NL) and allowed just 11 homers. Even though he struck out just 105 batters, he was very effective, with a 3.49 ERA.

Pineiro then signed a two-year, $16 million contract with the Angels. In his first year, he only made 23 starts but posted a solid 3.84 ERA – in one of the best pitchers’ parks in the league, mind you. In 2011, he had a 5.13 ERA in 146 innings. He then tore his labrum and his career is in jeopardy.

Pineiro was a more extreme version of Lohse, granted. In his walk year, Pineiro struck out just 4.4 batters per 9 innings. But like Pineiro, Lohse owes his success primarily to not walking anyone. And unlike Pineiro, you’re not getting Lohse for 2 years and $18 million. On 810 WHB, Buster Olney speculated that it would take 5 years and $75 million to sign Lohse.

Which is insane. It’s one thing to give $75 million to a pitcher with strikeout stuff in his late 20s. It’s quite another to give that much money to a command-and-control pitcher in the inferior league for his age 34 through age 38 seasons. It’s telling that the Cardinals did not sign Lohse to a long-term deal this summer, even while they were signing teammate Jake Westbrook to a two-year extension.

Oh, and assuming the Cardinals offer Lohse a qualifying offer (a 1 year, $13.3 million deal, which they almost certainly will), signing Lohse will cost the Royals the supplemental draft pick they got in the new competitive balance lottery. That will probably be around the #35 pick overall – that’s not chump change. (This would also apply to Edwin Jackson, I should point out.)

My suspicion is that one of the reasons the Royals have interest in Lohse is because they think he just needs a good defense behind him, and they’ve bought into the fiction that the Royals have a great defense. I hate to tell them this, but the Royals don’t have a great defense. There’s no evidence that they even have a good defense. There is evidence that they have one of the worst defenses in baseball.

Our ability to evaluate a player’s defense using statistics is still developing. However, our ability to evaluate the defense of a team as a whole is actually quite good. The statistic Defensive Efficiency – essentially, the percentage of balls in play that are turned into outs – is a fairly strong measure of team defense.

In 2012, the Royals ranked 28th in the majors in Defensive Efficiency, at .689. They ranked dead last in the AL, ahead of only the Brewers and Rockies, and right behind the Tigers.

Like you, I look at the team on the field and I wonder how this can be true. Mike Moustakas is Gold Glove-caliber, as is Alex Gordon. Alcides Escobar wasn’t quite as brilliant as he was in 2011, but was still above-average. Lorenzo Cain was terrific in center field. Salvador Perez is Ivan Rodriguez Jr. But again, this isn’t a measure of a single player, where errors are more likely, but the measurement of an entire team. It’s the difference between a political poll that surveys 300 voters vs. 3000 voters – the larger the sample size, the smaller the margin of error.

And if you look at what Defensive Efficiency says about other teams, you have to concede it’s a pretty accurate measure. The Tigers are winning despite a brutal defense, using the same philosophy the Brewers did last season. The best two defenses in baseball are the Angels and Rays, which makes sense. The A’s aren’t far behind them. The Orioles have a good defense. The Indians don’t.

So instead of fighting that conclusion, we need to figure out what that’s the case. Is Eric Hosmer’s positioning still hindering his defense? (Probably.) Is Jeff Francoeur just that bad? (In terms of his range – ignoring his arm – absolutely.) Can anyone on this team play defense at second base? (Maybe not – all five guys the Royals used there ranked below average, and as a whole, they were 25(!) runs below average.)

It’s possible that the Royals’ pitching staff was so bad that they made the defense look worse than it was, but I imagine such an impact was minimal. For one thing, as bad as the rotation was, the bullpen was above-average. So I have no choice but to come to the conclusion that the Royals have a bad defense. Maybe they’ll bounce back next year, now that Yuni is gone and Francoeur is likely to be put out to pasture soon. But for now, at least, I wouldn’t be signing a starting pitcher whose greatest virtue is that he puts his defense to work.

Which means I wouldn’t sign Kyle Lohse. Certainly not for the money it will take to get him.

I’ll get to the other free agents later, guys like Hiroki Kuroda and Shaun Marcum and the rest. But for now, the Royals could hardly do better than to find a way to reel in one of Greinke, Sanchez, or Jackson. And they could hardly do worse than to sign Kyle Lohse.

2013 Top Prospects: #2 - #5

While fans of other teams are glued to the present, we’re focused on the future, and hoping that Dan Quisenberry was wrong when he said that “I have seen the future, and it is much like the present, only longer.”

#1: Wil Myers

#2: Kyle Zimmer

Pos-T: RHSP

H-W: 6’3”, 215 lb

DOB: 09/13/1991 (Age 21)

Signed: 1st Round (#5 overall), 2012, University of San Francisco ($3 million)

Overall Rank in Baseball: #25-35

Stats:

2012: 40 IP, 39 H, 8 BB, 42 K, 1 HR, 2.04 ERA between Complex League and Low-A

I’ve been stewing for a while on who the Royals’ #2 prospect is, and I finally realized that the reason I’ve been stewing on it for so long is that I just have too many reservations about the player that is the consensus guy for that slot, Bubba Starling. We’ll get to him in a moment.

But I also decided that despite the inherent risks with any pitcher, let alone one that just had (minor) elbow surgery to remove bone chips, the upside for Kyle Zimmer was high enough to list him in this spot. It’s clear that the Royals made the right move in selecting him over Mark Appel, who turned down the Pirates’ offer (which was considerably larger than the offer Zimmer accepted) to return to college. But even ignoring signability, there’s reason to really be excited about what Zimmer brings to the table.

I wrote about him more during my draft recap, but in brief, his combination of 1) fresh arm, given that he was a converted position player who only has about two years worth of mound of experience, 2) youth (he just turned 21, making him 6-12 months younger than most college juniors when they’re drafted), and 3) outstanding control – has me very optimistic about his future.

The bone chips thing freaked out a lot of people, but I’m not too worried. They’re not that uncommon, the recovery is quick and predictable. The greater concern would be whether there’s something about his delivery that predisposes Zimmer to elbow problems. The Royals think that what predisposed him to injury was his conversion from position player to pitcher, and they don’t expect this to crop up again.

I expect Zimmer to start the year in Wilmington, and between his talent and the offense-crushing effects of that ballpark, it would be disappointing if he didn’t overpower the league and get promoted to Double-A by June. College pitchers with this pedigree are expected to move fast. Zimmer is the seventh college pitcher selected by the Royals in the top 12 picks of the draft. The others were:

Jeff Granger in 1993 (#5)

Dan Reichert in 1997 (#7)

Jeff Austin in 1998 (#4)

Kyle Snyder in 1999 (#7)

Luke Hochevar in 2006 (#1)

Aaron Crow in 2009 (#12).

Granger actually debuted in September the year he was drafted; I believe he and Bo Jackson are the only Royals to ever play in the majors the same year they were picked. In Granger’s case, his call-up was a contractual obligation, not something he earned. (He threw one inning and allowed three runs.) But Granger started the following season in Double-A. Reichert started 1998 in the Midwest League, but was in Double-A after just 15 appearances. Austin made 18 starts at Wilmington before a promotion to Double-A in 1999. Hochevar and Crow both started their first full seasons in Double-A. Only Kyle Snyder, who blew out his shoulder in early 2000 and missed two seasons, didn’t reach Double-A within a year of signing.

Every one of those pitchers has been a disappointment in one way or the other, which only proves my point – when a college pitcher gets picked that high, he’s on the fast track even if it turns out he’s not any good. So I expect Zimmer to be at Northwest Arkansas by June, if not sooner; don’t be surprised when you read a column in early March about how Zimmer looks as good as anyone in camp, and how the Royals are tempted to break camp with him. I can’t imagine that they will, but I can imagine that with a good performance in Double-A, that by August fans will be clamoring for him to get called up to the big club. And depending on the team’s needs, and their position in the pennant race, it wouldn’t be a shock if the fans got their wish.

Trade Suitability: This is a new item I’m throwing in for each prospect. Given the Royals need for starting pitching, and the likelihood that they will explore the trade market as an avenue to acquire some, I’m going to evaluate each prospect based on how much sense it makes for him to be part of a trade. I’m factoring in how much sense it makes for the Royals to part with him as well as how much sense it makes for an opposing team to want that prospect as part of a trade.

In Zimmer’s case, his trade suitability is Very Low. For one thing, he can’t be traded until one year after he signed, which was in mid-to-late June. That doesn’t preclude a trade entirely, since a player can be a “player to be named later” in a deal for up to six months. (For instance, last March the Royals traded D’Andre Toney as part of the deal for Humberto Quintero and Jason Bourgeois. Toney’s name was finally announced at the one-year anniversary of his signing in June.) But even then, the Royals would have to wait until mid-December to trade Zimmer, and that would limit their options.

Plus, for a team to trade a high first-round pick soon after drafting him – and before he had clearly gone bust – would be very rare. It’s not unheard of; the Indians traded Drew Pomeranz, the #5 pick in the 2010 draft, less than a year later as part of the Ubaldo Jimenez trade. (Pomeranz was a PTBNL for about two weeks until the one-year deadline passed.) But that hasn’t exactly worked out for the Tribe. It’s hard to imagine the Royals trading Zimmer under any circumstances this winter.

Let me also do a Trade Suitability for Wil Myers, which I would classify as Low-to-Medium. On the one hand, Myers has enormous trade value, and is the one guy in the farm system that the Royals could essentially trade straight-up for an established starting pitcher who still has two or three years left on his contract. On the other hand, Myers is ready to play right field in the majors right now, and the Royals’ current right fielder 1) is a free agent next winter and 2) sucked giant boulders this year. I do think the Royals are probably less reluctant to trade Myers than I am. But I’d still bet on Myers being in the organization when camp opens.

#3: Bubba Starling

Pos-B: CF-R

H-W: 6’4”, 180 lb

DOB: 08/3/1992 (Age 20)

Signed: 1st Round (#5 overall), 2011, KS High School ($7.5 million)

Overall Rank in Baseball: #30-45

Stats:

2012: .275/.371/.485, 10/11 in SB, in 53 G in Rookie Ball

The debate over Bubba Starling rages on, and is unlikely to end any time soon. On the one hand, he has a body that drips athleticism, a physique that would make a Tribute from District 1 jealous. On the other hand, he was exceedingly raw when he was drafted, having played against low-level high school competition in Kansas.

On the plus side, his tools are so extraordinary that even McKayla Maroney is impressed. On the down side, the Royals kept him in rookie ball the entire year.

He hit 10 home runs and stole 10 bases in 53 games? Good! He struck out 70 times in 200 at-bats? Bad!

And, of course, hovering over the whole thing is the fact that Starling is already 20 years old; he’s less than a year younger than Zimmer.

I’ve made my concerns about Starling clear, particularly the ones about his advanced age. And in the context of the amazing 2011 draft, the standard to hold Starling to is even higher than it should be for a typical #5 overall pick. Beyond that, the scouting opinions on Starling are varied; some scouts think he’s going to be a superstar, some scouts think his swing is a disaster and that he’ll never hit for average.

There are two hidden positives to take away from Starling’s first pro season. The first is that he was an outstanding defensive centerfielder, to the point where the Royals felt he was almost major league-ready in that regard. I’ve been told that one thing Starling started to do in 2012 was that, when the pitch was delivered, he did not stand with his feet perpendicular to a line between him and the batter (the way 99% of outfielders stand), but rather at a 45-degree angle.

This stance makes an outfielder a little bit vulnerable to balls hit in a specific area behind him, but it comes with an advantage: by watching the batter from a slight angle, it makes it easier for Starling to judge the depth of flyballs more quickly. That first step – the ability to determine where a ball is going to land right off the bat, and start heading in that direction – is the most underrated part of defense, because it happens before the camera is on you. I’ve been told that Dwayne Murphy, one of the great defensive centerfielders of the last 40 years, operated out of the same stance. I don’t know how much it matters, or even if it will continue, but it’s certainly interesting.

The other hidden positive for Starling is that, in addition to his power and speed, he showed patience at the plate; he drew 28 walks (two intentional) in 200 at-bats. I wouldn’t say he showed plate discipline yet, not when he’s striking out in 35% of his at-bats, but he demonstrated an understanding that not swinging at four pitches off the plate gives you first base. When you look at tools freaks who get drafted in the first round and become busts, an inability to walk is one of the most common causes for their downfall. Starling may strike out 200 times in the majors, and that may keep him from batting higher than .250. But you can play everyday in the majors if you’re an outfielder that hits .250 and draws 60 walks a year; you can’t if you hit .250 and draw 30 walks a year.

Even if Starling is a .250 hitter in the majors, his combination of power, speed, walks, and defense would turn him into a Drew Stubbs-type player. Stubbs isn’t great, but at least until this year was a useful everyday player for the Reds. Stubbs himself was the #8 overall pick in 2006, albeit out of college. If Starling turns into Stubbs, I’d say he was a huge disappointment, but not quite a bust.

The upside is that Starling cuts his strikeouts a little, just enough to hit .270 in the majors, and taps into his power more than expected, and becomes the new Eric Davis. I don’t think that’s likely – and when Davis was 19 in Rookie Ball, he hit .322/.467/.561 with 40 steals – but even the possibility that Starling turns into a Davis-type talent keeps him in the upper half of a Top Prospect list.

He’ll start the year at the Royals new low-A ball affiliate in Lexington, and with a strong season could be in Wilmington by August. If he doesn’t get a mid-season promotion this year, he should get one next year, meaning one way or the other, he ought to be in Double-A by his 22nd birthday in August, 2014. He’s not on the fast track. But he might be carrying a ton of freight when he arrives.

Trade Suitability: Very Low. The Royals would risk a riot if they traded away the most highly-touted local prospect in their history, and given the concerns about his game, if the Royals put him on the market, you’d have to figure that would be a giant red flag to the other 29 teams.

#4: Jake Odorizzi

Pos-T: RHSP

H-W: 6’2”, 185 lb

DOB: 03/27/1990 (Age 22)

Signed: Supplemental 1st Round (#32 overall), 2008, IL High School ($1.06 million)

Overall Rank in Baseball: #40-60

Stats:

2010: 121 IP, 99 H, 40 BB, 135 K, 7 HR, 3.43 ERA in low-A

2011: 147 IP, 134 H, 44 BB, 157 K, 17 HR, 3.73 ERA in high-A and AA

2012: 145 IP, 132 H, 50 BB, 135 K, 14 HR, 3.03 ERA in AA and AAA

7 IP, 8 H, 4 BB, 4 K, 1 HR, 4.91 ERA in two major league starts

I really don’t have much to say about Odorizzi, because he is what he is. He’s almost major-league ready, so there’s not much projection here. He has good stuff but not great stuff, good command but not great command, and gets bonus points for his good mechanics, which makes him less likely to get injured, and his athleticism, which makes his delivery repeatable and also makes him likely to get injured. There are dozens of guys in the minors with higher upside, but very few who are a better bet to make at least, say, 100 starts in the major leagues.

The hope is that Odorizzi’s athleticism gives him a fighting shot at adding a touch of velocity to his repertoire. Right now, his fastball is at a tipping point. He only throws in the low 90s – in his two major-league starts, Pitch f/x has his fastball averaging just 90.5 mph – and even with good command and three solid secondary pitches, it’s hard to be more than a #3 starter when you’re a right-hander who rarely breaks 91. But bump that up to 92-93, and you’re in good shape. It’s not common for a 22-year-old to add velocity, but it’s not uncommon either, and Odorizzi’s athleticism gives him a fighting chance.

But he’s not a phenom, and as I’ve written before, I think he would benefit from another few months in Omaha.

Trade Suitability: Medium to High. I don’t think the Royals are looking to trade him, but if it were me, I’d definitely shop him around. His relative lack of risk would make him very appealing to a team that’s rebuilding or looking for cheap starting pitching. At the same time, he doesn’t have the upside to frighten the Royals that they’d live to regret trading him away. Is it worth trading away six years of a potential #3 starter for, say, two years of a guaranteed #2 starter like James Shields or Jon Lester? Given where the Royals are in their rebuilding process, I might just say yes.

#5: John Lamb

Pos-T: LHSP

H-W: 6’4”, 200 lb

DOB: 07/10/1990 (Age 22)

Signed: 5th Round, 2008, CA High School ($165,000)

Overall Rank in Baseball: #80-120

Stats:

2010: 148 IP, 122 H, 45 BB, 159 K, 5 HR, 2.38 ERA in low-A, high-A, and AA

2011: 35 IP, 33 H, 13 BB, 22 K, 3 HR, 3.09 ERA in AA

2012: 13 IP, 15 H, 4 BB, 14 K, 2 HR, 6.92 ERA in Complex and Rookie Ball

I told you not to sleep on John Lamb.

Even though Lamb – not Mike Montgomery or Danny Duffy – was considered the best pitching prospect in The Best Farm System Ever two years ago, and even though Tommy John surgery has an outstanding success rate, I feel like Lamb has been largely forgotten – by both Royals fans and prospect mavens alike.

That’s understandable when you consider that Lamb had TJ surgery in May of 2011, but didn’t pitch competitively again until this August, 14 months later, and even then he was only pitching short stints in rookie ball. He’s missed the better part of two seasons, partly because of the timing of his injury (you’re much better blowing out your elbow in September, guaranteeing you’ll only miss one season), and partly because his return to the mound was delayed by tendonitis in his ankle. Even when Lamb did finally retake the mound, his inability to do any running due to the tendonitis limited his ability to build stamina, which is why he only threw 13 innings in six starts.

But the good news is that he should be at 100% when camp opens next February. His velocity was erratic in his rehab starts; sometimes he was 87-89 for an inning, sometimes 90-92. That’s not surprising, as a guy who’s missed over a year with an arm injury is going to be tentative at first, and needs to overcome the worry that he’s going to feel something tear in his elbow with every pitch. But with a few months of rest now, and the normal slow buildup of pitches that occurs in spring training, Lamb should be ready to hit the low 90s consistently next spring.

And anyway, what made Lamb a great prospect wasn’t his velocity, it was his ability to hit both sides of the plate, work the corners with his breaking stuff, add and subtract as necessary. Last year, his velocity was down all spring long, and into the season he was only hitting the upper 80s. His TJ surgery was a relief on some level, as it explained his missing velocity. (Lamb missed his senior season of high school after breaking his elbow in a car accident, which is why he fell to the fifth round. It may have had nothing to do with his need for elbow surgery, but it probably didn’t help.)

But here’s the thing – even without hitting 90, Lamb was getting guys out in Double-A, when he was 20 years old. He’s almost certain to be throwing harder in his second stint in Double-A, where he is expected to start next season. I see him pitching his way to Omaha by mid-season, and come August, if the Royals are in contention, they might find themselves facing a mini-Strasburg situation of their own, where they have to weigh the risks of letting Lamb throw too many innings in his first full season back from Tommy John surgery, versus his potential impact in a pennant race. I hope they come up with a better answer than the Nationals did, but more than that, I just hope the dilemma presents itself in the first place.

Trade Suitability: Low. While it’s not unheard of for a pitcher to be traded while in the midst of Tommy John rehab (the Cubs acquired Arodys Vizcaino from the Braves for Paul Maholm this summer), it’s hardly ideal. Given the length of his rehab, I think that other teams will want to make sure that Lamb is 100% healthy before they would accept him as the cornerstone of a trade.

For Want Of A Pitcher: Here We Go Again.

(While I plan to discuss Kevin Seitzer in greater detail later, I want to focus on the rotation right now. So my reaction in brief: am I sad that Seitzer was fired? Yes. Do I think he was scapegoated? Of course. Do I think firing him was a mistake? …that, I’m not so sure about.)

I’m sitting down on a Saturday afternoon, trying to take advantage of some rare free time to begin my analysis of the Royals’ rotation options for next year…and Bob Dutton drops a column on us that contains much food for thought. I’ll get to Dutton’s column later, I promise, but let me first share my thoughts with you as they were on the day the season ended.

Before the Royals figure out who they should bring into the rotation mix from outside the organization, they first need to get a firm handle on what options from within the organization should be part of the rotation for 2013.

The Royals only have one starting pitcher under a guaranteed contract for next season. That’s Bruce Chen, who is guaranteed $4.5 million. Chen had a disappointing season and that contract looks like a mistake at this point, but he wasn’t the complete disaster that, say, Luke Hochevar was. Chen finished with a 5.07 ERA, but that understates his performance nearly as much as his 3.96 ERA between 2010 and 2011 overstated his performance. Chen had a strikeout-to-walk ratio of better than 3 to 1 (140 to 44, ignoring intentional walks). He was done in by the 33 homers he allowed in 192 innings. He’s an extreme flyball pitcher, but in 2010 and 2011, he allowed 35 homers in 295 innings. Amazingly, his xFIP – my favorite “ERA estimator” – was better in 2012 (4.62) than it was in 2011 (4.68) and 2010 (4.79).

The consistency of his xFIP is telling – Chen has basically been the same pitcher three years running, only his ERA has jumped all over the map based on how far the fly balls were carrying. That’s basically who he is – a starter with an ERA in the mid-4s. He fits into the #5 slot in a rotation fine.

Luis Mendoza was probably the most pleasant surprise on the entire roster this season – particularly after he learned to throw the cutter around the end of June. He finished with a 4.23 ERA despite an unimpressive strikeout-to-walk ratio of 1.86. However, after implementing the cutter beginning with his start on June 29th, Mendoza had a 3.82 ERA, averaged over six innings a start, and had a K/BB ratio of 2.64. His sinker makes him a strong groundball pitcher as well. I’m perfectly happy slotting him in as the #4 starter.

Jake Odorizzi is the Royals’ most major-league-ready pitching prospect, and there’s a case to be made that he should be in the rotation to start the season. But I would be perfectly happy if he went back to Omaha to open 2013. While he had a fine 2.93 for the Storm Chasers this season, in 107 innings he struck out 88 and walked 40, a borderline ratio even at the Triple-A level, and a sign that he still has some things to work on.

Remember, last year in his first crack at Double-A, his strikeout rate dropped significantly – he K’d 11.8 batters per 9 innings in Wilmington before his promotion, but just 7.1 per 9 at Northwest Arkansas. So the Royals started him in Double-A again this year, and he dominated in seven starts (11.1 Ks per 9) before his promotion to Omaha, where his K rate dropped to 7.4 per 9. If history is any guide, Odorizzi could use a second audition in Triple-A to prove that he can miss bats there, and be ready for a permanent place in the Royals’ rotation by June or July. At the very least, he makes for a great #6 starter, the first understudy in the event that anyone in the projected rotation gets hurt during spring training. But the Royals should plan to break camp in 2013 with five starters better than Odorizzi.

Will Smith is a left-handed finesse pitcher who won’t kill you if you need him to fill in for two or three starts, but at least at this point in his development, he’s not a major-league starter. As a #7 starter, you could do a lot worse; as a #5 starter, you could do a lot better.

So right now, this is how the Royals’ rotation sets up:

#4: Luis Mendoza

#5: Bruce Chen

#6: Jake Odorizzi

#7: Will Smith

You may have noticed that there’s something missing at the top.

I have already analyzed Jeremy Guthrie’s performance extensively, so I’ll sum up here by saying that he projects as a very solid #3 starter, maybe with #2 upside. He certainly pitched like a #2 starter for the Royals this year, but you can’t completely ignore his performance with Colorado, he turns 34 in April…let’s just call him a #3 starter for simplicity’s sake.

I’ve been on the record as saying the Royals should offer him 2 years, $15 million; Sam Mellinger has suggested 2 and 18. Whatever. Somewhere in that range seems like something both sides can agree on; Dutton strongly suggests that the Royals will try to get something done with Guthrie in that range. If Guthrie gets a 3/30 offer elsewhere, he’s probably gone, but the odds of that seem low.

I do agree that the Royals should be aggressive in resolving Guthrie’s status sooner rather than later – but by “resolving” I mean “make him a quality offer, and if he says no, move on”, not “give him whatever he wants”. The Royals can negotiate with him now, whereas it will be a month before they can talk to other free agents. By the time free agent season opens, the Royals should already know whether Guthrie is in the fold or not.

But for now, let’s add him to the pile.

#3: Jeremy Guthrie

#4: Luis Mendoza

#5: Bruce Chen

#6: Jake Odorizzi

#7: Will Smith

Let’s stop for a second and ask, yet again, how on Earth can the Royals bring back Luke Hochevar?

It’s not just the 5.73 ERA in 2012 (the second-worst of any qualifier, behind only Ricky Romero) or the career 5.39 ERA. About that career ERA…oh, you guys are going to love this:

WORST CAREER ERA, MLB HISTORY, MINIMUM 125 STARTS

1. Kyle Davies, 5.59 ERA

2. Luke Hochevar, 5.39 ERA

3. Who the hell cares? Just look at #1 and #2 again

So yeah…Luke Hochevar. But setting aside for a moment just how bad he is…if the Royals bring him back, where exactly is the improvement in the rotation going to come from?

If Hochevar returns, that means there’s only one open spot in the rotation – unless you move Mendoza or Chen to the bullpen, which seems to me to be a waste of resources. Mendoza’s too good, and Chen doesn’t have the skill set to be a lefty specialist (LHB have a higher OPS against Chen than RHB for his entire career, which is quite unusual).

Whereas if you let Hochevar go, not only do you save $5 million in payroll, but you open up two spots for newcomers. The Royals have telegraphed that they’re willing to bring in at least one free agent, and are willing to explore trade possibilities to bring in one more. But if Hochevar returns, then you’ll wind up with a situation where either Mendoza or Chen – both of whom are better pitchers than Hochevar – have to move to the bullpen to accommodate him.

In the grand calculus of whether to bring Hochevar back, this pales compared to the consequence that bringing back Luke Hochevar means BRINGING BACK LUKE HOCHEVAR. But it’s just another reason to let him go. I’m an optimist, and I’m stubborn, so I continue to believe that the Royals will open their eyes to the harsh light of reality long enough to see what everyone else sees. But I admit that at this point, it’s a belief based more on faith than on evidence.

(It’s quite possible that Hochevar’s fate is tied to Guthrie’s. If Guthrie doesn’t re-sign, then the Royals would be left needing to fill three holes in their rotation instead of two, in which case they could easily talk themselves into sticking with the devil they know for one of those spots. All the more reason to get a deal done with Guthrie.)

Either way, the Royals need two pitchers to fill the #1 and #2 spots in their rotation. They won’t necessarily be “#1” and “#2” starters – the only #1 starter on the free agent market is Zack Greinke. But they need to be at least #3-plus, guys the caliber of Guthrie or better. The Royals can go to war next year with a #2, #3, #3, #4, #5 rotation and still hope to win. They just can’t go to war with what they had this year, with their two potential #2 starters both blowing out their elbows, and being left with a #4, #5, and a parade of #6s and #7s.

So if we are agreed that the Royals need to acquire two quality starting pitchers between now and February, let’s explore some options.

The two main categories to look at are free agent pitchers and trade candidates, but today I want to look at a third, largely-overlooked category, because I think there’s at least one gem there to be had there.

Both types of pitching acquisitions come with a downside. In the case of free agent pitchers, to sign the best ones, you almost always have to give them too many years, or too much money, or both – while they may improve your team in the short term, you’re going to feel some heartburn by the end of the contract.

In the case of going the trade route, while you might get a young pitcher who is still improving, and while you might not have to pay him nearly as much money, it’s going to cost you prospects – and for a truly impact pitcher, it’s going to cost you a LOT of prospects. Yes, the Nationals got Gio Gonzalez and he’s fantastic, and they’ve signed him for at least four more years. But they gave up Tom Milone and Derek Norris and A.J. Cole and Brad Peacock. Yeah, the Reds got Mat Latos – but did you see what Yasmani Grandal did in San Diego as a rookie?

But what if I told you that the Royals could acquire an established, quality starting pitcher, without surrendering any top prospects, and who would only require a one-year contract commitment? You’d be interested, wouldn’t you?

They can. It just requires them to be creative.

There are a number of starting pitchers around baseball whose current teams have club options for 2013. Bob Dutton mentions some of them in his column: Dan Haren, Tim Hudson, Jake Peavy, Ervin Santana, and James Shields. Hudson’s contract will probably be picked up by Atlanta; Shields (who actually has options for two more years) will certainly get picked up by Tampa Bay, at least until they trade him.

The White Sox have already indicated that they will not pick up Jake Peavy’s option. This, even though Peavy was healthy in 2012 for the first time in four years and had a terrific season: 219 innings, a 3.37 ERA in a hitters’ park, 194 Ks and just 48 walks. His option is for $22 million, which gives you pause, but consider that the White Sox owe him a $4 million buyout if they don’t pick up his option. So the marginal cost to them is $18 million. If it were me, with the White Sox’s payroll, I’d pay the extra $18 million to keep Peavy for one year. The White Sox seem to think they can decline the option and sign Peavy to a longer-term deal. Even if they couldn’t, they’re not about to trade Peavy to an in-division rival. So he’s out.

But then look over in Anaheim, where the Angels have Dan Haren and Ervin Santana. The Angels have options on both players for 2013. Santana has an option for $13 million (with a $1 million buyout) and Haren has an option for $15.5 million (with a $3.5 million buyout). Take out the buyouts, which the Angels have to pay either way, and they can keep either player on essentially a 1-year, $12 million contract.

As reported here, the Angels are inclined to let them both go.

Now, in Santana’s case that’s understandable. He did, after all, have a 5.16 ERA this year, and led the AL with 39 homers allowed. However, Santana was much better in the second half after some mechanical changes to fix his slider. From July 30th until his next-to-last start of the season, he had a 3.08 ERA in 10 starts, with 42 hits and 16 walks allowed in 64 innings. (He did get hammered in his last start.)

Selective endpoints can make even Luke Hochevar look good, but in the context of his career, 2012 is the anomaly for Santana – he had a 3.38 ERA in 2011, a 3.92 ERA in 2010, and threw over 220 innings each year. He’s definitely on my list of second-tier free agents who would be good gambles in the $5-8 million range. Only having to make a one-year commitment would be tempting, but at $12 million, you might be better off waiting until he’s a free agent and offering him $16 million for two years instead.

But then there’s Dan Haren. The same Dan Haren who has a 3.66 career ERA, including a 3.33 ERA from 2007 to 2011. The same Dan Haren who led the AL in strikeout-to-walk ratio (6.00) just last year, and led the NL in both 2008 and 2009. The same Dan Haren who made at least 33 starts and threw at least 216 innings every year from 2005 to 2011.

You’ll notice the timeframes I mentioned in the last paragraph ended in 2011, because this season, Haren dealt with some back issues that affected both his ability and his availability. But even this year, even dealing with back problems, Haren made 30 starts, had a 4.33 ERA, and in 177 innings, struck out 142 batters against 35 walks (a ratio of better than 4-to-1). In 2011, he struck out 20% of the batters he faced; this year that ratio dropped all the way to 19%.

His ERA jumped because he was more hittable (his BABIP jumped from .276 to .306) and because more flyballs left the yard (12.8%, vs. 7.5% last year). There’s a lot of variability in both of those stats, so he’s likely to improve in both regards next year. While the back problems can be worrisome, I’m much more worried about them with hitters – they can sap you of your power permanently, as they did with Don Mattingly and, to a lesser extent, Mike Sweeney – than with pitchers. Randy Johnson won his first Cy Young Award in 1995, then missed half of the 1996 season with back problems – and then came back in 1997 at full strength, finishing 2nd in the Cy Young vote.

And for what it’s worth, Haren pitched much better after a brief DL stint around the All-Star Break – he made 13 starts after he returned, with a  3.58 ERA, and in 73 innings he allowed just 68 hits and 14 walks. In his last seven starts, he walked 5 batters in 42 innings, and struck out 34.

There is some risk here – notably, the Angels play in a very strong pitchers’ park, which means he might be worse than he looks. On the other hand, he actually pitched better on the road (3.95 ERA) than at home (4.68 ERA) this year.

To me, this is a no-brainer. If Dan Haren goes on the free agent market, he’s getting a three-year deal as a bare minimum. To get him on a one-year, $12 million deal is a steal – and yet, that seems to be in play. The Angels are planning to decline his option and get nothing in return – if the Royals offer them even a modest package of talent, and only ask that the Angels pick up the buyout portion of his contract, why wouldn’t they say yes? They’re getting something instead of nothing.

The more I analyze the trades that teams make, the more I’ve come to the conclusion that the most important step in making good trades is to find the right teams to trade with. There are always teams that, for whatever reason, don’t know what they are doing at the moment – their front office is either incompetent or dysfunctional. Consider how the Royals were able to turn Jonathan Sanchez into Jeremy Guthrie – the Rockies don’t seem to have a clue what they’re doing, and announced a restructuring of their front office during the season that hasn’t clarified anything.

Once upon a time, the Red Sox had the most competent front office in the game. By the time the lights went down on last season, the knives had come out, owners were backstabbing managers, GMs were fleeing the scene, players were being outed for eating fried chicken in the clubhouse…you think it’s a coincidence that the Sox got absolutely fleeced by the A’s (Bailey for Reddick+) and Astros (Lowrie for Melancon)?

It brings to mind the classic opening line to the movie “Rounders”: “Listen, here’s the thing. If you can’t spot the sucker in the first half hour at the table, then YOU are the sucker.” (I think Allard Baird is still trying to spot the sucker, actually.)

If you’re not convinced that the other team in a trade negotiation doesn’t know what they’re doing, you have to at least consider the possibility that YOU don’t know what you’re doing.

If this were the Tampa Bay Rays talking about declining Dan Haren’s option, I’d be very concerned that they know something the rest of us don’t. But it’s not the Rays; it’s the Angels, who have a very competent GM in Jerry DiPoto, but also seem to be going through a power struggle at the moment between DiPoto and manager Mike Scioscia, with an impatient owner (Arte Moreno) who wants to know why all the millions he spent on Albert Pujols and C.J. Wilson didn’t lead to a playoff spot this year. So the fact that the Angels seem prepared to decline what should be a gimme option for Dan Haren doesn’t worry me all that much.

Instead, it strikes me as a golden opportunity for the Royals to buy low, acquiring a true #2 starter while only having to make a one-year commitment, and giving up precious little talent to do so. The Angels were done in this year by a very leaky bullpen – their bullpen finished 12th in the AL in ERA, despite pitching in a very good pitchers’ park. So maybe offer them, I dunno, Louis Coleman? In 111 career innings, Coleman has 129 strikeouts and a 3.25 ERA, and he’d be under club control for five years. If the Angels are letting Haren go anyway, why not get a pitcher who could work in the seventh inning for you for the next half-decade? And from the Royals’ perspective, would they really miss Coleman at all?

Those of you who have listened to me on 810 WHB this season have probably already heard me make the case for Dan Haren – a few weeks ago I even “predicted” that Haren would be the Royals’ Opening Day starter next year when Soren Petro asked me to give him a name. It wasn’t a forecast so much as a wishcast, but there’s no reason why it can’t happen. All it requires is some out-of-the-box thinking.

This is the move Dayton Moore needs to make, and needs to make now. Jeremy Guthrie can wait. Trading three Top Ten prospects for James Shields or Josh Johnson can wait. You can’t even talk to free agent pitchers until November. But right now, you can add a premium starting pitcher to your 2013 rotation, and neither break your payroll nor dip into your farm system. Do it now, Dayton. Before some other GM does.

2013 Is Our Time. Or Else.

What’s high in the middle and round on both ends? Yes, Ohio. But also, the 2012 Kansas City Royals. The Royals were determined to finish the season as poorly as they started it. But between their 3-14 start and their 2-9 finish, the Royals went 67-67. They were a .500 team for 83% of the season. Progress!

(That’s the longest stretch in which the Royals have played .500 or better in almost four years. From May 31st, 2008 through May 7th, 2009, the Royals were 71-64. In other words, the Royals are almost as good in Dayton Moore’s sixth full season on the job as they were in his second season on the job. So not really progress, no.)

Despite the Royals fade at the end, I remain completely convinced that they can contend in 2013. You might chalk this up to my boundless and perpetually irrational optimism, but my buoyancy comes with some rough edges. By that, I mean that I expect the Royals to contend in 2013, and you should too, whether your name is Joe Smith or, say, David Glass. Dayton Moore has been on the job for OVER SIX YEARS, and whatever the condition of the franchise when he took the job, there is no team in the history of baseball – or at least in the history of the Draft Era, beginning in 1965 – that couldn’t be turned around in seven years. The 2003 Tigers lost 119 games, and were in the World Series three years later.

The Kansas City Royals won 71 games last year. The Baltimore Orioles won 69 games. The Orioles play in the AL East. The Orioles’ farm system was so weak compared to the Royals that going into the 2011 season, Kevin Goldstein remarked that the Royals’ #18 prospect (who was, incidentally, Salvador Perez) would have ranked THIRD in the Orioles system.

The Baltimore Orioles are in the playoffs in 2012. Yes, I know that they have been the luckiest team in close games in, roughly, the history of baseball. (Their 29-9 record in one-run games is the best since 1900.) But they also have a positive run differential. They’ve improved steadily as the season progressed. They have a manager – a manager who I routinely put at the top of my list every time the Royals had a managerial opening over the last 10 years – who pushes every right button. Maybe it’s magic, but there’s nothing in the Collective Bargaining Agreement that prohibits magic. The Orioles are in the postseason, and anything can happen.

And then there’s Oakland. Of course there is. The A’s have been the polar opposite of the Royals since Sandy Alderson was the GM and Billy Beane was a fourth outfielder. The A’s are the team of Moneyball; the Royals, as I outlined in my last article, have been the most anti-Moneyball team in the major leagues for the last quarter-century. It’s not just the walks, although of course they have the fewest walks in baseball over that span. It’s the attitude that the Royals have towards using modern baseball theory.

To give you an example: the A’s won 74 games last year, and quite reasonably decided that a 74-win team didn’t need an elite closer. So Andrew Bailey, who in three seasons with the A’s had a 2.47 ERA and 81 saves, was traded to Boston for three young players. The Royals, who won fewer than 74 games year after year despite having a better closer than Andrew Bailey, chose to hold on to Joakim Soria because of some mystical notion that a great closer was like a security blanket, and that if they forced another pitcher into the ninth inning role, the psyche of the entire bullpen would collapse. So they kept Soria, and wound up with bupkis.

Meanwhile, without Soria this season, the bullpen nevertheless had the best season in franchise history. Greg Holland was forced into the closer’s role after Jonathan Broxton was traded, and was so traumatized by the pressure that he saved his first 13 opportunities.

This has nothing to do with OBP or WAR or stats in general. These are simple principles espoused by baseball analysts: even the best relievers are unpredictable. The impact of even an elite reliever on a bad team is minimal. When a bad team has an elite reliever, the benefit of keeping him pales compared to the potential benefit of trading him.

One team – the Oakland A’s – embraces this philosophy, and traded Andrew Bailey for Josh Reddick, Miles Head, and Raul Alcantara. Bailey was hurt and missed the first half of the season, then finished with a 7.04 ERA in 15 innings. Reddick, meanwhile, hit .242/.305/.463 and swatted 32 home runs this year. Head and Alcantara remain interesting prospects.

Another team – the Kansas City Royals – clings to the long-outdated notion that there’s a psychological benefit in having a closer you can rely on, even if your team isn’t very good. They kept Joakim Soria, and for their efforts they were rewarded with a $6 million contract for a pitcher who missed the season with Tommy John surgery.

Last year, the A’s won 74 games. True, the Royals have only won 74 games once since Dayton Moore was hired, but work with me here – the A’s weren’t fundamentally any better than the Royals a year ago. (The Royals actually had a better run differential – they were outscored by 32 runs, while the A’s were outscored by 34 runs.) As mentioned above, they then traded their closer. THEY ALSO TRADED THEIR TWO BEST STARTING PITCHERS FOR PROSPECTS.

They traded Gio Gonzalez to the Nationals, and in return received four prospects. Tom Milone, a soft-tossing lefty with impeccable control, was dropped into their rotation this year and made 31 starts, threw 190 innings, and had a 3.74 ERA. Derek Norris, a catcher out of the Mickey Tettleton mold, started the year in Triple-A, hit .271/.329/.477, and was promoted to Oakland. He hasn’t played great for the A’s – he hit .201/.276/.349 this year – but unlike a certain second baseman in Kansas City, they didn’t bury him when he failed to hit right out of the chute, and this afternoon he hit a home run in the A’s victory.

Milone and Norris, incidentally, were considered the two worst prospects in the trade. Pitchers A.J. Cole and Brad Peacock are farther away, but both have mid-rotation upside. (In fairness, Peacock took a step back this year.)

And the A’s traded Trevor Cahill to the Arizona Diamondbacks for, essentially, Jarrod Parker, with Ryan Cook tossed in. Parker, a highly-touted prospect who was drafted 9th overall, had missed all of 2010 with Tommy John surgery, and was still in Double-A last season. Yet as a rookie, Parker outpitched Cahill this year, with a 3.47 ERA in 181 innings for the A’s. Cook made the All-Star team as a rookie set-up man, finishing with a 2.09 ERA in 73 innings.

Throw in an aggressive move to sign Yoenis Cespedes, the emergence of Chris Carter, some shrewd platooning (Yes! Platooning! What a radical concept!) of guys like Jonny Gomes and Brandon Moss and Seth Smith, underrated mid-season acquisitions like George Kottaras and Stephen Drew, and you have Billy Beane’s finest performance yet. The Oakland A’s, winners of 74 games last year, 37-42 and 13 games out at the end of June this year, are AL West Champions.

SO DON’T TELL ME THE ROYALS CAN’T WIN NEXT SEASON. The time for low expectations is over. The time for excuses is over. If the Royals don’t have a winning record in 2013, then Dayton Moore shouldn’t have a job.

Fortunately for him, the Royals are well positioned to have a winning record in 2013. It shouldn’t be hard to upgrade their production in right field, for instance. And it also shouldn’t be hard to upgrade their rotation. But for 25 years, nothing has been easy for this organization. So I’m here to help. In the coming weeks, I’ll be reviewing the many starting pitchers available this off-season, whether by trade or free agency.

But before the Royals can analyze the market for starting pitchers, they need to do a good hard analysis of the starting pitchers they already have. And by that, I mean they need to cut Luke Hochevar, who wrapped a pretty bow around his season with a 9.56 ERA. He might have done us all an enormous favor; after Dayton Moore issued his vote of confidence for Hochevar, Luke finished with an 8.25 ERA in his last four starts. Judging from Moore’s comments on TV last night, he might just be re-considering his perpetual defense of Hochevar. We can hope, anyway.

Of course, in the same interview, Moore was asked whether he thought Miguel Cabrera or Mike Trout was the deserving MVP. As Buster Olney wrote (and Bob Dutton confirmed), with one exception, EVERY front office person he’s interviewed has said that they'd (correctly, in my not-so-humble opinion) vote for Trout, who is nearly Cabrera’s equal with the bat and is vastly superior with his legs and glove.

Moore, naturally, picked Cabrera, because he won the Triple Crown, and by the statistical standards we used in 1975, that makes him the best player. Only it’s not 1975 anymore. The A’s led the way into the 21st century, and are going to the playoffs in a year in which even their most fervent supporters thought was a rebuilding year. The Royals lag behind, and they’ve treaded water in a year in which most people thought they’d take a step forward.

This isn’t rocket science, people. As the A’s have shown, an analytical approach to baseball works. As the Royals have shown – over and over and over again – the opposite approach doesn’t. If Dayton Moore’s methods fail to yield results one more time, it will be time to bring in someone else. Someone, preferably, who is willing to use all the weapons at his disposal – scouts and stats alike – to build a winning franchise.

It's Not The Fans Who Are Impatient, Dayton.

(One correction to my last column – I wrote that the Royals didn’t sign any of their young players to long-term deals during the Herk Robinson & Allard Baird years. I forgot one player did, in fact, receive an eight-figure contract early in his sophomore season: Angel Berroa. I regret the error. The error of signing Angel Berroa, of course.)

This is one of the easiest columns for me to write, because I could have written it at any point this century, and in fact I have written variations of this column from time to time. On the other hand, this column is difficult to write, because reliving three decades of Royals incompetence is never easy.

1981: 10th (301 BB – strike-shortened season)

1982: 13th (442 BB)

1983: 14th (397 BB). Every other MLB team had at least 436 walks.)

Once upon a time, the Royals were a patient team. In 1972 – 40 years ago – the Royals led the American League in walks. They finished second in the league in walks in 1973, and third in 1974. Before the 1972 season, Royals’ GM Cedric Tallis made one of his annual player robberies at the Winter Meetings, stealing John Mayberry from the Astros for nothing. Mayberry was the Travis Hafner of his generation, an unathletic first baseman who was given up on by his original team because they didn’t appreciate the fact that he had both the power to crush a meaty pitch and the discipline to lay off the other ones.

In 1971, Mayberry had hit just .182/.260/.350 for the Astros; the year before he had hit .216/.318/.365. But he was just 22 when he was traded, and in the previous two years, in 134 games at Triple-A, he had drawn 92 walks and had a .420 OBP. Basically, Mayberry was exactly the type of player that the Royals have traded away for the last quarter-century. But in 1972, they acquired him instead. Mayberry is probably the most patient hitter in Royals history; he led the AL in walks twice, going over 110 walks each year. Aside from Darrell Porter in 1979, no other Royals has accomplished either feat once.

As recently as 1980, the Royals ranked a comfortable 6th in the AL in walks drawn. No Royal drew even 70 walks that year, but five different players drew at least 50.

1984: 14th (400 BB) – every other team in the majors had at least 420 walks.

1985: 12th (473 BB) – Last in AL with 416 UIBB

1986: 13th (474 BB)

But the seeds were already being sown for a generation of free-swingers. Two of the integral members of the 1980 Royals, Frank White and Willie Wilson, were excellent overall players despite not being aware that you were allowed to walk to first base if the pitcher threw four pitches out of the strike zone that you didn’t swing at.

White was the Royals’ everyday second baseman from 1976 through 1985 without ever drawing even 30 walks in a season. He finally learned some semblance of plate discipline in his mid-30s, drawing 43 walks in 1986 and 51 walks in 1987, and not coincidentally had two of his best seasons. Wilson played 19 years in the majors, and never drew 40 walks in a season. This was particularly absurd given that Wilson, in his prime, was one of the fastest ballplayers who ever lived. The man once hit five inside-the-park home runs in a single season – you would think that either Wilson or the Royals would recognize that his priority should be to get to first base by any means necessary, and let his speed take over from there.

Granted, at the time, the importance of walks as a means of getting on base – hell, the importance of getting on base – was not properly appreciated by the baseball establishment. The Royals were hardly alone in this.

Tracy Ringolsby, a fine Kansas City sportswriter who reaches a national audience through The Sporting News and Baseball America, wrote last winter, while comparing Willie Wilson to Rickey Henderson, that the biggest difference between the two was that Henderson had more power. In view of the fact that Henderson walks 106 times per 162 games played and Wilson walks 32 times, that statement is fairly preposterous. It’s quite a bit like saying that Twiggy and Dolly Parton are built about the same except that Twiggy is a half-inch taller. – Bill James, 1985 Baseball Abstract

But while the industry didn’t appreciate walks as much as they should have, no team appreciated them less than the Royals. By 1983, the Royals were dead last in the majors with 397 walks. Not one player drew even 50 walks of the unintentional variety. The 1983 Royals walked less than any other team from 1982 to 1992. Second on the list? The 1984 Royals.

In 1985, the Royals jumped all the way to 12th place in the AL in walks, but even that number was deceptive. In 1985, George Brett had one of his best seasons, and unlike earlier in his career, there was almost no one else in the lineup who was a threat. As a result, Brett was intentionally walked 31 times that year. Between 1958 and 2009, only one other AL player was given as many free passes – John Olerud (!) in 1993. The Royals led the AL in intentional walks – if you remove them from the equation, they were once again last in the AL in walks.

But they won the World Series, and never mind that their championship was due to fantastic starting pitching, a weak division, and some postseason luck. If the Royals could win a world championship without drawing any walks, then they must not be that important, right?

1987: 10th (523 BB)

1988: 9th (486 BB)

1989: 5th (554 BB)

In 1989, almost by accident, the Royals finished 5th in the AL in walks. The team still had its free swingers; White and Wilson were still playing regularly, and Bo Jackson walked 39 times, which I suppose was pretty good for a guy who went straight from the gridiron to the major leagues. But the Royals had acquired Danny Tartabull from the Mariners two years earlier, and Tartabull was always a patient hitter. And they had Kevin Seitzer.

Since Porter led the AL with 121 walks in 1979, only twice has a Royals player drawn even 90 walks in a season. Think about that for a second. Since 1980, a player has drawn 90 walks for his team 391 times – about 13 times for each franchise. The Phillies have had 27 ninety-walk seasons since 1980. The Indians had four players draw 90 walks – in 1999 alone.

Every other team in the majors has had more 90-walk seasons since 1980 than the Royals.

And one of those seasons, again, was George Brett in 1985, when he was walked intentionally 31 times – and 72 times of his own accord. Brett didn’t draw 103 walks that year because he was patient – he drew 103 walks because he was awesome.

But in 1989, Kevin Seitzer walked 102 times, and only seven were intentional. Frankly, it’s surprising he got that many intentional walks – while he hit .281 that year, he had no power to speak of, slugging .337. He earned his walks, and thanks to them, he put up an OBP north of .380 for the third straight year.

Naturally, a year and a half later he was on the bench because Hal McRae didn’t like his defense at third base. The following spring, Seitzer was released a week before Opening Day. If the Royals thought he was done, they miscalculated; he played six more years in the majors. He played five years with the Brewers, and hit .300/.376/.422 for them.

If you’re wondering why I’ve been such a strong supporter of Kevin Seitzer as the team’s hitting coach, wonder no more. In the last 30 years, he is quite literally the only player the Royals have employed who embraced the base on balls as an offensive weapon.

1990: 10th (498 BB)

1991: 10th (523 BB)

1992: 13th (439 BB)

1993: 14th (428 BB) – every other AL team had at least 483 walks.

In 1989, the Royals won 92 games, the most the franchise has won since 1980 – yes, more than they won in 1985. In 1989, the Royals drew more walks relative to the league than any other Royals team since 1980. This is not a coincidence.

Unfortunately, it was an anomaly. The Royals went back to their free-swinging ways the next year; by 1993, they were such hackers that they spotted every other AL team 55 walks – that’s one every three games.

1994: 12th (376 BB)

1995: 13th (475 BB)

1996: 12th (529 BB)

1997: 9th (561 BB)

The Royals have ranked in the bottom half of the American League in walks drawn for 22 consecutive seasons, from 1990 to 2011. They’ve ranked in the bottom half in walks drawn for 30 of the last 31 years, with 1989 the only outlier between 1981 and 2011.

1998: 12th (475 BB)

1999: 10th (535 BB)

2000: 14th (511 BB) – every other team in the AL had at least 526 walks.

2001: 14th (406 BB) – every other team in the majors had at least 456 walks.

And if anything, the problem is only getting worse over time. From 1981 through 1999, the Royals ranked at least 10th in the AL in walks eight times. Since the turn of the century, they’ve done so only three times in 13 years. Since 2000, the Royals are more likely to finish dead last in the AL in walks (four times) than finish 10th or higher (three times).

2002: 8th (524 BB)

2003: 10th (476 BB)

2004: 13th (461 BB)

2005: 12th (424 BB)

2006: 11th (474 BB)

Even more amazing is this: since 1998, when Jose Offerman walked 89 times, not a single Royals player has drawn more than 72 walks in a season. Carlos Beltran’s 72 walks in 2003 represents the franchise’s high-water mark for this century.

Since 1999, a player has drawn 73+ walks a total of 473 times, including 12 players already this year. EVERY SINGLE TEAM IN THE MAJORS HAS DONE IT AT LEAST EIGHT TIMES. Except the Royals. They haven’t done it once.

2007: 13th (428 BB)

2008: 14th (392 BB) – every other team in the majors had at least 417 walks.

2009: 13th (457 BB)

2010: 9th – tie (471 BB) – the Royals were closer to 13th than 8th.

2011: 11th - tie (442) – the Royals were just 7 out of last place.

And in 2012, it’s more of the same, if not worse. With six games to go, the Royals have drawn 381 walks. They are 35 walks behind every other team in the majors – the Red Sox (!) have 416. They need to draw 20 walks in their last six games in order to get over 400. If they don’t, they would be just the 12th team in the last 30 years to walk 400 times or fewer in a full season. But they’d be the fourth Royals team in the last 30 years.

It might even be worse than that. The Royals actually rank third in the AL in intentional walks – Jeff Francoeur, hysterically, has received a free pass nine times. I’ve been Seitzer’s biggest fan, and this time last year he looked like a hitting savant. But here we are, and for the 23rd consecutive season, and the 31st time in the last 32 years, the Royals are below average in walks. For the eighth time in 32 years, they rank dead last in the league. Either Seitzer isn’t preaching patience, the hitters aren’t listening, or they’re just not capable.

You have to hope there’s room for improvement. Francoeur will be replaced by Wil Myers at some point, and Myers has generally shown good plate discipline in the minors. Yuniesky Betancourt is gone. But beyond that, it’s hard to see how the Royals will improve to the point where they’re above league average in the next few years.

Salvador Perez and Alcides Escobar will probably never walk in 10% of their plate appearances – like Frank White and Willie Wilson before them, that doesn’t mean they’re not excellent all-around players, but it is a weakness in their game. Mike Moustakas’ career high for walks in the minors was 43 – he’s a free swinger, and while I think his walk rate will go up as his power develops (because pitchers will be afraid to challenge him), he’s likely to always be an early-in-the-count swinger. Lorenzo Cain’s walk rates in the minors were average at best; he’s probably a 40 or 50-walk guy at his peak.

Johnny Giavotella has been a disappointment in a number of ways, but consider this: in the minor leagues, he drew 238 walks against 2091 at-bats. In the majors, he has 14 walks against 349 at-bats. His walk rate has dropped 62% with the Royals. Plate discipline is such a low priority for the organization that a reasonably patient hitter in the minor leagues can turn into Angel Berroa once he gets to The Show.

If there’s hope for improvement, it rests with Eric Hosmer, who despite a nightmare of the season has upped his walks from 34 to 56 this season. He had a reputation for great strike zone knowledge in the minors; if he fixes his swing to the point where pitchers have to work him carefully, he could be the first Royal since the 1980s to draw 90 walks.

And then there’s Alex Gordon, who is clearly the most (and possibly only) patient hitter in the lineup, with 67 walks each of the last two years. It is partially for that reason that I think he should have been left alone in the leadoff spot in the lineup. Instead, the Royals moved him back to the #3 spot, because they see him more as a “run producer”, and never mind that it’s difficult to produce runs when there aren’t any runners on base for you to drive home.

But here’s why I’m worried. This year, in the leadoff spot, Gordon drew 39 walks against 335 at-bats, a healthy ratio that led to a .379 OBP. But since moving down to #3, he has drawn just 13 walks against 164 at-bats, a 30% drop in his walk rate. Not surprisingly, his OBP is down to .330.

And that, in a nutshell, is why I’m skeptical that the Royals are going to fix their plate discipline problem anytime soon. The Royals have taken the only patient hitter in their lineup, moved him to a lineup spot in which his on-base skills are not nearly as appreciated, and he’s responded by abandoning his signature skill in order to be a better fit in his new spot.

The Royals are fourth in the AL in batting average. But thanks to their lack of walks, they’re just 9th in the league in OBP, and 12th in the league in runs scored.

As the 1985 Royals showed, it is possible to win while being among the most impatient teams in baseball. But as the 1986 through 2012 Royals have shown, it is also immensely difficult. If the Royals make it a point of emphasis of ending their decades-long streak of not giving a damn about walks, it will make ending their other streak – their 27 playoff-free seasons in a row, the longest streak in American professional sports – a lot easier.