Royals Today: The Relievers.

On to the bullpen, although first I need to back up and discuss Joey Gathright, who somehow got left out of my review of the hitters.

Gathright looked like he might be ready for prime time last season. He hit .307 and drew some walks, and it’s almost impossible for a guy with a .371 OBP and blazing speed to not have value. This year, he’s essentially the same player – he strikes out about every 7 at-bats and walks about half that often, he’s still hitting the ball on the ground more than 75% of the time – but the hits aren’t falling in. He has seven more at-bats than last year, but 11 fewer hits. A .300 hitter with speed can play every day with no semblance of power; a .250 hitter can’t.

The difference between last year’s .307 and this year’s .256 can probably be chalked up to random variance. The problem is that it’s more likely that last year was the fluke than this year. He’s a career .263 hitter, which is pretty unimpressive for a left-handed hitter who’s one of the fastest players in the major leagues. Someone like Ichiro Suzuki pads his average with a ton of infield singles, but the difference is that Suzuki also occasionally gets hits on balls that, you know, reach the outfield.

Gathright gets a bunch of infield singles too – and that’s all he gets. Most of the time he doesn’t even bother trying hitting the ball anywhere else – he tries to bunt for a hit more than anyone else in the league (last year only Willy Taveras bunted more often.) Only once in his career has he managed more than 10 extra-base hits in a season, and this year he has all of three. I mean, the guy has seven triples in his career of over 1100 at-bats. Tony Pena Jr. has eight triples in just over 700 at-bats – and Pena has neither speed nor power. Any ball down the right field line or in either gap is a potential triple with Gathright’s speed, so the fact that he has only seven of them gives you some idea of how rarely he hits the ball that far.

And if you have no power to speak of, at some point the opponents are simply going to dare you to hit the ball over them. It’s not just that the infield plays shallow on Gathright – the outfield can play at almost Texas Leaguer-depth. The complete lack of power also inhibits Gathright’s ability to draw walks.

Last season, Joey spent half the year in Omaha and in 60 games drew 43 walks and had a .457 OBP. But in the majors he’s drawn just 36 walks in 470 AB the last two seasons, because major league pitchers are going to throw strikes when they know the hitter can’t make them pay if a pitch catches too much of the strike zone. Plus, it’s hard to draw walks when you’re bunting on the first pitch. Gathright has seen just 3.4 pitches per plate appearance this year, down from 3.52 last season and roughly 3.75 before that. I thought he could become another Gary Pettis, who hit just .236 for his career but drew enough walks that he had a .332 OBP, but even Pettis had a twinge of power to keep pitchers honest. Gathright doesn’t. (Although Pettis struck out a ridiculous amount – he averaged 131 whiffs per 162 games – for a guy with no power. What a weird player he was.)

Gathright’s been terrific on the basepaths this year, but he can’t use his speed if he’s not on the bases, and he’s not going to get on base often enough to be effective if the only threat he poses is the threat of a six-hopper to the shortstop. He’s well-cast in the role of fourth outfielder, but that’s all he is.

Moving on…

Is it safe to say that Joakim Soria, barring an unexpected collapse, will finish with one of the best seasons by a reliever in Royals history? Consider this: only three times in Royals history has a reliever pitched 30 innings or more with a WHIP (walks + hits per inning pitched) of less than one: Jeff Montgomery in 1989, Dan Quisenberry in 1983, and Soria. That’s Soria last year, when his WHIP was .942, behind only Quiz’s .928 mark in 1983, the year he should have won the Cy Young Award. (In Quiz’s defense, twice he would have had WHIPs under 1 if you don’t count intentional walks.)

You know what Soria’s WHIP is this year? .705. Just three relievers in history have had a lower WHIP in a season with 70+ innings – Dennis Eckersley (in 1989 and 1990), Eric Gagne (2003), and J.J. Putz last year. (Although Mariano Rivera has a .677 WHIP this season himself.)

Soria is on pace for 42 saves, which won’t match the record of 45 shared by Monty and Quiz, but is awfully close – and pitching for a much worse team that those two toiled for. And Soria’s ERA of 1.43 would be the second-best by a reliever in team history, behind Montgomery’s 1.37 mark in 1989. (Little-known fact: Montgomery has the lowest single-season ERA of any AL pitcher with 90 or more innings in the live-ball era.)

Objectively, Soria’s on pace for the third-best season by a Royals’ reliever, behind Quisenberry’s 1983 (139 IP, 1.94 ERA, 45 saves) and Montgomery’s 1989 (92 IP, 1.37 ERA). Soria has been better than everyone on an inning-for-inning basis – but he’s only on pace for 71 innings. Such is the role of the modern closer. The four pitchers who led the two leagues in saves in 2006 and 2007 averaged less than 64 innings. Twenty years ago, the four pitchers who led in saves in 1986-87 averaged over 98 innings.

It’s possible that modern closers are even more dominant than their predecessors on an inning-for-inning basis, but certainly not enough to make up for the massive drop in their innings. Which once again raises the question: would the Royals be better off with Soria in the rotation?

I don’t have a clear answer. Soria certainly has a starter’s repertoire. His personality is perfectly suited for a closer, but not in the sense that he gets all fired up to throw ridiculous heat for an inning, but in the sense that he never lets his emotions get the better of him. That personality certainly wouldn’t be a detriment in the rotation.

My biggest concern with a move to the rotation is simply that as dominant as Soria is, he doesn’t throw incredibly hard – typically topping out around 91 mph. His effectiveness stems from his diverse repertoire, some deception in his delivery, and above all his tremendous command. Those things should all translate well as a starter – but his velocity is likely to drop a little, and you have to ask yourself, how dominant can he be if he’s throwing 87-88? Greg Maddux won a bunch of Cy Young awards that way, but it’s not the typical formula for an ace.

I’d like to see the Royals experiment with Soria in the rotation before year’s end, now that it’s clear the Royals are not playing for 2008. I highly doubt this will happen, though. All I ask is that if Moore and Hillman are committed to Soria as their closer, that they use him like a 1980s style closer, not a 2000s style loser. I’m not talking about Goose Gossage or Dan Quisenberry, guys who threw 120+ innings a season and would come in to put out a fire with the bases loaded in the 7^th. (Although that would be nice.) I’m just asking that they bring Soria in for the 8^th inning on occasion, that they try to get 90-100 innings out of him in a season instead of just 70.

Soria averages just 15.5 pitches an inning, in large part because he faces so few batters per inning. The major league average is somewhere north of 17 pitches an inning – so right there, you can see that 90 innings for Soria is the equivalent of barely 80 innings for an average reliever in terms of the wear and tear on his arm. Soria doesn’t have a maximum-effort delivery and doesn’t appear to be at high-risk for arm injury. He is a Tommy John survivor, but on the other hand guys who come back from TJ surgery tend to have a “honeymoon” period of about 5 years when they’re very unlikely to suffer another elbow injury.

Hillman has shown some willingness to use Soria for two innings – he’s done so four times this year – but twice Soria came into pitch in a tie game in extra innings, and one of the time he blew the save in the 9^th but came back to pitch the 10^th after the Royals took the lead again. Only once all year has Soria come into pitch in a save situation before the 9^th inning – May 31^st against the Indians, after he hadn’t pitched in three days. He’s pitched the 8^th inning three other times, but all three games were games the Royals were losing badly and Soria just needed some work.

Hillman has asked Soria to get more than three outs for a save just once all year. That’s a ridiculous misuse of resources. I wrote about this Sunday, but if Hillman didn’t use him for a six-out save then, he’s never going to use him. Hillman’s been pretty good about using Soria in tie games, something a lot of managers won’t do – he’s done so four times – but until he lets go of the reins a little and uses Soria in the 8^th inning, he’s not going to get maximum value out of his closer.

One of the biggest arguments used against the idea of moving Soria to the rotation is that it’s been so long that the Royals have had a good closer, and the psychological impact of blowing those 9^th-inning leads for the last 10 years can’t be understated. This is true – the Royals, from 1996 through 2005, had a .386 winning percentage in one-run games. That’s not just bad, folks. That’s the worst record over a ten-year span by a team in major league history.

But my reply to that is this: the problem with the Royals in the late 1990s and early 2000s wasn’t that they didn’t have any good closers. The problem is that they didn’t have any good relievers.

Consider this little fact. What percentage of teams have at least one reliever on their roster with an ERA under 3? I’d say the vast majority of teams do – relievers vary so much from year to year that even marginal relievers will occasionally have an ERA in the 2s purely by chance. And for most of their history, the Royals did. If you define “reliever” as anyone who made 40 or more relief appearances, the Royals had a “good reliever” on their roster every year from 1981 to 1994. Until 1995, they never went more than two seasons without a good reliever – and only once (1979-1980) did they go more than one season without a good reliever.

Until 1995. Starting that season, the Royals didn’t have a single good reliever on their roster…for 12 straight years. You would think, in one of those years, they’d have a reliever who lucked into a good year, or whose teammates bailed him out a few times to keep his ERA down, or hell, someone who just gave up a ton of unearned runs to make his ERA artificially low.

I mean, for God’s sake, the Rockies, playing in the best hitters’ park ever created, have never gone three straight years without a good reliever. The Royals went an even dozen. With the kind help of my Baseball Prospectus colleague, Bil Burke, I can tell you that in the divisional era (1969-onwards), the Royals’ stretch of 12 consecutive years without a reliever with a sub-3 ERA is twice as long as the next-longest stretch. Four teams went six straight years without a “good reliever” – the 1972-77 Angels, 1982-87 Twins, 1993-98 Twins, and 1999-2004 Devil Rays. No team had a stretch of longer than six years – except our boys in blue.

Last year, finally, the Royals broke that streak. Soria had a 2.48 ERA, and he didn’t lead the team; David Riske had a 2.45 ERA. Jimmy Gobble’s 3.02 ERA (little known fact: 2007 was the last time Gobble recorded an out) was the third-best ERA in the bullpen – and the third-best ERA of any Royals reliever in 13 years.

This season, Soria is on pace for the first sub-2 ERA since Steve Farr in 1990 – and so is Ron Mahay. Ramon Ramirez had his ERA peek just over 3 after surrendering his first run of the season, but if he throws a scoreless inning his next time out his ERA will drop back into the 2s. Leo Nunez should get to 40 appearances if he stays healthy the rest of the season, and his ERA is 1.69. The Royals could conceivably end up with four relievers with an ERA under three. It’s not an exaggeration to say that if Soria were moved to the rotation, the Royals have three different candidates to replace him that have all pitched better than any other closer the Royals have used since the strike.

So this argument that the Royals can’t afford to move Soria because it’s been so long since they had an ace closer, and they shouldn’t mess with a good thing…I don’t buy it. The Royals have more quality options in their bullpen than they have since I was a teenager. There are a number of compelling arguments why they should leave Soria alone, but the fear of what happens to the ninth inning should not be one of them.

Reviewing the other relievers quickly:

- Ron Mahay has been, in a word, studly. His 1.78 ERA is just shy of the team record by a left-handed reliever (1.73, by Tom Burgmeier in 1971.) He has no platoon split to speak of – lefties are hitting .225, righties are hitting .223. He leads the bullpen in innings pitched, an amazing achievement for a left-hander. He’s been an absolute revelation.

Naturally, this means that the Royals are contemplating trading him. On paper, it makes sense. There are always contenders in need of a good lefthander in the bullpen (unlike, say, second base, where the market for Grudzielanek is nearly non-existent), and Mahay should fetch some decent talent. The fact that he’s signed for 2009 is a plus; realistically the Royals can’t expect to contend next season, so the value of keeping him for next year is outweighed by the value he’d bring another team.

The biggest reason not to trade him is this: these are baseball players, not baseball cards, and baseball players do not take kindly to being treated as such. Mahay signed a contract to pitch for the Kansas City Royals. He did so as a free agent, meaning he was free to sign with any team, and he chose Kansas City. Implicit in that contract is an understanding that Mahay will not be sold off at a profit at the first opportunity.

Obviously, players know that trades are part of the game. Any pre-free agency player is fair game, and so is any player in the final year of his contract. But if a team trades a player in the first year of a multi-year contract, they run the risk that the next time they want to sign a free agent, that player will say, “why should I sign with you when I might have to pack up and move in six months?” If the right deal comes along, the Royals should take it. But it has to be the right deal, or they run the risk of hurting their future forays in the free-agent market for a modest short-term gain.

- Ramon Ramirez just surrendered his first homer of the season, and has surrendered just two homers in 80 innings away from Coors Field in his career. Strangely, he’s not a groundball pitcher at all. This leads to the suspicion that his HR rate is a bit of a fluke, which it probably is. The more telling stat is that away from Coors Field, his career ERA is 2.24. There’s not much fancy about Ramirez – he throws a good fastball and an excellent slider – and he’s a good bet to remain effective. Just keep in mind that, like most pitchers with his repertoire, he’s susceptible to left-handed hitters, who against Ramirez hit about 80 points better than right-handers across the board.

- I don’t have much to say about Leo Nunez – you can’t conclude much about 21 innings, excellent though they were. I will say this: it’s good to have him back.

- Jimmy Gobble sucks.

Not enough for you? Assuming his season ends shortly – we can only hope – he will finish with the highest ERA ever by a Royals pitcher with 24 or more innings. In second is Don Wengert, 1999 (9.25), followed by Dan Reichert, 1999 (9.08). Just missing the list because of my arbitrary cutoff is Albie Lopez in 2003, with a 12.71 ERA in 22 innings. (Remember what I said about having bad relievers? Yeah.)

- Horacio Ramirez and Robinson Tejeda are just the most recent examples of why you should never, ever give up on a pitcher entirely until you’ve tried him in relief. Tejeda had a wee problem throwing strikes last night, but in 12.2 innings since he joined the team, he has struck out 14 and allowed just six hits. Horacio hasn’t walked a single batter in 15.2 innings. Just as importantly, both pitchers can work two or even three innings when needed, which is vital for a team that’s prone to having its starter knocked out of the game early. I think the idea of moving Horacio back to the rotation (and optioning Bannister) is ludicrous, though. At his best Horacio was a #4 starter, and he wasn’t always at his best. If we can turn him into a quality long reliever from the left side, that’s more valuable than anything he’s likely to give us in the rotation.

- The new kid who pitched last night showed a lot of potential. His fastball only touched 90, but he came with a three-quarters delivery and his arm has whip-like action that should make him tough on right-handers. He froze Ivan Rodriguez with a nasty curveball, and anyone who can strike Pudge out looking has some potential. He also showed some fine leather on the mound. And best of all, pitching in the AL, he won’t have to hit.

Yeah, the notion of using Tony Pena Jr. on the mound is crazy. But then, so is the notion of using him at the plate.

Royals Today: 7/20/2008.

If I may quote my White Sox beat writer friend from a few years ago…how the hell did we win this game?

Things certainly started out well enough, the exact opposite of Friday night’s death by a thousand singles. Teahen poked one up the middle, Aviles dropped one into the left-center gap, and DeJesus sliced one to left. DeJesus stole second base on the pitcher; A.J. Pierzynski didn’t even throw to second. Butler singled to center. The new lineup was looking good.

With one out Gordon drew a walk – he already has more walks this year than last – to load the bases, but Olivo struck out and John Danks was threatening to wiggle out of the inning. Until Ross Gload came through with a two-run single. 4-0, Bannister hasn’t even taken the mound – what could go wrong?

Well, Hillball could make an appearance. With two outs, men on first and third, and German at the plate…Gload lit out for second. He was only about by about ten feet.

I realize I’m spitting in the wind here – nothing against any of you fine readers, but none of you are flashing signs at first base – but can someone get through to Trey Hillman that the only threat Ross Gload poses on the bases is to his own team? Gload has now attempted 7 steals this season, and has been nailed on more than half of them. He’s 11-for-20 in his career.

The situation made the decision to run even worse. For one thing, there was a runner at third base – which raises the risks of getting caught stealing, because you end the inning with a man in scoring position already, but does not raise the rewards. You can calculate the break-even point for a stolen-base attempt using the run expectancy matrix. For instance, this season when there are men on first-and-third and two outs, the average team scores 0.458 runs the rest of the inning. With men on second and third and two outs (i.e. after a successful steal of second), that number rises to 0.616 runs. But if the runner is caught stealing, the number drops to zero, as the inning is over. If you do a little algebra, you can calculate that the break-even point for a basestealing attempt in this situation is 74.3% - you have to be successful more than 74.3% of the time to make the steal attempt worthwhile.

By comparison, with a man on first only and two outs, the break-even point is 67.3%. You already have a man in scoring position – why put two runners at risk of dying on the bases so that one runner might advance?

The second point has nothing to do with math and everything to do with psychology. John Danks has already given up four runs, and two men are on base – he’s obviously laboring, and you have a chance to ice this game against a struggling pitcher. Why hand him a free out? Hillman did, and it would hurt the Royals even more when German led off the second with a double into the gap – a double that probably would have scored Gload from first base anyway.

Ah, but the fun was just getting started. DeJesus was caught leaning the wrong way on first base, and got picked off (officially a caught stealing because he got caught in a rundown) to end the second. And in the fifth, Billy Butler – who I swear is trying to set the all-time record for most boneheaded baserunning outs in one season – casually assumed that Gordon’s line drive would get through the infield, and was almost to third base when Orlando Cabrera reached up and caught it. He could have crawled to the bag and had time to double up Butler.

So in the span of five innings, the Royals had made the final out on the bases three times. Meanwhile, Bannister’s transition to becoming a power pitcher hit another roadblock. He gave up two runs in the first inning (and left the bases loaded), and a game-tying three-run homer to Joe Crede in the third. Remarkably, he started both innings by retiring the first two batters. There’s a lot of good things to take from this outing – he struck out four batters, and aside from Swisher’s homer every other hit was a single. Much like Greinke, he just seemed to be giving up a lot of well-placed batted balls.

But there are still some adjustments he has to make. He threw 77 pitches in just three innings, and reached a full count on five batters. He seems to be trying to up his strikeout rate by nibbling at the corners – Bannister has not thrown strikes on more than 62% of his pitches in any of his last eight starts. By comparison, he threw more than 62% strikes in ten of his first 12 starts.

Meanwhile, the Royals couldn’t touch their old teammate D.J. Carrasco, but Horacio Ramirez was equally effective in the bottom halves of the inning. In the seventh, DeJesus took off for second base on a 2-2 count to Butler. It may have been a hit-and-run; Butler swung through a bad pitch, and DeJesus was out easily at second place for the inning-ending double play. That’s four unnecessary outs in seven innings.

In the bottom of the seventh, all the wasted opportunities came to bear when Swisher connected off Ramon Ramirez – shortly after Jim Thome doubled for his 2000^th career hit – for a go-ahead homer. I’ll take the blame on this one; when Ramirez entered the game, I mentioned to the small but hardy group of Royals fans that joined me at the park today that he had not surrendered a home run all season.

And then, in the top of the 8^th, came one of the weirdest managerial moves I’ve ever seen. After Grudzielanek struck out against Octavio Dotel, we watched as Alex Gordon trudged from the on-deck circle back to the dugout. We waited for him to return, perhaps with a new bat or helmet or something. We wondered why Jose Guillen was walking to the plate instead. We heard the PA announcer overhead informing us that Guillen was pinch-hitting for Gordon, but it didn’t register. Until at some point it did, and we all turned to each other, a row of Royals fans all with their mouths open but no sound coming out.

Jose Guillen was pinch-hitting for…Alex Gordon.

Alex Gordon, who’s hitting .280/.365/.492 against right-handed pitching.

Gordon, who’s just a tick behind David DeJesus as the best hitter on the team against right-handers.

With Guillen, who’s hitting .257/.275/.420 against RHP.

I dare say it’s unusual to deliberately give up the platoon advantage when pinch-hitting in any situation, unless the batter is a pitcher or his dad used to manage the club but quit in the middle of the night or something. But to pinch-hit for one of your best hitters in a key situation and surrender the platoon advantage at the same time…I’m sorry, but this doesn’t add up.

I suspect there is more to the story here. After the game Hillman said, “I didn’t really like the way Alex was swinging the bat today.” O-kay. If you say so, Trey. Gordon walked in the first inning. He struck out in the third inning – both those at-bats against a left-hander, and we all know Gordon has had trouble against left-handers this year. Against Carrasco in the fifth, he hit a soft line drive that Cabrera caught – not a screaming line drive, but certainly one that would have gotten through for a hit had it been placed better. Miguel Olivo, to that point, had a worse game than Gordon – and he’s garbage against right-handed hitters. But for some reason Hillman decided that Gordon was the problem.

There has to be more to the story here. Maybe Gordon wasn't showing enough effort, or he was insubordinate, or he made a pass at one of Hillman’s relatives. But somehow he has gotten on Hillman’s bad side. That’s the only explanation that makes sense here. Whatever the explanation is, it’s not good for Royals fans. Either we have yet another clubhouse crisis that needs to be defused, or our manager is just astonishingly stupid. There’s no way to spin this as a positive going forward.

But today, it was brilliant. Rarely in the annals of Royals history has such a clearly bad move played a more significant role in helping the Royals win. Guillen got hit by a pitch. He stole second base – yeah, it finally worked, Trey, and it still didn’t factor in the outcome. Gload worked a walk from Matt Thornton, against whom lefties are hitting .132 this year. And Esteban German, getting a chance to prove that the last two seasons were not a fluke, ripped one past Joe Crede, and Gload came around from first to score the go-ahead run.

If you think I’m done ripping on Trey Hillman, think again. As early as the sixth inning, I turned to the boys and said, “you know, if we have the lead in the 8^th and Hillman doesn’t use Soria for two innings, he’s never going to use him for two innings.” Soria hasn’t pitched since the All-Star Game on Tuesday. His two set-up men, Ramirez and Mahay, both pitched yesterday. (In fact, Soria’s the only guy in the pen who didn’t pitch on Friday or Saturday.) The Royals’ starting pitcher didn’t make it past three innings for the second time in three days. Soria is the only fresh reliever in the pen. It’s a tight game on the road against a team that kills us in their park. The Sox have their leadoff hitter due up to start the 8^th. If you’re not going to use Soria for the two-inning save here, when are you?

Mahay came in to pitch the 8^th. Cabrera hit a line-drive right at DeJesus. Pierzynski hit a ground-rule double to right-center. Carlos Quentin walked. And only then did Soria get up in the pen and start throwing lightly.

Brian Anderson singled through the 5-6 hole to leftfield. And Trey Hillman got to play the genius, because replacing German (who had moved to third) in leftfield was Guillen – who launched a one-hop missile to the plate. Pierzynski didn’t even bother to slide – he just pulled up as Olivo tagged him. He looked more surprised than anything else, like he had just been the victim of the hidden-ball trick or something. Mahay struck out Thome, and that was it.

I mean, yeah, there was still an inning to play, but it was time for the Mexicutioner to restore order and sanity, and he did. Konerko managed to hit Soria’s first pitch of the ninth to medium-depth centerfield; the next two hitters both struck out on curveballs that were so wicked that Olivo had to tag both batters because each strikeout pitch bounced.

(Now that Soria has a nickname, is it time we named his pitches as well? At the very least, I propose we name the Mexicutioner’s weapon of choice – that ridiculous slow curveball that batters know they’re going to get with two strikes and still can’t resist – the Guillotine. Why the Guillotine? Because it’s sharp, it drops straight down, and it dispatches its victims with lethal efficiency.)

So the curse is broken. Despite my presence at the park, despite one of Hillman’s worst games in a season rife with bad ones, the Royals won. A special thanks to the guys who came to the game with me, and congratulations to Brian Sobek, who by virtue of outlasting the competition in the Obscure Royals Trivia contest I dreamed up, won himself a Mexicutioner T-shirt courtesy of my friends at 810 WHB.

A Report From the Park.

And now you know why I almost never attend Royals games in person anymore.

I moved to the Chicago area five summers ago, and if I can't live in Kansas City, living in a city with one of the AL Central rivals is the next best thing - I'm guaranteed 9 or 10 Royals games a season here. And if I lived in the city proper, it's a good bet I'd attend the majority of them. But I live in Naperville, which is a little over 20 miles from downtown as the crow flies. It's a 30 minute drive with no traffic...and in Chicago there's no such thing as no traffic. Weeknight games require that I leave the house at rush hour, which almost guarantees the drive will take over an hour.

So I only make it to two or three games a year. Amazingly, in the five years I've lived here I don't believe I've seen the Royals win a single time. I've attended most of the games in the press box, and I can tell you that I have no idea what the mood in the clubhouse is after the Royals win, because every time I've visited the clubhouse it's after a loss and all the reporters are asking the players what went wrong tonight. I'm like the Grim Reaper. Players see me and they make a beeline for the trainer's room.

I vividly remember this game early in the 2005 season, before it was clear that the Royals were the worst team in baseball and the White Sox were the best. Greinke was brilliant that night, the Royals got a home run from Graffanino in the 7th...and in the eighth, the White Sox scored two runs on walk, a hit by pitch, and then with two outs, Andy Sisco and Ambiorix Burgos combined to walk three consecutive batters to force in the tying and winning runs. Immediately after the game ended, one of the White Sox beat writers in the row in front of me stared at his scorecard for a long moment, puzzled, then said to the guy sitting next to him, "how the hell did we win this game?" I did not jump down, grab him by the throat, and explain to him, "because you're playing the Royals, you moron!" But I thought about it.

So I did not attend any of the games when the Royals were in town last month. But my brother Roukan moved to the Chicago area late last year, and had never been to the ballpark. Roukan is the sort of fan that would follow the Royals religiously if they just tossed him a bone. He's not a fair-weather fan - he hung with the team for most of the 1990s - but at some point the 90+ loss seasons started eating away at his soul, and he gave them up. Nowadays when I talk to him about Alex Gordon hitting a bomb or Joakim Soria making opposing hitters cry, he asks me very politely to save the Royals talk for when they have a winning record in August.

But tonight was a beautiful night for baseball, the weekend is upon us, and best of all, Zack Greinke was on the mound. If ever there was a chance to introduce him to the park, it was tonight. I slipped on my #23 jersey over my Mexicutioner T-shirt, picked my brother up and headed to the park. Traffic was a nightmare, and we weren't able to pull into the parking lot ($22, folks, and they cram us in like sardines) until about 7:15. By the time we got to the gate and found a scalper to buy tickets from, it was about 7:25. (What, you think I'm going to give the White Sox my hard-earned money? Comfort to the enemy? Never!)

We heard a few scattered cheers during our approach, but no wild yelling, no fireworks to signal a home run - and it's hard to hurt Greinke much without the homer. We figured the cheering was just there to mark the end of the top of the first inning.

And then we came out of the concourse and into the stands, and saw the score. It was 4-1, Chicago. There were two men on. There were no men out. And as we watched, Nick Swisher grounded one through the hole into left to load the bases. By the time we reached our seats, Joe Crede had poked another ball into left for a hit. Alexei Ramirez hit a sacrifice fly - the #9 hitter made the first out of the inning - but the Sox were already leading, 6-1.

We might as well have left the park at that point. Zack Greinke had somehow surrendered seven groundball singles in a row - interrupted only by a hit-by-pitch to the inveterate master of the form, Carlos Quentin. And this all happened in the blink of an eye - despite facing 11 batters in the first, Greinke threw just 28 pitches. The Sox had four runs on the board by the time Zack had thrown seven pitches.

And just as we were thinking that Zack ran into some bloody awful luck in the first inning, he hung a curve to Quentin leading off the second for a home run.

We trudged through the next few innings, watching as Billy Butler hit a drive to the deepest part of the park that was chased down by Swisher. We almost left the game in the sixth, but then Butler came up again and hit a towering flyball that was a no-doubter from the moment he connected. With the game within three runs, we thought we'd stick it out and see if the Royals could pull off the miracle, but then Jimmy Gobble decided he'd had enough of this whole "throw strikes" concept and put the game out of reach. We left during the seventh-inning stretch; I'm not a big fan of the Los Angeles approach to fandom, but at that point I felt that the best thing I could do for the team was to get as far away from them as possible.

I'm sorry, Zack. This game was all my fault.

I hope to see many of you on Sunday - just to confirm, you should find me directly underneath the little tower that stands outside the entrance to Gate 3 at 12:15. But if the Royals lose again on Sunday...that's it. I'm not going back there until the Royals figure out how to win in this Godforsaken ballpark. And until I find an exorcist.

Royals Today: The Starters.

And now, the starting pitchers…

- At the All-Star Break, Zack Greinke has pitched almost exactly as much as he pitched all of last season – he’s thrown 124 innings and faced 515 batters this year, compared to 122 and 507 last year. And the rest of his numbers are nearly identical as well:

- 122 hits allowed last year, 120 hits allowed this year;
- 36 walks last year, 36 walks this year;
- 106 Ks last year, 104 Ks this year;
- 52 runs allowed (50 earned) last year; 49 runs allowed (48 earned) this year;
- He was 7-7 last year; he’s 7-5 this year.

His ERA is a little better this year (3.48 to 3.69), but the league average is also better, and Zack’s ERA+ is a little worse this year (123 to 127).

The biggest difference is that Greinke allowed 12 homers last season, but 17 this year. On the other hand, he’s allowed just 22 doubles this year compared to 35 last year. His splits against him in 2008 are .252/.304/.422; last year they were .265/.319/.427. His OPS+ against was 96 last year, 95 this year. Any way you slice it, his performance has been identical.

Except for one massive difference: last year, Zack made 14 starts and 38 relief appearances, throwing 44% of his innings in relief. This year, he has been in the rotation all year. Use the same pitcher as a starter and then as a reliever, and there’s no comparison: almost every pitcher will be much more effective in relief. As a starter last season, Greinke let opposing hitters bat .292/.346/.494, but as a reliever they hit just .226/.282/.332.

So while on the surface it appears that Greinke hasn’t had a breakthrough season, he has. Four years ago I called him the future of pitching – the future has finally arrived. He ranks 7^th in the league in VORP among pitchers. He’s the new Curt Schilling or Ben Sheets, a guy who can give you 220 innings a year with a terrific strikeout-to-walk ratio tempered only slightly by his propensity to give up homers. Unlike Schilling or Sheets, though, Greinke has a pristine health record (well, physical health record), and the time off two years ago probably helped his arm. His mechanics are considered to be excellent. Much like Posnanski recently wrote about DeJesus, we no longer have to dream about the promise of Zack Greinke’s future. The reality of his present is pretty damned good.

And oh, yeah: he’s still just 24 years old. I don’t care what else Dayton Moore does this season – if he doesn’t have Greinke signed to a long-term deal by Christmas, then his efforts as GM this season will earn a failing grade.

- I think the general perception of Brian Bannister is that he’s been a disappointment this season, with his 5.24 ERA, and a 6.34 ERA since April 30^th. I can’t say I’m disappointed, because I expected this – and I don’t mean that in a bad way. I wrote in this year’s Baseball Prospectus that Bannister was going to struggle in the short term as he made adjustments. The thing is, he knew he would have to make some adjustments, and made some of them before the season began – which led to his great April. He has struggled since, but there’s still a light at the end of the tunnel.

Bannister’s struggling this year because he’s giving up more homers (1.17 per 9 innings vs. 0.82 last year), and because he’s giving up more hits on balls in play (.293 BABIP this year, .262 last year). But here’s the thing: we knew – and Bannister knew – that his BABIP last year was probably not sustainable. And given that he’s a flyball pitcher who pitches to contact, his home run rate last season was probably unsustainable as well. Meanwhile, his walk rate is up, but just marginally (2.62 vs. 2.40 BB/9 innings), but his strikeout rate is up significantly (5.40 vs. 4.20 K/9 innings.)

Bannister was so successful last year in part because of an ability to keep hits and homers off the board that wasn’t really an ability at all. His performance hasn’t declined this year – it’s simply regressed. Meanwhile, the most important skill for a flyball pitcher is the ability to strike hitters out – and that’s a trait that Bannister has been overtly working on this season, to good effect. There was simply no way a pitcher with Bannister’s profile could survive as a major league starter with a strikeout rate of 4.2 per nine. With a strikeout rate of 5.4 per nine? Now he has some wiggle room.

Back in the spring, when I wrote about Bannister as part of my spring training countdown, I finished my writeup with this exhortation to him: “Brian, if you’re reading this, just remember that the numbers aren’t saying you can’t remain effective. What they’re saying is that you can’t remain effective the same way. So while your efforts to keep your BABIP at a low level are laudable, focusing your efforts on getting more strikeouts is going to yield a lot more bang for your buck.”

I don’t know if Banny reads this blog, though of course if there’s one player who does, it’s him. But it really doesn’t matter, because Bannister is the one player in all of baseball who was most likely to reach this conclusion on his own. He’s actively trying to miss bats, and he’s going through the inevitable transition period as he learns how to do that without upsetting the other parts of his game.

I don’t know if he’s going to be successful. But I do know that he couldn’t continue to be successful with his old approach. It’s going to be very, very interesting to see how he performs in the second half.

- I can’t get a handle on Luke Hochevar. One start, he’s a strike-throwing, groundball machine; the next start, he’s the second coming of Scott Elarton. In 108 career innings, he’s allowed just 10 homers and 26 doubles – his career slugging average against is an impressive .409 – but his strikeout-to-walk ratio is a decidedly unimpressive 60-to-44.

I believe in him for two reasons. The first is that sinker. His G/F ratio is 1.86, which ranks 11^th among the 121 pitchers in the majors with 80+ innings this year. As Nate Silver discovered a few years ago when he was tweaking his PECOTA formula, a pitcher’s tendency to be a groundball or flyball pitcher is an innate tendency that almost never changes over time. Saying that Hochevar is a groundball pitcher is almost like saying he’s right-handed; it’s not what he does, it’s who he is. By contrast, a pitcher’s walk and strikeout rates are much more mutable. Hochevar may not increase his strikeout rate dramatically, but he doesn’t really have to. His strikeout rate isn’t fantastic, but Chien-Mien Wang has thrived with a strikeout rate that’s even lower. (Hochevar’s sinker doesn’t compare to Wang’s, mind you.) If Luke can cut his walks by a third and keep the ball down, he’ll be a #3 starter at least.

I’ve never seen a study look at the issue of whether groundball pitchers have a tendency to peak later in their careers, but my guess would be yes. Kevin Brown had a breakout season when he was 31; Derek Lowe broke out as a closer at age 27, and as a starter at age 29. Wang was still in the minors when he was Hochevar’s age. Even Brandon Webb, who was an instant sensation, was 24 as a rookie – and just a year earlier had been a hittable and lightly-regarded prospect.

So there’s reason to believe Hochevar still has some upside, which he’s more likely to reach because of my second reason for optimism: his intellect. I haven’t dealt with him directly, but colleagues of mine who have were deeply impressed with his intelligence and self-awareness. I’ve said this many times before, but to reiterate: intelligence is vital for a starting pitcher. Good pitching requires a plan. Smart pitchers are more likely to be able to formulate that plan, execute it, adjust it on the fly, take feedback from it, and tweak that plan for the next start. As much attention as Bannister has received for trying to alter his approach as the season has progressed, Hochevar has been doing the same thing, both this year and last. It will be a long time before we know whether his plan is working, but I’ll always bet on the guy who’s trying to improve over the guy who’s coasting on his talent.

And remember: the guy everyone thought the Royals should have taken with the #1 overall pick, Andrew Miller, has a 5.66 career ERA. More surprisingly, given that Miller was considered an extreme groundball pitcher in college, his career G/F ratio is lower (1.62) than Luke’s (1.89). Yeah, yeah, in hindsight they should have taken Lincecum. But in foresight, they might have made the right call.

- Gil Meche, like the three pitchers above, is supposed to be a pretty smart guy. (And yes, Greinke is smart. He may come across as a flake, but I’m convinced that’s partly an act – and on the mound he’s a veritable pitching savant.)

But we’re beginning to see glimpses of the reason why most Mariner fans threw their hands up in despair for much of Meche’s tenure in Seattle. He’s got a ton of talent…but most of his career has been defined as a waste of that talent. This guy’s stuff is way too good for him to have a 4.71 ERA.

As with Bannister, let’s break down his peripherals to see where the problem lies. Compared to last year, Meche’s strikeout rate has held (6.50 last year, 6.58 this year). His walk rate is up a little (2.58 to 3.14), his homers are up a smidge (0.92 to 1.05), and his BABIP is up almost imperceptibly (.298 to .302). Last year opponents hit .263/.314/.397 against Meche; this year they’re at .269/.326/.429. In all honesty, he’s not pitching that much worse than last season, certain not enough to explain a jump in his ERA of over a point.

The biggest difference between The Epic of 2007 and 2008 is that last year, Meche turned it up a notch with runners in scoring position, allowing a line of just .233/.298/.355. This year, he’s been hit hard in those situations, with a line of .286/.353/.490. That’s the difference between a guy who strands 65% of the baserunners he puts on (and makes the All-Star team) and a guy who strands 55% of his baserunners (and has a below-average ERA).

The difference in Meche hasn’t been his skill level, just his timing. From start to start you don’t know if you’re going to get the guy who strikes out 10 batters in a start (as he did June 15^th) or the guy who strikes out no one (July 2^nd). But for the season as a whole Meche hasn’t been all that much worse than last year. The problem is that a lot of us thought last year might have been a springboard to bigger and better things, possibly heralding a breakout to #1 starter status a la Jason Schmidt or Chris Carpenter at the same age.

That hasn’t happened, and that’s unlikely to change. But Meche has been exceedingly durable (he tied for the league lead in starts last year, and is tied again this year), and if nothing else, a pitcher who gives you 34 starts with even a league-average ERA is a heck of a commodity. Even at $11 million a year, Meche has positive trade value if it ever came down to that.

- I have precious little to say about Kyle Davies. He’s also just 24 – him, Hochevar, and Greinke were all born in a six-week span in 1983 – and he has the best ERA of his career so far, but 1) a 4.59 ERA is nothing to write home about, and 2) his ERA is a fluke. It seems like all the injuries along the way have robbed Davies of his fastball – he’s averaging barely a strikeout every other inning, and even in Omaha wasn’t missing very many bats. He makes for a very capable replacement starter, but he should represent no roadblock whatsoever when the Royals feel Carlos Rosa is ready for an extended audition, ideally at some point in August.

- I haven’t had time to cover the minors in any detail this year, but suffice it to say that the Royals have as many quality starting pitching prospects as they’ve had in a long, long time. The overall depth of starting pitching in the organization, including the major league level, is probably the best it’s been since the Royals traded away Bret Saberhagen after the 1991 season. This was Dayton Moore’s stated priority when he was hired, and so far he’s come through in spades. Rosa has excellent stuff and the numbers finally reflect that this year; Dan Cortes is still the best pitching prospect in the system and he’s just 21; Blake Wood has a big-league future, if not in the rotation then certainly in the pen; and in the low minors Dan Duffy is proving last season was no fluke. That’s to say nothing of Julio Pimental (who pitched in the Futures Game) or Edward Cegarra, who’s starting for Wilmington at age 19, or the promise of newer draft picks like Michael Montgomery and Tyler Sample and Sean Runion.

Dayton Moore has tried to make a splash the last two winters by signing premium free agents to eight-figure contracts. This winter, I predict he’s going to make a splash by taking advantage of all this pitching depth to trade some of it for a middle-of-the-order hitter.

- Another housekeeping note: due to overwhelming demand, I’ve decided to move the ballpark meet-up at U.S. Cellular Park from Saturday to SUNDAY, July 20^th. You don’t necessarily have to email me to confirm – just show up at the park as follows.

The game is at 1:05 CDT, and the plan is this: we’ll meet outside of Gate 3 at 12:15 PM SHARP. At 12:30 SHARP, we’ll head to the ticket office and purchase the best tickets available for a group of our size. Looking at the White Sox’ attendance this year, the only Sunday game that sold out was against the Cubs, so I think we’re safe there. Worst case, we’ll find some scalpers and split up into groups. If you’re coming to the game but already have tickets, drop by and say hi.

I’ll be the tall pasty guy with the Royals cap and the white Zack Greinke jersey. If there’s any change in plans – inclement weather, the Sox graciously provide us with a luxury box, whatever – I’ll post it here, so check here before the game just to be safe.

Royals Today: All-Star Break Edition

As we reach the All-Star Break, let’s run down the entire offense while watching the Home Run Derby and wondering where Josh Hamilton ranks among the all the players in major league history in terms of raw talent:

- You know, if you could rip John Buck’s 2007 and 2008 season into halves and combine the good parts of each season, you’d have a hell of a player. Last year, Buck hit for good power (18 HR in 347 AB) but couldn’t hit for average (.222) and was terrible with men in scoring position (.179/.257/.326). This year, Buck is hitting for a better average (.251), he’s got the best strikeout-to-walk ratio of his career (a still sub-optimal 50 to 22), and he’s hitting .361/.408/.574 with runners in scoring position. (By the way, that’s just another data point against the claim that clutch hitting is a skill and not random variation.) But he’s hit just 5 home runs.

I believe in the theory that when a young player shows a particular ability in one season, he possesses that talent – players don’t hit for a lot of power in their mid-20s and then never hit for power again. Mark Teahen is doing his best to prove me wrong, but in Buck’s case, this year is the fluke season – he’s hit for power in every season but this one. Maybe he’s sacrificing some power for contact, but it’s worth noting that his rate of doubles (15 in 227 AB) is the highest of his career. Look for him to hit more big flies in the second half; if he can keep the average over .250, he still might rank in the upper half of major league catchers when the season’s out.

- Ross Gload’s been on quite the tear of late, and his season marks are up to .277/.327/.336. That’s still miles from good. I’ve made this point before: Gload is a terrific bench player, because he can be used as both a pinch-hitter (he hits line drives, rarely strikes out, and his career splits against LHP and RHP are almost identical) and as a defensive replacement. He’s not remotely a starting first baseman. I know Moore values Defense Uber Alles, but at some point we have to punt on this season, and when that point is reached Butler needs to play first base and Gload needs to hit the bench.

- I have probably written less about Mark Grudzielanek than anyone else on the roster. What’s there to say? He’s a pro’s pro, perhaps the smartest defensive player on the team, a guy who can hit .300 by punching the ball to right field in his sleep. I was skeptical when the Royals signed him, because 36-year-old second basemen are not exactly growth stocks. But Grudzielanek has actually improved his numbers every year with the Royals. I think now is the right time to move him, and there’s at least a 50/50 chance he’ll be in another uniform in three weeks. So let’s acknowledge him for what he’s done for the Royals, giving the team a rock of stability in the middle infield for the better part of three seasons. As free agent signings go, he’s been the most pleasant surprise since the Royals inked Greg Gagne.

- Alex Gordon, I’ve sort of covered. One relatively unnoticed development: Splash already has nearly as many walks this year (39) as last (41). Plate discipline and power are highly correlated, though which comes first is a chicken-or-the-egg argument: you’re more likely to hit for power if you work the count, but you’re more likely to get pitched carefully if you’re a power threat. In Gordon’s case, we know he’s got the power; if he continues to get into favorable counts, eventually the 3-1 cookies will come.

- In the live-ball era (since 1920), there are 23 members of the 160-160 club: players who have hit .160 or less with 160 at-bats or more. The Royals have been honored with the presence of such a member for two straight seasons – Jason Larue (.148, 169 AB) last year, and Tony Pena Jr. (.155, 181 AB) this year.

Pena’s not just hitting .155, though – he also has just five walks all year, putting his OBP at just .176. If Pena doesn’t bat again this year – we can only hope – his OBP will be the lowest of any player with 130 or more at-bats in the live-ball era. I’m amused to see that the player whose record he’s trying to break with a .178 mark is Angel Salazar – yes, that Angel Salazar, the guy who torpedoed the Royals’ pennant hopes in 1987. (Salazar actually set the record with the Expos in 1984; by comparison, his .212 OBP in ’87 is almost Bondsian.)

Incidentally, if we lower the threshold to 120 at-bats, Pena’s .176 OBP would improve to third-worst - thanks to Gaylord Perry and Robin Roberts. Six pitchers since 1920 have had between 120 and 130 at-bats - four of them had better OBPs than Pena has.

And remember, Pena’s OBP is only as high as it is because he's been intentionally walked – twice. At least he’s a good bunter. Oh wait…

- Mike Aviles is hot again – 14-for-32 in his last seven games – and that might be more impressive than his first hot stretch, because by now you have to figure the book on Aviles has gotten around the league. He hit .336 with power in Triple-A, he’s hitting .310 with doubles power in the majors, he doesn’t strike out a whole lot – he’s still playing over his head, but if the Royals can stomach his defense out there for a full season, he could be one of the best-hitting shortstops the Royals have ever had.

In their history, guess how many times the Royals’ shortstop hit 12 homers? Twice – Angel Berroa’s Rookie of the Year season, and Jay Bell’s amazing single year in Kansas City. How many times has the team’s shortstop garnered more than 45 extra-base hits? Twice – the same two years.

In 36 games, Aviles has 4 homers and 16 extra-base hits. If he plays every game the rest of the way, he’s on pace to finish with 12 homers and 47 extra-base hits – in 105 games. Over a full season Aviles could shatter most of the offensive marks for a Royals shortstop. He’ll have to, to make up for his glove.

- More people seem ready to give up on Billy Butler than on Alex Gordon. Let’s take a step back, everyone. Butler has played in 159 games in his career – a full season, basically. His career marks include a .274 average, 10 homers, 36 doubles, and 48 walks. Not star material, but for a 21-22 year old player, that’s something to build on. While his power has regressed this year, he has improved his walk rate and cut his strikeouts from his rookie season. The problem is simple: he’s hitting way too many groundballs. His G/F ratio was 1.69 as a rookie, and is 1.77 this year. He’s already hit into 12 double plays this year, which is frightening. Someone needs to convince him that he’s not the second coming of Ken Harvey. Ideally, that someone would be his hitting coach. I’m sure there’s a compelling reason why the Royals haven’t fired Mike Barnett. I just can’t find it.

- Jose Guillen has been a swirling vortex of suck for six weeks, and he’s been an unstoppable line-drive machine for six weeks. Over the last three weeks he’s back to SVOS (.167/.214/.212 in his last 17 games), and I’m thinking “Sybil” might be a good nickname for him. But after half a season, the Royals have spent $12 million on a leftfielder with an OPS+ of 98. He must have a hell of an impact in the clubhouse.

- I’m happy to say that in Baseball Prospectus I wrote of DeJesus, “Expect a power spike into the 13-17 homer range this season.” The problem is that I wrote that in BP last year – before David had the worst season of his career. But as I wrote in this year's book, his peripherals from last season were unchanged – his secondary skills were intact, and he didn’t strike out any more than usual – so he was likely to bounce back. But back in March I wasn’t expecting a career year out of him. Hell, at the end of May I wasn't expecting a career year out of him - on May 26^th he was hitting .270/.329/.365, and some idiot was advocating trading him to the Cubs for Felix Pie and Ronny Cedeno. Yeah, I’m glad the Royals didn’t listen to me that time.

David’s having a nice little year, though really the only difference between this season and 2005-06 is that he’s hitting a few more homers and a few less doubles. DeJesus straddles the line between quality regular and minor star, the type of player that falls apart around age 32. That’s still four years away, and coincidentally he’s signed through 2011. I think he’s elevated himself from part of the problem to part of the solution.

Incidentally, it was widely reported that DeJesus’ walk-off homer against Brandon Morrow on Saturday was the first walk-off homer for the Royals since Alberto Castillo in 2005. This is true, but the difference is that Castillo’s homer came with the game tied. As was Carlos Beltran’s walk-off homer on Opening Day 2004 (although that game gets an honorable mention since Mendy Lopez had already tied the game with a homer.) The Royals had two walk-offs in 2003, four in 2002, three in 2001 – but all came with the game tied.

The last time the Royals had a walk-off home run that turned defeat into victory? Yep – the “What is going on?” walk-off, courtesy Rey Sanchez, on April 12^th 2000. Sanchez’s homer came with the Royals down 6-4 and men on second and third. But even Sanchez’s homer came with nobody out, so it wasn’t the do-or-die situation that DeJesus faced.

The last time the Royals got a walk-off home run when they were losing and down to their final out came in similar circumstances. They were losing by a run going to the bottom of the ninth, the opponent got two quick outs, walked a batter, and then their flame-throwing closer faced the Royals’ centerfielder, who hit the game-ending homer.

The closer was Goose Gossage. The hitter was Amos Otis. The year was 1978.

If what DeJesus did on Saturday seems remarkable, that’s because it was. The Royals snatched victory away from the jaws of defeat on a walk-off homer with one out to go for the first time in over 30 years.

And even THEN there’s a caveat: A.O.’s home run was an inside-the-parker. (Man, I’d love to see the video of that.) It wasn’t a walk-off so much as a run-off. The Royals last walk-off homer when down to their final out was on July 22^nd, 1973, when Otis hit a three-run homer off Eduardo Rodriguez, immediately after Cookie Rojas reached on an error by Don Money that should have ended the game.

That was the team’s last do-or-die walk-off homer, and until Saturday, their only one – ever. I’m glad I was watching the game on Saturday, because I had never seen a Royal player do what DeJesus did. I couldn’t have: it had never before happened in my lifetime.

A.O.’s walk-off came two months after the Royals were no-hit for the first time. DeJesus’ walk-off came two months after the Royals were no-hit for the second time. Spooky.

(And as if it needed to be said: God Bless Retrosheet and Baseball-Reference.com.)

- For all that Mark Teahen could be, what he is is the epitome of average. His career OPS+ is 99. He has played third base and right field in his career, two positions in the middle of the defensive spectrum. He has average power (14 homers per 162 games), average plate discipline (58 walks), average speed (11 steals), average, uh, average (.270). He plays roughly average defense. He’s almost 27 years old, the classic midpoint of a player’s career. The only areas in which he’s decidedly not average is his baserunning ability – he has averaged 33 doubles and 8 triples per 162 games, which is a testament to his baserunning instincts more than his foot speed.

Strange stat: he grounded into 23 double plays last year, but just four so far this year, even though he’s hitting groundballs at the same rate (1.85 G/F last year, 1.81 this year). Butler and him should set up a friendly wager over who hits more fly balls in the second half. Hell, I’ll put up the stakes.

- Miguel Olivo has done what he always does: swing at everything (53 Ks, 7 walks), occasionally connect (9 HRs in 196 AB), and crush lefties (.293/.349/.638). The most interesting question for me in the second half is whether he’ll play well enough, and often enough, to merit Type B free agency status at the end of the year.

Two years ago the Royals signed David Riske to a two-year contract, but with a player option to leave after just one year. I thought it was a foolish concession at the time, but that’s because at the time I didn’t realize that if the player opted out he would still be treated as a true free agent if he signed with another team – meaning the Royals would get compensation if his status warranted it. Riske pitched well enough to merit Type B status, so when he opted out, the Royals got a supplemental first-round pick for their troubles, and used that pick on Michael Montgomery, who at last check was pitching very well down in rookie ball. That’s a nice payoff: for $3 million the Royals got a fine year of middle relief and the 40^th pick in the draft.

This wasn’t an accidental provision, because this winter Dayton gave Olivo the same kind of deal. Olivo can opt out at the end of the season, and there’s a good chance he will depending on the depth of catchers on the market. If he does, there’s a good chance he’ll be a Type B free agent – you have to rank in the top 40% at your position to do so, and the rankings take into account performance over the last two seasons. The exact formula was created by the Elias Sports Bureau, which means it’s both Byzantine and not particularly reflective of reality, but playing time factors heavily into the equation. Olivo was a full-time starter last year and at least a half-time player this year, so the odds are in favor that he’ll get a new contract, the Royals will make use of their shrewd acquisition of Brayan Pena, and get another draft pick for their troubles.

- The most important statistic for Esteban German is this: 93. As in, he’s had 93 plate appearances all year. The notion that he’s washed up or should be released on the basis of 93 plate appearances is laughable. He’s been a victim of too much depth at second base, but with Callaspo out indefinitely and Grudzielanek likely to be traded at some point, he’s likely to get more playing time in the second half. This is the same guy with a .380+ OBP the last two years – he still has some value.

- Callaspo has bigger things to worry about than his performance on the field in the first half. Assuming he gets his life in order, he still has upside as a potential starting second baseman. He has lived up to his reputation for making contact – he’s whiffed just 9 times in 100 at-bats – but he needs to hit for at least a smidgeon of power. He’s only 25. I’d still rather have him than Billy Buckner, who has a 4.73 ERA in Triple-A Tucson this season.

I’ll try to get to the pitchers soon, but for now, tying up some loose ends…

- A few days ago I received a card in the mail from Rob Neyer – he had been doing some spring cleaning (in July) and found a few Royals baseball cards I might enjoy.

The first one was clearly a special card, as a piece of fabric was tucked inside. The back of the card gave the story away: “Congratulations! You have just received an authentic MLB All-Star-Worn Jersey Card of Ken Harvey from 2005 Topps Baseball Series 1.” The second card was a Bowman Chrome rookie card – complete with facsimile signature! – of Colt Griffin.

And all this time, I thought Rob was a friend.

- I’ll finish up with this: I’m planning to attend the Royals-White Sox tilt at U.S. Cellular Park this Saturday, July 19^th. Game time is 6:05 CDT. If you live in the Chicagoland area and want to join me at the park, shoot me an email at ranyj@baseballprospectus.com. Bonus points if you’re willing to do the heavy lifting in terms of organizing the outing; Sox games on Saturday nights sometimes sell out, so we may need to purchase tickets ahead of time. No guarantees, but if we get a half dozen or more people interested in attending the game, we’ll try to set something up. You don’t have to be a Royals fan to join us…but you have to be good at pretending to be a Royals fan.

Gordon: Splash or Flash (In-the-Pan)?

About 10 days ago I was on the radio with Kevin Kietzman and Danny Clinkscale, and towards the end of the interview the talk turned towards Alex Gordon, who for the second consecutive year is failing to live up to expectations. Two years ago Gordon was the Minor League Player of the Year, the year after he was named the College Player of the Year. He was the #1 prospect in the land the year after he was the #2 draft pick in the land. Playing for Wichita he hit for average (.325), he hit for power (29 homers), he hit the ball in the gaps (39 doubles), he had good plate discipline (72 walks), he had excellent speed (22 steals in 25 attempts.) Hell, he even did the little things well; he got hit by 16 pitches, and only grounded into 4 double plays. His defense got good reviews; scouts agreed that his numbers were no fluke. There was absolutely nothing he didn’t do well. He was as sure-fire a prospect as a player could be.

For two months last year, it looked like the Alex Gordon of 2006 had been secretly replaced by Folger’s Crystals. He was hitting .172/.287/.278 on June 4^th, with a grand total of 8 RBIs in 52 games. The Royals refused to send him down to the minors – though they were reportedly about to send him down when he woke up with a four-hit game on June 7^th – and over his last 99 games he hit .284/.328/.477. It was something to build on. Many Hall of Famers have had a rookie season like Gordon’s.

But here we are, past the halfway point of Gordon’s sophomore season, and nothing has changed. His final numbers last season, even with the atrocious start, were .247/.314/.411; he’s hitting .250/.333/.406 this season. Given that offense is down significantly in the AL this year, his performance is a little better this season; his OPS+ has increased from 87 to 96, his EqA from .246 to .257. The problem is that he’s trending in the wrong direction – over his last 39 games he’s hitting .199. His defense has gone south, at least according to the numbers (BP rated his defense as 2 runs below average last year, but 8 runs below average already this season). I’m not sure if I trust those numbers – fielding data over half a season is not particularly reliable. But even his speed seems to have evaporated – he stole 14 bases in 18 attempts last year, and is just 2-for-4 on the bases this year.

So the question is: should we officially be worried about Gordon now? As Clinkscales asked me on the air, how many times has a player who had TWO disappointing seasons to start his career gone on to become a superstar?

Among my many talents is not, unfortunately, the ability to think quickly on my feet, particularly in front of a live audience. While I came up with a weak answer by bringing up Mike Schmidt as a third baseman who struggled mightily as a rookie before having a breakthrough sophomore years, I couldn’t think of a single player who, like Gordon, played every day right out of the chute, but didn’t have the light bulb go on until season #3.

But this might not simply have been a problem with coming up with the right answer in ten seconds or less. Because even afterwards, I still couldn't come up with a list of players who had immense potential but took a little longer than usual to reach it – the kinds of players you want Gordon to be lumped in with when we look back at his career in 15 years. So I decided to research it.

Keep in mind, I’m looking for a player whose trajectory is very similar to Gordon’s; plenty of star players take years to reach their potential. Someone like Nate McLouth, for instance, is having a breakthrough season in his fourth attempt, but he’s a totally different player – a 25^th-round pick, an undersized guy who broke into the majors as a fourth outfielder type but never go the chance to play every day until this season. (By the way, why has no one made the comparison of McLouth to Brady Anderson yet? Both are speedy white guys who showed some secondary skills but didn’t hit much as part-time players, McLouth for three years, Anderson for four. Anderson was considered a fluke all the way through his 1992 season, and there are still a lot of people who are waiting for McLouth to turn into a pumpkin this year. Stop waiting, folks – flukes don’t swat 55 extra-base hits in 89 games. The Mighty Mite is for real.)

So I devised a list of players who:

1) had their rookie seasons between 1961 and 2000;
2) were 23 years old as a rookie;
3) batted over 400 times in their rookie season;
4) hit between .240 and .265;
5) had an OBP between .300 and .340;
6) slugged between .360 and .460.

I ended up with a total of 17 players, the most recent of whom being Carlos Febles, of all people. (Carlos the Lesser hit .256/.336/.411 as a rookie, though keep in mind that was at the peak of the Juiced Ball/Bat/Body era.) Let’s split those 17 players into four groups.

Group 1: Not that good to begin with.

Buck Rodgers hit .258/.309/.372 as a rookie catcher for the LA Angels in 1962, and that would prove to be the best season of his career. Byron Browne was a rookie outfielder for the Cubs in 1963, and hit .243/.316/.427. Over the next year he would bat just 85 times, for three different teams.

Rick Schu hit .252/.318/.373 as the Phillies’ third baseman in 1985, quite an accomplishment for a guy who was signed as a non-drafted free agent out of high school, but he would never bat more than 300 times in a season again. Febles started battling injuries his sophomore season and was never the same.

Group 2: Takeoff in Year Two. Sort of.

Bill Melton really doesn’t fit well into the three other groups, but he’s not a great fit here either. He was a rookie third baseman for the White Sox in 1969, and hit .255/.326/.433. After hitting 23 homers as a rookie, he would hit 33 each of the next two years, and after the 1971 season had to be considered one of the best young players in the game. But he got hurt and missed much of the 1972 season, gave the Sox three good years from 1973 to 1975, then was out of the game within two years, his career over just after his 32^nd birthday. I’m not sure what the story was here, to be honest. Melton had a short peak, but it was a pretty nice peak.

Larry Walker hit .241/.326/.434 as a rookie for the Expos in 1990, but technically he wasn’t a rookie because he had spent an entire year on the DL while in the minors, and in those days time spent on the DL counted as service time. As a result of Walker’s rookie season, the rule was amended so that time spent on the 60-day DL didn’t count as service time for purposes of rookie eligibility. (Although it continued to count as service time for purposes of free agency – which is why Walker was a free agent after just five years in Montreal.) He hit .290/.349/.458 as a sophomore, and I was tempted to put him in Group 4, because while he definitely improved between years one and two, it was an incremental improvement and not a breakthrough. The only thing that he did better was hit for average; his homers dropped from 19 to 14, his steals from 21 to 14, his walks from 49 to 42. The breakthrough came in year three; he hit .301/.353/.506, was named an All-Star and finished fifth in RoY voting. Walker’s career will always be difficult to evaluate fully because we just don’t know if, away from Coors Field, he would have been a superstar or just a star. Regardless, he’s probably headed to the Hall of Fame. His lifetime numbers are .313/.400/.565, and as Daniel Okrent once said of Baker Bowl creation (and Hall of Famer) Chuck Klein – career line: .320/.379/.543 – there’s just too much there.

Group 3: The plodders. The list you don’t want Gordon to wind up on, the guys who showed promise their first two seasons but never built on it.

Dick Green was a rookie second baseman for the Kansas City A’s in 1964, and hit .264/.311/.395. He hit just .232/.308/.363 as a sophomore in 1965, but given the era those numbers are better than they look – Green’s OPS+ his first two seasons were 92 and 91. He would continue to be the A’s starting second baseman more or less through 1974, and was the starter for three straight world championship teams, but aside from a nice little year in 1969 (.275/.353/.427), was no more than an average second baseman throughout his career. He hit just .155 in 36 postseason games; in 1972 he was the starting second baseman that manager Dick Williams would routine pinch-hit for after one at-bat, as Williams used the expanded rosters to carry three or four second baseman and pinch-hit for each one of them in turn.

Jim Lefebvre hit .250/.337/.369 as a rookie second baseman for the Dodgers in 1965, which was enough to win him Rookie of the Year honors. In 1966 hit .274/.333/.460 with 24 homers, making the All-Star team. But that would be his high-water point; Lefebvre continued to hit around league average for the next five years, but after playing second base his first two seasons the Dodgers started jerking him around, having him play third base some, and after a poor season in 1972 his playing career came to a sudden end at age 30. His contributions to baseball were far from over, as he would become a long-time coach, manage for three teams, and sire an occasionally self-righteous broadcaster. (Seriously, Ryan – tone down the rhetoric a little, okay?)

George Wright was a fourth-round pick of the Rangers in 1977, and was a rookie outfielder for them in 1982, when he hit .264/.305/.377; the following season he played in every game, hit .276/.321/.424, and even received a tenth-place MVP vote. He would hit .243, .190, and .202 the next three years, and his career was over. I must confess I’ve never even heard of this guy, although that may be because when I think of George Wright, I think of the guy who, you know, helped invent professional baseball.

Gabe Kapler was a late-round find for the Tigers, who drafted him in the 57^th round in 1995. He hit .245/.315/.447 as a rookie in 1999, then was traded to Texas in the massive Juan Gonzalez trade and hit .302/.360/.473 as a sophomore. He was considered one of the most promising young hitters in the game at that point…but for whatever reason, things never worked out for him, although he’s having a mini-renaissance off the Brewers’ bench this season at age 32, after retiring and coaching in the minors for a year. Young players don’t fulfill their promise all the time. Many times there’s an obvious reason in retrospect. (Mark Quinn, anyone?) Sometimes, like with Kapler - a notorious workout fiend and a good guy by all accounts – there isn’t.

Group 4: The late bloomers.

Here’s the important list, the one that we hope Gordon can be added to in the future. In chronological order:

Lou Brock hit .263/.319/.412 as a rookie centerfielder for the Cubs in 1962. In 1963, he moved to rightfield and hit .258/.300/.382. He stole 40 bases in those two seasons – combined. In 1964, he was hitting .251/.300/.340 on the morning of June 15^th, when the Cubs declared it official – he was a dud. Brock found himself in a Cardinals uniform that night, having been packaged in a six-player trade. The Cubs wouldn’t regret this trade for at least a few weeks. Brock hit .348/.387/.527 the rest of the season, and the Cards would win the World Series that fall. Brock stole 43 bases in 1964; starting in 1965 he would steal 50 or more bases for 12 straight years, culminating with a record 118 steals (at age 35!) in 1974, and maintained an OPS+ of 107 or better in all 12 years. He would be inducted into the Hall of Fame in 1985. On the flip side, Ernie Broglio did win 8 games for the Cubs in his career. (He also lost 19.)

As much as I like the Lou Brock comparison for Gordon, I like the next one even better. If the amateur draft had been instituted a year earlier, Bobby Murcer would have been an almost sure-fire first-round pick. He was dubbed the next Mickey Mantle from the day he signed, as he had the misfortune of hailing from the same state (Oklahoma) and being signed by the same scout (Tom Greenwade). Murcer, as you may have just read in his obituary, got some playing time with the Yankees at age 19 and 20, but then spent two years in the army. He was in the Yankees’ Opening Day lineup in 1969, at age 23, playing third base. He had a fine rookie season: .259/.319/.454, with 26 homers. A fine season, but a disappointment to those who were expecting Mick Jr. The disappointment intensified the next season, when he hit .251/.348/.420. By this point, he had been stationed in centerfield like the Mick, and in 1971 the breakthrough finally came: Murcer hit .331/.427/.543, and if you translate those numbers to a 2007 Kauffman Stadium context, they become .373/.473/.611. 1971 was the first of five straight All-Star appearances (and first of three Top-10 MVP finishes) for Murcer. He would remain a productive player in a slowly-diminishing role until 1982, when he was 36. May he rest in peace.

Von Hayes was a seventh-round pick of the Indians in 1979, and made the majors for a cameo in 1981, hitting .257/.346/.394 in 109 at-bats. As a rookie outfielder in 1982 he hit .250/.310/.389, with 14 homers and 32 steals. Hayes was nonetheless so highly regarded that after the season the Phillies traded five different players for Hayes straight-up. (We can finally put that trade to rest – one of the five was Julio Franco.) Hayes hit just .265/.337/.370 in his first year in Philadelphia, though fortunately Philly fans are famously tolerant of poor first impressions by their players. In 1984, though, Philadelphia got what they traded for – Hayes hit .292/.359/.447, stole 48 bases, and played a strong centerfield. He would remain an above-average hitter through 1990, and became one of the most patient hitters in the game, twice drawing over 100 walks. The end came quick for Hayes – he was done at age 33 – but he had a nice, extended peak.

Ron Gant was a fourth-round pick of the Braves in 1983, and in 1988 hit .259/.317/.439 as their rookie second baseman (yes, second baseman), finishing fourth in Rookie of the Year voting. (It’s always fun to remember where some sluggers started their major league careers. Gary Sheffield was the Brewers’ shortstop once upon a time. Danny Tartabull played 24 games at shortstop for Seattle, and 31 at second base. Kevin Mitchell was a shortstop once. I’d love to see some video highlights of these guys at their original positions.) The next year, Gant was moved to third base and then the outfield, and collapsed, hitting .177/.237/.335. He spent some time in the minors clearing his head, and came back the next year a different player. He hit .303/.357/.539, hit 32 homers and stole 33 bases. The next three seasons he anchored the Braves lineup as they started their consecutive postseason streak, but he hurt himself after the 1993 season (if I remember correctly, he was in a motorcycle accident), the Braves released him, and he missed all of 1994. He returned with the Reds in 1995 and didn’t miss a beat, then started the have-bat-will-travel itinerant portion of his career, but to the end he could rake.

Craig Biggio, like Gordon, was a first-round pick, and two years after he was drafted he was in the Astros’ lineup as their catcher, hitting .257/.336/.402 as a rookie. He hit .276/.342/.348 as a sophomore, his homers dropping from 13 to 4. You know the rest of the story – after three years behind the dish he moved to second base, he started to hit for power at age 27, and from 1994 to 1998 he was one of the four or five best players in baseball. He was never the same after that, but held on long enough for 3000 hits and the inevitable parade in Cooperstown.

Biggio’s teammate Luis Gonzalez was taken in the fourth round in 1988, and hit .254/.320/.433 for the Astros in 1991. He slumped to .243/.289/.385 as a sophomore, and Vegas had taken the odds that he would still be in active in 2008 off the board. Gonzalez hit .300/.361/.457 in his third season, and was a good solid player for the next five years, but let’s be honest: no one saw what was coming. After the 1998 season the Tigers traded him straight up for Karim Garcia, for God’s sake. From 1999 to 2003, Gonzalez hit .314 and averaged 33 homers and 87 walks a year. He won’t go to the Hall of Fame, but if he was inducted, he’d be far from the worst outfielder there.

Ray Durham was a fifth-round pick of the White Sox in 1990, was called up early in the 1995 season and hit .257/.309/.384 as a rookie. As a sophomore, he hit .275/.350/.406, which was an improvement but still not anything to write home about in that era; his OPS+ went from 83 to 95. As a junior, he hit .271/.337/.382, but his durability and speed still made him an asset at the position. Then in 1998 he turned his game up a notch; he tacked on about 15 extra-base hits and 20 walks a season, and had an OPS+ above league-average for nine straight years. He was basically the prototype for Orlando Hudson, with a better bat and more speed but a much worse glove. He’s had a heck of a career.

When I started this study, I didn’t expect to analyze every single player that compared to Gordon – I figured I’d just find two or three guys who went on to greatness and see if Gordon’s profile fit theirs or not. What I found surprised me, in a good way. For one, I would have expected to find dozens of guys who had a rookie season similar to Gordon’s, given the wide parameters I set up – instead I found just 17. But what’s really remarkable is how many of those players went on to great career, even though nearly all of them did not have a breakout season in their second year. Just two out of the 17 had a star-caliber sophomore year, and both examples (Melton and Walker) are borderline at that. Apparently, if you want to have a Cal Ripkenesque sophomore season, you need to have a Ripkenesque rookie season.

But if you can simply follow up a solid rookie season with a roughly equivalent performance as a sophomore at ages 23 and 24, the odds are still very good that you will eventually go on to have a very fine career. Eliminate the first two groups, and we have 11 players who, like Gordon, have followed up their rookie seasons with more of the same.

Four of those 11 would go on to have disappointing seasons – Green, Lefebvre, Wright, and Kapler. Green and Lefebvre were both second baseman, and there is a long chain of evidence that second basemen do not develop as well as players at other positions. While the exact reason is not certain, owing to the fact that second basemen make the pivot on double plays – and usually with their back to the runner – the theory is that second basemen are prone to minor injuries which impede their development. When it strikes, we call it “Brent Gates Syndrome”, after the A’s second baseman, who had a terrific rookie season in 1993 and then had his OPS+ drop for five straight seasons. Carlos Febles is an obvious victim of this. Gordon plays third base, obviously, and more critically he has been injury-free to this point in his career. His durability is one of his best traits, and makes it less likely that he will suffer this fate.

George Wright really doesn’t belong on this list; he was never well-regarded to the best of my knowledge, and to my mind resembles Darryl Motley more than Alex Gordon. That leaves Kapler, who serves as a cautionary tale that there are no sure things with prospects.

But even Kapler was a 57^th-round pick. Gordon’s pedigree is impeccable, which puts him in with the guys in group four. Biggio was a first-rounder, and Murcer would have been. Brock might have been; he was a black player who attended a traditionally black school in 1960, so he might have fallen in the draft through no fault of his own. The other draft-eligible players all went between the fourth and seventh rounds, although all of them were signed out of high school – all of them may have been first-round picks if, like Biggio, they had gone to college instead.

If there’s a red flag here, it’s that the parameters I selected are slightly favorable to Gordon – he hit .247/.314/.411, which is about the midpoint of the range I selected, but he played in 2007, in an offensive environment that was better than most of these players enjoyed. That’s mostly a problem in comparing him to the guys who debuted in the 1960s, but you could argue that his rookie season does not stack up against the rest of the group. Here’s his EqA as a rookie, compared to everyone in groups three and four:

Biggio: .292
Murcer: .287
Gonzalez: .282
Lefebvre: .278
Gant: .277
Brock: .259
Green: .258
Hayes: .251
Kapler: .249
Gordon: .246
Durham: .243
Wright: .242

Based purely on his rookie performance, Gordon’s a little out of his depth. But factor in his track record, his pedigree, his second-half performance…I don’t think it’s incorrect to lump him in with these other guys.

Seven of the 11 players would go on to have stellar careers; two of the 11 went on to be Hall of Famers. Gonzalez hit his stride late in his career – it does the Royals no good if Gordon becomes a perennial All-Star in his 30s – but the other six guys would be named to an All-Star team or finish in the top 10 in MVP voting by their fifth season – all but Hayes by their fourth season. And keep in mind that you could easily lump Larry Walker in with this group, which would increase Gordon's odds to 8 out of 12, or 3 out of 12 for a Hall of Fame career.

I don’t know about you, but I feel a lot better about Gordon than I did when I started this study. Sometimes we get so wrapped up in what a player isn’t doing – in Gordon's case, hitting left-handers – that we overlook what he is doing. Gordon isn’t hitting lefties (.193/.273/.220), but by the same token, he’s hitting right-handed pitching very well (.276/.358/.490). I think batting him third against LHP is nuts – Hillman finally seems to agree – but against RHP, I think batting him third is wholly appropriate. Gordon is striking out at the same rate he did last year, but his walk rate is up almost 50%. When he gets ahold of one, he still hits the ball farther than any Royals hitter from the left side since George Brett.

Honestly, I think what bothers Royals fans more than Gordon’s performance is his attitude. When a guy with Gordon’s demeanor is playing well, he’s praised for being stoic, for not letting himself get swept up by the highs and lows in the game from day to day. When he’s not playing well, he gets ripped for not caring. But this is something we simply can’t know as fans. Sure, it looks bad when Gordon takes three straight pitches for strikes in the bottom of the ninth of a tie game, then trudges back to the dugout, as he did on Tuesday. But it’s easy to be fooled by the perception that someone is trying hard, when in reality we have no idea who’s working out in the weight room after the game, who’s spending the extra time working on defensive drills, who’s eating right and getting eight hours of sleep every night. Castigate Gordon for his work ethic if you think he deserves it – just don’t rip him because of the look on his face.

A few years ago the Royals had another player that was immensely talented, but also very quiet in the clubhouse, a stoic personality who didn’t seem to get overly upset when things didn’t go well, and it led a lot of people into thinking that he just didn’t care. It didn’t matter when Carlos Beltran won Rookie of the Year honors, but when he hit like crap as a sophomore and missed half the season with an injury, the whispers started. They hit a crescendo when Beltran refused to report to the team’s spring training camp to rehab – remember that?

And for the first half of 2001, he hit as badly as he did as a sophomore. On June 24^th, he was hitting .249/.294/.372, with seven homers all year. On June 20^th, I brilliantly wrote in a Rob & Rany dialogue that “even I’m beginning to give up on” Beltran. (Ten days later, after Beltran had a six-game stretch when he went 11-for-23 with five homers, I asked for forgiveness, pointing out that Beltran had changed his stance back to his 1999 form and that had made all the difference. Hey, don't tell me I don't know which way the wind is blowing.)

But halfway through his third season, Carlos Beltran looked like a bust, like the rookie hype was a mirage. Three months later he would finish with the best season of his career, and his superstar projection was back on track, a projection he has mostly justified since. But even years later, when Beltran had a terrible first season with the Mets, people close to the team argued that Beltran couldn’t handle the pressure New York. But just because a player doesn’t provide a good quote or throw his helmet after a bad at-bat doesn’t mean that they aren’t working their ass off to get better.

So let’s lay off Gordon for now. I still think the best is yet to come.

(Please tell me this makes up for my long absence, right?)