Hillman's Post-Mortem.

Wow.

When I wrote my last article, I had no expectation that Trey Hillman would actually be fired before my next post. Feel free to insert your own joke about the frequency of my postings if you want, but this move happened faster than even the most optimistic Royals fan could have expected.

In retrospect, it’s pretty clear that the straw that broke Hillman’s back came on Sunday, just hours after my last article posted, when Josh Hamilton failed to tag up from first base on a routine fly ball…and the entire team missed it. No one on the team was even aware that they missed a chance to call Hamilton out on appeal until after the game was over. Instead, the Rangers scored two more runs in the inning. They won the game by two runs. You do the math – I have no doubt that David Glass did.

It’s easy to say that the decision to fire Hillman came from ownership. It’s easy because it’s probably accurate. Sam Mellinger writes that much to his own surprise, this decision came entirely from Dayton Moore. I have no doubt that Mellinger’s intel is solid, but I think that the mechanics of a move this big are too complicated to be a simple either-or proposition. The ultimate decision rested in Moore’s hands, but the idea that Moore made the decision to fire Hillman entirely on his own – barely 48 hours after he said “He’s exactly what our organization needs at this point in time” – is frankly far more worrisome than the idea that ownership imposed this decision on him.

It’s no secret that Moore was close with Hillman on a personal as well as a professional level, and if there was any doubt, Moore removed them when he broke down briefly at the start of his press conference. As he said, this was the most difficult decision he has made in his career. Credit to him for making it, then, but credit also to ownership for forcing some accountability here.

As a rule, meddling from ownership is never a good thing. But if there’s an exception, this would be it. It’s not clear if Moore was going to let his personal relationship with Hillman cloud his judgment, but if David Glass stepped in and helped make the decision for him, he not only saved Moore from himself, he might have saved Hillman from having his reputation further damaged.

I speak from experience: eight years ago this month, the general manager of the Royals finally fired his long-time manager, a manager that he had grown so fond of that he could not bring himself to let him go until well after it was clear that a change needed to be made. The general manager was Allard Baird, and his manager was Tony Muser. In 2001, Muser’s fourth full season as manager, the Royals lost 97 games, tying a team record for losses set…under Muser’s watch two years earlier. Rob and I were calling for Muser’s head all season, and we weren’t the only ones. Instead, Baird’s big move that season was to trade Jermaine Dye for Neifi Perez.

Muser came back in 2002 as a dead man walking, even if he and his GM didn’t realize it. The Royals started 8-15, and late in the night on May 1st in Detroit, Muser learned he was fired – from a member of the media, as the news leaked before Baird could tell him himself. Baird let his friend down that night, but really, he let his friend down much more by not cutting the cord with him a year earlier, when Muser’s reputation might have been salvageable. Afterwards, I wrote this piece for Baseball Prospectus. Eight years later, Muser has yet to get a second chance as a manager in the major leagues.

Muser’s successor, Tony Pena, resigned in the middle of the night in Toronto, choosing to abandon his ballclub rather than come back to Kansas City and possibly testify in a divorce case in which he had been implicated. Pena’s successor, Buddy Bell, announced he would be “retiring” at the end of the 2007 season, ostensibly to take a position with the Royals that would require less travel. Approximately 18 minutes after the season, Bell announced that he was 1) hired by the White Sox 2) as their Director of Minor League Instruction, a position which requires a tremendous amount of travel. It wasn’t hard to read between the lines.

By the standards of recent Royals history, then, the timeline for the firing of Hillman was nice and clean. In his third full season, the Royals were not only not getting better, they were getting worse. That’s a pretty good rule-of-thumb to fire a manager with no previous record of success. Maybe it’s a brutal standard to uphold, but it’s a fair one.

In the aftermath of his firing, there’s a rather spirited debate going on about what Hillman did wrong. Joe Posnanski makes the case here that Hillman lost the respect of the players early, and never gained it back. I think he has a very valid point; this isn’t the first time someone has compared Hillman to Vern Rapp, and after the Hillman experience, I think it should be a hard-and-fast rule in baseball: NEVER hire a manager who hasn’t spent time IN SOME CAPACITY with a major league baseball team. I don’t care if he’s managed, played, coached, served as a trainer, batboy, whatever. The culture of a major league clubhouse is unique, and no amount of managing in the minors or in Japan can substitute for it.

But ultimately I don’t think that Hillman’s time in Kansas City would have been much longer or more successful even if he had spent a year coaching in the majors first. To Hillman’s credit, he seemed to correct a lot of the mistakes he made in his first season, when he almost lost the clubhouse in September. The price of fixing those mistakes may have been substantial; I don’t think it’s a coincidence that Jose Guillen has played almost every day this season, even as his production has cratered, or that Gil Meche seemed to have final say over when he came out of the ballgame. But I think that Hillman’s biggest mistake with the Royals is far more fundamental. I think his mistake was in accepting the job in the first place.

No matter how impressive a manager might be when it comes to things that don’t show up in the standings, he’s going to lose his job if the things that do show up in the standings – wins and losses – don’t show progress after 2 or 3 seasons. And given the overall state of the Royals’ organization after the 2007 season, when Hillman was hired, he was facing an uphill battle to keep his job from day one.

He inherited a team that had lost 93 games, that had started Ross Gload at first base, and for whom Odalis Perez was the #3 starter. More than that, he inherited a team that after the season was ranked by Baseball America as having the #24 farm system in baseball. A small-market team with no talent on the field or in the minor leagues: this was close to mission impossible. The job wasn’t made any easier by his general manager’s decision to focus on high school talent in his first two drafts. I’m not faulting Moore for that decision at all; it may in fact prove to be the right move in the long run. But Hillman didn’t have a long run. He had to know that his GM wasn’t doing him any favors by drafting guys who wouldn’t be ready to help the team until well into the future – a future that Hillman might not have.

Or to put it another way, as recently as this spring training many Royals fans – myself included – lamented the Royals’ decision to draft Mike Moustakas and Eric Hosmer over Matt Wieters and Gordon Beckham. It’s now a lot less clear whether the Royals made the wrong decision. But having Wieters and Beckham might have made Hillman a more successful manager in 2010, even if they didn’t make him a better manager. Ultimately a manager is only as good as his players, and the Royals still don’t have the horses.

I think I made this case to a friend back when Hillman was hired: I’d hate to be Hillman, but I’d love to be the guy who replaces Hillman. By 2010 or 2011, my thinking went, the organization ought to have a lot more talent in place, making it possible for the Royals to be a contender by 2012 or 2013. Hillman just chose the wrong window of time to be the manager for the Kansas City Royals. He’s now paying the price for it.

That’s not to absolve him of his failings or to argue that his firing was unjustified. He earned this decision. But it’s only fair to point out that he was dealt a losing hand from day one.

The most important consequence of this move is that it places the progress of the team squarely on the shoulders of Moore, as they should be. Losing franchises have a natural sort of progression. After a team underachieves for long enough, the general manager fires the manager; if the underachievement continues for a few more years, then the owner fires the general manager. The new general manager then gets to fire the manager he inherits at a time of his choosing, and then the cycle repeats itself.

The Royals just finished the first stage. Moore inherited Buddy Bell, and was not beholden to him at all, so letting Bell go after the 2007 season was a free move. But Hillman was his guy, and by nudging Moore to fire him, Glass also sends a very strong message that the next time the pressure builds to axe someone in the front office, it probably won’t be the manager who gets scapegoated.

This is a good thing, and I say that even though I am not one of the chorus of Royals fans calling for Moore to get fired right now. While Moore has made some egregious errors in constructing this roster, it simply can not be stressed enough: the reason why the Royals suck year after year isn’t because they sign guys like Kyle Farnsworth and trade for guys like Yuniesky Betancourt. The reason the Royals are on schedule for their 15th losing record in the last 16 years is because they have done a terrible job of scouting and developing talent for a long, long time.

It’s too early to say whether Moore has fixed that fundamental weakness. But it’s not too early to say that the early results are promising. I hope to get to the minor leagues soon – I intended to spend today writing about them before Hillman was fired – but even casual Royals fans have heard about the exploits of Moustakas, Hosmer, Michael Montgomery et al. this season.

Hillman leaves behind a team that is not only not good, it’s not young. Incredibly, Billy Butler was the only player on the entire roster who was under the age of 26. That’s not a reflection on Hillman, but on the man who handed him this team. The good news is that while the success of the team may not change quickly, the complexion of the team just might. Mike Aviles isn’t young, but he represented an immediate upgrade to the lineup; pretty soon we may say the same about Kila Ka’aihue. Blake Wood, called up the other day, is 24. By this time next year, no less than three lineup spots and two spots in the rotation – and, if we’re lucky, the better part of the entire bullpen – might be turned over to young talent.

At that point or soon thereafter, it will be fair to judge Dayton Moore. If those players live up to their hype, then whoever succeeds Hillman as manager next year – whether it’s Ned Yost or (hopefully) someone else – will get the credit. And if they don’t, Moore will take the blame, and Royals fans will get their scalp.

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I hope to be back soon with a full analysis of Ned Yost. In the meantime, from the self-promotion department:

- For those of you who would like to listen to the radio show after the fact (and the timing of Hillman’s firing couldn’t have been better, as we went on the air less than 2 hours later), click here to download the podcast. Scroll down to “Additional Programming”.

- My original hometown paper, the Wichita Eagle, ran a profile of me in Sunday’s edition here.

- Going further back, prior to the season I did my patriotic duty as an American by agreeing to be interviewed by America.gov here. Pay no mind to my prediction that the Atlanta Braves would win the World Series - that quote clearly must have come from Dayton Moore.

Hillman's Last Stand.

I know I owe you some vaguely optimistic words about the callups of Mike Aviles and Kila Ka’aihue. But that will have to wait. There are times for childish fantasies like gingerbread houses and sugar plums and young Royals with upside, but this is not one of them. This is a time to have a very frank, sober, adult conversation.

Trey Hillman has crossed the point of no return in Kansas City.

Yesterday’s game was an exhibition of managerial malpractice almost unparalleled in the history of the franchise. Hillman could hardly have damaged the Royals’ chances to win the game more if he had tried. It is exceedingly important that every Royals fan understand the extent to which Hillman hurt both his team’s chances of winning last night, and his most well-paid pitcher’s chances of earning his generous contract for well into the future.

Some background is necessary to understand why Hillman was the talk of the baseball twittersphere last night.

Let’s start with the trivial stuff. Yuniesky Betancourt, as you probably know, cost the Royals (and Zack Greinke) a run on Friday night when he nonchalantly dropped a routine pop-up with a man on second and two outs. The photograph of his muff – I believe it was on the front cover of the Star’s sports page – should be the emblem of the Royals season. (It’s picture #11 in this montage.)

It has it all – terrible form (Yuni, as you may have heard, likes to catch pop-ups at chest level, with one hand), terrible vision (as the ball is bouncing off his glove, Yuni is staring up at the sky, possibly distracted by a passing robin, or maybe looking for the North Star), and a kind of nonchalant insouciance that suggests that catching pop-ups is beneath a man of Yuni’s talents.

It was a bad, unforgivably bad, play, and it cost Greinke yet another unearned run.

Afterwards, Hillman said that he would take “action” against Betancourt. The appropriate action should be quite obvious – bench him for the next game. Instead, Betancourt started, while Mike Aviles had his first day off in five games. But don’t worry – Betancourt was fined a few bucks, so Hillman’s point was made. Never mind that Betancourt is making $3 million this season, so a fine of, say, $1000 would be the equivalent of a $20 fine for someone who makes $60,000 a year. That’s not even a slap on the wrist; it’s more like punishing him with a tickle fight.

Naturally, Betancourt rewarded his manager’s confidence by going 0-4 last night, batting with a man on base all four times, and with a man in scoring position three times. And once again, he failed to drive home a runner on third with less than two out. In a game the Royals lost by one run.

While Hillman benched Aviles in favor of Betancourt, he did see fit to give Ka’aihue his first start of the season, moving Billy Butler to DH and giving Jose Guillen the day off. Ka’aihue didn’t have a good day, going 0-for-3, before Hillman pinch-hit for him with Guillen against a left-hander in the 7th. That, by itself, was a perfectly defensible move. But after Guillen made an out to keep the game tied, Hillman decided he had to keep Guillen in the game, setting off a ridiculous sequence of musical chairs.

Guillen stayed in at right field, forcing David DeJesus to left field, forcing Scott Podsednik to center field, forcing Mitch Maier to first base.

Maier had never played first base before in the majors. He had never played first base before in the minors. But Hillman decided that the late innings of a tie game was the perfect time for him to get his first opportunity, not to mention downgrading the defense significantly at two other positions. It didn’t cost the Royals in the end, but it was a curious decision. If Willie Bloomquist isn’t on the roster to keep the Royals from playing three players out of position, then why is he here?

These two moves were just the appetizers to the main course, a sequence of events so baffling that even now I keep hoping that the official scorer in Arlington was strung out on meth and that none of what I’m about to recount ever happened.

Starting for the Royals last night was the artist formerly known as Gil Meche, the artist who, after the Royals criminally allowed him to throw 121 pitches despite a self-acknowledged “dead arm” on July 1st of last year, had allowed 53 earned runs in 54 innings. The same Gil Meche who missed time in spring training with tightness in his shoulder. The same Meche who, coming into the game, had a 9.89 ERA this season and had allowed more walks (18) than strikeouts (14).

The Royals have been in denial that something’s still wrong with Meche all season. After his last start, we get this: “He was almost over the hump,” Hillman said. “If the breaking ball (to Rios) with two strikes doesn’t get through the left side … it’s a lot better line for him.” Meche allowed 9 hits and 5 runs in 5 innings in that start; he walked 3 batters and he struck out 2. That performance can’t be explained away by a couple of groundballs with eyes.

Was Meche still hurting? “The only thing I can go on is what comes out of his mouth and the mannerisms you see when he’s pitching,” Hillman said. “Most of the time you see something different in the mannerisms. I haven't seen anything different.”

It is with this background in mind that Meche took the mound last night, and gutted his way through 7 strong innings. I say “gutted” because he wasn’t dominant, or even in control, by any stretch of the imagination. He walked 5 batters and struck out only 3. In the sixth inning, Vladimir Guerrero led off with a single, but was then thrown out by Maier when he tried to advance to third on Ian Kinsler’s single, allowing Meche to get out of the inning unscathed.

But still, through 7 innings and 104 pitches, Meche allowed just 2 runs in 7 innings. The bullpen was fairly rested, thanks to Greinke – only Kyle Farnsworth had thrown the day before, and just one inning. Furthermore, the team has a day off on Monday. With the top of the Rangers’ lineup due up, there was no reason to push Meche any further – get a fresh arm in there.

Hillman sent Meche to the mound to start the bottom of the eighth. Meche promptly walked Elvis Andrus on five pitches. The heart of the Rangers’ order – Michael Young, Josh Hamilton, Guerrero and Kinsler – was due up. Alarm bells were going off on the mound.

The Rangers regifted the baserunner back to the Royals, as Andrus was thrown out trying to steal with Young at the plate. Meche returns the favor again, walking Young on six pitches. He’s now thrown 115 pitches, and walked the last two batters he’s faced. The alarm bells were now accompanied by red and blue flashing strobe lights. There’s a meeting on the mound. "He just came out and asked how I felt," Meche said. "Basically I said, 'I've been in here this long, let me battle my way out of this.' He just said basically, 'Let's go. The ball four is killing us.'" Hillman leaves Meche in.

Hamilton beats out an infield single on Meche’s second pitch. Meche has now thrown 117 pitches. The last three batters he’s faced have reached base safely. The go-ahead run is on second base with one out. A speaker pops out of the pitching rubber and a muffled voice states, “Please pull over into the visitor’s dugout.”

Meche stays in to pitch to future Hall of Famer Vladimir Guerrero. On the third pitch, Guerrero nails a ball to deep center field, which Podsednik runs down as Young cruises into third base. 120 pitches.

Meche pitches to Kinsler. Kinsler works the count to 2-2, fouls off a pair of two-strike pitches, and Meche hangs a curveball. Kinsler bangs it to right field to plate the go-ahead run. 127 pitches.

At this point, sure, why the hell not leave Meche in? We’ve already reached the point of absurdity – what’s one more batter going to do? David Murphy mercifully flies out on the first pitch. Neftali Feliz and his 100 mph fastball come in to pitch the 9th, and despite a pinch single from Aviles, Feliz puts the game away.

So to recap: Gil Meche, who started complaining of a tired arm after throwing 132 pitches in a complete game last June, and who has been consistently awful since throwing 121 pitches with a dead arm last July, and who wasn’t pitching well so much as pitching lucky on this night, was allowed to throw 128 pitches – the longest outing by any major league pitcher this season – on Saturday night. He was left in to complete the 8th inning, despite a fresh bullpen, and despite the fact that he allowed the first three batters to reach base safely.

Oh, yeah - and as a result, Meche surrenders the game-winning run.

Does anyone remember what happened in that game on July 1st? Because Hillman clearly doesn’t. Meche started the 6th inning that day, in a game tied 2-2, having thrown 99 pitches. He allowed the leadoff hitter to reach base. With two outs, he then allowed a walk, putting men on first and second with two outs. Hillman left him in to pitch – TO JOE MAUER – and Mauer hit the go-ahead single. Meche has never been the same since.

Last night, facing a virtually identical situation, Hillman made the exact same decisions. It’s as if the game of July 1st never happened. It’s as if I and Joe Posnanski and a hundred other bloggers – Royals fans and non-Royals fans – hadn’t immediately declared Hillman’s decision to be one of the dumbest moves of the season. It’s as if we weren’t immediately proven correct when Meche’s season went into the tank. It’s as if Meche didn’t miss the entire month of September. It’s as if those who do not learn from history are not actually doomed to repeat it.

But they are. Ten months ago, Trey Hillman made perhaps the worst decision of his managerial career, and ruined – perhaps irrevocably – his second-best starting pitcher. Yesterday, faced with the same choice, he made the exact same decision. There can be no stronger evidence that Hillman hasn’t learned a thing on the job.

The old me would now proceed with a few thousand words filled with choice insults and all but demanding that when the Royals return home today, that Hillman be left behind in Arlington along with his retired number. The new me is trying to be a little less emotional and a little more analytical. So I’m not going to insist that the Royals fire Hillman on the spot.

I’m not going to argue that Hillman should be fired. I’m just going to predict that he will be. Probably soon.

It doesn’t take an archaeologist to read the writing on the wall of this cave. Hillman’s contract expires at the end of the season; he was conspicuously not given a contract extension over the winter, cementing his lame-duck status. The Royals are 11-20 and fading fast. As Royals fans we’ve become inured to losing, but it’s worth pointing out that the Indians, who inspired this classic media meltdown the other day, actually have a better record than the Royals.

And trust me: David Glass is getting pissed. Most fans still have this image of Glass as this soulless, bean-counting owner who cares about the accounting ledgers more than the standings. But I stand by what I’ve written since Dayton Moore was hired: David Glass has been a model owner for the last four years. He hired the man who was considered the #1 GM prospect in the game by Baseball America, he’s let Moore run the team without interference, and he has opened his wallet when Moore asked him to.

The team’s payroll may still be low, but it’s no longer among the lowest in the game, and the Royals have spent more money in the draft over the last two years than any team but the Pirates. And part of the reason the payroll is so low is that the Royals simply didn’t have any players worth spending millions of dollars on. Since Moore took over, the Royals haven’t lost a single player to free agency that they wanted to keep. Instead, they’ve signed a pair high-profile free agents from other teams (Meche and Guillen), and several more mid-range free agents like Kyle Farnsworth, Juan Cruz, Willie Bloomquist, and Horacio Ramirez.

The money spent on those players has almost uniformly been wasted – but that’s just it. It’s Moore’s fault for spending the money – not Glass’s fault for not spending the money.

And I have it on good authority that Glass is getting pissed off. It wouldn’t surprise me if the decision to release Juan Cruz outright was a reflection of that (although it might also have something to do with the fact that Cruz, in addition to pitching terribly, was a gigantic pain in the ass.) But Glass is starting to realize that his front office isn’t wearing any clothes, and I expect that pretty soon Moore will have to make a more substantial sacrificial offering.

Since the Royals’ magical, mystical 18-11 start last season, they have now played 164 games – a full season plus two more games. They’re 58-106 in that span. That’s astonishing. In 2005, the year before Moore was hired, the Royals reached the absolute nadir of their existence by going 56-106. Five years later, despite a payroll more than 50% higher, despite millions being invested in the farm system, the Royals are exactly as bad now as they were then.

And they show no signs of getting better. On the contrary, as Posnanski wrote on Friday, they show all the signs of a team about to fall into the abyss. He wrote that the day before Hillman launched his second sneak attack on Gil Meche’s shoulder.

I didn’t expect much from the Royals this season, and I suspect most of you didn’t either, but so far the Royals are failing to meet even my meager expectations. It’s been clear for a long time that Hillman wasn’t part of the solution, but now we have overwhelming evidence that he’s a part of the problem.

The Royals have 21 games left in May as I write this. If they play under .500 in that span – say, 9-12 or worse – they’ll be 20-32 or worse after Memorial Day, and the Hillman Watch will begin in earnest. I put the odds that he gets cashiered before Flag Day at about 30%; the odds that he’s gone by the trading deadline have to be around 70%. And the odds that he returns next year? Jose Guillen has a better chance of coming back.

Sayonara, Trey. I had high hopes for you when you were hired, so believe me when I say I’m sorry it didn’t work out. But they didn’t. It’s in the best interests of everyone for you to move on.

Especially Gil Meche.

Royals Today: 5/6/2010

As usual, I picked a bad week to disappear. Well, not disappear exactly – I’ve taken advantage of having the Royals in Chicago to spend a lot of time watching them at the ballpark and talking to people connected to the team. I just haven’t taken the time to write. So let’s catch up with the events of the last week:

Zack Greinke pitches brilliantly again, loses again.

I’m not sure what more I can add to this. As Posnanski pointed out a while back, going back to August 16th, 2008, Zack Greinke had made 46 starts with a 2.11 ERA – and the Royals were 22-24 in those starts.

Now, his ERA in that span is 2.08, and the Royals are 22-25.

Sometimes I wonder if the Royals were put on this earth with the express purpose of teaching the world the core principles of sabermetrics. Want to understand the importance of the base on balls? Consider that the Royals are 11-17, and have been outscored 148-113, even though they’ve outhit their opponents this season. The Royals have 270 hits; their opponents have 264. The Royals have been outhomered by a modest margin, 29-25, but the big difference is this: the Royals – as usual – rank dead last in the AL in walks drawn, with 75. And the Royals – as usual – rank dead last in the AL in walks allowed, with 123.

In 28 games, the Royals have allowed 48 walks more than they’ve drawn, a difference of nearly two walks a game. If OBP is life, the Royals are walking zombies, much as they’ve been for the last quarter century.

If you want to know why it seems like so much of the Kansas City media – and increasingly, the Kansas City fan base – is so stat-savvy even though the team itself is stuck in the 1970s, it’s precisely because we’ve seen what happens to a team that ignores 30 years of analytical progress. Royals fans understand the value of a walk, because they’ve seen first-hand the consequences of a dismissive approach to plate discipline.

And now, they understand the worthlessness of win-loss records for pitchers, because they’ve seen how even the most brilliant pitcher the majors has seen in a decade can go winless into May when the other 24 men on the roster stab him in the back.

Run support? The Royals have scored 16 runs in his six starts.

Bullpen support? In the five games that Greinke has turned the game over to the bullpen, his relievers have pitched a total of 13.1 innings – AND ALLOWED 20 RUNS. Greinke’s relievers have allowed more runs in 13.1 innings than his offense has scored in six entire games. In other words, if Greinke had not allowed a single run all season, the Royals still would have been outscored, 20-16, in his six starts.

On Sunday, Greinke was able to eliminate the bullpen from the equation – knowing that Joakim Soria was probably unavailable after pitching in three straight games, he pitched efficiently as well as brilliantly, throwing just 87 pitches in eight innings. Joe Maddon may have been exaggerating when he said that Greinke could have gone 15 innings, but I have no doubt that if the Royals had managed to score one run, Greinke would have pitched the ninth, and probably the tenth as well – becoming the first Royals’ starter to go into extra innings since Kevin Appier went 10 innings in 1992.

But the Royals, of course, didn’t score a run. And Greinke lost a 1-0 complete game for the second time since the beginning of the 2009 season. In that same span, every other starting pitcher in baseball has combined to lose a 1-0 complete game (not counting rain-shortened starts) twice.

As Joe Sheehan tweeted after the game, the Royals don’t deserve Zack Greinke. I wrote that exact phrase in a column with Rob back in 2005, and it remains equally true today.

These two articles are still parodies, I think. At the rate we’re going, one day they may not be.

Royals take advantage of their bullpen depth to trade Carlos Rosa.

It’s too easy, really, to make jokes about the fact that on Sunday the Royals, who at the time of the trade had the second-worst bullpen ERA in all of baseball, traded away Carlos Rosa, probably their most major league-ready relief prospect.

It’s too easy to see that the Royals traded Rosa for a 20-year-old shortstop with a career line in the minors of .256/.304/.338, and say that once again the Royals have made a move that defies common sense.

In this case, though, it really is too easy. The reality is a lot more complicated.

Two years ago today, Rosa was arguably the best pitching prospect in the organization, which says as much about the state of the farm system then as it says about Rosa. He was a starting pitcher with a terrific fastball – excellent velocity, excellent late life. The fastball was good enough to dominate Double-A hitters – in eight starts, he had a 1.20 ERA and allowed just 37 baserunners in 45 innings – despite a lack of a quality off-speed pitch.

The thinking was that if Rosa could just develop his off-speed stuff, he could be a #2 starter. But here we are, two years later, and Rosa is no closer to coming up with a second pitch today than he was then. He tried to develop a changeup, he tried to develop a slider, but both pitches are still below-average. And in the interim, he’s dealt with some arm woes that have sapped his fastball.

He only made 11 starts in Triple-A in 2008 because of arm trouble, and after the season the Royals decided to move him to the bullpen, as much to keep him healthy as to hide the fact that he was still a one-pitch pitcher. That winter, you may remember, the Royals were set to trade him to the Marlins for Mike Jacobs, but the Marlins were sufficiently concerned about the status of Rosa’s elbow that they backed out of the deal – forcing the Royals to substitute Leo Nunez instead. (Nunez has allowed just 3 hits and one run in 11.1 innings for Florida this year. Put him back on the Royals this year, and the team is probably at .500 instead of 11-17.)

Rosa was healthy enough to pitch in 2009, but in retrospect it’s clear that he had lost a little off his fastball, and for a guy who only had that one above-average pitch, he couldn’t afford to lose even a little. He got off to a terrible start in Omaha’s bullpen last year, and while he pitched much better the second half, he still had a 4.56 ERA for the season. In particular, his control was way off – after walking just 19 batters in 96 innings in 2008, he walked 32 batters in 71 innings last year. This year, at the time of the trade, he had walked 7 more batters in just 12 innings.

Since switching to full-time relief last season, Rosa had pitched 83 innings. He had struck out 90 batters, but he had also allowed 82 hits (including 8 homers) and 39 walks. Translated to the majors, those aren’t the numbers of a future major league closer, or even a quality set-up man. Those are the numbers of a garbage-time reliever. Factor in the scouting report on him, and I can see why the Royals were willing to get rid of him. I mean, we just had a reliever on the roster with a good-not-great fastball and no quality secondary offerings. His name was Roman Colon, and he was just sold to a Korean team. For Rosa, at least, the Royals got a prospect in return.

Navarro isn’t a great prospect by any means, but I’ve seen too many people focus on his statistics – as listed above – without mentioning his most important statistic: he’s just 20 years old. He’s 20 years old, and already in high-A ball. He’s a shortstop, and by most accounts a good one. The Royals are coming off a Lost Decade of shortstops, having featured such luminaries as Rey Sanchez, Neifi Perez, Angel Berroa, Tony Pena Jr, and now Yuniesky Betancourt. With Jeff Bianchi out for the year, shortstop glaringly remains the one position where the Royals had no quality prospects in the minors.

So I don’t know about you, but I’m willing to take a flier on a kid barely out of his teens who can switch-hit, who has at least some understanding of the strike zone (he had walked 8 times in 19 games before the trade), and at the very least isn’t a liability with the glove.

It’s a cliché to say that if the Royals make a decision about a player, the exact opposite opinion is likely to be true. But in this case, I really do trust their judgment. The fact that the Royals didn’t call up Rosa, despite a desperate need for a reliever who could keep his ERA under 6, is very telling.

And keep in mind that the Royals traded him to the Diamondbacks, the one team in baseball with a worse bullpen ERA than the Royals at the time. And then keep in mind that Allard Baird’s old assistant, Muzzy Jackson, works for the Diamondbacks and was likely the impetus for their interest in Rosa.

And then keep in mind that Muzzy’s interest in another Royals farmhand was the impetus for the last trade between these two teams, when the Royals traded Billy Buckner to Arizona – in exchange for Alberto Callaspo.

I don’t expect this trade to work out nearly as well, but I do think it’s a good trade for Kansas City. The Royals’ bullpen woes notwithstanding, you’ll rarely get burned trading away relievers, and credit to Dayton Moore for not letting the team’s current situation obscure that fact.

The Alex Gordon Era comes to an end. Sort of.

I hate it.

I hate it that the Royals, after giving Alex Gordon just 31 at-bats to prove himself this season, decided that they had seen enough. I hate it that the Royals let the return of Chris Getz – Chris Getz! – take a job away from a player who, for all his faults, remains one of the few players on the roster capable of hitting 25 homers, or mustering an OBP north of .350.

I hate the fact that once again, the Royals have managed to take a situation that seemed impossible to screw up, and screwed it up. Alex Gordon is probably the most can’t-miss prospect in the history of the organization. The #2 overall pick in the draft. College Player of the Year. Then Minor League Player of the Year, and #1 prospect in all of baseball according to multiple publications. A standing ovation in his first major league at-bat on Opening Day.

Three years later, he’s no longer a major leaguer. And he’s no longer a third baseman.

So yeah, I hate what’s become of Alex Gordon, and I hate what the Royals did to him last Sunday.

I hate it. But I agree with it.

I agree with it because ultimately, I don’t think the Royals made this move because they were dissatisfied with Gordon’s bat. I think they could no longer tolerate his glove. And I think they are right.

That batting average is a vastly overrated statistic is one of the central maxims of sabermetrics. But batting average looks like Win Shares compared to fielding average, which is such a useless stat that even the mainstream media rarely mentions it anymore.

But even fielding average is useful at the extremes. And with four errors in just 10 games at third base, Gordon’s defense was certainly extreme. His fielding average is .765. Seven-six-five. Anything under .950 is terrible; anything under .900 is historically bad. Fielding .765 is like batting .110 – just like there’s no combination of power and walks that can make a .110 average look good, there’s no amount of range that can make up for booting or throwing away a quarter of your fielding opportunities.

Not that Gordon’s range was any good either. In 84 innings at third base, he made just 13 plays, for a range factor of 1.39 plays per 9 innings. That’s exactly half the major league average of 2.78 plays per 9 innings for a third baseman.

Prefer more advanced statistics? Baseball-reference.com puts Gordon at 4 runs below average – 4 runs in just 10 games. Fangraphs.com has him at -4.2 runs. That translates to close to 70 runs below average over a full season.

The only saving grace here is sample size – maybe it was just a bad 10 games. A really, really bad 10 games. If Gordon had a history or a reputation for being a quality third baseman, that would be a legitimate excuse. He has neither. Gordon, at his best, was an average third baseman, and he hasn’t been at his best for much of his career. I’m not sure that this is the right time to pull the plug, but I’m not sure that it isn’t either.

Particularly since the domino effect of moving Gordon away from third base is that the Royals can move Callaspo away from second base. Far, far away. We might not be certain that Gordon will never play a quality third base – but we can be damn well certain that Callaspo will never be even an adequate second baseman. He was bad last year; he was downright intolerable this season. He missed line drives six inches over his head; he couldn’t run down balls in the hole that were ten feet to his left; his double play pivot was neither quick nor graceful.

I’m not nearly as convinced as the Royals are that Chris Getz is an excellent defensive second baseman. Frankly, it doesn’t matter. Even if he’s just adequate, replacing Gordon with Getz upgrades the defense at two positions. Callaspo’s skills translate much better at third base than at second. He has agility and reasonable first-step quickness, which plays well at third – he’s just ungodly slow. On the basepaths, he runs like a catcher, and Craig Biggio aside, there’s a reason you never see catchers move to second base.

My main concern with demoting Gordon to Omaha was that the Royals would move him to first base, which would be unbelievably dumb, given that they have Kila Ka’aihue ready and Eric Hosmer not far behind. But they moved him to left field instead. I suggested that the Royals move him to a corner outfield spot as early as two years ago, and while it’s far from an ideal position given the offensive demands, it’s more ideal than the alternatives.

My other concern was that the demotion was punitive, rather than corrective, in nature – that the Royals were simply fed up with Gordon, and that he likely had played his last game in a Royals uniform. But multiple sources close to the team assure me that the team really is sincere about giving Gordon another chance – maybe just one more chance – as an everyday player, once he’s mastered the nuances of the outfield. There’s a good chance that neither Scott Podsednik nor Rick Ankiel will be back next season, Guillen is as good as gone, and even David DeJesus may not return, either because of a trade or because the Royals elect not to pick up his option.

So the opportunity will be there for Gordon to play regularly in the outfield; he just better be sure to take advantage of the opportunity this time, because there may not be another one. I hate that it’s come to this, that Alex Gordon, superstar third baseman of the future, is now Alex Gordon, hopefully-adequate left fielder of the present. But as I’m fond of saying, what’s past is prologue. Gordon isn’t the player that we thought he would be. But if we accept him for the player that he is, we might be pleasantly surprised by his worth.

More to come, but I have a radio show to get ready for, so I’ll try to pick back up as soon as possible.

Royals Today: 4/29/2010

The wait is over: Rany on the Radio returns this evening at 6 PM. We’ve tried to make an effort to give the show a consistent time slot this year – last year we’d be on Thursday unless the Royals were playing, in which case it would be Wednesday, unless it was a day game on Thursday…it got to be like a third-rate network sitcom that bounced around to accommodate the rest of the schedule. This year, the hope is that you can find us every Thursday at 6 PM on 810 WHB. (This is why we didn’t start last week – evidently some non-baseball sports league was holding a draft or something. Stupid NFL.)

Some quick thoughts before the show tonight:

- It appears that all the talk about Luke Hochevar’s improved fastball was an illusion after all. As Greg Hall recounts here, even the pitching staff thinks the radar gun at the K is hot, and as Jeff Zimmerman analyzes the data here, they’re right – the gun is about 2 mph faster than at other parks. I don’t know how the Pitch F/X data could be this off, but if there’s one thing I’ve learned about the Royals, it’s that they can make the impossible seem commonplace.

- Greg Schaum is reporting that the Royals are putting John Parrish on the DL and calling up Victor Marte. Let me be the first to say: Marte is not the answer. If he goes back down in a couple of days when Chris Getz returns, this is no big deal. But if the Royals send down Alex Gordon instead…well, they are the Royals. They have a reputation to live up to.

- Speaking of Gordon…I’ve defended Trey Hillman to an extent for his handling of the bullpen. But that doesn’t mean his overall body of work is anything to be proud of. Case in point: last night, with the Royals down a run in the 8th, after Alberto Callaspo singled with two outs, Hillman pinch-ran for him with Gordon.

Meanwhile, Willie Bloomquist was still in the lineup at second base, and was due to bat in the 9th.

This is amazing on several levels:

1) Hillman decided that it was more important to upgrade from Callaspo to Gordon on the basepaths than to upgrade from Bloomquist to Gordon with the bat.

2) Bloomquist was in the starting lineup, I suppose, because the Mariners started a lefty on the mound. It so happens that the Mariners’ closer, David Aardsma, is right-handed.

3) Jason Kendall was at the plate when Gordon pinch-ran. If the point of bringing Gordon in to run was so that he might be able to score on a double in the gap, wouldn’t it make sense only if the batter could actually hit a double? We’re talking about the player with the lowest slugging average in the majors last year. Kendall has 3 extra-base hits so far this season, and had just 23 all of last year.

4) Rick Ankiel is supposedly available to pinch-hit, but he stayed on the bench in the 9th, while Bloomquist naturally made an out. So either Ankiel really isn’t available and the Royals are pulling our leg (never!), or Hillman really thought Bloomquist was his best option in the 9th.

- I know that Yuni is hitting .325, and we’ve been subject to the requisite articles that he’s become a better, more disciplined hitter. Pardon me if I wait a little longer before acknowledging defeat. His new-found discipline has translated into exactly one walk all season. Last night, he worked the count to 3-1 with two outs in the ninth, prompting Frank White (himself a fair swinger) to recommend that Yuni take a pitch and try to work a walk. He fouled off the 3-1 pitch, then swung on a 3-2 pitch that was high and a foot outside to end the game.

According to Fangraphs, Betancourt has swung at 56% of the pitches he’s seen this season – by far the most in his career. He’s swung at 46% of pitches outside the strike zone – last year he swung at just 31%, and his career high is 34%. All the evidence suggests that he’s LESS disciplined at the plate this season.

This lack of discipline has been most galling when it comes to situational hitting. Seven times this season Betancourt has batted with a man on third base and less than two out, i.e. a situation where you just want to put the ball in play. He has one hit in those seven at-bats, but the problem is that in his other six at-bats he didn’t bring the runner home even once. This cost the Royals the game on Saturday night, when he struck out with the game-winning run on 3rd base in the 10th (he saw four pitches, all of them out of the strike zone, and swung at three of them). It might have cost the Royals the game on Tuesday, when he grounded out weakly with Mitch Maier on third base and one out after Maier had tripled in the game’s first run. Maier didn’t score; the Royals lost 3-2. The major league average for bringing home a runner on third with less than two out is in the 55-60% range. For Yuni so far this year, it’s 14%.

So yeah, he’s hitting .325, but his approach hasn’t changed at all; if anything, it’s gotten worse. Batting average is a notoriously variable statistic, and even a bad hitter can hit .325 for a month. Just look at Betancourt himself:

July 2006: .374

May 2007: .327

August 2007: .317

April 2008: .301

August 2008: .305

September 2008: .343

Hell, Betancourt batted .303 last April, and by June the Mariners were desperate to get rid of him. Because even when Betancourt hits .300, his complete lack of walks and modest power makes him only marginally useful. And when he hits .214, like he did last May, he’s a lineup killer.

If Betancourt is hitting .325 at the All-Star Break, call me. Until then, call me a skeptic.

A Tale Of Two Bullpens.

How bad was it? The Royals’ bullpen broke more records than the White Sox on Disco Demolition Night. Ray Bradbury’s agent was calling them to pose for the cover of “Fahrenheit 451”. In “Close & Late” situations, over 728 at-bats, Royals’ opponents hit a ridiculous .328/.404/.520, turning every hitter into Gary Sheffield. Never before had a team blown more saves than they had recorded; the Royals saved just 29 of 59 games. The Royals were the first team in AL history to record a Rolaids Relief score below zero. According to Tom Ruane, the Royals’ 11-32 record in one-run games was the worst by any team in over 60 years. The four worst winning percentages in one-run games this century:

Year Team W L Pct.

1935 Boston (NL) 7 31 .184

1937 St. Louis (AL) 10 31 .244

1999 Kansas City 11 32 .256

1916 Philadelphia (AL) 11 32 .256

The 1937 St. Louis Browns finished 46-108 - and they were the best of the other three teams on this list. The 1935 Braves finished 38-115, the second-worst record this century. The worst? Those 1916 Athletics (36-117). Three teams with overall winning percentages in the .200s, and last year’s Royals. Wow.

As historic as their futility in close games was, it was the Royals’ collapse at the end of games that is so damning on the bullpen. The Royals, owners of the third-worst record in baseball, were better than .500 through 6 innings. Consider this chart, where “expected wins” assumes the Royals won all the games they were leading, and half the games they were tied:

Inning 6 7 8 Final

Ahead 73 70 66 64

Tied 20 15 14 0

Behind 68 76 81 97

Expected Wins 83 77.5 73 64

Through 6 innings, the Royals were 73-68 with 20 ties, yet by game’s end were 64-97. They slipped 19 games in the standings after the 6^th inning. Nineteen games. Inning-by-inning data is not available prior to 1980, but with Keith Woolner’s help, we found that over the last 20 years, the 1985 Pirates had held the record with an 18-game drop. After 7 innings, the Royals 13.5-game drop broke the record of 12, previously held by the 1997 Cubs.

You get the point. This isn’t your standard “we would have won 10 more games with a good bullpen” sob story. This was the Real McCoy. The 1999 Royals were the worst late-inning team of at least the last 20 years, and the worst close-game team of the last 60.

- Baseball Prospectus 2000

I wrote those words over a decade ago, and I never thought I would see a worse bullpen in my lifetime. I probably won’t – the season is still young, after all. But the 2010 Royals are giving the 1999 Royals a run for the money – and that’s with a shutdown closer in Joakim Soria.

Let’s compare the two head-to-head:

The 1999 Royals were 29 of 59 in save opportunities – as mentioned above, the first team in history to have more blown saves than actual saves. The 2010 Royals are 6 of 13 in save opportunities.

The 1999 bullpen had a composite 5.77 ERA. The 2010 bullpen has a 6.61 ERA. (And remember, 1999 was the peak of the juiced era – the league ERA was 4.86. The ERA of the American League this year – keep in mind that offense usually is down in April – is just 4.11.)

The 1999 bullpen allowed opposing hitters to bat .303/.385/.479. Against the 2010 bullpen, opposing hitters are batting .306/.408/.502.

The 1999 bullpen allowed 124 runs in the 7th inning (0.77 runs per game), and 111 runs in the 8th inning (0.69 runs per game). The 2010 bullpen, through 20 games, has allowed 23 runs in the 7th (1.15 runs per game) and 14 runs in the 8th (0.70 runs per game). That’s right – the team is allowing OVER ONE RUN AN INNING in the seventh.

The 1999 Royals were just 53-20 (.726) in games they were leading after 6 innings, and 55-15 (.786) in games they were leading after 7. The 2010 Royals are 5-6 (.455) in games they lead after 6, but 7-2 (.778) in games they lead after 8.

As shown in the chart above, the 1999 Royals were 73-68 with 20 ties after 6 innings – their “expected record” was 83-78, but they finished 64-97. In other words, they lost 19 games between the end of 6 innings and the end of the game. They lost 10.5 games after 7 innings, and 9 games after 8 innings.

After 6 innings, the 2010 Royals are 11-6 with 3 ties. (Read that again.) Their expected record is 12.5 – 7.5, which would put them in second place, just 2 games behind the Twins. Instead they are 8-12. Just 20 games into the season, the Royals have already lost 4.5 games after 6 innings. After 7 innings, they are 9-10 with one tie; they’ve lost 1.5 games after 7. They are 7-11 with 2 ties after 8 innings; thanks to Soria, their record hasn’t dropped at all after the 8th inning.

By almost every metric, the 2010 Royals have performed worse to this point than their 1999 counterparts. This is astonishing, given that the Royals have one of the best closers in baseball at their disposal. Partly thanks to Soria, and partly thanks to the Royals coming back after Kyle Farnsworth had given up the go-ahead run in extra innings against Detroit, the Royals’ record in one-run games is actually 4-4. Which, if anything, makes the performance of the bullpen even worse. The 1999 Royals suffered from bad luck as much as a bad bullpen; the bullpen found a way to give up just enough runs to lose, and the offense shut down in the late innings. By contrast, the 2010 Royals have actually come back in the late innings twice – once against the Tigers in the 11th, and once on Rick Ankiel’s bloop single in the 8th to beat the Red Sox. Without a more productive offense, the situation could be even more dire.

The closer for the 1999 Royals was Jeff Montgomery, who was on his last legs – he would retire after the season. Monty had just 12 saves and a whopping 6.84 ERA. Take out his performance, and the team’s middle relievers had a 5.64 ERA. Take out Soria’s performance this season (just 2 runs allowed in 9 innings), and the middle relievers this season have allowed 44 earned runs in 53.2 innings – a 7.38 ERA.

Yogi was right. It’s déjà vu all over again.

Bullpen Redux.

First off, I want to address the main criticism I’ve heard about my last article. As reader Dan wrote in the comment section:

“I’m really surprised that Rany missed Craig’s point, which many have already pointed out. The best use of the best reliever in your bullpen is not necessarily as a closer. Bring him in anytime in the last three innings when the scoring threat is greatest (men are on base, middle of the order, etc). Let him get out of that jam, and whether he gets three outs or stay[s] in for six, he got you out of the jam and you still have the lead. Worry about keeping a lead in the ninth when there is actually a lead in the ninth to worry about.”

I’ve seen a lot of comments like these, saying that it’s okay for Soria to come in to pitch the 7th inning in a key situation, because he doesn’t necessarily have to finish the game – once the crisis has passed, someone else can pitch the ninth.

I get this point, I really do. And I agree with it to some extent – in a perfect world, we wouldn’t have “closers”, we’d have “stoppers”, who are brought in to stop an opponent’s rally cold.

But the whole point of my article was that the way teams use their bullpens has evolved so drastically over the last 30 years that it’s a foolish utopian dream to argue that Trey Hillman should immediately jump back into the Dan Quisenberry model. Before we turn Joakim Soria into Quisenberry, I argued, let’s first turn him into Jeff Montgomery. Once the Royals see that Soria can handle that kind of role without the world ending, then we can talk about extending things further.

But to idea that the Royals should bring Soria in to pitch in the 7th and then come out of the game, letting someone else to pitch the 9th (and earn the save), is even more of a pipe dream than having him go 7 or 8 outs for the save. It’s simply never been done before. Never mind that the fans and media will absolutely revolt the first time Robinson Tejeda or Josh Rupe blows the 2-run lead in the 9th that Soria hands off to him. (This to me is actually a minor concern, because – for reasons I may get into in a future post – the media and fan base in Kansas City is probably more willing to accept sabermetric and other “unconventional” baseball ideas than anywhere else in America.)

Here’s a rough description of the four ways a team can use its closer, from the least efficient to the most efficient:

1) The Eckersley model: 9th-inning save situations only.

2) The Montgomery model: pitch the 9th, and sometimes the 8th, usually save situations but also in tie games.

3) The Quisenberry model: come in whenever the game is on the line, from the 6th inning on, and stay in to close out the game.

4) The Utopian model: come in to put out fires at any point in the game, then exit the game and let a lesser reliever pitch once the fire is out.

Currently, pretty much every team in baseball follows the first method; a few teams (including the Royals) will dabble with the second method. In my last article I argued for the Royals to whole-heartedly adopt Method #2, and worry about Method #3 later. The response has been “what about Method #4?” To which I can only say, “let’s get the Royals to embrace Method #2 first.” Sure, I’d love to see the Royals adopt Method #4 – but I’d also love to see them embrace the 4-man rotation, and carry just 10 pitchers, and build a platoon at a couple of positions, and clone George Brett. But step by step, guys.

Otto Von Bismarck once said, “Politics is the art of the possible.” I am trying to be political here, because I want to see the Royals (and every other team) use their best reliever more efficiently, and I’d rather push for a small change that’s possible than a large change that isn’t. I’m not saying that the people pushing for the Royals to use Soria in the Utopian model are wrong. They’re not. I’m not even saying that they’re wasting their time, because they’re not. As I’ve learned from reading Nate Silver, if nothing else, suggesting the Utopian model may help move the Overton Window, which may make a less extreme but still radical idea like using Soria for 6 outs become more palatable.

So by all means, let’s keep reminding the Royals that there’s a better way to use Soria. But let’s also temper our expectations. It took 30 years for teams to make a complete mess of the way they use their closers. It’s going to take time – and a lot of intermediate steps – to reverse the damage.

- Last night, Hillman brought Soria in to pitch the 9th in a tie game. This isn’t that notable – once the game goes into the 9th inning tied, it becomes impossible for the home team to have a save situation, so you have no choice but to use your closer in a tie game. Still, there are a lot of managers who would have waited at least until extra innings before bringing in their closer. Then, after Soria worked a rather efficient 9th inning with just 12 pitches, Hillman let him throw the 10th as well. If Yuniesky Betancourt had ever bothered to learn that you don’t actually have to swing at every pitch, Hillman might have been rewarded for his willingness to defy conventional wisdom with a victory. (In the bottom of the 10th, with the winning run on third and one out, Betancourt saw four pitches. None of them were in the strike zone, yet he swung at three of them, and struck out.)

The bullpen remains a cluster**** of the highest order, but I stand by my position that Hillman is mostly an innocent bystander in all this. It’s hard for any manager to look smart when he has exactly one reliable reliever. Hillman deserves better than to be scapegoated because his GM has made such a mess of things.

- Speaking of Dayton Moore and his mess, Moore turned the impressive trick of dumping Luis Mendoza without actually improving the bullpen. Mendoza was replaced with Bruce Chen, and while Chen pitched poorly for the Royals last season, his career ERA (4.71) is barely half that of Mendoza (8.43). Moreover, in three starts for Omaha he had allowed just 13 hits in 21 innings, with 20 strikeouts against just 5 walks. Chen is one of those Quadruple-A guys who always dominates in Triple-A but struggles in the majors, so I’m not expecting much from him, but he’s better than Mendoza.

Unfortunately, Moore also released Juan Cruz and replaced him with Brad Thompson. This is mystifying. I understand that Cruz has been an unbridled failure with the Royals, and it’s impressive that Moore was willing to accept the sunk cost of his contract (and that David Glass let him). But at least Cruz has a history of success, something Thompson really doesn’t. Cruz went on the DL late last year, and based on the results I suspect he was pitching hurt for most of the season. After striking out 33% of the batters he faced in 2007-2008, he struck out just 17% of opposing batters last year.

This year, he was ridiculously ineffective with men on base (he allowed all 6 runners he inherited to score), but he also struck out 7 of the 28 batters he faced. There was at least a glimmer of hope there. I don’t see how, in just 5.1 innings of work, he showed the Royals enough to release him – particularly when they’re keeping Kyle Farnsworth, who’s been almost exactly as ineffective. (Farnsworth has thrown 5.2 innings. Both pitchers have allowed 9 hits. Cruz walked four; Farnsworth has walked only two, but also hit two batters, and he’s given up a homer. And Farnsworth has only three strikeouts.)

In his place, the Royals have brought up Thompson, who had a 4.84 ERA for the Cardinals last year, and is an extreme finesse pitcher who struck out just 34 batters in 80 innings. Given how bad the team’s defense still is – as put on vivid display each of the last few nights – I’m not sure a pitcher who’s primary skill is pitching to contact is going to be any better than Cruz.

The Royals have a wealth of relief options in the minors, from the just-waiting-for-his-turn Carlos Rosa to the nearly-ready Blake Wood to the always-forgotten Chris Hayes to some intriguing Double-A options like Blaine Hardy and Federico Castaneda. None of these guys are sure things; they’re all still better than recycling yet another failed major league pitcher.

- Just to make it clear how much the bullpen has hurt the Royals, consider this: if games ended after six innings, the Royals would be 8-6 with 3 ties. Instead, they’re 6-11. Get this: the Royals have a losing record when leading after six innings. In the eight games they’ve led after six, they’re 3-5.

The 7th inning is the culprit. Thanks to Soria, the Royals have won all 5 games they’ve had a lead going into the 9th. And they’ve only lost 1 game where they had a lead entering the 8th. But between the beginning and the end of the 7th, the Royals go from 8-6 with 3 ties to 6-10 with 1 tie.

- What is most amazing to me about the pitching staff this season is that, despite a middle relief corps that is historically inept, no one has even suggested that one possible solution might be to let the starting pitchers work a little deeper into the game.

The Royals have played 17 games so far, and not once has their starter thrown even 110 pitches. Only six times has the starter thrown 100 pitches. Neither Kyle Davies nor Brian Bannister has thrown 100 pitches yet.

I’m not saying this is a bad thing, necessarily – the usage of starting pitchers today is much more sane than it was 10 or 15 years ago. I’m just saying that if you had told me back in 1998, when I first invented Pitcher Abuse Points because Jim Leyland was letting Jesus Sanchez throw 146 pitches and Livan Hernandez throw 153 pitches and Tony Muser was grinding Jose Rosado’s arm into dust, that a scant 12 years later a team would rather lose game after game in the 7th inning than let its starting pitchers (none of whom are younger than 26, mind you) throw even 110 pitches…well, let’s just say I would have been surprised.

The starting pitchers have averaged 5.82 innings per start this year; even if you take Gil Meche out of the equation, it’s 6.17 innings per start. The Royals’ starter has completed the 7th inning just twice all season. The Royals could easily let their starters get another out or two – allowing them to complete the 7th more regularly – without letting them exceed 115 or 120 pitches. For pitchers with mature arms (i.e. older than 25), I don’t really get concerned with their pitch counts until they approach 120.

It’s clear the Royals don’t have a reliever capable of protecting leads in the 7th. Maybe the solution is to see if their starters are capable of protecting leads in the 7th.

Hillman and the Bullpen.

Jason Kendall is hitting .352, Yuniesky Betancourt is hitting .309…and the Royals are still 6-9. Apparently not even Lucifer can guarantee the Royals victory. If Joe Hardy played for Kansas City, “Damn Yankees” would end with the Royals losing their 100th game of the season.

The Royals incessant failures have allowed another meme to crop up, a meme that is explained well by Craig Brown here:

‘Asked by the traveling reporters if he considered bringing closer Joakim Soria into Tuesday’s seventh inning, Hillman offered this:

“There’s a thought there but, No. 1, it’s a very unusual time for Joakim Soria to pitch in a ballgame. No. 2, you’ve still got those same bats coming up in the ninth in a higher-leverage situation — because it is the ninth, even if there are no runners on base.”

I added the emphasis because Hillman’s use of term “high leverage” is impressive. It would be more impressive if he knew what the hell he was talking about.

Following his logic, the higher the inning number, the higher the leverage. Sometimes, it actually works that way. Other times, like Tuesday, not so much.’

I’m going to do something a little unexpected here: I’m going to defend Trey Hillman – to a point. I don’t mean to pick on Craig specifically – he’s a great guy and one of the best Royals bloggers in the business. He wasn’t the first person to criticize Hillman for this quote; he just had the misfortune of being the last, or at least the one whose article I was reading (after Rob Neyer linked to it) when I decided to respond.

I’ve written many times (it’s not original; Bill James wrote this a quarter-century ago) that bad teams inevitably focus on their failures on their best players. (Just witness the manner in which the Royals have treated Alex Gordon this season; as Bob Dutton wrote last night, Gordon’s “time in the big leagues might hinge on his production while Chris Getz recovers from a strained right oblique”. I like Chris Getz, but the notion that Gordon might lose his job to Getz is nutz.)

But I think that we can add a Fan’s Corollary to The Rule of Bad Teams, that goes something like this:

A fan base that has endured too much losing for too long inevitably focuses on minor or secondary causes for their team’s failures, because the primary cause of those failures are too basic to warrant mentioning.

In the Royals’ case, the root cause of the team’s failure so far this season is pretty simple: the bullpen can’t pitch worth a damn. But that’s too easy and definitive an explanation. It’s hard to admit that the problem is that we have exactly one good reliever, because that’s a problem that no amount of massaging can fix. So instead it’s tempting to say that the real problem is that Trey Hillman is doing a lousy job of using his one good reliever. It’s tempting to say that the problem would be solved by simply using Joakim Soria in the seventh inning.

It was Voltaire who originally said, “The perfect is the enemy of the good.” We could use a little Voltaire right now, and not just because he probably had a better slider than Roman Colon.

Look, I would love to see Soria come in when the Royals are in a jam in the 7th inning, work his way out of it, then close out the game in the 8th and 9th, just like my grandpappy told me Dan Quisenberry did it in the good ol’ days. I fervently believe that the reliever usage patterns of the 1970s and early 1980s were significantly better than those of today. But to think that the Royals, or any team, is going to turn the clock back 30 years in one jump is ridiculous, and holding on to that kind of hope will only lead to frustration.

I’m going to define a “Long Save” as a save in which the pitcher recorded 7 or more outs, i.e. he entered the game in the 7th inning or earlier, but stayed in to close out the game. By that definition, here’s a brief history of the Long Save:

Prior to 1960, the most Long Saves in a season was 9, by Hoyt Wilhelm in 1953.

From 1960 to 1969, a pitcher recorded 9 or more Long Saves in a season 11 times (three times by Wilhelm again); the record was 13, by Bob Lee in 1964.

In the 1970s, eighteen pitchers recorded 9 or more Long Saves in a season, and a 5 Long Save season was accomplished no fewer than 119 times. In 1979, Jim Kern broke Lee’s record with 16 Long Saves.

The Long Save was still prominent in the 1980s; 16 pitchers reached the 9-Long Save mark, and 117 pitchers had at least 5 Long Saves in a season. In 1982, Dan Quisenberry recorded 17 Long Saves, still the all-time record. He had 13 in 1983, and 15 (third-most all-time) in 1984.

But during this decade the counter-revolution began. In the first half of the 80s (1980-1984), there were eleven 9 Long Save seasons, and 68 seasons with 5 Long Saves. From 1985 to 1989, there were just 5 and 49, respectively.

In 1989 and 1990, the Oakland A’s had probably the best bullpen in major league history of a 2-year span. This was partly due to the way Tony La Russa handled Dennis Eckersley, protecting the broken-down starter by using him in one-inning roles almost exclusively. Imitation being the sincerest form of flattery, the Long Save disappeared from the game almost overnight.

In 1990, Duane Ward had 7 Long Saves for the Blue Jays. The following year six different pitchers had 5 Long Saves. Since 1992, only two pitchers – Derek Lowe and Scott Williamson, both in 1999 – have had 5 Long Saves in a season. Since 2000, the only pitcher with more than 5 Long Saves FOR THE DECADE is Tim Wakefield, with 6. That should be a clue that, in virtually every case, the rare Long Save that occurs in today’s game goes to pitchers who are long relievers, not closers, who happened to come into the game in the 6th inning of a 10-2 game, and went ahead and completed the game, thus earning a save by the rule that any pitcher who throws 3 innings to close out a victory gets one.

While it’s possible I’ve missed someone, as best as I can tell there has not been a single instance of a closer pitching more than 2 innings for a save this century. Williamson had a 7-out save for the Reds on May 5th, 2000, but he was sort of the co-closer with Danny Graves at the time. The closest I can find is Salomon Torres, who had a 3-inning save on April 4, 2008, and saved 28 games that year – but his next save wasn’t until May 24th, so it’s pretty clear he wasn’t in the closer’s role yet.

So yes, it would be perfect if Soria became the first closer in over two decades to enter a game in the 7th inning. But it’s not going to happen, and it won’t happen until we first see closers being regularly used in the 8th inning.

And in that category, Hillman is actually ahead of the curve. Let’s call a save of at least 4 outs a Medium Save. Like the Long Save, the Medium Save has become more and more rare over the years, but is still occasionally seen in the wild. In 1983, Quisenberry had 35 (!) Medium Saves – meaning only 10 of his then-record 45 saves were of the 9th-inning variety. In 1993, Jeff Montgomery had 18 Medium Saves – John Wetteland had 19 – and no one has had that many in a season since. But as recently as 2004, John Smoltz had 16 Medium Saves, the most of any pitcher in the last 17 seasons.

Here’s a list of the pitchers with the most Medium Saves in 2009:

8: Brian Wilson

7: Joakim Soria

7: Mariano Rivera

7: Ryan Franklin

7: Andrew Bailey

Now yes, it’s true that Hillman only started stretching Soria out after it was clear he had no choice – he recorded his first one on July 7th, and the second one on July 25th, after the memorable meltdown against Tampa Bay when the Royals lost three straight games in the 8th inning. But at least he did adapt. That’s more than I can say for other members of the organization.

If you want to argue that Hillman is not using Soria correctly, you’ll have to talk to someone else – I agree with you. But I have to point out that Hillman’s usage of his closer is no worse, and in many cases is better, than the way that 29 other managers use theirs. You could respond, as Rob Neyer frequently does, that when you’re the Royals, being “no worse” than other teams isn’t enough – given the inherent disadvantages to your market, you have to do things better than the competition.

I would agree to that as well. But Hillman doesn’t have to use Soria in the 7th inning to accomplish that. He simply needs to use him in the 8th more regularly.

Hillman has shown a willingness to do that. Twice this season, Soria has come in for the save with two outs in the 8th. Not impressed? Consider that he is the only pitcher in baseball with 2 Medium Saves this year.

Really, my only beef with Hillman’s usage of Soria is his bizarre delineation between the four-out save and the six-out save. Hillman has said on multiple occasions that he feels there’s a big difference between the two, which I find curious. To me, the bigger difference would be between the three-out and the four-out save – in the latter case, you come in to pitch, then sit down for 15 minutes, then get up again. Being forced to warm up twice instead of once would seem to me to be a bigger difference than throwing an extra 10 pitches in the 8th.

The refusal to use Soria for more than 4 outs nearly cost them the game yesterday, and did cost Greinke the victory. Yesterday was the perfect day to stretch Soria out a little – he hadn’t pitched since the 18th, and today is an off-day. With a one-run lead on the road, it was madness to start the inning with anyone else – and yet Hillman did just that, bringing in the guy who was in Triple-A ten days ago to start the inning. The Blue Jays predictably tied the game up.

Our story has a happy ending, because in the 9th Robinson Tejeda threw one of the most overpowering innings I have ever witnessed*, and then Alex Gordon had one of the most important hits of his career, a two-out, extra-inning home run off a left-handed pitcher after he had gone 0-for-3 with 2 Ks and a throwing error in the game. Soria got his 3-out save opportunity, and everyone went home happy. But they almost didn’t.

*: Tejeda threw 8 pitches in the inning, all strikes, and all (I believe) fastballs. He struck out Vernon Wells on 3 pitches, got Lyle Overbay to hit a lazy flyball on an 0-1 count, then struck out Jose Bautista on 3 pitches. It was a ridiculous display of power pitching, and proof that if he can just throw strikes, Tejeda can be that bridge to Soria the Royals so desperately need.

What makes Hillman’s refusal to use Soria to start the 8th so maddening is that he finally broke down and gave in to the impulse last season, and it worked beautifully. After the bullpen collapse against Tampa Bay, Soria came in to start the 8th six times the rest of the season. In one of those games, he came in with a 5-4 lead, gave up three runs in the 8th and was pulled after getting just two outs. In the other five games, he pitched two scoreless innings for the save. In another game Hillman brought him in to pitch the bottom of the ninth in a tie game at Detroit; the Royals scored in the 10th and Soria finished out the game to earn the win.

Soria earned 5 saves of the 6-out variety in 2009. No other pitcher in baseball had more than 2. The last pitcher with 5 such saves was Aquilino Lopez in 2003.

The Twins are frequently held up as the smartest team in the division; Joe Posnanski thinks that Ron Gardenhire is the best manager in the game. You know how many times Joe Nathan has gone 6 outs for the save in his career? Once – on June 15th, 2006.

Let’s go around the division. How many 6-out saves does Bobby Jenks have in his career? One – against the Royals, in September of 2005. The last Indians closer to go 6 outs for a save was Steve Karsay, in 2000. The last Tigers closer to go 6 outs was Matt Anderson, in 2001.

So is the difference between the Royals and the other teams in the division really the way that Trey Hillman uses his closer? Or is the difference that the other teams in the division actually have someone to pitch the 8th inning? Which is a bigger mistake – that Hillman didn’t go to Soria in the 8th yesterday, or that he did go to Josh Rupe – and that aside from Soria, Josh Rupe was probably the best option?

If Tejeda had pitched the 8th, and pitched it as well as he would end up pitching the 9th, this is all an academic exercise. And going forward, on a team that’s so starved for middle relief that literally one good outing can move you right behind Soria in the pecking order, we might well see Tejeda in that spot the next time the Royals need a bridge to their closer.

If the Royals continue to struggle this season, Hillman is probably going to get the axe, and I can’t say that I’ll be particularly sad to see him go. But his usage of Soria wouldn’t make my top ten list of reasons why he should be fired. Yes, I would argue that Hillman should use Soria for two innings instead of one, that he should use him in tie games rather than to protect three-run leads, and all that.

But look around baseball. On Saturday night, Jerry Manuel used every other reliever in his bullpen to pitch in a scoreless game in extra innings, before he finally got around to using his closer, Francisco Rodriguez, in the 19th inning. And Manuel out-managed Tony La Russa, who double-switched Matt Holliday out of the game, putting the pitcher in the lineup right behind Albert Pujols; inexplicably hit-and-ran with Pujols at the plate in the 19th inning, costing the Cardinals the game; and made a half-dozen other ridiculous decisions. Managers – even good managers – make sub-optimal decisions all the time. Hillman’s track record in this regard is hardly unusual.

Two years ago, Soria saved 42 games, yet only twice did he pitch more than 3 outs for the save. Yet no one was complaining too loudly about Hillman’s use of his bullpen, because the Royals had Ramon Ramirez and Leo Nunez to pitch the 8th. That the Royals no longer have Ramirez and Nunez to pitch the 8th is regrettable, but don’t pin the blame for that on Hillman.

The Royals have a bullpen of horrors for the second straight season, but the root cause for that is not a failure to manage their personnel. It’s a failure to select their personnel. And the fault for that does not reside primarily with Hillman. If you’re looking to blame someone for that, you have to aim higher.

Having Soria pitch in a tight situation in the 7th or even 6th inning would be perfect, but simply having Soria start the 8th inning to protect a one-run lead would be good. The perfect is the enemy of the good. Let’s concentrate our efforts on convincing Hillman to send Soria out there for six outs instead of four. I still hold out hope that one day baseball teams will go back to the way bullpens were run in 1977. But we have to get back to 1993 first.