Friday, March 4, 2011

The Meaning of the Minors, Part 2.

Here’s what you missed on Glee…er…in my last article.

This study here by Scott McKinney finds that only about 30% of Baseball America Top 100 Prospects go on to be successful major leaguers. The Royals have nine Top 100 Prospects this year, but given the odds, we can expect no more than three or four of them to be quality players in the majors. Ergo, the Royals’ youth movement is doomed to failure. Only I disagree.

Two years ago, on one of the earliest episodes of “Rany on the Radio”, before any of us knew where the farm system was headed, I asked my guest – the intrepid Kevin Goldstein – to name a sleeper in the Royals’ organization. He gave me the name of Salvador Perez, who was such a deep sleeper he was almost comatose – at the time Perez was struggling to hit .200 in the Midwest League. He was just 18 and had plenty of projection, but he had a long, long way to go. Perez struggled so badly that he was eventually sent back to the short-season leagues once their season got underway.

Last year, though, Perez was a quiet revelation. The Royals aggressively started him in Wilmington, jumping him past the same Midwest League where he had struggled so mightily the year before. Despite being the youngest player in the Carolina League to start the year – he didn’t turn 20 until May – Perez hit well over .300 in the early part of the season, before going into a tailspin mid-year when pitchers started taking advantage of his aggressiveness at the plate. But around mid-July Perez adjusted right back, hitting over .300 the rest of the way.

For the season, Perez hit .290/.322/.411, with 7 homers and 21 doubles in 365 at-bats. He was an aggressive hitter (just 18 walks), but also made excellent contact (just 38 strikeouts). Those are respectable numbers for any 20-year-old catcher, but coming in the hitters’ graveyard of Wilmington, they were especially impressive. This is the same ballpark where Mike Moustakas had hit just .250/.297/.421 the year before. This is the same ballpark where Carlos Beltran hit .229/.311/.363, just two years before Beltran was the American League Rookie of the Year.

Defensively, Perez earned nothing but praise, being named the best defensive catcher in the system. He threw out 42% of attempted basestealers, and showed good agility and plate-blocking skills behind the plate.

Last November 8th – the iPhone does a good job of record-keeping – I got a text message out of the blue from Joe Sheehan, who was watching games in the Arizona Fall League. “Salvador Perez just hit a freaking bomb.” He continued. “Extremely young and a big kid. I’m getting a Sandy Alomar feel, and I mean that in a good way.” Alomar was an overrated player throughout his career, as he rarely played at the level he established as the Rookie of the Year in 1990. (That year, Alomar hit .290/.326/.418, numbers eerily similar to Perez’s numbers last year.) But Alomar did play 20 seasons in the major leagues.

(As an aside, with regards to the comments I made about Wil Myers a few days ago, it’s worth pointing out that Alomar was 6’5”, and was so injury-prone – generally suffering from knee problems – that he played in 100 games in a season just four times in his career. Perez is tall, but fortunately not that tall, at 6’3”.)

This spring, as Bob Dutton wrote recently, Perez has been the talk of camp.

“He’s as good a thrower as I’ve ever seen — as I’ve ever seen! — behind the plate,” said manager Ned Yost, himself a former catcher. “I always thought that a 1.8 (second) throw to second base was a myth. I’d never seen one. This kid is constantly in the 1.8s.

“He blocks the ball very well and has great energy behind the plate. He has a lot of leadership qualities. There’s a lot going on with that kid, and it’s all positive.”

There’s even this line later in the article: And Perez is already turning heads while drawing comparisons to Sandy Alomar because of his size and skills.

The Royals moved Wil Myers to the outfield in order to preserve his bat, and in order to get him to the majors more quickly. But there’s no doubt that the decision was made easier by the fact that they already had a prospect in the organization who projects as an above-average catcher. Perez will probably be a solid-average hitter for a catcher, with plus defense. Given his superior defense and high-contact batting skills, I’ve also used Yadier Molina as a potential comp.

Perez should head to Double-A this spring. Most Royals hitters put up raw numbers in Northwest Arkansas that are at least as good as their numbers in Wilmington, and I expect Perez to flirt with .300 once again, with perhaps a little more power. He’s on course to be the Royals’ starting catcher by mid-2012, shortly after his 22nd birthday.

Now here’s the punchline: according to Baseball America, Salvador Perez is the SEVENTEENTH-BEST prospect in the system. According to Kevin Goldstein and Baseball Prospectus, Perez is the TWENTIETH-BEST prospect in the system.

Even better: both of those rankings were issued before the Zack Greinke trade. Once you make room for Jeffress and Odorizzi, Perez moves down two more slots. A player that is widely viewed as a future everyday catcher in the major leagues may or may not be one of the 20 best prospects in the Royals’ organization.

And that, in a nutshell, is why I believe in this farm system. As impressive as the high-end talent in the farm system is, I’m almost more impressed by the quantity of prospects that Dayton Moore has collected than the quality.

That is why I believe that, even with the devastating attrition that waylays travelers on the road from prospectdom to major league stardom, the Royals have enough talent in their system to become a contender.

True, the majority of Top 100 Prospects don’t become successes in the major leagues. But you know what? A sizeable minority of successes in the major leagues weren’t Top 100 Prospects. Not every major-league star was as highly-touted coming through the minor leagues as Chipper Jones or Alex Rodriguez. Brandon Webb was never a Top 100 Prospect, not even prior to the 2003 season, when he was called up in April and wound up throwing 181 innings for the Diamondbacks with a 2.84 ERA. John Lackey was never a Top 100 Prospect, not even prior to the 2002 season, which ended with him being the winning pitcher in Game 7 of the World Series. Johan Santana was never a Top 100 Prospect. Mark Buehrle was never a Top 100 Prospect, nor was Danny Haren. Jim Edmonds never made BA’s Top 100 list, nor did Brian Giles, nor did Jorge Posada. Mariano Rivera, of course, was never a Top 100 Prospect.

Hell, just look at the best players the Royals have developed in recent times. Johnny Damon and Beltran and Zack Greinke were top prospects, sure. But Mike Sweeney was never a BA Top 100 Prospect, not even after he conquered that Wilmington ballpark to the tune of .310/.424/.548 in 1994. Neither was David DeJesus, although I will immodestly point out that in BP 2004, I rated DeJesus the #26 prospect in baseball prior to his rookie season. Joe Randa was never a Top 100 Prospect, nor was Joakim Soria, nor was Jose Rosado.

The Royals don’t simply have more Top 100 Prospects than any team in the history of Top 100 Prospects lists. They also have one of the strongest collections of talents in the next Top 100 Prospects, the guys that you might rank from #101 to #200 in baseball. Don’t take my word for it. I asked Kevin Goldstein of Baseball Prospectus, Jim Callis of Baseball America, and Keith Law of ESPN.com that question: “Off the top of your head, how many Royals do you think would rank between #101 and #200 in all of baseball?” Their answers:

Goldstein: “Somewhere between 3 and 5 guys, I think?” Goldstein, however, has TEN Royals (the same nine guys from BA’s list as well as Jeremy Jeffress) in his Top 101.

Law: “I'm thinking at least 7, probably more like 8-10. Dwyer, Odorizzi, Ventura, Colon, Yambati, Jeffress, Adam for certain. Probably Collins because at some point I'll start ranking relievers, plus Eibner and Crow. That's 10.” Keep in mind that Law had only six Royals in his Top 100, although he had Dwyer and Odorizzi among his 10 prospects who “just missed”.

Callis: “Guys who I ranked 101-150: Crow, Eibner, Jeffress. Guys who other BA editors ranked 101-150: Adam, Ventura, Collins. If you take it down to 200, you could make a case for Melville, Cuthbert, Yambati, Perez--everyone's lists are all over the place at that point.

I think it's safe to say you could put as many as 17 Royals on the Top 200 (or eight from 101-200).”

There seems to be a consensus that the Royals have somewhere between 14 and 17 players that would rank on a Top 200 list. Let’s split the difference and call it 16 – which means that if the Royals have 9 prospects among the Top 100, they have 7 more among the Next 100. I imagine that number also ranks among the highest in baseball.

To put it another way, a month or two ago I asked Jim Callis where the Royals’ farm system would rank if you simply ignored their entire Top 10 list – if the Royals just released their ten best prospects. His answer: “middle of the pack, probably.” The Royals have basically an entire organization’s worth of talent behind their 10 best prospects.

Here’s a list of Baseball America’s 10 best Royals prospects who are not in their Top 100:

1. Aaron Crow
2. Jeremy Jeffress (I’m guessing this is where he’d be ranked)
3. Brett Eibner
4. Jason Adam
5. Yordano Ventura
6. Tim Collins
7. Tim Melville
8. Cheslor Cuthbert
9. Robinson Yambati
10. Salvador Perez

Jeffress and Collins will probably never make the Top 100 list, both because they’re relievers and because they’ll likely exhaust their rookie eligibility this season. Crow might also not qualify for the Top Prospect list next year, although it’s worth remembering that he already made the list at #40 last year. But the other seven guys on this list all have an excellent chance to make the Top 100 in the future. Just two of those seven (Perez and Tim Melville) have so much as played a game in a full-season league yet.

Between these 10 players, and the #5 overall pick the Royals have in the upcoming draft, the Royals could easily place another four or five prospects in next year’s Top 100 – along with the guys on this year’s Top 100 list who don’t lose their rookie eligibility. It’s not out of bounds to suggest the Royals might break their own record for most Top 100 Prospects on next year’s list.

And then there are the players who are already on the Royals roster. Alex Gordon was the #2 prospect in the game four years ago, and if he serves to remind people of the risk of even the best of prospects, he also shouldn’t be dismissed as a guaranteed bust just yet. I’d say the odds that Gordon still establishes himself as a “success” are at least as high as your typical Top 100 Prospect. Billy Butler was a Top 100 Prospect three times, topping out at #25 in 2007. Luke Hochevar was a Top 100 Prospect twice. And last year, along with Crow at #40, Noel Arguelles checked in at #100.

Those five Royals represent McKinney’s study writ small: only Butler is a clear success at this point, although the other four still have the potential to be impact players. But add those five to the nine current Top 100 Prospects, add on another four or five on next year’s list, and now you’re talking about 18 or 19 players of a “Top 100” caliber. Even if the Royals hit on just a third of them, that’s six quality players. (And keep in mind that Gordon won’t be a free agent until after 2013, Soria until after 2014, and Butler until after 2015.)

Then factor in the guys who never see a Top 100 list. There’s Soria, of course, and also Kila Ka’aihue, who will get the opportunity to prove himself this year. Mike Aviles never sniffed a Top 100 list, but is a versatile and useful player. And the Royals are stacked with relievers – I mentioned Jeffress and Collins above, but there’s also Louis Coleman and Patrick Keating and a half-dozen other guys who could be quality relievers without ever being considered for a Top 100 Prospect list. Hell, Baseball America has David Lough as the #25 prospect in the system, and I still think he has a chance to be the second coming of David DeJesus.

That is a simply enormous amount of talent. It’s rare to find a team with so much minor league talent that even if just one-third of it pans out, the remaining talent is still sizeable enough to form the backbone of a contending team. But this is one of those rare instances.

I am not claiming that the Royals have enough talent in their system to win in 2013 and beyond. No doubt, Dayton Moore will have to go outside the system to fill in holes, and he will have to do so far more judiciously than he has done so in the past. But there’s a perception out there that Moore will have to bring in a massive amount of talent to complement his own, because the Royals’ prospect pipeline will turn out to be just a garden hose. I don’t think that’s the case. Moore has to steer clear of the pitfalls he has plunged into in the past, but he doesn’t have to be the second coming of Cedric Tallis.

Keep in mind that with the Royals’ payroll likely to be the lowest in the majors this year, and with only Butler and Soria under contract after 2011, the Royals have the two most desirable commodities any team can have on the trade market: prospects, and the ability to take on salary. The Royals are perfectly positioned to trade some of their excess prospects for an established major leaguer who is expensive and perhaps even overpaid, but who is a championship-caliber player at a position the Royals need to fill.

If, come the summer of 2012, the Royals are short a corner outfielder, could they trade Chris Dwyer, Cheslor Cuthbert, and Johnny Giavotella for Nick Markakis? If they need a catcher, could they trade Robinson Yambati and Derrick Robinson for Miguel Montero? If they’re desperate for another starting pitcher, could they trade Tim Melville, Humberto Arteaga, and David Lough for Wandy Rodriguez?

Maybe. Don’t focus on the specific trade proposals here; that’s not the point. The point is that in a market where teams have become almost overly reluctant to surrender prospects for ready-now major-league talent, the Royals have an excess of prospects that they can shop around in what is a seller’s market. If Joe Saunders, a borderline Top 100 prospect (Tyler Skaggs), and two non-descript arms can fetch Dan Haren…the Royals may be able to acquire impact players without ever resorting to free agency, and without surrendering any impact prospects in return.

With all that said, it would be easier to make the case that an exceptional farm system can build a contending team all by itself if we could point to some team out there that has done so in the past. Well, there is one, and in my next article we’ll look at that team in more detail. You might be surprised by who it was. I know I was.

Sunday, February 27, 2011

The Meaning of the Minors, Part 1.

This past week seemed to be the moment that the Royals’ farm system took center stage on a national stage. A year of steadily-building hype that started with an exceptional outing by Mike Montgomery in Wilmington last April, then a two-homer debut by Mike Moustakas coming back from a ribcage injury later that month, has reached full bloom with the unveiling of Baseball America’s Top 100 Prospects list. Some highlights:

- Three Royals’ hitters – Eric Hosmer, Moustakas, and Wil Myers – ranked back-to-back-to-back at #8, #9, #10. I’m not sure if any team has ever had three prospects ranked in the Top 10 before.

- With John Lamb at #18 and Mike Montgomery at #19, the Royals had five prospects in BA’s Top 20. That is, according to Baseball America, unprecedented. (If the Royals had lost two more games in 2009, they’d have six players in the Top 20. The top three players selected last June – Bryce Harper, Jameson Taillon, and Manny Machado – are all Top 20 prospects.)

- The Royals had four more players ranked – Christian Colon at #51, Danny Duffy at #68, Jake Odorizzi at #69, and Chris Dwyer at #83. That makes nine Royals in the Top 100 – and none of them scraped onto the bottom of the list. No team has ever had nine players on the Top 100 Prospect list before.

- Using a slightly more sophisticated point system designed by BA, which credits an organization with 100 points for having the #1 prospect, 99 points for the #2 prospect, all the way down to 1 point for the #100 prospect – the Royals had 574 points. Again, in the 22-year history of Baseball America’s Top 100 Prospect list, the Royals have the highest-ranked collection of prospects ever. Only one team (the 2006 Diamondbacks) come within 100 points of the Royals, meaning that even if the Royals released Eric Hosmer today, they’d still have the second-best group of prospects in the last 22 years.

The Royals’ farm system has been on such a roll for the past year that it’s hard to believe that a year ago, Baseball America ranked the Royals as having the 16th-best farm system in baseball. Kevin Goldstein and Keith Law had them ranked higher – if I remember correctly, 9th and 10th respectively – but it’s safe to say that no one saw this coming. I’m an incorrigible optimist, and I thought that if Hosmer and Moustakas bounced back and the pitchers stayed healthy and Wil Myers hit and…yeah, even I didn’t see this coming. The performance of the farm system last season represents the greatest overperformance by the Royals in any significant facet since 1985.

Word on the street is that Joe Posnanski is in Arizona, writing a column about the Royals’ farm system for Sports Illustrated. Think about that for a moment – a team that has won 70 games just twice in the last ten seasons is getting a feature article in Sports Illustrated solely on the basis of its farm system. Something like a dozen Royals players are going to find their names inside the pages of SI before they’ve played a game in the major leagues. (Already, there’s an article on SI’s website about the Royals’ minor leaguers here.)

And with all that, someone had to go and splash the cold water of reality on the proceedings. Over at Royals Review, a gentleman named Scott McKinney performed a quantitative analysis of Baseball America’s Top 100 Prospect list over the years, and came to the rather reasonable conclusion that only about 30% of all Top 100 Prospects turn out as “successes” at the major league level. Or to put it another way, about 70% of all Top 100 Prospects go bust.

How very rude of him. (You can read his study here.)

This article got a fair amount of attention, not just on these here internets but also on Kansas City radio, where my friend Soren Petro spent the better part of an hour talking about the implications, and painting a picture of the Royals’ future that can only be described as depressing. I asked for the opportunity to make a rebuttal, and was on Soren’s show this past Tuesday. As things usually go when I’m on the radio, 35 minutes passed in a blink of an eye, and while we covered a lot of topics and discussed a lot of players in detail, I never got around to arguing the main point, which is whether we’re overrating the potential impact that the farm system is going to have on the future of the team at the major league level.

Fortunately for you, that means I can make my case here instead.

I don’t have any real issues with McKinney’s study; on the contrary, I think his results only quantified what most analysts already suspected, which is that the risk of prospects – even top prospects – is far greater than we’d care to admit. For years, we’ve been saying that the best way to develop a starting pitcher in the majors is to start with five pitching prospects. According to McKinney, that rule of thumb is exactly true; the success rate for pitchers on the Top 100 list is 23%. (For position players, not surprisingly, it’s much higher – 37%.)

Five of the Royals’ nine Top 100 Prospects are pitchers, but the risk is mitigated somewhat by the fact that the Royals have three Top-10 hitting prospects, a class of prospect which is about as low-risk as they come. McKinney estimates the success rate of Hosmer, Moustakas, and Myers at around 61% each. So of the nine prospects, McKinney arrived at an “expected value” of 3.104 successes. (Actually, I believe McKinney made a math error – he assigned John Lamb and Mike Montgomery the wrong values – and the actually “expected value” should be 3.452 successes.) Basically, two of the big three hitters should be a success, one of the five pitchers, and then the Royals get a freebie with Christian Colon. Two of the other six players will be “contributors”, guys who aren’t above-average players but still have value in the majors, and the other three or four will be busts.

That’s not nearly the scenario Royals fans are looking for. More to the point, if the Royals end up with three above-average players (including one star) and two contributors out of their farm system, coupled with the 100-loss talent they have in the majors right now, they’re not going to sniff contention in the next few years without a massive infusion of talent from outside the system.

Before you throw yourself off a bridge, let me massage the data a little. While I agree with the gist of McKinney’s conclusions, I do think that the overall success rate he comes up with overstates the risk of prospects a little. I think that for three main reasons, which I’ll expound upon by using three different players as props:

Todd Van Poppel: Van Poppel was considered the best player available in the 1990 draft, but fell to #13 overall because of the bonus demands of one Scott Boras. (In some ways, Van Poppel was the first top draft prospect to fall in the draft because of signability issues.) He made eight starts in the minors that summer, and while he was overpowering – 49 strikeouts and 18 hits allowed in 38 innings – he also walked 19 batters. The following spring, he ranked #1 on Baseball America’s. In 1991, Van Poppel was rushed to Double-A, and in 131 innings he walked 90 batters against just 115 strikeouts. That performance dropped him on the prospect list in 1992…all the way to #2.

I’ve been a subscriber to Baseball America since 1992 or 1993, and they’ve been the gold standard for coverage of the minor leagues since well before then. But I do think that in the early years of their Top Prospect list Baseball America overvalued scouting reports, and understated the risk with pitchers four levels away from the majors. I think even they’d acknowledge that they do a better job of evaluating prospects today than in the past.

(Another good example was Kiki Jones, a high school right-hander selected #15 overall in the 1989 draft by the Dodgers. He wasn’t particularly tall at 5’11”, but he threw hard, and in 12 starts in rookie ball he went 8-0 with 1.58 ERA and struck out a batter an inning. The following spring, Baseball America unveiled their first-ever Top 100 Prospect list. Kiki Jones was #6 overall. Jones struggled with arm problems and never even reached the majors.)

McKinney addresses this phenomenon in his study; breaking out the lists by year, he found that the success rate for players was only 27% from 1990 to 1993, and around 32% from 1994 to 2003. And this year, Jameson Taillon, who compares favorably with Van Poppel as right-handed flamethrowers from Texas high schools, is ranked at “only” #11.

Bill Pulsipher: Pulsipher, a big hard-throwing left-hander selected by the Mets in the second round in the 1991 draft, ranked as Baseball America’s #21 prospect overall three years later. Pulsipher spent all of 1994 in Double-A as a 20-year-old pitcher, and was outstanding – in 201 innings, he allowed 179 hits, and while he allowed 89 walks, he also struck out 171 batters.

Read those numbers again. Pulsipher threw TWO HUNDRED AND ONE INNINGS. In a minor league season that ended around Labor Day. In just 28 starts. And as those walk and strikeout numbers suggest, those weren’t exactly high-efficiency innings.

The following spring, Pulsipher ranked as the #12 prospect in baseball, a part of the Mets’ Generation K along with Paul Wilson (#16) and Jason Isringhausen (#37). All three had shouldered huge workloads – Wilson in college, the other two in the minors. Pulsipher made it to The Show in 1995 and in 17 starts posted a 3.98 ERA. He then blew out his shoulder, didn’t return to the majors until 1998, and was a shell of his former self. No one can fault his effort – as recently as 2009, he was still toiling on the fringes of organized baseball, in Mexico and the Northern League, which is just incredibly sad.

Wilson blew out his shoulder after his rookie season in 1996, and missed three seasons, but returned to the majors in 2000 and managed to find gainful (if not necessarily effective) employment for the next five years. Only Isringhausen – who in 1994 threw just 193 innings in 28 starts, the lucky guy – had a productive career, as a closer, and only after rehabbing from Tommy John surgery.

Teams don’t handle their pitching prospects the way they did 20 or even 10 years ago. John Lamb made 28 starts last year, the same number that Pulsipher threw in 1994, but only threw 148 innings. And he threw the most innings of the five Royals pitchers on the list. Presumably, the success rate of pitching prospects has gone up over time as teams have become more careful with them. But if they have, I’m not sure McKinney’s study would have captured it, as in order to have an extended follow-up period he ended his study with BA’s 2003 Top Prospect List.

Pablo Ozuna: Once upon a time, Pablo Ozuna was a Top 10 Prospect. Prior to the 1999 season, BA ranked him the #9 prospect in the land. Over at Baseball Prospectus, where I had started my own Top Prospect list, Ozuna landed at #5. And why not? In 1998 Ozuna, as a 19-year-old shortstop in the Midwest League, had just hit .357 and stolen 62 bases. He had just been traded from the Cardinals to the Marlins as the centerpiece of the deal that brought Edgar Renteria to St. Louis.

Only it turns out Ozuna wasn’t 19 years old during the 1998 season. He was 23, and turned 24 before the season ended. Needless to say, he shouldn’t have been a Top 100 Prospect, let alone Top 10, but Ozuna’s real date of birth wasn’t revealed until it was too late. Ozuna would eventually break in with the 2005 White Sox as a 30-year-old rookie utility player.

Ozuna is just the most glaring example of what has been a very common phenomenon among Latin American prospects – particularly from the Dominican Republic, where a lack of accurate record-keeping has made it easier for ballplayers to carry around fictitious birthdates and even names. The US government cracked down on identity theft in a post 9/11 era, which has limited but hardly ended the problem. It would be interesting to see whether Top 100 Prospects from the Dominican Republic were more likely to go bust than American-born players.

In any case, this doesn’t affect the Royals. Eight of their nine Top Prospects were born in America; Christian Colon is from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

These three factors all conspire to lower the success rate of top prospects, and I think it’s fair to assume that as these factors are eliminated, that the expected success rate of top prospects should rise. I think it’s a modest difference, but it could be the difference between having three successes and four successes out of the Royals’ collection of Top 100 guys.

Also, while I think that McKinney uses a fair definition of “success” – a player averaging 1.5 fWAR a season over the first six full seasons of his career – for most players, I’m not sure that’s a fair threshold for relievers. Actually, I’m fairly sure it’s not. Robinson Tejeda has been, by any objective standard, a useful reliever for the Royals the last two years. He threw 61 innings last year, 74 innings in 2009 (when he made 6 starts), and had a 3.54 ERA each season. That’s not an elite-level reliever, but that’s a pretty useful set-up man.

But Tejeda didn’t reach the 1.5 fWAR threshold in either season. Daniel Bard, who had an outstanding season as the Red Sox’ set-up man last year, clocked in at exactly 1.5 fWAR. It is quite possible for a pitcher to be a successful reliever in the majors without qualifying as a “success” by the parameters of this study. That’s not a huge failing of the study, because out of 100 prospects, generally only three or four are relievers at the time they’re placed on the list. But with most teams carrying seven relievers at a time, it’s important to note that over a quarter of a team’s roster is exempt from the definition of “success” posed by this study.

Still, out of the other 18 roster spots, if the Royals wind up with four average or above-average players out of their farm system, that’s not going to be good enough. I have no illusions about that. And yet I still think that the Royals have the talent in their farm system right now to build a sustained contender in two or three years.

The reason is quite simple. Oh…but would you look at the time? (Or word count?) It’s getting late. I’ll explain why in Part 2.

Saturday, February 26, 2011

The Baseball Show With Rany And Joe.

Many years ago, before I started this blog, before “Rob and Rany”, before even Baseball Prospectus, my best resource for baseball analysis on a day-to-day basis was the regular phone call I shared with my friend, Joe Sheehan. It was so long ago that Joe wasn’t even making fun of the Royals yet.

Joe and I became introduced to each other in the winter of 1992-93, when he answered a request I had made on the rec.sport.baseball bulletin board – the World Wide Web was still a few years away, and r.s.bb was the premier baseball resource on the internet – looking for potential owners for a Strat-o-matic league that I had founded in college. He joined the league, soon made some snarky remarks about the loaded team I had built by taking advantage of some sub-par competition in the league’s inaugural draft, and I fired back. Pretty soon we were emailing back and forth on a regular basis. He invited me to come play in a Strat-o-matic tournament, and ignoring everything my parents had taught me about strangers and the most basic principles of common sense, I agreed. I hopped aboard an Amtrak train at Baltimore’s Penn Station headed to Atlantic City. I was 17 at the time.

Fortunately, it turned out that Joe was not a 55-year-old child molester masquerading as a college senior. We had a fun weekend, I met a bunch of other hard-core baseball fans and Strat players, and even managed to finish .500 in my first tournament. I headed back to college at Johns Hopkins, Joe headed back to USC, and we started talking on the phone on a regular basis. Sometimes we talked about college, sometimes we talked about girls, but usually we talked about baseball. Joe was older than me, and had not spent the better part of seven years living in Saudi Arabia almost completely cut off from baseball, so the educational process generally flowed in one direction. Joe was also a journalism major and a razor-sharp writer, and from our regular emails I learned as much about writing from him as I learned about baseball.

Joe and I would go on to co-found Baseball Prospectus together the winter after I graduated from college. He’s gone on to great professional success as a sportswriter, writing the daily baseball column at BP for many years, and now writing for both Sports Illustrated as well as his own subscription-based newsletter (which you really should subscribe to here.) Meanwhile, I’ve gone on to write a free blog about the most-ridiculed team in the major leagues.

Somewhere along the way, though, we stopped talking on the phone as much. I got married, had three kids, finished medical school and residency and opened my own practice. We might talk on the phone four or five times a year instead of four or five times a week. But when we did talk, the conversations were as animated and argumentative and filled with a mutual love of baseball as ever. During one of our talks last summer, as I headed to a Royals-White Sox tilt at U.S. Cellular, one of us said to the other, “You know what? We should just tape our phone calls and turn them into a podcast.”

On Thursday night, after figuring out the nuances of recording a call on Skype, we did just that. You can listen to the first episode of “The Baseball Show with Rany and Joe” by clicking here. With the help of our producer Brady Gardiner, we’ve submitted the podcast to iTunes; I’ll let you know once we’ve been approved. The plan is to tape a show once a week, generally on a Monday or Tuesday, and hopefully we’ll get the jitters and general awkwardness of the first show out with regular practice.

This isn’t a Royals-centric show by any means, though I’m sure they’ll get more attention than they would on any other general baseball podcast. It’s exhilarating and frankly rather frightening for me to be talking about the major leagues again, as it’s been over three years since I wrote about the other 29 teams on a regular basis. (And before anyone asks, this podcast shouldn’t affect my “Rany on the Radio” show one way or the other. I might be back on the air with 810 WHB this April, I might not, but either way it won’t be the fault of this podcast.)

Anyway, I hope you’ll tune into our podcast, and I hope you’ll enjoy it. Either way, it’s good to be talking to Joe regularly again.

Sunday, February 20, 2011

Royals Today: 2/20/2011.

It’s a bullet point Sunday. This should clear the decks of my off-season thoughts, and we’ll move into spring training mode shortly.

- When I discussed the Soria-to-the-Yankees rumors in my last article, I was negligent in not bringing up perhaps the best piece of evidence that the Yankees were willing to give up a ton of talent for Soria: that they – and by “they” I mean the Steinbrenner brothers more than Brian Cashman – subsequently gave Rafael Soriano a 3-year, $35 million contract.

Actually, they gave Soriano more than a $35 million contract – they gave him a $35 million contract with the option to opt out after each year. They’re paying a middle reliever almost $12 million a year, in a contract that offers tremendous downside and no upside. In the best-case scenario for the Yankees, where Soriano is one of the best relievers in baseball in 2011, he’ll walk away.

If there’s a silver lining to the contract, it’s that the Yankees so vastly overpaid for Soriano that even if he has a great year he might not opt out, because even a top-tier closer is going to struggle to get more than $12 million a year on the open market. The Yankees have craftily diminished the value of the opt-out clause for Soriano by throwing so much money at him that he won’t want to leave. This means that the Yankees will be paying almost $27 million in 2011 to a pair of relievers who – in a best-case scenario – will pitch about 150 innings combined. And their fourth starter is Sergio Mitre.

So yeah, I can see the argument that if the Yankees were willing to give Soriano $35 million for 3 years – with options on the player’s side – they might be willing to pay through the nose for a superior player on a $27 million contract for 4 years – with all the options in their favor.

- Speaking of overpaid relievers…you might have noticed that the Tampa Bay Rays signed Kyle Farnsworth.

Short of Billy Beane giving a multi-year contract to Jeff Francoeur, it’s hard to think of a transaction that could cause more cognitive dissonance among the sabermetric community. Kyle Farnsworth is overrated. Tampa Bay might have the smartest front office in baseball (at least that’s what Jonah Keri says.) Smart teams don’t sign overrated players. But the Rays signed Farnsworth. We are caught in an infinite logic loop, one that threatens to tear the very fabric of the universe apart.

There is only one way out of this paradox, which is to accept that Farnsworth isn’t nearly as overrated as everyone thinks. I’m not sure I’m prepared to do that. Farnsworth had one of the most anti-clutch seasons in the history of baseball in 2009. Batting average isn’t the most useful stat in the world, but consider this. When the game was within two runs either way, opponents were 52-for-103 against Farnsworth in 2009 – they hit .505. When the game margin was 3 or 4 runs, they hit .364. When the margin was 5 runs or more, they hit .203.

Yeah, it was probably a fluke. But I’m still not prepared to forgive him.

The Rays don’t have anything to forgive, and what they see is a pitcher who had an xFIP of 3.37 in 2009, and 3.63 in 2010. They also see a pitcher who – thanks to Bob McClure – finally started mixing in more off-speed pitches last season, throwing more changeups as well as a new cut fastball. That looks awfully appealing for a team that has lost half their bullpen to free agency.

Don’t cry for them – the Rays have 12 of the first 88 picks in the June draft, which is the greatest number of extra picks by any team in the history of the draft. (The Rays will have drafted TEN TIMES before the Royals make their second selection.) Oh, and this is considered to be the strongest draft pool in years.

I’m still skeptical that Farnsworth has truly turned a corner. But it’s worth remembering that if he has, and if the Rays are once again taking advantage of The Extra 2%, it’s only because of the work that Bob McClure and the Royals did with him.

- The Royals signed Zach Miner to a minor-league contract, which may mean nothing in the end – Miner is coming off Tommy John surgery and isn’t expected back until June at the earliest. But my reaction to the transaction says something about the Royals.

Miner, at his best, is a pitch-to-contact right-hander who lets his defense work for him. (He has a solid 4.24 career ERA despite striking out just 5.5 batters per 9 innings.) The Royals have sifted through the bargain bin to find pitchers like him in the past, with usually awful results – not just because the pitchers themselves have marginal talent, but because these are exactly the kind of pitchers who most need a strong defense behind them. Among their many flaws, the Royals of recent vintage have suffered from a defense that is almost comically bad.

So it says something that my reaction to the Miner signing was not along the lines of “here we go again”. For that, I can thank Alcides Escobar’s arrival – and Yuniesky Betancourt’s departure. It remains to be seen whether Escobar can live up to his Gold Glove potential from a year ago, but I am comfortable in saying that he is an above-average defensive shortstop. The man he is replacing is perhaps the worst defensive everyday shortstop in the majors.

At second base, the Royals will start the year with Chris Getz at second base; Getz might not hit, but from what we’ve seen of him he’s at least an average defender, and perhaps slightly better. Say what you want about Jeff Francoeur, but he’s almost always been an above-average defender in right field. Alex Gordon can be expected to improve in left field now that he’s had a full year to adjust to the position, and he wasn’t bad last year. Every center field option other than Melky Cabrera (who, sadly, is favored to win the job) plays at least average defense. I think Mike Aviles will do a fine job at third base, where his lack of speed won’t hurt him as much as in the middle infield, and where his arm should be fully recovered in his second year after Tommy John surgery. Kila Ka’aihue figures to get a fair amount of the reps at first base, and he figures to be a modest improvement on Billy Butler.

Add it all together, and the defense looks to be better – maybe not dramatically better, but slightly better across the board, and significantly better at shortstop. It might take a slight hit in June if Mike Moustakas takes over at third and Aviles moves back to second; on the other hand, by June I suspect the Melky Cabrera experiment in center field will be over.

Suddenly, taking a flyer on Zach Miner doesn’t seem like such a pointless waste of resources. And pitchers with better stuff than Miner, but with a similar propensity to play democratic baseball – like Luke Hochevar – are well-situated to take a step forward.

- Speaking of defensive upgrades, the Royals have made the long-expected decision to move Wil Myers from catcher to right field.

I can certainly see the viewpoint that looks at this move as a wasted opportunity. The Royals had the chance to have one of the best-hitting catchers in baseball; Wil Myers has the kind of bat that might approach a .300/.400/.500 line in a few years. The only catchers who can regularly do that are Joe Mauer and Brian McCann. Victor Martinez could, once upon a time, and Carlos Santana and Buster Posey probably will in the near future. Even if Myers wasn’t the most agile backstop in the world, his stick figured to make up for it. Martinez is a well below-average catcher defensively, and that didn’t stop him from making eight figures this off-season.

A bad defensive catcher may cost his team a few runs by allowing too many errant pitches to get past him, and by not providing enough of a deterrent to baserunners with larceny in their heart. But the evidence that a bad defensive catcher will hurt his pitching staff with his game-calling skills is scant. The statistical evidence suggests that conventional wisdom vastly overstates the effect of a bad defensive catcher.

Having said all that, I agree with the decision to move Myers to right field. My concern with leaving Myers behind the plate wasn’t his defense; it was his offense. The rigors of squatting behind the plate 140 times a game, 140 games a year, are not beneficial towards a prospect’s maximum development as a hitter. Myers, who hit a combined .315/.429/.506 last season, as a 19-year-old in a pair of tough hitters’ parks, is the most precocious hitter in the system. Eliminating the chores of catching from Myers’ job description removes the biggest roadblock on his path to becoming an All-Star hitter.

The cost-benefit analysis would be different if Myers were an excellent defensive catcher, or even if he were just average. But Myers still needed a lot of work back there; while he had a strong arm (he threw out 32% of attempted base stealers last year), his mobility was a question mark – he allowed 20 passed balls despite catching in just 75 games. The majority – not all, but a majority – of scouts felt that ultimately he would have to move off the position. Getting the transition over with now takes away the upside that Myers ultimately settles in at catcher and still hits at an elite level, but also removes the much larger downside of wasting Myers’ energy on a fruitless task for the next year or two that also retards his bat’s development.

I’ve made this comparison before, but Myers’ skill set and size is reminiscent of a young Jayson Werth. Werth was a first-round pick of the Orioles in 1997, and after hitting .260/.359/.382 as a 19-year-old catcher in A-ball in 1998, he was a Baseball America Top 100 Prospect the following spring. He would make the list four times in five years (1999, 2000, 2002, and 2003).

The problem was that he wasn’t a great catcher, and he really didn’t have the body type for the position. The ideal catcher frame is not too tall, and with a low center of gravity. Werth is listed at 6’5”, 215 pounds. (Myers is not as tall but just as stringy – 6’3”, 190 pounds.) He wasn’t getting better as a catcher, and his offense wasn’t developing; as a 21-year-old in 2000, he hit just .228/.361/.355 in Double-A. After that season, the Orioles gave up on him, trading him to Toronto for John Bale. (Yes, that John Bale.)

The Blue Jays let him catch full-time in 2001, and then…well, allow me to quote myself, writing Werth’s entry as the #38 prospect in the minors in Baseball Prospectus 2003:

Never underestimate the importance of common sense. Werth was a first round draft pick as a high school catcher, and despite flashes of greatness he failed to make an impression on anyone – to the point where the Orioles traded him to Toronto for John Bale. Until that is, someone in the Blue Jays organization looked at Werth’s lanky, 6’5”, 210-pound physique and thought, ‘gee, he really doesn’t look like a catcher.’ He didn’t look like a catcher because he wasn’t one – he was a speedy center fielder trapped behind the plate for reasons not easily divined.”

Werth moved to the outfield in early 2002 and never caught again. But after two cups of coffee with Toronto, the Blue Jays traded him to the Dodgers on the eve of the 2004 season for Jason Frasor. Werth had a fine rookie season in 2004, was disappointing in 2005, and then was hurt and missed all of 2006. The Dodgers let him go that winter, he signed with Philadelphia, and he has been one of baseball’s best right fielders ever since.

In retrospect, had Werth been moved to the outfield prior to the 1999 season, he probably wouldn’t have been traded for a middle reliever twice before he established himself in the majors. By moving Myers to the outfield now, the Royals are depriving themselves of the slight possibility that Myers could be this generation’s Mike Piazza, a poor defensive catcher who is nonetheless a perennial All-Star because of his bat. But they also eliminate the much more likely scenario where the Royals waste years trying to determine whether Myers can both catch and hit, and another team reaps the benefits years down the line. It’s a fair tradeoff. Sometimes it’s better not to be too greedy.

The other major reason why moving Myers is the right move for the organization is that they already have Myers’ replacement as the organization’s catcher of the future in Salvador Perez. But more on him next time.

- I thought that a comfy spot as an NRI with an NL West club was the perfect landing spot for Brian Bannister, but he threw us all a curveball by heading to Japan. As you’d expect from Banny, it was a really smart move.

He’s guaranteed a lot more money than he would have made stateside in 2011, and he gets to pitch against somewhat inferior competition in a league where probably 70% of the pitchers have a fastball that tops out in the upper 80s and rely on breaking stuff and slop and guile to get batters out. And knowing Banny, he probably sees his move to Japan as a terrific experience he might not get to enjoy in the future. I mean, he’ll live in Tokyo for a year, pitch for the famous Yomiuri Giants, maybe learn some Japanese. (And maybe, while he’s there, impart a bit of sabermetrics to the Land Of The Rising Sun And A Million Sacrifice Bunts.)

If his shoulder feels better and he finds his cutter again, he can always return stateside in a year or two. The trans-Pacific crossing has become easier over the years going both ways; an American pitcher no longer has to worry that a move to Japan probably spells the end of his major league career. (The Royals have done as much as anyone to dispel that notion, what with Darrell May and John Bale.) The greatest testament to the idea that you can come home again is Colby Lewis, who took a two-year sabbatical in Japan, got his shoulder healthy and started throwing strikes, and returned to the majors last year with 201 innings and a 3.72 ERA.

Lewis had a lot of nibbles from American teams last winter after his success in Japan, but decided to return to Texas, where he had spent the bulk of his career before leaving. I have no reason to think Bannister left Kansas City on bad terms with the Royals; if he makes it big in Japan, maybe we’ll see him again in a year or two.

---

A few housekeeping notes to conclude:

So as a new season is upon us, I fear that I may be running out of column ideas. Or at least, I’m running out of original column ideas. The storyline for the 2011 Royals is the same as the one for 2010: it’s all about the minor leaguers, at least until August or so when a good number of those minor leaguers start getting their wings.

I have no problem with devoting the bulk of my writing towards the prospects in the system, but I suspect that might become boring for many of you. So if you have any column ideas that you’d like me to explore, feel free to leave them in the comment section. I can’t guarantee that I will pursue them all – you can bet that I will pursue very few of them – but I promise I’ll read them all, and if anything catches my fancy I’ll let you know.

Also, I’ve got an idea of doing a regular chat session of sorts, where I answer questions from readers. My website isn’t exactly set up for that sort of thing, so here’s what we’ll do: I have set up a separate email address, askrany@gmail.com. Feel free to submit questions about the Royals to that address, I’ll check it periodically, and when I’ve got a good number of questions that I can answer, I’ll post the answers here. I won’t answer every question, and submitting the same question 17 times does not improve the odds that it will get answered.

Finally, speaking of the website, I’ve used pretty much the same template since I started it three years ago. I’d love to have a more functional website, that could do audio and video and God knows what else, but I don’t have the time to develop a more functional site. If anyone out there is capable of creating a more functional website, and has the credentials to back it up, drop me a line at the email address above. Thanks.


Thursday, February 17, 2011

Royals Today: 2/17/2011.

With spring training in full swing, along with the usual hopeful stories (Sean O’Sullivan has lost 25 pounds! Jason Kendall might be ready for Opening Day*!), I figure it’s time to do a thought dump of all the off-season stories that I haven’t covered yet but have been meaning to get around to. Here’s one of them.

*: Hopeful only for Jason Kendall.

The big story-that-wasn’t-a-story for the Royals this winter was the Royals’ refusal – according to Bill Madden of the New York Daily News – to consider trading Joakim Soria to the Yankees. This provoked a lot of conversation among Royals fans, most of it pointing out that closers – even the best closers – are terribly overrated, and that if the Royals had any chance of getting, say, Jesus Montero from the Yankees for Soria, they were fools not to pull the trigger.

I think we have to take this story with a grain of salt – Madden carefully constructed his column to suggest that the Yankees would trade Montero and shortstop Eduardo Nunez for Soria, but without explicitly stating that the Yankees made such an offer. I’m not convinced that they did, or that they would. For one thing, the Yankees’ refusal to part with Nunez last year is what scuttled the Cliff Lee trade, and prompted the Mariners to trade Lee to the Rangers instead. I find it hard to believe that the Yankees would refuse to give Nunez up for Lee, but happily part with him for Soria. (Then again, given that their refusal to give up Nunez essentially cost the Yankees the AL pennant, it’s quite possible that the Steinbrenner brothers have made it clear to GM Brian Cashman that they won’t let prospects stand in the way of acquiring star major-league talent.)

Then there’s the question as to why the Royals would want Nunez in the first place, particularly after acquiring Alcides Escobar. Nunez has a good defensive reputation; Escobar has a better one. Nunez’s offensive value, like Escobar’s, is primarily driven by batting average – he doesn’t hit for much power or walk a whole bunch. But Escobar had a career .293 average in the minors; Nunez has a .274 average. And while Escobar has already been a disappointment after a full season in the majors, he’s just six months older than Nunez, who has all of 50 major league at-bats on his resume.

I think Nunez is kind of a red herring, because the reason to make such a deal – if such a deal was indeed offered – is to get Montero. Montero is pretty clearly one of the five best prospects in baseball; the only players I would clearly rank ahead of him are Mike Trout and Bryce Harper, and maybe Julio Teheran. In terms of pure hitting ability, Montero would probably rank #1. He’s a career .314/.371/.511 hitter in the minors, and hit .289/.353/.517 in a full season of Triple-A last season, when he was just 20 years old. Scouts love him. Miguel Cabrera comparisons seem positively reasonable, with a lower blood alcohol level.

But if you believe that the Royals have moved on from Stage 1 of rebuilding, the “acquire talent at all costs” stage, and are now in Stage 2, the “shape your talent to fit the confines of a major-league roster” stage, then it’s not clear what you would do with Montero. He’s a catcher like Wil Myers is a catcher, in that he’s catching more out of a vain hope that he can miraculously improve into an acceptable backstop more than out of any real conviction that he’ll last at the position. Unlike Myers, if Montero moves, it will be to first base; he doesn’t have the mobility to play elsewhere.

And if he’s a first baseman…I’m not sure any team in baseball has less of a need for a player at a particular position than the Royals do at first base. Billy Butler is signed through 2015, Kila Ka’aihue under team control through 2016, and both are expected to make room for Eric Hosmer from around mid-2012 through 2018. Montero seems like a luxury the Royals don’t need.

Gun to my head, I’d still trade Soria for Montero, because a closer is a luxury the Royals don’t need either. And Montero isn’t just another hitting prospect; he’d be the best prospect in the best farm system in baseball. If everything went according to plan, Montero wouldn’t be expendable; Ka’aihue and maybe even Butler would be expendable. If nothing else, the excess first base talent ought to fetch enough on the trade market to make up for Soria’s 65 innings a season.

That said, I don’t think it’s a slam dunk. Soria is as valuable as much for his contract as for his talent; if the Royals pick up all his options, he’ll be paid $26.75 million over the next four years, a terrific deal for one of the three best closers in the game. According to Baseball-Reference, Soria has been worth an average of 3.2 Wins Above Replacement in his career, which would be worth somewhere around $15 million a year on the open market.

But owing to the high-leverage situations that Soria is used in as a closer, he’s actually worth more than that. According to B-R, Soria has averaged 4.2 a season Win Probability Added – a statistic which looks at each outing he makes in context, so that how he pitches with a one-run lead in the ninth is more important than how he pitches when he’s getting some work in a 10-1 game. Last season, Soria was worth 5.1 wins by this measure – and by Baseball Prospectus’ WXRL, a stat with a different design but similar premise, he led all relievers by being worth 6.5 wins. By WXRL, Soria has never ranked lower than 7th in the majors – not even in 2009, when he missed a month with an injury and threw only 53 innings. If Soria pitches as well over the next four seasons as he did in the past four seasons, his contract is an enormous bargain, and even an offer of Jesus Montero should be treated with caution.

That’s the question, though: is it realistic to expect Soria to continue to pitch at, frankly, a Hall of Fame level for the next four seasons? Relievers are notoriously inconsistent, and even the best relievers have off-seasons. If Soria has an off-year or two in the next four, or if he gets hurt and misses a season, then his contract no longer looks like a bargain, and failing to trade him at the peak of his value would constitute a grand opportunity missed.

There is an inherent risk with Soria as there is with any pitcher. But it’s not fair to lump Soria in with all relievers when we say that “relievers are inconsistent.” Soria isn’t any reliever – he’s a phenomenally effective one, and we need to compare him with other phenomenally effective relievers if we want to gauge his risk level.

Consider this: Soria has notched 30 saves with an ERA+ of 200 or more (meaning his ERA is less than half the league average, adjusted for ballpark) in each of the last three years. In all of major-league history, just three relievers have had more than three such seasons in their entire careers. Mariano Rivera (10!), Joe Nathan (5), and Billy Wagner (4). Just three other pitchers have done it three times: Jonathan Papelbon, John Wetteland, and Robb Nen.

Papelbon accomplished the feat in 2006, 2007, and 2009, and just missed in 2008 with a 199 ERA+. He was 28 when he accomplished it for the third time. Rivera did it three straight years from ages 27 to 29 – the other four pitchers didn’t accomplish it a third time until they were in the 30s. Soria is just 26 years old.

That is to say: no closer in major-league history has been as consistently, phenomenally successful at a younger age than Joakim Soria. It’s hard to chart his future path because it’s hard to find anyone to compare him with.

The best we can do is to compare him with the pitchers above. Rivera is the greatest reliever in history and the greatest postseason pitcher in history. Wagner pitched 16 seasons in the majors, and in only one season – 2000, when he missed most of the year with torn tendon in his arm – did his ERA go above 2.85. He’s a Hall of Famer in my book. Nathan has a 1.87 ERA in six seasons with the Twins, before missing all of 2010 after Tommy John surgery.

Wetteland was an outstanding reliever for seven straight seasons, from 1992 to 1998; after two sub-par seasons by his standards in 1999 and 2000 (he still had an ERA+ of 140 and 120), he abruptly retired at the age of 33. Papelbon had a disappointing 2010, and it remains to be seen where his career goes from here. Nen is by far the most inconsistent pitcher on this list; from 1994 to 2002, he alternated ERAs below 3.00 and above 3.00 every single season. But Nen was a dominant closer right to the end, when he pitched through a serious shoulder injury in a valiant and star-crossed effort to lead the 2002 Giants to a World Championship. He never pitched again.

Not one of these pitchers lost their place as one of the best closers in the game until their early 30s. Nathan missed a season after his elbow blew out, Wagner missed part of a season. If you believe these are fair comps for Soria, then it’s fair to say that there’s a risk that Soria might lose one of the next four years to injury. But the odds that he will suddenly turn into just an ordinary reliever – or even just an ordinary closer – seem remote.

That doesn’t change the fact that he’s still a luxury for the Royals, at least in 2011 and possibly 2012. But it does mean that the Royals are justified in asking for the sun, the moon, and the stars for him. Jesus Montero is a reasonable offer. But it’s also completely reasonable for the Royals to have turned it down.

Saturday, February 12, 2011

Digital Digest.

Well, another Arab dictator has been sent packing, which means it’s time to get back to baseball. And not a moment too soon, what with Pitchers And Catchers Reporting on Monday (I capitalize the event out of respect).

I’m pretty sure I’m the last Royals blogger to chime in on the Royals’ promotional idea of conducting a contest which allowed bloggers to be credentialed, and hold their own press conference with Royals’ officials, for the Royals Fanfest on January 21st and 22nd.

I thought it was a good idea, if not a ground-breaking one – I think the Pirates and Giants held similar events for their bloggers. It’s a sign that the Royals – along with a lot of sports franchises – are slowly catching on to the idea that sports coverage in this century is a lot different than in the last. Every year, more and more fans are getting news and analysis of their favorite teams from what we might call “non-professional” sources: sources that have no insider access but are informed, opinionated, and well-written. And more and more fans are using the opportunity to engage with other passionate fans online.

In the long run, having a more involved fan base can only be a good thing for a sports franchise. In the short run, teams have to figure out how to encourage that involvement while still keeping some sort of barrier that prevents any Joe Fan from starting a blog that’s profane, uninformed, and unread, then crashing the press box at Kauffman Stadium.

I was worried that this might be a window dressing event, where the Royals randomly pick fans with no blogging experience, or where they hand-select the five people in the blogosphere who praised Dayton Moore for the Jason Kendall signing. Fortunately, judging from the winners, the contest was legitimate. The guys (and one gal) who were picked are, for the most part, well-known members of the Royals’ online community, and they don’t just blow rainbows and sunshine when they write.

I have to give the Royals extra credit, as well, for the truly inspired lineup they trotted out there. As expected, Dayton Moore was the first to take questions, and then Ned Yost held court. But the Royals finished with a pair of players – Billy Butler, an obvious choice…and Jeff Francoeur.

My initial reaction was to Frenchy’s inclusion, I must admit, kind of juvenile – I reveled in the train-wreck image of bloggers asking Francoeur to his face variations of the question, “why do you suck so bad?” But after some reflection, I realized how diabolically brilliant a move this was. Knowing how the blogosphere felt towards Francoeur, the Royals (specifically VP of Communications Mike Swanson and Director of Media Relations Dave Holtzman) decided to unleash the full force of Francoeur’s intangibles on his biggest critics.

Friendliness? Articulate, well-thought-out answers? A willingness to admit his weaknesses as a player and recognize the criticisms leveled against him? The confidence that he is addressing those weaknesses and will prove his doubters wrong this season? It was all there – a tour de force of an interview. By the time he finished speaking – and you can download the entire press conference here, courtesy of Nick Scott from Broken Bat Single – you couldn’t help but root for Francoeur to prove his doubters wrong. Not even if you were one of those doubters, and not even if – judging from what the Braves’ and Mets’ contingent of bloggers have written – you knew he’s played this act before.

Like I said: diabolical. Well-played, guys. Well-played.

I don’t know if this will become a regular event, but I hope it will. I think the Royals understand that independent bloggers are an inexorable part of the future of sports coverage, and they might as well embrace it. When Swanson and I met and buried the hatchet at the Winter Meetings in December 2009 – over a year ago – he told me even then that he was hoping to plan blogger-specific media events in the future. This was clearly a premeditated event, so I’m hopeful that it won’t be an isolated one.

And from my vantage point here in Chicago, it seemed like it went well – with the exception of one borderline-creepy question asked of Billy Butler, the bloggers acquitted themselves well in asking pointed but respectful questions, and the Royals acquitted themselves well by answering those questions with the same seriousness that they would answer questions from the mainstream media. That doesn’t necessarily mean answering the questions head-on – as Scott put it, Moore did a terrific job of “filibustering” to answer the question he wanted to answer. But then, Moore does that when he’s answering questions from Soren Petro or Sam Mellinger as well. Being a part of the media means accepting that sometimes the answers you get aren’t the answers you’re looking for – but even those answers are revealing in their own way.

Judging from what those bloggers felt about the event afterwards, it seems like it accomplished what the Royals wanted it to: they gave bloggers credibility, earned goodwill from a community of their most devoted fans, presented the Royals as a transparent organization unafraid of a little criticism, and did so without compromising anyone’s integrity. There are precious few win-win situations in sports, so even though this wasn’t a momentous event, it’s worth tipping your cap to the Royals for thinking outside the box a little and coming up with one.

The event also resurrected the topic of whether bloggers should be treated like full-fledged members of the sports media, which is to say whether they should receive press credentials, be allowed to sit in the press box, etc. How you answer that question depends in large part on whether you feel that press credentials are a perk of the job, or a prerequisite. If you think that press credentials are some kind of an award for hard work, then you can make a solid case that the most passionate bloggers, who spend as many hours a week covering the Royals as most professional sportswriters, deserve credentials as compensation for their services.

But if you think that the press box and clubhouse access are there simply to facilitate the job of people who cover the team from an up-close perspective, then it’s hard to make the case that bloggers need that kind of access. By definition, a blogger doesn’t need that access; the fact that we are capable of blogging in the first place is proof of that.

I don’t think that bloggers need access to do our job, but I do think that we can do our job better with it. I was in the press box for the four-game series against Baltimore at Kauffman Stadium last July. My credentials came courtesy of my work with 810 WHB, and it certainly made that job easier – for one thing, we broadcast our trade deadline show from inside the stadium, from the very room that the press conference was held in. And there’s no better place to write a column while watching a ballgame than in a press box. But truthfully, the most valuable part of being credentialed for me wasn’t the access to the press box or even the clubhouse – it was the access to the writers and broadcasters and other people who cover the team. The ability to network and meet with people who cover the game professionally – that’s the kind of access that a blogger can benefit from.

I could name a half-dozen Royals bloggers (I don’t want to name names and inadvertently leave someone out) who deserve the same opportunities that I’ve had. And I think that the Royals (and all of MLB) should begin re-considering their across-the-board denial of credentials for all bloggers. But I don’t blame them for taking it slow. There are benefits to giving bloggers credentials, but they are modest compared to the potential harm that would come from giving the wrong person access.

And I think as bloggers we need to remember that press credentials are a double-edged sword. Yes, it means you have access to the players and front office types that you write about every day – but it also means the players and front office types have access to you. Would I write the harsh (but fair!) criticisms of people like Jason Kendall and Yuniesky Betancourt and Nick Swartz if I knew I was going to see them every day?

On the one hand, you probably should never write something about a person that you wouldn’t be willing to say to their face. On the other hand, it’s one thing to say something personal about a person’s conduct or character, and quite another to simply point out how ineffective they are at playing a game. Implicit in my criticisms of Betancourt is that he is still 100 times better at playing baseball than I am – criticizing his performance in no way ought to suggest that he is a lousy human being. Whatever I say about the effectiveness of a player or a trainer or a general manager, I try not to comment about their off-field behavior or character – and when I do, it almost invariably is something that has already been reported by a reputable news source.

I think that saying that Player X is a terrible player is completely within my rights as a blogger, because Player X’s ability to play baseball only matters if you accept the fictional construct that baseball actually matters. Professional sports only have as much meaning as its fans give it. If you don't care about how good a player is, you are tearing down the construct that it matters how good any player is. It’s far better for Yuniesky Betancourt that I rail about how bad he is – and by railing about how bad he is, I give relevance to the game of baseball that he is so bad at, which draws fans to the ballpark and keeps television sets on and pays his salary – than for me to ignore his performance and spend my summer evenings at the movie theater or playing golf instead.

But I’m human, and it would be hard for me to write unflattering things about a person who I run into regularly, even if they are unflattering things about his ability to play an ultimately meaningless game. Being a blogger is liberating because we can be brutally honest without repercussions, but sometimes being brutally honest means being, well, brutal. I enjoy having press credentials every now and then, but I wouldn’t want to have them all the time. When you’re in the press box, you’re a journalist first and a fan second. But I’m a fan first and a journalist second, and I want to stay that way. I suspect most bloggers feel the same.

Monday, February 7, 2011

The Roots of a Revolution.

(It’s been over six months since I went off-topic on my blog, so in light of current events, I hope you’ll forgive me if I grab hold of the third rail once again. You’ve been warned.)

Every few years I travel to Damascus, Syria, where my parents were born and grew up, and where I still have my maternal grandmother and dozens of relatives on both sides of my family. These trips are an obligation more than a vacation; I never learned to speak Arabic as a child, and it’s hard not to feel like a fish out of water in a country where you don’t speak the language. But I go, because I have family to see. My parents left their entire life behind to move to America 40 years ago; the least I can do is to repay the favor for a fortnight every couple of summers.

My last trip to Damascus was in the summer of 2006, when public opinion in the Middle East towards America was at its absolute nadir. To be clear, the frustration and anger towards America has almost always been directed at our government, and almost never directed at its citizens. The only reactions I’ve ever received as an American in the Arab world are respect and occasionally a little jealousy. But there’s no question that there was an unpleasant vibe in the air the last time I visited. America’s nation-building adventure in Iraq was, at the time, a fiasco wrapped in a disaster stuffed into a catastrophe.

It will be decades before any kind of final judgment can be written about the invasion of Iraq, but in 2006, anarchy reigned, innocent civilians were being slaughtered by the hundreds each day, terrorist groups had seized the upper hand, and the face of America in the Arab world was the pictures of the tortures at Abu Ghraib. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees had swarmed into Syria seeking asylum. The week after I returned home from Damascus, war erupted between Israel and Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, and soon thousands of Lebanese refugees were crossing into Syria from the other side. It was a bad time.

On the last day of my trip, my parents had invited the entire extended family over for dinner. Sitting outside in the backyard on a peaceful night, it was easy to forget the chaos that was hemming the country in from all sides. I struck up a conversation with my uncle, Mohammad Ali. (Yes, Mohammad Ali. There’s a reason Cassius Clay chose that name – they are the two most common names in the Muslim world.) Mohammad Ali has always been the uncle I’ve been closest with; the youngest of my mom’s seven siblings, he came to America for college when I was a young child, learned English fluently, graduated from Ohio State – I’ve learned to forgive him – and then moved to Wichita to work as an aeronautical engineer. After almost 15 years in America, he returned to Syria to raise his family and serve his country, and started a successful software company.

Eventually the conversation turned – as all conversations in the Arab world do – towards politics. I asked Mohammad Ali what he thought of the United States’ decision to invade Iraq. By way of background, I will admit to being deeply, deeply ambivalent about the run-up to war in 2003, which is to say I was much less anti-war than most of my friends. I had no illusions that the stated reasons for war – the weapons of mass destruction, to say nothing of the fictional but oft-repeated links between Saddam Hussein and 9/11 – were anything but convenient excuses. I had no doubts that the Bush administration was motivated by realpolitik – pure national self-interest, the desire to gain a base of power in the region, secure oil reserves, and eliminate a man who had been a thorn in the side of U.S. foreign policy for fifteen years.

And still, in the end, I reluctantly supported the invasion. I supported it because I saw no internal solution for the fundamental problem of the Arab world: the political oppression of its people.

There was a time, in the 1950s, when Syria was a democracy. It wasn’t a particularly stable democracy, with presidents that changed with the seasons, but it was a democracy. Elections were held, checks and balances were in place, and a judge’s ruling could not be overturned on the whim of a politician. And then a coup brought to power a cadre of men who wanted power for power’s sake and had the military force needed to keep it. Not only in Syria; a coup established dictators in Iraq (Saddam Hussein) and Libya (Muammar Qaddafi) and Algeria and Tunisia and Yemen and elsewhere. In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser was a national hero for helping to push the British out of the country in 1952, but soon he established a lineage of rulers with absolute power. When Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1982, his successor Hosni Mubarak took advantage of the security crisis by claiming vast, unchecked “emergency” powers for himself. Those “emergency” laws have been in effect for nearly three decades.

In 2003, the only country in the Arab world with anything that remotely resembled a democracy was Lebanon, where instead a civil war was fought for 15 years from 1975 to 1990. Every other country was either a monarchy de facto, where a leader only left office in a coffin and was succeeded by his son, or by a monarchy de jure, as in the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the smaller states in the Persian Gulf.

It had been this way my entire life. Hafez al-Assad was the President of Syria since before I was born. He continued to rule Syria with an iron fist until he died in 2000. At the time of his death, his son Bashar was only 34, and Syria’s constitution required the President to be at least 40. The day after Hafez died, an emergency council convened and voted to change the constitution to lower the age requirement to – surprise! – 34. Bashar has been President ever since.

And over the past 40 years, the Arab world has hardly progressed economically, educationally, or technologically while the rest of the world passed them by. In 1950, most of the countries in the Arab world had a higher GDP than South Korea. Today South Korea exports cars and computers to America; the main exports from the Arab world are oil, oil, oil, and maybe olives and dates.

It’s no great mystery why the economies of the region have been so stagnant. In Syria, the reward for creating a successful business is that someone connected to the government pays you a visit and says, “What a wonderful business you’ve built. Give me ownership of half of your company, or I’ll shut it down.” (Please don’t try to conflate this with taxation; this was protection money to the mafia that ran the country.) More than the political oppression, the crushing corruption that seeped down from the top of the government to the lowest levels, such that you can’t cross the border from Syria to Lebanon and back without paying a bribe to the customs officials, castrated a nation.

A well-armed and loyal military was able to castrate any opposition to the regime. Most notoriously, in 1982 there was an armed uprising in Syria, in the city of Hama, which was led by members of the Muslim Brotherhood – you’ve probably heard that group in the news. Hafez al-Assad sent the army to the outskirts of the city, and the order was given to open fire. The city was bombarded by air and by artillery for three weeks before the army moved in; the military didn’t distinguish between militants in the street and people hiding in the homes. Somewhere between 20,000 and 40,000 people, mostly innocent bystanders, were killed. One of my best friends' mother is from Hama; she lost several of her brothers in the attack. It has been described as “the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its own people in the modern Middle East”. In America, news of the massacre was buried in the back pages, in small font.

The people’s ultimate weapons against a tyrant are time and mortality, but even those weapons are ineffective against familial succession. Hosni Mubarak has long been planning to transfer power to his son Gamal upon his death. The only two men more frightening to the Iraqi people than Saddam Hussein were his sons Uday and Qusay. The Syrian people thought things might be different when Bashar took over for his father. Bashar was, in fact, not originally meant to be the successor; his older brother Bassel had long been groomed for that role. Bashar went to medical school in Syria, and was finishing his ophthalmology residency in England when Bassel died in a one-vehicle car accident.

So the expectation is that Bashar, having seen the virtues of democracy up close, having been thrust into absolute power unexpectedly, would be uncommonly willing to make reforms that might the people a greater voice. Ten years later, Syria has opened up economically from the Soviet-inspired ways of the 1980s, when my dad had to pay a smuggler to bring his mother a new refrigerator from Lebanon. (When I was a kid in the early 1980s, the currency exchange rate was 8 Syrian pounds to one dollar. By the time Hafez Al-Assad died, the exchange rate was close to 50 to 1.) But it’s as corrupt as ever, and speaking out against the government is as dangerous as ever.

Which is why, in 2003, I came to the conclusion that an invasion of Iraq might, in the long term, lead to a better outcome than the status quo. No Arab leader had been more brutal to his people than Saddam Hussein. Sanctions to Iraq had only led to crippling poverty and a devastating public health crisis that had killed thousands, without weakening Hussein’s grip on the country. Without external pressure, Hussein was going to terrorize his country until the day he died, at which point he would be succeeded by one of his sons, who inherited their father’s brutality but missed out on his intelligence. So I decided that a war, even a bloody war and the unrest that would likely follow, was a better outcome than another 40 years like the 40 years that had just passed. I thought that this was the right war, even though it was fought for all the wrong reasons.

I would soon come to regret my position. I learned that there is no such thing as the right war fought for the wrong reasons. I learned that there is one form of government that is worse than totalitarianism, and that’s unbridled anarchy. I was astonished by our government’s plan for what to do with Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, a plan which apparently involved unicorns and rainbows and a mass singing of Kumbaya. I was dumbfounded by the atrocities that American soldiers were capable of, and were permitted to do by their superiors, in Abu Ghraib and other places.

And still, in the summer of 2006, I wasn’t convinced that the Iraq War was a bad idea. I still saw no other alternative for the people of Iraq and the entire Arab world other than continued dictatorship, continued political oppression, and the continued squandering of an entire region’s human potential.

I shared this opinion with my uncle, before asking him for his. He had lived in America long enough to understand the complexities and contradictions of our nation. I figured he might understand.

He sighed deeply. “Rany, I want democracy to come to the Middle East as much as you. But this –” he gestured theatrically – “this is not the way to bring democracy to the Arabs. I don’t understand why America didn’t just give them time to work.”

“Well in that case, Khalo,” I said, “how do you expect democracy to happen? You’ve been stuck with brutal dictators since before I was born – why should I expect anything different before I die?”

“Have faith, Rany.” My uncle, a devout Muslim, pointed his index finger towards the sky. “Give them time to work.”

“Them? God and His angels?”

He looked at me strangely, and then laughed. “The satellites.”

There are many methods a dictator uses to keep himself in power. Fear is Plan A, of course. It’s not enough for the people to be afraid of standing up to the government; the people must be afraid of saying anything remotely critical of the government. Freedom of speech is truly the most basic of freedoms; without it, the people can not organize to defend every other freedom they hold dear.

In the 1980s, during the darkest era of the Syrian regime, the government didn’t bother to imprison people who spoke out against it. That was far too civilized a response. They went one better: they imprisoned the dissidents’ children instead. They tortured and, all too frequently, eventually killed them. (When Hafez al-Assad lost his own son in a car accident, well, you can guess what the reaction was. Id quot circumiret, circumveniat.)

I have a close friend here in Chicago – it’s probably better that I not identify him by name – whose grandfather back in Syria made the mistake of denouncing the Syrian government in the early 1980s. They came for his son and threw him in prison. His son was 16 at the time.

The son – my friend’s uncle – was one of the lucky ones. He was released after ten years; his sister in America got him a visa to emigrate here. He’s been married almost 15 years, has four kids, and owns a gas station on the south side. Not bad for someone who went from high school sophomore to the gulag overnight. (And you thought your high school years sucked.)

Fear is a powerful weapon, but eventually fear can be overcome. Add ignorance, though, and the synergy between the two is formidable. If the people don’t know there’s a better way to live, they have no reason to fear in the first place. I’m sure “1984” is on the required reading list at Dictator Finishing School.

I’m not an expert on these things, but I suspect that nowhere on Earth has a dictatorship been more successful at keeping its people ignorant than in North Korea. The average North Korean probably thinks that not only is the world flat, but that it ends abruptly at the demilitarized zone. I don’t think most North Koreans have any idea that the rest of the world looks upon their nation as the biggest hellhole on the planet. That level of ignorance is horrifying, and a horrifyingly effective way to maintain power.

The Arab people were never that cut off from the world, but they were close. In the 1980s, your television choices were Syria Channel 1 and Syria Channel 2. Channel 2 might show the occasional inoffensive US drama – “Little House on the Prairie” – with Arabic subtitles. If you were really lucky, you might be able to pick up Lebanese television.

And then the satellites came.

There was no specific moment when the satellite revolution began. But at some point in the early 1990s, as technology made satellite dishes progressively cheaper and smaller, eventually they reached the point where most Arabs could afford one, and could fit one onto their balcony or install it on a perch outside a window. There was no such thing as cable TV; if you wanted TV choices, you needed a dish. By the mid-1990s, an apartment building looked from the outside like a satellite dish farm.

The authorities didn’t like this new development, but they didn’t resist it too much. More TV choices meant more bland entertainment, which meant more ways for the masses to while away their time without resisting the government. There was no danger that the people would take to the streets because they had seen too many episodes of Baywatch. So the Arab governments mostly looked the other way as their people feasted on American action movies and European soccer matches.

And then, in 1996, Al Jazeera arrived.

The Al Jazeera channel has long been misunderstood in America. This wasn’t always the case. In March of 2001, six months before 9/11, 60 Minutes ran a long and flattering piece on how Al Jazeera was helping to open up the Arab world. But then 9/11 happened, and then Osama bin Laden sent his videotapes to Al Jazeera, and soon the network was branded in the United States as Al-Qaeda’s mouthpiece.

The best analogy I’ve seen for why bin Laden would send his tapes to Al Jazeera is the case of Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, who sent his Manifesto to the New York Times. Granted that Kaczynski’s politics were dosed with a generous amount of crazy pills, his anti-government stance is generally classified as right-wing. The New York Times is generally characterized as a left-of-center newspaper. Kaczynski sent his Manifesto to the New York Times not because they shared his point of view, but because they were the Paper of Record, the most respected news source in America. He figured sending his Manifesto to the Times (and the Washington Post) would grant him the maximum exposure, and he was right; the Times published his rant, his own brother read it and realized who the author was, and now Kaczynski spends his days in an 8-by-8 cell.

So it goes with bin Laden, who sends his tapes to Al Jazeera not because they sympathize with his Islamic nihilism, but because by 2001, they were the most respected news source in the Arab world. And just as the Times’ publication of Kaczynski’s Manifesto gave him what he wanted – publicity – but also gave the world clues to his identity, Al Jazeera’s airing of those tapes serves a double purpose. The US government condemns those tapes – but you can’t tell me they’re not also watching them frame-by-frame, looking for clues as to bin Laden’s whereabouts and intentions.

Labeling Al Jazeera as simply a tool of Al-Qaeda misses the entire point. Al Jazeera was, from its first day on the air, something the Arab world had never seen before: a television channel in Arabic, available to almost everyone in the Arab world, that provided a frank and reasonably unbiased source of news. It provided the unvarnished truth, and that made it extremely dangerous. If there was corruption going on in Jordan, it was reported. If there was a government crackdown in Egypt, it was reported. If a Saudi dissident living in exile in England had some scandalous information about the Saudi royal family, it was reported. All you need to know about Al Jazeera is that its greatest critics are the Arab governments, who have applied all kinds of pressure on Qatar – where Al Jazeera is based – to tone down the rhetoric.

It was not and is not a perfect news source. Al Jazeera has its own biases, and has been criticized for having a staunch pro-Arab stance in its reporting, particularly when it comes to Israel and Palestine. It’s been described, not inaccurately, as the Arab version of Fox News. And that’s not a bad thing. Whatever your feelings are about Fox News, I think we can all agree that in a world where the government had banned from the airwaves any news reports other than what’s shown on PBS, Fox News would be a breath of fresh air. In a world where Lyndon LaRouche had deposed the federal government and established autocratic rule, Fox News would be the voice of the resistance. That’s what Al Jazeera is to the Arab world, and the demonization of the network in America has been both profoundly sad and counterproductive – counterproductive in the sense that ignoring Al Jazeera’s positive impact on the region is part of the reason why our government has been caught so off-guard by the events of the last six weeks.

(Full disclosure: when Al Jazeera launched its English channel in 2006, my sister Rana briefly worked out of Washington DC in their department of public relations for North America. Yes, I know – she worked in PR for Al Jazeera. The punchlines write themselves.)

For the last 15 years, then, the Arab world has had the access that was denied them for so long. They’ve seen the truth about how oppressive and hypocritical their own governments are, and they’ve seen the truth about how messy and imperfect and yet ultimately how ennobling and empowering Western democracies are. (In the words of Winston Churchill, “It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except all the others that have been tried.”) And having already opened the barn door to letting the masses own satellite dishes, the governments of the region were mostly helpless to do anything about it. Baywatch, it turns out, was a Trojan horse.

The seeds that were planted 15 years ago took a long time to bear fruit, but they’re blooming now, and the fruit is sweet. Six weeks ago, the Arab world was an unbroken chain of dictatorships. On December 17th, protests a Tunisian man named Muhammad Bouazizi, a college graduate who had been reduced to working as a fruit vendor – illegally – set himself on fire to protest the hopelessness of his plight. Bouazizi, who died of his burns a few weeks later, is the Archduke Ferdinand of the Arab revolution – for a region that was fuel-soaked kindling, he was the spark.

Al Jazeera – and other satellite channels which have followed in its wake – supplied the fuel, broadcasting the protests in Tunisia to an enraptured Arab world – nowhere more enraptured than Tunisia itself. Protests which began in the small town of Sidi Bouzid soon spread to the capital of Tunis; on January 6th most of the nation’s lawyers went on strike, followed by teachers the next day. The protests were also fueled by, speaking of maligned news sources, a Wikileaks cable that described rampant corruption by the Tunisian government, mostly by the family of “President” Ben Ali. On January 14th, Ben Ali and his family – along with a rumored 1.5 tons of gold – were on a plane out of the country. I’m 35 years old, and this is the first time I’ve ever seen an Arab dictator deposed by the will of the people.

Eleven days later, a revolution began in Egypt which might – emphasize might – depose another one. And while Tunisia is the pinky finger of the Arab world, Egypt is its heart. The population of Egypt is approximately 80 million, four times that of Syria and nearly eight times larger than Tunisia’s. I presume I don’t have to go into details about the Egyptian revolution; whereas the Tunisian revolution was almost completely ignored by Western media until the final days, they’ve been a little bit quicker to catch on to the fact that what’s going on in Egypt is potentially momentous.

The speed and finality of the Tunisian revolution caught everyone – thankfully, the Tunisian government included – off-guard. When the protesters hit the streets of Cairo on January 25th, the Egyptian government was more prepared. It took aim at what it deemed to be the root source of the protests: technology. They tried to shut down Al Jazeera (threatening the journalists who work at the station, briefly imprisoning some of them, forcing the network off the air for a time, even burning down their station), Twitter and Facebook (turning off the nation’s entire internet), and cell phone communication (shutting down all cell phone networks).

It almost worked. But it’s hard to put out a fire once it’s lit. It’s especially hard to put down a revolution when the army, as it did in Tunisia, refuses to open fire on peaceful protesters. Meanwhile, in the last two weeks, there have been staged protests in Yemen, and in Jordan, and in Algeria. (In Syria, for a variety of reasons that are too complicated to get into here, attempts to form protests fizzled badly.) I feel like I’ve stepped into an alternate universe, one in which the Arab people are not doomed to living their lives without political expression, without recourse for their grievances, without due process when their rights are infringed upon. It’s a heady experience.

And suddenly Al Jazeera is being appreciated in a new light. Americans are even starting to ask why Al Jazeera English, which was just launched in 2006 and is one of the most-watched TV networks in the world, is almost completely unavailable in America. Over the past 10 days, the web traffic to Al Jazeera English, which streams online, has increased over 2000% – and over half of that traffic comes from America.

Where does it go from here? If only I knew. Mubarak has proven far more difficult to dislodge than Ben Ali, leading to an impasse that shows no signs of being broken. The American response to the Egyptian revolution has been predictably pathetic. I say “pathetic” because, presented with an opportunity to support a populist uprising against a dictator, a genuinely grassroots movement to establish a democracy in the Arab world, the greatest democracy on Earth has dithered and hemmed and hawed, trying to find a way to support the protesters without pissing off Mubarak too much. I say “predictably” because the reason the United States is trying to play both sides is because while Mubarak is a dictator, he’s our dictator. Egypt has been a reliable ally to the United States, for the past 30 years, and in return our government has looked the other way while he’s ruled over his people with impunity.

It’s telling that there has been very little criticism of the President by the Republican leadership regarding his Egyptian policies – there seems to be a consensus across the political spectrum that the path Obama is following is not only the right path, it’s the only path. That this path involves the USA telling the Egyptian people to be patient about their pesky grievances like liberty and freedom and democracy is simply a manifestation of how morally bankrupt our foreign policy towards the Arab world has been for the last half-century.

You know all those Arab dictatorships? With a few exceptions (Libya, Syria), they’re all allies of America. While we fought two wars against Saddam Hussein, we originally supported him when he launched a pointless and bloody war against Iran for eight years. They keep the oil flowing and keep the Israel/Palestine conflict from escalating, and for them we suspend the bedrock principle of western democracy, the one that says that rulers require the consent of the governed. Hell, we might even suspend reality long enough to claim that they have the consent of the governed.

Barely a week ago, Vice President Joe Biden said of Hosni Mubarak, “I would not refer to him as a dictator.” (Personally, I thought Biden really went beyond the pale when he continued, “And I would not refer to Yuniesky Betancourt as a defensive liability.”) On the other side of the aisle, Dick Cheney went one further, saying of Mubarak, “He’s been a good man, he’s been a good friend and ally of the United States.” With allies like these…well, as an Egyptian tweeted on Thursday: “Dear US government: We don’t hate you because we hate your freedom; we hate you because you hate our freedom.”

The refusal by the US to force Mubarak out of office is partly out of recognition for his allegiance these past three decades, and partly out of fear for what the alternative might be. Specifically, the Western world is freaked out about the possibility that if the Egyptian people are free to choose their rulers, they might choose to give power to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood is not a benevolent organization, but neither is it Al-Qaeda. Despite what you may have read, it is not a nihilistic movement that seeks to subjugate the world under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism. It is a political Islamic movement, in a country where all political dissent is suppressed, and where many of its adherents are or have been imprisoned for their beliefs. Oppression radicalizes dissenters, so it is not surprising that extremist branches have splintered off of the main movement.

It’s one thing to be wary of the Muslim Brotherhood. It’s quite another to be so afraid of them that you would prefer to put the Egyptian people’s chance for democratic representation on hold – indefinitely. One of the reasons the Muslim Brotherhood has so much popularity is because, having never been given the opportunity to govern, they can offer a utopian vision of the future to their supporters without ever having to deliver. Whatever power they might gain in democratic elections comes attached with the responsibility to deliver on their promises. If they don’t create jobs and make the trains run on time, they’ll be thrown out of office in the next election just like every other political party. And it becomes impossible for Islamists to lash out at the government when they’re part of the government.

On the other side of this, let’s say you were a oppressive dictator – let’s call you “Hosni Mubarak” – who enjoys good relations with America, and the American government tried to gently nudge you towards relinquishing some of your power. Let’s say that the American government considers Muslim terrorism to be its greatest existential threat. Let’s say that there was a small but vocal minority of Muslim activists in your country. Wouldn’t you do everything in your power to convince your American friends that you were the only person keeping those Muslim activists from becoming Muslim terrorists, facts be damned? Machiavelli would approve, and I’m pretty sure that “The Prince” is the first book on that dictator reading list.

Fortunately, after buying Mubarak’s act for so long, our government (and many journalists) are coming to the realization that the Muslim Brotherhood has a place in a future democratic Egypt. The comparisons of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt with the Iranian revolution are incredibly facile. Aside from the fact that the Brotherhood does not have nearly as much popular support as the Ayatollah Khomeini did, Iran is a Shi’ite country, while the Muslims of Egypt are mostly Sunni. It’s like saying that Baptists are going to take their cue from the Vatican.

As for the notion that a new government might refuse to honor the peace agreements that Egypt has signed with Israel, and might threaten Israeli security, I can only say this: a true and lasting peace can only occur by the consent of the people on both sides. A peace treaty signed with a dictator is, by its very definition, an unstable one. Unless you plan to consign the Egyptian people to being ruled by dictators in perpetuity, at some point you have to let democracy flourish and take your chances. The Egyptian people are dealing with raging unemployment, a moribund economy, food shortages – but they have had, for over three decades, peace with Israel. I think it unlikely that they want to add a new war with a more-powerful neighbor to their list of miseries.

Last weekend, a group of friends of mine had a spirited argument over a single question: Did George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq help to accelerate the move towards democracy in the Arab world, by trying to implant a democracy where once an odious tyrant ruled? Or did it hinder the democratic impulse in the region, because Iraq descended into such chaos that it made dictatorships look stable by comparison? I can tell you that we didn’t reach any kind of consensus.

But I can also tell you that, after thinking about it some more, I think the question is kind of a red herring. I think that our intervention in Iraq has little bearing on the events in Tunisia and Egypt that have every leader in the Arab world soiling his pants. What has happened these last six weeks would have happened whether or not we invested a trillion dollars and thousands of American lives in Iraq.

I think that my uncle was right. A satellite can do what an army can’t. An army can overthrow a government, but a satellite can empower the people to do it themselves. An army can only coerce; a satellite can convince. It’s too early to know whether this really is the Berlin Wall moment for the Arab world, or just their Tiananmen Square. It’s too early to know whether our government will support the green shoots of democracy in the Middle East, or sell out its principles and the Arab people in favor of “stability” once again. But if the Arab people are now convinced that they control their own destiny; that they’re entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and refuse to settle for anything less than a government of the people, by the people, and for the people: well, I’d say 2011 is shaping up to be a pretty good year.

I can only pray that our own government remembers that the principles worth fighting for in 1776 are still worth defending – or at least not worth compromising – today.

UPDATE: If you're still unsure of the power of satellite TV and instant communication to the people, consider this. Over the past few days, it seemed that the power of the protests was flagging a little, after the Obama administration (foolishly, in my opinion) decided to throw its support to a very slow transition led by Vice President (and Army general) Omar Suleiman. Then yesterday, Wael Ghonim, one of the bloggers who helped to spark the protests with his Facebook page, (and who is a high-ranking executive for Google in the region,) went on satellite TV hours after he was released from custody, where he had been detained for the past 12 days. Today, this is the response in Tahrir square.